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TerraTec Cinergy Hybrid T USB XS with demodulator MT352 use EM2880_BOARD_TERRATEC_HYBRID_XS not EM2882_BOARD_TERRATEC_HYBRID_XS #425

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@ghost ghost commented Jun 11, 2017

I have a Terratec Cinergy Hybrid T USB XS 00cd:0042 which stop to work with kernel 3.xx and newer, because from tree 2.6 to 3.0 someone change the driver info from EM2880_BOARD_TERRATEC_HYBRID_XS to EM2882_BOARD_TERRATEC_HYBRID_XS
With EM2882 I have this error:

[  671.082716] em2882/3 #0: Binding DVB extension
[  671.140861] em2882/3 #0: /2: dvb frontend not attached. Can't attach xc3028

while with EM2880 this work properly

[   78.959513] em2882/3 #0: Binding DVB extension
[   78.997430] xc2028 7-0061: creating new instance
[   78.997435] xc2028 7-0061: type set to XCeive xc2028/xc3028 tuner

I hope you can accept my patch

…ARD_TERRATEC_HYBRID_XS not EM2882_BOARD_TERRATEC_HYBRID_XS
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@ghost ghost closed this Aug 17, 2017
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 27, 2018
in the (rare) case of failure in nla_nest_start(), missing NULL checks in
tcf_pedit_key_ex_dump() can make the following command

 # tc action add action pedit ex munge ip ttl set 64

dereference a NULL pointer:

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
 PGD 800000007d1cd067 P4D 800000007d1cd067 PUD 7acd3067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 PID: 3336 Comm: tc Tainted: G            E     4.18.0.pedit+ torvalds#425
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
 RIP: 0010:tcf_pedit_dump+0x19d/0x358 [act_pedit]
 Code: be 02 00 00 00 48 89 df 66 89 44 24 20 e8 9b b1 fd e0 85 c0 75 46 8b 83 c8 00 00 00 49 83 c5 08 48 03 83 d0 00 00 00 4d 39 f5 <66> 89 04 25 00 00 00 00 0f 84 81 01 00 00 41 8b 45 00 48 8d 4c 24
 RSP: 0018:ffffb5d4004478a8 EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: ffff8880fcda2070 RBX: ffff8880fadd2900 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffb5d4004478ca RDI: ffff8880fcda206e
 RBP: ffff8880fb9cb900 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: ffff8880fcda206e
 R10: ffff8880fadd2900 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880fd26cf40
 R13: ffff8880fc957430 R14: ffff8880fc957430 R15: ffff8880fb9cb988
 FS:  00007f75a537a740(0000) GS:ffff8880fda00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000007a2fa005 CR4: 00000000001606f0
 Call Trace:
  ? __nla_reserve+0x38/0x50
  tcf_action_dump_1+0xd2/0x130
  tcf_action_dump+0x6a/0xf0
  tca_get_fill.constprop.31+0xa3/0x120
  tcf_action_add+0xd1/0x170
  tc_ctl_action+0x137/0x150
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x263/0x2d0
  ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x40
  ? rtnl_calcit.isra.30+0x110/0x110
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x4d/0x130
  netlink_unicast+0x1a3/0x250
  netlink_sendmsg+0x2ae/0x3a0
  sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x26f/0x2d0
  ? do_wp_page+0x8e/0x5f0
  ? handle_pte_fault+0x6c3/0xf50
  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x38e/0x520
  ? __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0
  __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0
  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
 RIP: 0033:0x7f75a4583ba0
 Code: c3 48 8b 05 f2 62 2c 00 f7 db 64 89 18 48 83 cb ff eb dd 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 3d fd c3 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ae cc 00 00 48 89 04 24
 RSP: 002b:00007fff60ee7418 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff60ee7540 RCX: 00007f75a4583ba0
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fff60ee7490 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 000000005b842d3e R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 00007fff60ee6ea0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007fff60ee7554 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 000000000066c100
 Modules linked in: act_pedit(E) ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter binfmt_misc crct10dif_pclmul ext4 crc32_pclmul mbcache ghash_clmulni_intel jbd2 pcbc snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm aesni_intel crypto_simd snd_timer cryptd glue_helper snd joydev pcspkr soundcore virtio_balloon i2c_piix4 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables xfs libcrc32c ata_generic pata_acpi virtio_net net_failover virtio_blk virtio_console failover qxl crc32c_intel drm_kms_helper syscopyarea serio_raw sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm ata_piix virtio_pci libata virtio_ring i2c_core virtio floppy dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: act_pedit]
 CR2: 0000000000000000

Like it's done for other TC actions, give up dumping pedit rules and return
an error if nla_nest_start() returns NULL.

Fixes: 71d0ed7 ("net/act_pedit: Support using offset relative to the conventional network headers")
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 30, 2018
in the (rare) case of failure in nla_nest_start(), missing NULL checks in
tcf_pedit_key_ex_dump() can make the following command

 # tc action add action pedit ex munge ip ttl set 64

dereference a NULL pointer:

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
 PGD 800000007d1cd067 P4D 800000007d1cd067 PUD 7acd3067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 PID: 3336 Comm: tc Tainted: G            E     4.18.0.pedit+ torvalds#425
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
 RIP: 0010:tcf_pedit_dump+0x19d/0x358 [act_pedit]
 Code: be 02 00 00 00 48 89 df 66 89 44 24 20 e8 9b b1 fd e0 85 c0 75 46 8b 83 c8 00 00 00 49 83 c5 08 48 03 83 d0 00 00 00 4d 39 f5 <66> 89 04 25 00 00 00 00 0f 84 81 01 00 00 41 8b 45 00 48 8d 4c 24
 RSP: 0018:ffffb5d4004478a8 EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: ffff8880fcda2070 RBX: ffff8880fadd2900 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffb5d4004478ca RDI: ffff8880fcda206e
 RBP: ffff8880fb9cb900 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: ffff8880fcda206e
 R10: ffff8880fadd2900 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880fd26cf40
 R13: ffff8880fc957430 R14: ffff8880fc957430 R15: ffff8880fb9cb988
 FS:  00007f75a537a740(0000) GS:ffff8880fda00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000007a2fa005 CR4: 00000000001606f0
 Call Trace:
  ? __nla_reserve+0x38/0x50
  tcf_action_dump_1+0xd2/0x130
  tcf_action_dump+0x6a/0xf0
  tca_get_fill.constprop.31+0xa3/0x120
  tcf_action_add+0xd1/0x170
  tc_ctl_action+0x137/0x150
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x263/0x2d0
  ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x40
  ? rtnl_calcit.isra.30+0x110/0x110
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x4d/0x130
  netlink_unicast+0x1a3/0x250
  netlink_sendmsg+0x2ae/0x3a0
  sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x26f/0x2d0
  ? do_wp_page+0x8e/0x5f0
  ? handle_pte_fault+0x6c3/0xf50
  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x38e/0x520
  ? __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0
  __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0
  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
 RIP: 0033:0x7f75a4583ba0
 Code: c3 48 8b 05 f2 62 2c 00 f7 db 64 89 18 48 83 cb ff eb dd 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 3d fd c3 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ae cc 00 00 48 89 04 24
 RSP: 002b:00007fff60ee7418 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff60ee7540 RCX: 00007f75a4583ba0
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fff60ee7490 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 000000005b842d3e R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 00007fff60ee6ea0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007fff60ee7554 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 000000000066c100
 Modules linked in: act_pedit(E) ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter binfmt_misc crct10dif_pclmul ext4 crc32_pclmul mbcache ghash_clmulni_intel jbd2 pcbc snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm aesni_intel crypto_simd snd_timer cryptd glue_helper snd joydev pcspkr soundcore virtio_balloon i2c_piix4 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables xfs libcrc32c ata_generic pata_acpi virtio_net net_failover virtio_blk virtio_console failover qxl crc32c_intel drm_kms_helper syscopyarea serio_raw sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm ata_piix virtio_pci libata virtio_ring i2c_core virtio floppy dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: act_pedit]
 CR2: 0000000000000000

Like it's done for other TC actions, give up dumping pedit rules and return
an error if nla_nest_start() returns NULL.

Fixes: 71d0ed7 ("net/act_pedit: Support using offset relative to the conventional network headers")
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
teknoraver pushed a commit to teknoraver/linux that referenced this pull request Sep 15, 2018
[ Upstream commit 85eb9af ]

in the (rare) case of failure in nla_nest_start(), missing NULL checks in
tcf_pedit_key_ex_dump() can make the following command

 # tc action add action pedit ex munge ip ttl set 64

dereference a NULL pointer:

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
 PGD 800000007d1cd067 P4D 800000007d1cd067 PUD 7acd3067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 PID: 3336 Comm: tc Tainted: G            E     4.18.0.pedit+ torvalds#425
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
 RIP: 0010:tcf_pedit_dump+0x19d/0x358 [act_pedit]
 Code: be 02 00 00 00 48 89 df 66 89 44 24 20 e8 9b b1 fd e0 85 c0 75 46 8b 83 c8 00 00 00 49 83 c5 08 48 03 83 d0 00 00 00 4d 39 f5 <66> 89 04 25 00 00 00 00 0f 84 81 01 00 00 41 8b 45 00 48 8d 4c 24
 RSP: 0018:ffffb5d4004478a8 EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: ffff8880fcda2070 RBX: ffff8880fadd2900 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffb5d4004478ca RDI: ffff8880fcda206e
 RBP: ffff8880fb9cb900 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: ffff8880fcda206e
 R10: ffff8880fadd2900 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880fd26cf40
 R13: ffff8880fc957430 R14: ffff8880fc957430 R15: ffff8880fb9cb988
 FS:  00007f75a537a740(0000) GS:ffff8880fda00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000007a2fa005 CR4: 00000000001606f0
 Call Trace:
  ? __nla_reserve+0x38/0x50
  tcf_action_dump_1+0xd2/0x130
  tcf_action_dump+0x6a/0xf0
  tca_get_fill.constprop.31+0xa3/0x120
  tcf_action_add+0xd1/0x170
  tc_ctl_action+0x137/0x150
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x263/0x2d0
  ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x40
  ? rtnl_calcit.isra.30+0x110/0x110
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x4d/0x130
  netlink_unicast+0x1a3/0x250
  netlink_sendmsg+0x2ae/0x3a0
  sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x26f/0x2d0
  ? do_wp_page+0x8e/0x5f0
  ? handle_pte_fault+0x6c3/0xf50
  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x38e/0x520
  ? __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0
  __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0
  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
 RIP: 0033:0x7f75a4583ba0
 Code: c3 48 8b 05 f2 62 2c 00 f7 db 64 89 18 48 83 cb ff eb dd 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 3d fd c3 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ae cc 00 00 48 89 04 24
 RSP: 002b:00007fff60ee7418 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff60ee7540 RCX: 00007f75a4583ba0
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fff60ee7490 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 000000005b842d3e R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 00007fff60ee6ea0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007fff60ee7554 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 000000000066c100
 Modules linked in: act_pedit(E) ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter binfmt_misc crct10dif_pclmul ext4 crc32_pclmul mbcache ghash_clmulni_intel jbd2 pcbc snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm aesni_intel crypto_simd snd_timer cryptd glue_helper snd joydev pcspkr soundcore virtio_balloon i2c_piix4 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables xfs libcrc32c ata_generic pata_acpi virtio_net net_failover virtio_blk virtio_console failover qxl crc32c_intel drm_kms_helper syscopyarea serio_raw sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm ata_piix virtio_pci libata virtio_ring i2c_core virtio floppy dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: act_pedit]
 CR2: 0000000000000000

Like it's done for other TC actions, give up dumping pedit rules and return
an error if nla_nest_start() returns NULL.

Fixes: 71d0ed7 ("net/act_pedit: Support using offset relative to the conventional network headers")
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jan-kiszka pushed a commit to siemens/linux that referenced this pull request Sep 15, 2018
[ Upstream commit 85eb9af ]

in the (rare) case of failure in nla_nest_start(), missing NULL checks in
tcf_pedit_key_ex_dump() can make the following command

 # tc action add action pedit ex munge ip ttl set 64

dereference a NULL pointer:

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
 PGD 800000007d1cd067 P4D 800000007d1cd067 PUD 7acd3067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 PID: 3336 Comm: tc Tainted: G            E     4.18.0.pedit+ torvalds#425
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
 RIP: 0010:tcf_pedit_dump+0x19d/0x358 [act_pedit]
 Code: be 02 00 00 00 48 89 df 66 89 44 24 20 e8 9b b1 fd e0 85 c0 75 46 8b 83 c8 00 00 00 49 83 c5 08 48 03 83 d0 00 00 00 4d 39 f5 <66> 89 04 25 00 00 00 00 0f 84 81 01 00 00 41 8b 45 00 48 8d 4c 24
 RSP: 0018:ffffb5d4004478a8 EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: ffff8880fcda2070 RBX: ffff8880fadd2900 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffb5d4004478ca RDI: ffff8880fcda206e
 RBP: ffff8880fb9cb900 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: ffff8880fcda206e
 R10: ffff8880fadd2900 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880fd26cf40
 R13: ffff8880fc957430 R14: ffff8880fc957430 R15: ffff8880fb9cb988
 FS:  00007f75a537a740(0000) GS:ffff8880fda00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000007a2fa005 CR4: 00000000001606f0
 Call Trace:
  ? __nla_reserve+0x38/0x50
  tcf_action_dump_1+0xd2/0x130
  tcf_action_dump+0x6a/0xf0
  tca_get_fill.constprop.31+0xa3/0x120
  tcf_action_add+0xd1/0x170
  tc_ctl_action+0x137/0x150
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x263/0x2d0
  ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x40
  ? rtnl_calcit.isra.30+0x110/0x110
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x4d/0x130
  netlink_unicast+0x1a3/0x250
  netlink_sendmsg+0x2ae/0x3a0
  sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x26f/0x2d0
  ? do_wp_page+0x8e/0x5f0
  ? handle_pte_fault+0x6c3/0xf50
  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x38e/0x520
  ? __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0
  __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0
  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
 RIP: 0033:0x7f75a4583ba0
 Code: c3 48 8b 05 f2 62 2c 00 f7 db 64 89 18 48 83 cb ff eb dd 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 3d fd c3 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ae cc 00 00 48 89 04 24
 RSP: 002b:00007fff60ee7418 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff60ee7540 RCX: 00007f75a4583ba0
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fff60ee7490 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 000000005b842d3e R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 00007fff60ee6ea0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007fff60ee7554 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 000000000066c100
 Modules linked in: act_pedit(E) ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter binfmt_misc crct10dif_pclmul ext4 crc32_pclmul mbcache ghash_clmulni_intel jbd2 pcbc snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm aesni_intel crypto_simd snd_timer cryptd glue_helper snd joydev pcspkr soundcore virtio_balloon i2c_piix4 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables xfs libcrc32c ata_generic pata_acpi virtio_net net_failover virtio_blk virtio_console failover qxl crc32c_intel drm_kms_helper syscopyarea serio_raw sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm ata_piix virtio_pci libata virtio_ring i2c_core virtio floppy dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: act_pedit]
 CR2: 0000000000000000

Like it's done for other TC actions, give up dumping pedit rules and return
an error if nla_nest_start() returns NULL.

Fixes: 71d0ed7 ("net/act_pedit: Support using offset relative to the conventional network headers")
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
roidayan pushed a commit to roidayan/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 19, 2018
in the (rare) case of failure in nla_nest_start(), missing NULL checks in
tcf_pedit_key_ex_dump() can make the following command

 # tc action add action pedit ex munge ip ttl set 64

dereference a NULL pointer:

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
 PGD 800000007d1cd067 P4D 800000007d1cd067 PUD 7acd3067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 PID: 3336 Comm: tc Tainted: G            E     4.18.0.pedit+ torvalds#425
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
 RIP: 0010:tcf_pedit_dump+0x19d/0x358 [act_pedit]
 Code: be 02 00 00 00 48 89 df 66 89 44 24 20 e8 9b b1 fd e0 85 c0 75 46 8b 83 c8 00 00 00 49 83 c5 08 48 03 83 d0 00 00 00 4d 39 f5 <66> 89 04 25 00 00 00 00 0f 84 81 01 00 00 41 8b 45 00 48 8d 4c 24
 RSP: 0018:ffffb5d4004478a8 EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: ffff8880fcda2070 RBX: ffff8880fadd2900 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffb5d4004478ca RDI: ffff8880fcda206e
 RBP: ffff8880fb9cb900 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: ffff8880fcda206e
 R10: ffff8880fadd2900 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880fd26cf40
 R13: ffff8880fc957430 R14: ffff8880fc957430 R15: ffff8880fb9cb988
 FS:  00007f75a537a740(0000) GS:ffff8880fda00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000007a2fa005 CR4: 00000000001606f0
 Call Trace:
  ? __nla_reserve+0x38/0x50
  tcf_action_dump_1+0xd2/0x130
  tcf_action_dump+0x6a/0xf0
  tca_get_fill.constprop.31+0xa3/0x120
  tcf_action_add+0xd1/0x170
  tc_ctl_action+0x137/0x150
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x263/0x2d0
  ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x40
  ? rtnl_calcit.isra.30+0x110/0x110
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x4d/0x130
  netlink_unicast+0x1a3/0x250
  netlink_sendmsg+0x2ae/0x3a0
  sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x26f/0x2d0
  ? do_wp_page+0x8e/0x5f0
  ? handle_pte_fault+0x6c3/0xf50
  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x38e/0x520
  ? __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0
  __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0
  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
 RIP: 0033:0x7f75a4583ba0
 Code: c3 48 8b 05 f2 62 2c 00 f7 db 64 89 18 48 83 cb ff eb dd 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 3d fd c3 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ae cc 00 00 48 89 04 24
 RSP: 002b:00007fff60ee7418 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff60ee7540 RCX: 00007f75a4583ba0
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fff60ee7490 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 000000005b842d3e R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 00007fff60ee6ea0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007fff60ee7554 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 000000000066c100
 Modules linked in: act_pedit(E) ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter binfmt_misc crct10dif_pclmul ext4 crc32_pclmul mbcache ghash_clmulni_intel jbd2 pcbc snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm aesni_intel crypto_simd snd_timer cryptd glue_helper snd joydev pcspkr soundcore virtio_balloon i2c_piix4 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables xfs libcrc32c ata_generic pata_acpi virtio_net net_failover virtio_blk virtio_console failover qxl crc32c_intel drm_kms_helper syscopyarea serio_raw sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm ata_piix virtio_pci libata virtio_ring i2c_core virtio floppy dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: act_pedit]
 CR2: 0000000000000000

Like it's done for other TC actions, give up dumping pedit rules and return
an error if nla_nest_start() returns NULL.

Fixes: 71d0ed7 ("net/act_pedit: Support using offset relative to the conventional network headers")
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2021
This commit fixes the following checkpatch.pl errors:

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#12: FILE: ./hal/HalHWImg8723B_RF.c:12:
    +	struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm, const u32 Condition1, const u32 Condition2

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#124: FILE: ./hal/HalHWImg8723B_RF.c:124:
    +	struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm, const u32  Condition1, const u32 Condition2

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#262: FILE: ./hal/HalHWImg8723B_RF.c:262:
    +void ODM_ReadAndConfig_MP_8723B_RadioA(struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#423: FILE: ./hal/HalHWImg8723B_RF.c:423:
    +void ODM_ReadAndConfig_MP_8723B_TxPowerTrack_SDIO(struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#425: FILE: ./hal/HalHWImg8723B_RF.c:425:
    +	struct ODM_RF_CAL_T * pRFCalibrateInfo = &(pDM_Odm->RFCalibrateInfo);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#758: FILE: ./hal/HalHWImg8723B_RF.c:758:
    +void ODM_ReadAndConfig_MP_8723B_TXPWR_LMT(struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm)

Signed-off-by: Marco Cesati <marcocesati@gmail.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Mar 16, 2021
This commit fixes the following checkpatch.pl errors:

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#12: FILE: ./hal/HalHWImg8723B_RF.c:12:
    +	struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm, const u32 Condition1, const u32 Condition2

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#124: FILE: ./hal/HalHWImg8723B_RF.c:124:
    +	struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm, const u32  Condition1, const u32 Condition2

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#262: FILE: ./hal/HalHWImg8723B_RF.c:262:
    +void ODM_ReadAndConfig_MP_8723B_RadioA(struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#423: FILE: ./hal/HalHWImg8723B_RF.c:423:
    +void ODM_ReadAndConfig_MP_8723B_TxPowerTrack_SDIO(struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#425: FILE: ./hal/HalHWImg8723B_RF.c:425:
    +	struct ODM_RF_CAL_T * pRFCalibrateInfo = &(pDM_Odm->RFCalibrateInfo);

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#758: FILE: ./hal/HalHWImg8723B_RF.c:758:
    +void ODM_ReadAndConfig_MP_8723B_TXPWR_LMT(struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm)

Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Cesati <marcocesati@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210315170618.2566-12-marcocesati@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ojeda added a commit to ojeda/linux that referenced this pull request Jul 4, 2021
rename RUSTCFLAGS to RUSTFLAGS
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 13, 2023
The dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump
file, but if a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which
called from __kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashs,

 CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

 pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
 lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
 ...
 Call trace:
  __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
  pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
  __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
  dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
  elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
  do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
  get_signal+0x59c/0x788
  do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
  do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
  el0_da+0x130/0x138
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
  el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always an user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag
in struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory
copy, also introduce the helpers to set/clear/check the flag, for now,
it's only used in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to
any other scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 13, 2023
The dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file,
but if a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

 CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

 pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
 lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
 ...
 Call trace:
  __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
  pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
  __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
  dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
  elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
  do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
  get_signal+0x59c/0x788
  do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
  do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
  el0_da+0x130/0x138
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
  el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/clear/check the flag, for now, it's only
used in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230413041336.26874-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 15, 2023
The dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file,
but if a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

 CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

 pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
 lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
 ...
 Call trace:
  __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
  pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
  __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
  dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
  elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
  do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
  get_signal+0x59c/0x788
  do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
  do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
  el0_da+0x130/0x138
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
  el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/clear/check the flag, for now, it's only
used in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230413041336.26874-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 16, 2023
The dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file,
but if a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

 CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

 pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
 lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
 ...
 Call trace:
  __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
  pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
  __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
  dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
  elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
  do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
  get_signal+0x59c/0x788
  do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
  do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
  el0_da+0x130/0x138
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
  el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/clear/check the flag, for now, it's only
used in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230413041336.26874-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 17, 2023
The dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file,
but if a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only
used in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 18, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 18, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 19, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 20, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Kaz205 pushed a commit to Kaz205/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 21, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 21, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 21, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 25, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 27, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 30, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request May 4, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Kaz205 pushed a commit to Kaz205/linux that referenced this pull request May 5, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Kaz205 pushed a commit to Kaz205/linux that referenced this pull request May 5, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Kaz205 pushed a commit to Kaz205/linux that referenced this pull request May 5, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Kaz205 pushed a commit to Kaz205/linux that referenced this pull request May 8, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Kaz205 pushed a commit to Kaz205/linux that referenced this pull request May 8, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Kaz205 pushed a commit to Kaz205/linux that referenced this pull request May 20, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Kaz205 pushed a commit to Kaz205/linux that referenced this pull request May 20, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Kaz205 pushed a commit to Kaz205/linux that referenced this pull request May 20, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Kaz205 pushed a commit to Kaz205/linux that referenced this pull request May 30, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Kaz205 pushed a commit to Kaz205/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 5, 2023
dump_user_range() is used to copy the user page to a coredump file, but if
a hardware memory error occurred during copy, which called from
__kernel_write_iter() in dump_user_range(), it crashes,

  CPU: 112 PID: 7014 Comm: mca-recover Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 torvalds#425

  pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
  lr : _copy_from_iter+0x3bc/0x4c8
  ...
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x110/0x260
   copy_page_from_iter+0xcc/0x130
   pipe_write+0x164/0x6d8
   __kernel_write_iter+0x9c/0x210
   dump_user_range+0xc8/0x1d8
   elf_core_dump+0x308/0x368
   do_coredump+0x2e8/0xa40
   get_signal+0x59c/0x788
   do_signal+0x118/0x1f8
   do_notify_resume+0xf0/0x280
   el0_da+0x130/0x138
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xc0
   el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190

Generally, the '->write_iter' of file ops will use copy_page_from_iter()
and copy_page_from_iter_atomic(), change memcpy() to copy_mc_to_kernel()
in both of them to handle #MC during source read, which stop coredump
processing and kill the task instead of kernel panic, but the source
address may not always a user address, so introduce a new copy_mc flag in
struct iov_iter{} to indicate that the iter could do a safe memory copy,
also introduce the helpers to set/cleck the flag, for now, it's only used
in coredump's dump_user_range(), but it could expand to any other
scenarios to fix the similar issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230417045323.11054-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
This pull request was closed.
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