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Merge pull request #1 from torvalds/master #422
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rebase from torvalds/linux
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Static code analyzer warns that index value for scratch_pt may be equal to -1. Index value type is intel_gvt_gtt_type_t, so it may be any number at range -1 to 17. Check first if cur_pt_type and cur_pt_type+1 is valid values. v2: - Print some error messages if page table type is invalid. (Colin Xu) v4: - Print cur_pt_type in error message. (Colin Xu) This patch fixed the critial issue torvalds#422 reported by klocwork. Acked-by: Colin Xu <colin.xu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksei Gimbitskii <aleksei.gimbitskii@intel.com> Cc: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com> Cc: Zhi Wang <zhi.a.wang@intel.com> Cc: Colin Xu <colin.xu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com>
Static code analyzer warns that index value for scratch_pt may be equal to -1. Index value type is intel_gvt_gtt_type_t, so it may be any number at range -1 to 17. Check first if cur_pt_type and cur_pt_type+1 is valid values. v2: - Print some error messages if page table type is invalid. (Colin Xu) v4: - Print cur_pt_type in error message. (Colin Xu) This patch fixed the critial issue torvalds#422 reported by klocwork. Acked-by: Colin Xu <colin.xu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksei Gimbitskii <aleksei.gimbitskii@intel.com> Cc: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com> Cc: Zhi Wang <zhi.a.wang@intel.com> Cc: Colin Xu <colin.xu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com>
netdev_upper_dev_link() is useful to manage lower/upper interfaces. And this function internally validates looping, maximum depth. All or most virtual interfaces that could have a real interface (e.g. macsec, macvlan, ipvlan etc.) use lower/upper infrastructure. Test commands: ip link add dummy0 type dummy ip link add rmnet1 link dummy0 type rmnet mux_id 1 for i in {2..100} do let A=$i-1 ip link add rmnet$i link rmnet$A type rmnet mux_id $i done ip link del dummy0 The purpose of the test commands is to make stack overflow. Splat looks like: [ 54.352441][ T2169] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in usage_match+0x85/0xa0 [ 54.353332][ T2169] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880a6eae420 by task ip/2169 [ 54.404290][ T2169] [ 54.404615][ T2169] CPU: 1 PID: 2169 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.5.0+ torvalds#422 [ 54.409543][ T2169] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 54.410619][ T2169] Call Trace: [ 54.411051][ T2169] [ 54.411345][ T2169] Allocated by task 1: [ 54.793962][ T2169] (stack is not available) [ 54.794566][ T2169] [ 54.794880][ T2169] Freed by task 2519193708: [ 54.795487][ T2169] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff9b9dbe58 [ 54.796508][ T2169] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 54.797274][ T2169] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 54.798058][ T2169] PGD 11b818067 P4D 11b818067 PUD 11b819063 PMD 0 [ 54.798879][ T2169] Thread overran stack, or stack corrupted [ 54.799451][ T2169] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI [ 55.293798][ T2169] CPU: 1 PID: 2169 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.5.0+ torvalds#422 [ 55.294661][ T2169] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 55.296407][ T2169] RIP: 0010:stack_depot_fetch+0x10/0x30 [ 55.297122][ T2169] Code: ff e9 f9 fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 9c 1d 91 ff e9 ca fe ff ff cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 89 f8 0 [ 55.299622][ T2169] RSP: 0018:ffff8880a6eae2c8 EFLAGS: 00010006 [ 55.798954][ T2169] RAX: 00000000001fffff RBX: ffff8880a6eaea48 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 55.799997][ T2169] RDX: 0000000000000019 RSI: ffff8880a6eae2d0 RDI: 0000000000003ff0 [ 55.801075][ T2169] RBP: ffffea00029baa00 R08: ffffed101aabe403 R09: ffffed101aabe403 [ 55.802147][ T2169] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed101aabe402 R12: ffff8880d0660400 [ 55.803174][ T2169] R13: ffff8880a6ead900 R14: ffff8880a6eae4f0 R15: ffff8880a6eae610 [ 55.804192][ T2169] FS: 00007fc124f030c0(0000) GS:ffff8880d5400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 55.805328][ T2169] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 55.806193][ T2169] CR2: ffffffff9b9dbe58 CR3: 00000000a9a20004 CR4: 00000000000606e0 [ 55.807223][ T2169] Call Trace: [ 55.807642][ T2169] Modules linked in: rmnet dummy veth openvswitch nsh nf_conncount nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_dex [ 56.293411][ T2169] CR2: ffffffff9b9dbe58 [ 56.294041][ T2169] ---[ end trace 0c069624f07c5c8c ]--- [ 56.294761][ T2169] RIP: 0010:stack_depot_fetch+0x10/0x30 [ 56.295494][ T2169] Code: ff e9 f9 fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 9c 1d 91 ff e9 ca fe ff ff cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 89 f8 0 [ 56.298122][ T2169] RSP: 0018:ffff8880a6eae2c8 EFLAGS: 00010006 [ 56.298728][ T2169] RAX: 00000000001fffff RBX: ffff8880a6eaea48 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 56.299770][ T2169] RDX: 0000000000000019 RSI: ffff8880a6eae2d0 RDI: 0000000000003ff0 [ 56.799064][ T2169] RBP: ffffea00029baa00 R08: ffffed101aabe403 R09: ffffed101aabe403 [ 56.800117][ T2169] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed101aabe402 R12: ffff8880d0660400 [ 56.801137][ T2169] R13: ffff8880a6ead900 R14: ffff8880a6eae4f0 R15: ffff8880a6eae610 [ 56.802181][ T2169] FS: 00007fc124f030c0(0000) GS:ffff8880d5400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 56.803325][ T2169] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 56.804173][ T2169] CR2: ffffffff9b9dbe58 CR3: 00000000a9a20004 CR4: 00000000000606e0 [ 56.805198][ T2169] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Fixes: b37f78f ("net: qualcomm: rmnet: Fix crash on real dev unregistration") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Graduate `Box`, `Arc`, `Vec`, `Pin` and `Error`
There's issue as follows: XFS: Assertion failed: (bmv->bmv_iflags & BMV_IF_DELALLOC) != 0, file: fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c, line: 329 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:102! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 14612 Comm: xfs_io Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2-next-20230315-00006-g2729d23ddb3b-dirty torvalds#422 RIP: 0010:assfail+0x96/0xa0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000fa178c0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff888179a18000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888179a18000 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff8321aab6 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed1105f85139 R12: ffffffff8aacc4c0 R13: 0000000000000149 R14: ffff888269f58000 R15: 000000000000000c FS: 00007f42f27a4740(0000) GS:ffff88882fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000b92388 CR3: 000000024f006000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> xfs_getbmap+0x1a5b/0x1e40 xfs_ioc_getbmap+0x1fd/0x5b0 xfs_file_ioctl+0x2cb/0x1d50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Above issue may happen as follows: ThreadA ThreadB do_shared_fault __do_fault xfs_filemap_fault __xfs_filemap_fault filemap_fault xfs_ioc_getbmap -> Without BMV_IF_DELALLOC flag xfs_getbmap xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_SHARED); filemap_write_and_wait do_page_mkwrite xfs_filemap_page_mkwrite __xfs_filemap_fault xfs_ilock(XFS_I(inode), XFS_MMAPLOCK_SHARED); iomap_page_mkwrite ... xfs_buffered_write_iomap_begin xfs_bmapi_reserve_delalloc -> Allocate delay extent xfs_ilock_data_map_shared(ip) xfs_getbmap_report_one ASSERT((bmv->bmv_iflags & BMV_IF_DELALLOC) != 0) -> trigger BUG_ON As xfs_filemap_page_mkwrite() only hold XFS_MMAPLOCK_SHARED lock, there's small window mkwrite can produce delay extent after file write in xfs_getbmap(). To solve above issue, hold XFS_MMAPLOCK_EXCL lock when do xfs_getbmap(), to prevent write operations by do_page_mkwrite(). During doing __xfs_filemap_fault() we can't hold IOLOCK lock, as it's may lead to ABBA dealock with xfs_file_write_iter().It's very easy to reproduce when do fsstress, lockdep will detect deadlock. Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
There's issue as follows: XFS: Assertion failed: (bmv->bmv_iflags & BMV_IF_DELALLOC) != 0, file: fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c, line: 329 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:102! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 14612 Comm: xfs_io Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2-next-20230315-00006-g2729d23ddb3b-dirty torvalds#422 RIP: 0010:assfail+0x96/0xa0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000fa178c0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff888179a18000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888179a18000 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff8321aab6 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed1105f85139 R12: ffffffff8aacc4c0 R13: 0000000000000149 R14: ffff888269f58000 R15: 000000000000000c FS: 00007f42f27a4740(0000) GS:ffff88882fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000b92388 CR3: 000000024f006000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> xfs_getbmap+0x1a5b/0x1e40 xfs_ioc_getbmap+0x1fd/0x5b0 xfs_file_ioctl+0x2cb/0x1d50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Above issue may happen as follows: ThreadA ThreadB do_shared_fault __do_fault xfs_filemap_fault __xfs_filemap_fault filemap_fault xfs_ioc_getbmap -> Without BMV_IF_DELALLOC flag xfs_getbmap xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_SHARED); filemap_write_and_wait do_page_mkwrite xfs_filemap_page_mkwrite __xfs_filemap_fault xfs_ilock(XFS_I(inode), XFS_MMAPLOCK_SHARED); iomap_page_mkwrite ... xfs_buffered_write_iomap_begin xfs_bmapi_reserve_delalloc -> Allocate delay extent xfs_ilock_data_map_shared(ip) xfs_getbmap_report_one ASSERT((bmv->bmv_iflags & BMV_IF_DELALLOC) != 0) -> trigger BUG_ON As xfs_filemap_page_mkwrite() only hold XFS_MMAPLOCK_SHARED lock, there's small window mkwrite can produce delay extent after file write in xfs_getbmap(). To solve above issue, just skip delalloc extents. Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
There's issue as follows: XFS: Assertion failed: (bmv->bmv_iflags & BMV_IF_DELALLOC) != 0, file: fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c, line: 329 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:102! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 14612 Comm: xfs_io Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2-next-20230315-00006-g2729d23ddb3b-dirty torvalds#422 RIP: 0010:assfail+0x96/0xa0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000fa178c0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff888179a18000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888179a18000 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff8321aab6 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed1105f85139 R12: ffffffff8aacc4c0 R13: 0000000000000149 R14: ffff888269f58000 R15: 000000000000000c FS: 00007f42f27a4740(0000) GS:ffff88882fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000b92388 CR3: 000000024f006000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> xfs_getbmap+0x1a5b/0x1e40 xfs_ioc_getbmap+0x1fd/0x5b0 xfs_file_ioctl+0x2cb/0x1d50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Above issue may happen as follows: ThreadA ThreadB do_shared_fault __do_fault xfs_filemap_fault __xfs_filemap_fault filemap_fault xfs_ioc_getbmap -> Without BMV_IF_DELALLOC flag xfs_getbmap xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_SHARED); filemap_write_and_wait do_page_mkwrite xfs_filemap_page_mkwrite __xfs_filemap_fault xfs_ilock(XFS_I(inode), XFS_MMAPLOCK_SHARED); iomap_page_mkwrite ... xfs_buffered_write_iomap_begin xfs_bmapi_reserve_delalloc -> Allocate delay extent xfs_ilock_data_map_shared(ip) xfs_getbmap_report_one ASSERT((bmv->bmv_iflags & BMV_IF_DELALLOC) != 0) -> trigger BUG_ON As xfs_filemap_page_mkwrite() only hold XFS_MMAPLOCK_SHARED lock, there's small window mkwrite can produce delay extent after file write in xfs_getbmap(). To solve above issue, just skip delalloc extents. Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
There's issue as follows: XFS: Assertion failed: (bmv->bmv_iflags & BMV_IF_DELALLOC) != 0, file: fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c, line: 329 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:102! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 14612 Comm: xfs_io Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2-next-20230315-00006-g2729d23ddb3b-dirty torvalds#422 RIP: 0010:assfail+0x96/0xa0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000fa178c0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff888179a18000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888179a18000 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff8321aab6 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed1105f85139 R12: ffffffff8aacc4c0 R13: 0000000000000149 R14: ffff888269f58000 R15: 000000000000000c FS: 00007f42f27a4740(0000) GS:ffff88882fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000b92388 CR3: 000000024f006000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> xfs_getbmap+0x1a5b/0x1e40 xfs_ioc_getbmap+0x1fd/0x5b0 xfs_file_ioctl+0x2cb/0x1d50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Above issue may happen as follows: ThreadA ThreadB do_shared_fault __do_fault xfs_filemap_fault __xfs_filemap_fault filemap_fault xfs_ioc_getbmap -> Without BMV_IF_DELALLOC flag xfs_getbmap xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_SHARED); filemap_write_and_wait do_page_mkwrite xfs_filemap_page_mkwrite __xfs_filemap_fault xfs_ilock(XFS_I(inode), XFS_MMAPLOCK_SHARED); iomap_page_mkwrite ... xfs_buffered_write_iomap_begin xfs_bmapi_reserve_delalloc -> Allocate delay extent xfs_ilock_data_map_shared(ip) xfs_getbmap_report_one ASSERT((bmv->bmv_iflags & BMV_IF_DELALLOC) != 0) -> trigger BUG_ON As xfs_filemap_page_mkwrite() only hold XFS_MMAPLOCK_SHARED lock, there's small window mkwrite can produce delay extent after file write in xfs_getbmap(). To solve above issue, just skip delalloc extents. Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Patch series "allow KASAN to detect UAF in SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU slabs", v2. The purpose of the series is to allow KASAN to detect use-after-free access in SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU slab caches, by essentially making them behave as if the cache was not SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU but instead every kfree() in the cache was a kfree_rcu(). This is gated behind a config flag that is supposed to only be enabled in fuzzing/testing builds where the performance impact doesn't matter. Patch 1/2 is new; it's some necessary prep work for the main patch to work, though the KASAN integration maybe is a bit ugly. Patch 2/2 is a rebased version of the old patch, with some changes to how the config is wired up, with poison/unpoison logic added as suggested by dvyukov@ back then, with cache destruction fixed using rcu_barrier() as pointed out by dvyukov@ and the test robot, and a test added as suggested by elver@. Output of the new kunit testcase I added to the KASAN test suite: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kmem_cache_rcu_uaf+0x3ae/0x4d0 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810d3c8000 by task kunit_try_catch/225 CPU: 7 PID: 225 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G B N 6.10.0-00003-gf0fc688e25ed torvalds#422 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 print_report+0xce/0x670 [...] kasan_report+0xa5/0xe0 [...] kmem_cache_rcu_uaf+0x3ae/0x4d0 [...] kunit_try_run_case+0x1b3/0x490 [...] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xe0 kthread+0x2a5/0x370 [...] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 [...] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 225: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6e/0x70 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0xef/0x2b0 kmem_cache_rcu_uaf+0x10d/0x4d0 kunit_try_run_case+0x1b3/0x490 kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xe0 kthread+0x2a5/0x370 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x47/0x70 slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0xee/0x240 rcu_core+0x676/0x15b0 handle_softirqs+0x22f/0x690 irq_exit_rcu+0x84/0xb0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6a/0x80 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x8e/0xa0 __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x70/0xa70 kmem_cache_rcu_uaf+0x16e/0x4d0 kunit_try_run_case+0x1b3/0x490 kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xe0 kthread+0x2a5/0x370 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810d3c8000 which belongs to the cache test_cache of size 200 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of freed 200-byte region [ffff88810d3c8000, ffff88810d3c80c8) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10d3c8 head: order:1 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 flags: 0x200000000000040(head|node=0|zone=2) page_type: 0xffffefff(slab) raw: 0200000000000040 ffff88810d3c2000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000801f001f 00000001ffffefff 0000000000000000 head: 0200000000000040 ffff88810d3c2000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000000 00000000801f001f 00000001ffffefff 0000000000000000 head: 0200000000000001 ffffea000434f201 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88810d3c7f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88810d3c7f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88810d3c8000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88810d3c8080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88810d3c8100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== ok 38 kmem_cache_rcu_uaf This patch (of 2): Currently, when KASAN is combined with init-on-free behavior, the initialization happens before KASAN's "invalid free" checks. More importantly, a subsequent commit will want to use the object metadata region to store an rcu_head, and we should let KASAN check that the object pointer is valid before that. (Otherwise that change will make the existing testcase kmem_cache_invalid_free fail.) So add a new KASAN hook that allows KASAN to pre-validate a kmem_cache_free() operation before SLUB actually starts modifying the object or its metadata. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240724-kasan-tsbrcu-v2-0-45f898064468@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240724-kasan-tsbrcu-v2-1-45f898064468@google.com Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "allow KASAN to detect UAF in SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU slabs", v2. The purpose of the series is to allow KASAN to detect use-after-free access in SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU slab caches, by essentially making them behave as if the cache was not SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU but instead every kfree() in the cache was a kfree_rcu(). This is gated behind a config flag that is supposed to only be enabled in fuzzing/testing builds where the performance impact doesn't matter. Patch 1/2 is new; it's some necessary prep work for the main patch to work, though the KASAN integration maybe is a bit ugly. Patch 2/2 is a rebased version of the old patch, with some changes to how the config is wired up, with poison/unpoison logic added as suggested by dvyukov@ back then, with cache destruction fixed using rcu_barrier() as pointed out by dvyukov@ and the test robot, and a test added as suggested by elver@. Output of the new kunit testcase I added to the KASAN test suite: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kmem_cache_rcu_uaf+0x3ae/0x4d0 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810d3c8000 by task kunit_try_catch/225 CPU: 7 PID: 225 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G B N 6.10.0-00003-gf0fc688e25ed torvalds#422 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 print_report+0xce/0x670 [...] kasan_report+0xa5/0xe0 [...] kmem_cache_rcu_uaf+0x3ae/0x4d0 [...] kunit_try_run_case+0x1b3/0x490 [...] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xe0 kthread+0x2a5/0x370 [...] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 [...] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 225: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6e/0x70 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0xef/0x2b0 kmem_cache_rcu_uaf+0x10d/0x4d0 kunit_try_run_case+0x1b3/0x490 kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xe0 kthread+0x2a5/0x370 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x47/0x70 slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0xee/0x240 rcu_core+0x676/0x15b0 handle_softirqs+0x22f/0x690 irq_exit_rcu+0x84/0xb0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6a/0x80 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x8e/0xa0 __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x70/0xa70 kmem_cache_rcu_uaf+0x16e/0x4d0 kunit_try_run_case+0x1b3/0x490 kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xe0 kthread+0x2a5/0x370 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810d3c8000 which belongs to the cache test_cache of size 200 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of freed 200-byte region [ffff88810d3c8000, ffff88810d3c80c8) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10d3c8 head: order:1 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 flags: 0x200000000000040(head|node=0|zone=2) page_type: 0xffffefff(slab) raw: 0200000000000040 ffff88810d3c2000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000801f001f 00000001ffffefff 0000000000000000 head: 0200000000000040 ffff88810d3c2000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000000 00000000801f001f 00000001ffffefff 0000000000000000 head: 0200000000000001 ffffea000434f201 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88810d3c7f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88810d3c7f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88810d3c8000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88810d3c8080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88810d3c8100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== ok 38 kmem_cache_rcu_uaf This patch (of 2): Currently, when KASAN is combined with init-on-free behavior, the initialization happens before KASAN's "invalid free" checks. More importantly, a subsequent commit will want to use the object metadata region to store an rcu_head, and we should let KASAN check that the object pointer is valid before that. (Otherwise that change will make the existing testcase kmem_cache_invalid_free fail.) So add a new KASAN hook that allows KASAN to pre-validate a kmem_cache_free() operation before SLUB actually starts modifying the object or its metadata. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240724-kasan-tsbrcu-v2-0-45f898064468@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240724-kasan-tsbrcu-v2-1-45f898064468@google.com Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 8ee81ed ] There's issue as follows: XFS: Assertion failed: (bmv->bmv_iflags & BMV_IF_DELALLOC) != 0, file: fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c, line: 329 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:102! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 14612 Comm: xfs_io Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2-next-20230315-00006-g2729d23ddb3b-dirty torvalds#422 RIP: 0010:assfail+0x96/0xa0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000fa178c0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff888179a18000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888179a18000 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff8321aab6 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed1105f85139 R12: ffffffff8aacc4c0 R13: 0000000000000149 R14: ffff888269f58000 R15: 000000000000000c FS: 00007f42f27a4740(0000) GS:ffff88882fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000b92388 CR3: 000000024f006000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> xfs_getbmap+0x1a5b/0x1e40 xfs_ioc_getbmap+0x1fd/0x5b0 xfs_file_ioctl+0x2cb/0x1d50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Above issue may happen as follows: ThreadA ThreadB do_shared_fault __do_fault xfs_filemap_fault __xfs_filemap_fault filemap_fault xfs_ioc_getbmap -> Without BMV_IF_DELALLOC flag xfs_getbmap xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_SHARED); filemap_write_and_wait do_page_mkwrite xfs_filemap_page_mkwrite __xfs_filemap_fault xfs_ilock(XFS_I(inode), XFS_MMAPLOCK_SHARED); iomap_page_mkwrite ... xfs_buffered_write_iomap_begin xfs_bmapi_reserve_delalloc -> Allocate delay extent xfs_ilock_data_map_shared(ip) xfs_getbmap_report_one ASSERT((bmv->bmv_iflags & BMV_IF_DELALLOC) != 0) -> trigger BUG_ON As xfs_filemap_page_mkwrite() only hold XFS_MMAPLOCK_SHARED lock, there's small window mkwrite can produce delay extent after file write in xfs_getbmap(). To solve above issue, just skip delalloc extents. Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Signed-off-by: Leah Rumancik <leah.rumancik@gmail.com> Acked-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 8ee81ed ] There's issue as follows: XFS: Assertion failed: (bmv->bmv_iflags & BMV_IF_DELALLOC) != 0, file: fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c, line: 329 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:102! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 14612 Comm: xfs_io Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2-next-20230315-00006-g2729d23ddb3b-dirty torvalds#422 RIP: 0010:assfail+0x96/0xa0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000fa178c0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff888179a18000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888179a18000 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff8321aab6 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed1105f85139 R12: ffffffff8aacc4c0 R13: 0000000000000149 R14: ffff888269f58000 R15: 000000000000000c FS: 00007f42f27a4740(0000) GS:ffff88882fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000b92388 CR3: 000000024f006000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> xfs_getbmap+0x1a5b/0x1e40 xfs_ioc_getbmap+0x1fd/0x5b0 xfs_file_ioctl+0x2cb/0x1d50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Above issue may happen as follows: ThreadA ThreadB do_shared_fault __do_fault xfs_filemap_fault __xfs_filemap_fault filemap_fault xfs_ioc_getbmap -> Without BMV_IF_DELALLOC flag xfs_getbmap xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_SHARED); filemap_write_and_wait do_page_mkwrite xfs_filemap_page_mkwrite __xfs_filemap_fault xfs_ilock(XFS_I(inode), XFS_MMAPLOCK_SHARED); iomap_page_mkwrite ... xfs_buffered_write_iomap_begin xfs_bmapi_reserve_delalloc -> Allocate delay extent xfs_ilock_data_map_shared(ip) xfs_getbmap_report_one ASSERT((bmv->bmv_iflags & BMV_IF_DELALLOC) != 0) -> trigger BUG_ON As xfs_filemap_page_mkwrite() only hold XFS_MMAPLOCK_SHARED lock, there's small window mkwrite can produce delay extent after file write in xfs_getbmap(). To solve above issue, just skip delalloc extents. Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Signed-off-by: Leah Rumancik <leah.rumancik@gmail.com> Acked-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 8ee81ed ] There's issue as follows: XFS: Assertion failed: (bmv->bmv_iflags & BMV_IF_DELALLOC) != 0, file: fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c, line: 329 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:102! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 14612 Comm: xfs_io Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2-next-20230315-00006-g2729d23ddb3b-dirty torvalds#422 RIP: 0010:assfail+0x96/0xa0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000fa178c0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff888179a18000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888179a18000 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff8321aab6 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed1105f85139 R12: ffffffff8aacc4c0 R13: 0000000000000149 R14: ffff888269f58000 R15: 000000000000000c FS: 00007f42f27a4740(0000) GS:ffff88882fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000b92388 CR3: 000000024f006000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> xfs_getbmap+0x1a5b/0x1e40 xfs_ioc_getbmap+0x1fd/0x5b0 xfs_file_ioctl+0x2cb/0x1d50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Above issue may happen as follows: ThreadA ThreadB do_shared_fault __do_fault xfs_filemap_fault __xfs_filemap_fault filemap_fault xfs_ioc_getbmap -> Without BMV_IF_DELALLOC flag xfs_getbmap xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_SHARED); filemap_write_and_wait do_page_mkwrite xfs_filemap_page_mkwrite __xfs_filemap_fault xfs_ilock(XFS_I(inode), XFS_MMAPLOCK_SHARED); iomap_page_mkwrite ... xfs_buffered_write_iomap_begin xfs_bmapi_reserve_delalloc -> Allocate delay extent xfs_ilock_data_map_shared(ip) xfs_getbmap_report_one ASSERT((bmv->bmv_iflags & BMV_IF_DELALLOC) != 0) -> trigger BUG_ON As xfs_filemap_page_mkwrite() only hold XFS_MMAPLOCK_SHARED lock, there's small window mkwrite can produce delay extent after file write in xfs_getbmap(). To solve above issue, just skip delalloc extents. Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Signed-off-by: Leah Rumancik <leah.rumancik@gmail.com> Acked-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
rebase from torvalds/linux