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"Kernel Panic" run 'soft/kmod_scripts/sof_bootone.sh' cause kernel panic on BYT with sof-byt-rt5651.tplg #68

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ghost opened this issue Aug 8, 2018 · 16 comments
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bug Something isn't working BYT Applies to Baytrail platform P2 Critical bugs or normal features

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@ghost
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ghost commented Aug 8, 2018

System Environment:
Kernel repo: topic/sof-dev: 46b7b64
soft repo: topic/master: cfff9e0
using the tplg: sof-byt-rt5651.tplg

Reproduce step:
run the "soft/kmod_scripts/sof_bootone.sh" script, that means do the module reload one time.
the panic will be hit.

the log:
dmesg.txt

@ghost
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ghost commented Aug 8, 2018

the root cause is found:
It is related to the rt5651's tplg. the rt5651 use the "get/put/info ID" with 259.
but the kernel has not merged this patch accordingly.
which will cause the "Tone Switch 5" kcontol allocate failure.
when we do the module reload, this will cause the kernel panic in the remove_widget() function.
because the null pointer is trying to be accessed in this function.

@plbossart
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Are you saying the kernel oops happens in the chunk of code below?
If yes, can you try and protect the dereferences when kcontrols is NULL?

if (dobj->widget.kcontrol_type == SND_SOC_TPLG_TYPE_ENUM) {
/* enumerated widget mixer */
for (i = 0; w->kcontrols != NULL && i < w->num_kcontrols; i++) {
struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol = w->kcontrols[i];
struct soc_enum *se =
(struct soc_enum *)kcontrol->private_value;
int j;

		snd_ctl_remove(card, kcontrol);

		kfree(se->dobj.control.dvalues);
		for (j = 0; j < se->items; j++)
			kfree(se->dobj.control.dtexts[j]);

		kfree(se);
		kfree(w->kcontrol_news[i].name);
	}
} else {
	/* volume mixer or bytes controls */
	for (i = 0; w->kcontrols != NULL && i < w->num_kcontrols; i++) {
		struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol = w->kcontrols[i];

		if (dobj->widget.kcontrol_type
		    == SND_SOC_TPLG_TYPE_MIXER)
			kfree(kcontrol->tlv.p);

		/* Private value is used as struct soc_mixer_control
		 * for volume mixers or soc_bytes_ext for bytes
		 * controls.
		 */
		kfree((void *)kcontrol->private_value);
		snd_ctl_remove(card, kcontrol);
		kfree(w->kcontrol_news[i].name);
	}
}

@ghost
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ghost commented Aug 8, 2018

@plbossart
you are exactly right.
in this panic case, it is caused by below. the kcontrol is actually NULL already, access the pointer "kcontrol->tlv.p" will cause panic.
if (dobj->widget.kcontrol_type
== SND_SOC_TPLG_TYPE_MIXER)
kfree(kcontrol->tlv.p);

I will make a PR for this protection.

@plbossart
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Thanks. Since this is going to touch non-SOF code in soc-topology, we'll have to be more generic and check what happens for other widgets as well, not just the control ones.
Alternatively we'd want to bail when the unknown binding is found, that might actually be a better way of doing things?

@ghost
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ghost commented Aug 8, 2018

@plbossart
Yes, I agree with you. we can add check here, this could be the last line.
and add more code to do more check in the kcontrol allocate location.
I will do more debug for this issue.
thank you!

@ghost
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ghost commented Aug 8, 2018

@plbossart @lgirdwood
I found two questions during this debugging:

  1. I did not find location to free the instance of "struct snd_sof_control{}".
    we allocate this instance in sof_control_load(), this function's call-stack is below:
    soc_tplg_dapm_widget_dmixer_create()
    soc_tplg_init_kcontrol()
    tplg->ops->control_load()
    sof_control_load()

but I did not find the free location, normally I think it should be in sof_control_unload() function.
but actually it is not there. it might be a memory leak.
its call-stack is shown below:
snd_soc_tplg_component_remove()
remove_mixer()
dobj->ops->control_unload()
sof_control_unload()

  1. I have to update the description of the root cause of this panic issue again(maybe I am wrong, please point it out)
    when the soc_tplg_dapm_widget_dmixer_create() is called to construct the instance of kcontrol.
    actually, it will construct the instance "struct snd_sof_control{}", not to construct the instance "struct snd_kcontrol{}". so it will has problem when we try to free the instance in remove_widget() function.
    because the snd_kcontrol{} is never allocated, only the snd_sof_kcontrol{} is allocated.

please revert to me, if I am wrong.
thank you!

@ghost
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ghost commented Aug 8, 2018

the remove_widget() did not call the sof_control_unload() function. so it has no chance to free the snd_sof_control{} instance.

@ghost
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ghost commented Aug 8, 2018

Just now I tried: call the control_unload() in remove_widget(). it is not right. also will has the panic.
I just wonder where is the location to free the snd_sof_control{} instance.

@lgirdwood
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@zhigang-wu please try and switch on the kernel memory debugging tools (under kconfig debug options). This will mean a kernel rebuild, but it does help to shed light on any double frees or use after free issues.

@ghost
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ghost commented Aug 8, 2018

@lgirdwood
I will try it. thank you for your suggestion.

@ghost
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ghost commented Aug 10, 2018

this issue can be fixed by PR #72

@ghost
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ghost commented Aug 14, 2018

the PR #80 and PR #72 can fix this kind of kernel panic issue already.

@mengdonglin mengdonglin added bug Something isn't working P1 Blocker bugs or important features BYT Applies to Baytrail platform reload labels Sep 16, 2018
@ZhendanYang
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This issue still exists on latest code base:
sof-dev : 108d9cf
sof tool: 78748d4
sof stable-1.2: 7dd4b1d

@ZhendanYang
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This issue can still reproduce with latest code base:
kernel: sof-dev 160b45f
sof tool: 57b5212
sof stable-1.2 : 7dd4b1d
dmesg-panic.log

@mengdonglin mengdonglin added P2 Critical bugs or normal features and removed P1 Blocker bugs or important features labels Oct 10, 2018
@mengdonglin
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@stevyan @markyang Could you help to check if this issue is gone with fixing of #144 by #311?

@markyang
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markyang commented Dec 12, 2018

Summary:
This issue cannot be reproduced on BYT with ALC5651 using the build on Dec 7
There is no Kernel Panic, both arecord and aplay worked fine.

Test steps:

  1. kmod_scripts/sof_bootone.sh
  2. arecord -Dhw:0,0 -c2 -fS16_LE -vv -i ~/mytest.wav #OK
  3. aplay -Dhw:0,0 -c2 -fS16_LE -vv -i ~/mytest.wav #OK

Test env:
sof master: b5d6c71 #Dec 7
kernel sof-dev: a71221d #Dec 7
tplg: test-ssp2-mclk-0-I2S-volume-s16le-s16le-48k-19200k-codec.tplg

plbossart pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 17, 2020
… list

[BUG]
The following small test script can trigger ASSERT() at unmount time:

  mkfs.btrfs -f $dev
  mount $dev $mnt
  mount -o remount,discard=async $mnt
  umount $mnt

The call trace:
  assertion failed: atomic_read(&block_group->count) == 1, in fs/btrfs/block-group.c:3431
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3204!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 4 PID: 10389 Comm: umount Tainted: G           O      5.8.0-rc3-custom+ #68
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Call Trace:
   btrfs_free_block_groups.cold+0x22/0x55 [btrfs]
   close_ctree+0x2cb/0x323 [btrfs]
   btrfs_put_super+0x15/0x17 [btrfs]
   generic_shutdown_super+0x72/0x110
   kill_anon_super+0x18/0x30
   btrfs_kill_super+0x17/0x30 [btrfs]
   deactivate_locked_super+0x3b/0xa0
   deactivate_super+0x40/0x50
   cleanup_mnt+0x135/0x190
   __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20
   task_work_run+0x64/0xb0
   __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1bc/0x1c0
   __syscall_return_slowpath+0x47/0x230
   do_syscall_64+0x64/0xb0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The code:
                ASSERT(atomic_read(&block_group->count) == 1);
                btrfs_put_block_group(block_group);

[CAUSE]
Obviously it's some btrfs_get_block_group() call doesn't get its put
call.

The offending btrfs_get_block_group() happens here:

  void btrfs_mark_bg_unused(struct btrfs_block_group *bg)
  {
  	if (list_empty(&bg->bg_list)) {
  		btrfs_get_block_group(bg);
		list_add_tail(&bg->bg_list, &fs_info->unused_bgs);
  	}
  }

So every call sites removing the block group from unused_bgs list should
reduce the ref count of that block group.

However for async discard, it didn't follow the call convention:

  void btrfs_discard_punt_unused_bgs_list(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
  {
  	list_for_each_entry_safe(block_group, next, &fs_info->unused_bgs,
  				 bg_list) {
  		list_del_init(&block_group->bg_list);
  		btrfs_discard_queue_work(&fs_info->discard_ctl, block_group);
  	}
  }

And in btrfs_discard_queue_work(), it doesn't call
btrfs_put_block_group() either.

[FIX]
Fix the problem by reducing the reference count when we grab the block
group from unused_bgs list.

Reported-by: Marcos Paulo de Souza <mpdesouza@suse.com>
Fixes: 6e80d4f ("btrfs: handle empty block_group removal for async discard")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.6+
Tested-by: Marcos Paulo de Souza <mpdesouza@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
cujomalainey pushed a commit to cujomalainey/linux that referenced this issue Nov 11, 2020
[ Upstream commit 0daf2bf ]

Each EMAD transaction stores the skb used to issue the EMAD request
('trans->tx_skb') so that the request could be retried in case of a
timeout. The skb can be freed when a corresponding response is received
or as part of the retry logic (e.g., failed retransmit, exceeded maximum
number of retries).

The two tasks (i.e., response processing and retransmits) are
synchronized by the atomic 'trans->active' field which ensures that
responses to inactive transactions are ignored.

In case of a failed retransmit the transaction is finished and all of
its resources are freed. However, the current code does not mark it as
inactive. Syzkaller was able to hit a race condition in which a
concurrent response is processed while the transaction's resources are
being freed, resulting in a use-after-free [1].

Fix the issue by making sure to mark the transaction as inactive after a
failed retransmit and free its resources only if a concurrent task did
not already do that.

[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in consume_skb+0x30/0x370
net/core/skbuff.c:833
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88804f570494 by task syz-executor.0/1004

CPU: 0 PID: 1004 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc7+ thesofproject#68
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0xf6/0x16e lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1c/0x250
mm/kasan/report.c:383
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:513 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold+0x1f/0x37 mm/kasan/report.c:530
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:186 [inline]
 check_memory_region+0x14e/0x1b0 mm/kasan/generic.c:192
 instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:56 [inline]
 atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:27 [inline]
 refcount_read include/linux/refcount.h:147 [inline]
 skb_unref include/linux/skbuff.h:1044 [inline]
 consume_skb+0x30/0x370 net/core/skbuff.c:833
 mlxsw_emad_trans_finish+0x64/0x1c0 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:592
 mlxsw_emad_process_response drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:651 [inline]
 mlxsw_emad_rx_listener_func+0x5c9/0xac0 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:672
 mlxsw_core_skb_receive+0x4df/0x770 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:2063
 mlxsw_pci_cqe_rdq_handle drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/pci.c:595 [inline]
 mlxsw_pci_cq_tasklet+0x12a6/0x2520 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/pci.c:651
 tasklet_action_common.isra.0+0x13f/0x3e0 kernel/softirq.c:550
 __do_softirq+0x223/0x964 kernel/softirq.c:292
 asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:711

Allocated by task 1006:
 save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:48
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:494 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:467
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:586 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2824 [inline]
 slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2832 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc+0xcd/0x2e0 mm/slub.c:2837
 __build_skb+0x21/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:311
 __netdev_alloc_skb+0x1e2/0x360 net/core/skbuff.c:464
 netdev_alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:2810 [inline]
 mlxsw_emad_alloc drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:756 [inline]
 mlxsw_emad_reg_access drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:787 [inline]
 mlxsw_core_reg_access_emad+0x1ab/0x1420 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:1817
 mlxsw_reg_trans_query+0x39/0x50 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:1831
 mlxsw_sp_sb_pm_occ_clear drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_buffers.c:260 [inline]
 mlxsw_sp_sb_occ_max_clear+0xbff/0x10a0 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_buffers.c:1365
 mlxsw_devlink_sb_occ_max_clear+0x76/0xb0 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:1037
 devlink_nl_cmd_sb_occ_max_clear_doit+0x1ec/0x280 net/core/devlink.c:1765
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:669 [inline]
 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:714 [inline]
 genl_rcv_msg+0x617/0x980 net/netlink/genetlink.c:731
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x152/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2470
 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:742
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1304 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x53a/0x750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1330
 netlink_sendmsg+0x850/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0x150/0x190 net/socket.c:671
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6d8/0x840 net/socket.c:2359
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xff/0x170 net/socket.c:2413
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2446
 do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:384
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Freed by task 73:
 save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:48
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
 kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:316 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x170 mm/kasan/common.c:455
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1474 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1507 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3072 [inline]
 kmem_cache_free+0xbe/0x380 mm/slub.c:3088
 kfree_skbmem net/core/skbuff.c:622 [inline]
 kfree_skbmem+0xef/0x1b0 net/core/skbuff.c:616
 __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:679 [inline]
 consume_skb net/core/skbuff.c:837 [inline]
 consume_skb+0xe1/0x370 net/core/skbuff.c:831
 mlxsw_emad_trans_finish+0x64/0x1c0 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:592
 mlxsw_emad_transmit_retry.isra.0+0x9d/0xc0 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:613
 mlxsw_emad_trans_timeout_work+0x43/0x50 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:625
 process_one_work+0xa3e/0x17a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
 worker_thread+0x9e/0x1050 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
 kthread+0x355/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:291
 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:293

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88804f5703c0
 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224
The buggy address is located 212 bytes inside of
 224-byte region [ffff88804f5703c0, ffff88804f5704a0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00013d5c00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000
index:0x0
flags: 0x100000000000200(slab)
raw: 0100000000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff88806c625400
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000000c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88804f570380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff88804f570400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff88804f570480: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                         ^
 ffff88804f570500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff88804f570580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc

Fixes: caf7297 ("mlxsw: core: Introduce support for asynchronous EMAD register access")
Signed-off-by: Amit Cohen <amcohen@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
bardliao pushed a commit to bardliao/linux that referenced this issue Nov 25, 2020
Each EMAD transaction stores the skb used to issue the EMAD request
('trans->tx_skb') so that the request could be retried in case of a
timeout. The skb can be freed when a corresponding response is received
or as part of the retry logic (e.g., failed retransmit, exceeded maximum
number of retries).

The two tasks (i.e., response processing and retransmits) are
synchronized by the atomic 'trans->active' field which ensures that
responses to inactive transactions are ignored.

In case of a failed retransmit the transaction is finished and all of
its resources are freed. However, the current code does not mark it as
inactive. Syzkaller was able to hit a race condition in which a
concurrent response is processed while the transaction's resources are
being freed, resulting in a use-after-free [1].

Fix the issue by making sure to mark the transaction as inactive after a
failed retransmit and free its resources only if a concurrent task did
not already do that.

[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in consume_skb+0x30/0x370
net/core/skbuff.c:833
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88804f570494 by task syz-executor.0/1004

CPU: 0 PID: 1004 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc7+ thesofproject#68
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0xf6/0x16e lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1c/0x250
mm/kasan/report.c:383
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:513 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold+0x1f/0x37 mm/kasan/report.c:530
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:186 [inline]
 check_memory_region+0x14e/0x1b0 mm/kasan/generic.c:192
 instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:56 [inline]
 atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:27 [inline]
 refcount_read include/linux/refcount.h:147 [inline]
 skb_unref include/linux/skbuff.h:1044 [inline]
 consume_skb+0x30/0x370 net/core/skbuff.c:833
 mlxsw_emad_trans_finish+0x64/0x1c0 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:592
 mlxsw_emad_process_response drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:651 [inline]
 mlxsw_emad_rx_listener_func+0x5c9/0xac0 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:672
 mlxsw_core_skb_receive+0x4df/0x770 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:2063
 mlxsw_pci_cqe_rdq_handle drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/pci.c:595 [inline]
 mlxsw_pci_cq_tasklet+0x12a6/0x2520 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/pci.c:651
 tasklet_action_common.isra.0+0x13f/0x3e0 kernel/softirq.c:550
 __do_softirq+0x223/0x964 kernel/softirq.c:292
 asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:711

Allocated by task 1006:
 save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:48
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:494 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:467
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:586 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2824 [inline]
 slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2832 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc+0xcd/0x2e0 mm/slub.c:2837
 __build_skb+0x21/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:311
 __netdev_alloc_skb+0x1e2/0x360 net/core/skbuff.c:464
 netdev_alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:2810 [inline]
 mlxsw_emad_alloc drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:756 [inline]
 mlxsw_emad_reg_access drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:787 [inline]
 mlxsw_core_reg_access_emad+0x1ab/0x1420 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:1817
 mlxsw_reg_trans_query+0x39/0x50 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:1831
 mlxsw_sp_sb_pm_occ_clear drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_buffers.c:260 [inline]
 mlxsw_sp_sb_occ_max_clear+0xbff/0x10a0 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_buffers.c:1365
 mlxsw_devlink_sb_occ_max_clear+0x76/0xb0 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:1037
 devlink_nl_cmd_sb_occ_max_clear_doit+0x1ec/0x280 net/core/devlink.c:1765
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:669 [inline]
 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:714 [inline]
 genl_rcv_msg+0x617/0x980 net/netlink/genetlink.c:731
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x152/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2470
 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:742
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1304 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x53a/0x750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1330
 netlink_sendmsg+0x850/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0x150/0x190 net/socket.c:671
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6d8/0x840 net/socket.c:2359
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xff/0x170 net/socket.c:2413
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2446
 do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:384
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Freed by task 73:
 save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:48
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
 kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:316 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x170 mm/kasan/common.c:455
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1474 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1507 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3072 [inline]
 kmem_cache_free+0xbe/0x380 mm/slub.c:3088
 kfree_skbmem net/core/skbuff.c:622 [inline]
 kfree_skbmem+0xef/0x1b0 net/core/skbuff.c:616
 __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:679 [inline]
 consume_skb net/core/skbuff.c:837 [inline]
 consume_skb+0xe1/0x370 net/core/skbuff.c:831
 mlxsw_emad_trans_finish+0x64/0x1c0 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:592
 mlxsw_emad_transmit_retry.isra.0+0x9d/0xc0 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:613
 mlxsw_emad_trans_timeout_work+0x43/0x50 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c:625
 process_one_work+0xa3e/0x17a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
 worker_thread+0x9e/0x1050 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
 kthread+0x355/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:291
 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:293

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88804f5703c0
 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224
The buggy address is located 212 bytes inside of
 224-byte region [ffff88804f5703c0, ffff88804f5704a0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00013d5c00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000
index:0x0
flags: 0x100000000000200(slab)
raw: 0100000000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff88806c625400
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000000c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88804f570380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff88804f570400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff88804f570480: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                         ^
 ffff88804f570500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff88804f570580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc

Fixes: caf7297 ("mlxsw: core: Introduce support for asynchronous EMAD register access")
Signed-off-by: Amit Cohen <amcohen@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
bardliao pushed a commit to bardliao/linux that referenced this issue Oct 27, 2021
…tible()

Using wait_event_interruptible() to wait for complete transmission,
but do not check the result of wait_event_interruptible() which can be
interrupted. It will result in TX buffer has multiple accessors and
the later process interferes with the previous process.

Following is one of the problems reported by syzbot.

=============================================================
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at net/can/isotp.c:840 isotp_tx_timer_handler+0x2e0/0x4c0
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc7+ thesofproject#68
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:isotp_tx_timer_handler+0x2e0/0x4c0
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 ? isotp_setsockopt+0x390/0x390
 __hrtimer_run_queues+0xb8/0x610
 hrtimer_run_softirq+0x91/0xd0
 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x4d/0x80
 __do_softirq+0xe8/0x553
 irq_exit_rcu+0xf8/0x100
 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x9e/0xc0
 </IRQ>
 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20

Add result check for wait_event_interruptible() in isotp_sendmsg()
to avoid multiple accessers for tx buffer.

Fixes: e057dd3 ("can: add ISO 15765-2:2016 transport protocol")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/10ca695732c9dd267c76a3c30f37aefe1ff7e32f.1633764159.git.william.xuanziyang@huawei.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+78bab6958a614b0c80b9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
plbossart pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 26, 2023
When using DMA mode we are facing with Oops:
[  396.458157] Unable to handle kernel access to user memory without uaccess routines at virtual address 000000000000000c
[  396.469374] Oops [#1]
[  396.471839] Modules linked in:
[  396.475144] CPU: 0 PID: 114 Comm: arecord Not tainted 6.0.0-00164-g9a8eccdaf2be-dirty #68
[  396.483619] Hardware name: YMP ELCT FPGA (DT)
[  396.488156] epc : dmaengine_pcm_open+0x1d2/0x342
[  396.493227]  ra : dmaengine_pcm_open+0x1d2/0x342
[  396.498140] epc : ffffffff807fe346 ra : ffffffff807fe346 sp : ffffffc804e138f0
[  396.505602]  gp : ffffffff817bf730 tp : ffffffd8042c8ac0 t0 : 6500000000000000
[  396.513045]  t1 : 0000000000000064 t2 : 656e69676e65616d s0 : ffffffc804e13990
[  396.520477]  s1 : ffffffd801b86a18 a0 : 0000000000000026 a1 : ffffffff816920f8
[  396.527897]  a2 : 0000000000000010 a3 : fffffffffffffffe a4 : 0000000000000000
[  396.535319]  a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : ffffffd801b87040 a7 : 0000000000000038
[  396.542740]  s2 : ffffffd801b94a00 s3 : 0000000000000000 s4 : ffffffd80427f5e8
[  396.550153]  s5 : ffffffd80427f5e8 s6 : ffffffd801b44410 s7 : fffffffffffffff5
[  396.557569]  s8 : 0000000000000800 s9 : 0000000000000001 s10: ffffffff8066d254
[  396.564978]  s11: ffffffd8059cf768 t3 : ffffffff817d5577 t4 : ffffffff817d5577
[  396.572391]  t5 : ffffffff817d5578 t6 : ffffffc804e136e8
[  396.577876] status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: 000000000000000c cause: 000000000000000d
[  396.586007] [<ffffffff806839f4>] snd_soc_component_open+0x1a/0x68
[  396.592439] [<ffffffff807fdd62>] __soc_pcm_open+0xf0/0x502
[  396.598217] [<ffffffff80685d86>] soc_pcm_open+0x2e/0x4e
[  396.603741] [<ffffffff8066cea4>] snd_pcm_open_substream+0x442/0x68e
[  396.610313] [<ffffffff8066d1ea>] snd_pcm_open+0xfa/0x212
[  396.615868] [<ffffffff8066d39c>] snd_pcm_capture_open+0x3a/0x60
[  396.622048] [<ffffffff8065b35a>] snd_open+0xa8/0x17a
[  396.627421] [<ffffffff801ae036>] chrdev_open+0xa0/0x218
[  396.632893] [<ffffffff801a5a28>] do_dentry_open+0x17c/0x2a6
[  396.638713] [<ffffffff801a6d9a>] vfs_open+0x1e/0x26
[  396.643850] [<ffffffff801b8544>] path_openat+0x96e/0xc96
[  396.649518] [<ffffffff801b9390>] do_filp_open+0x7c/0xf6
[  396.655034] [<ffffffff801a6ff2>] do_sys_openat2+0x8a/0x11e
[  396.660765] [<ffffffff801a735a>] sys_openat+0x50/0x7c
[  396.666068] [<ffffffff80003aca>] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x2
[  396.674964] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

It happens because of play_dma_data/capture_dma_data pointers are NULL.
Current implementation assigns these pointers at snd_soc_dai_driver
startup() callback and reset them back to NULL at shutdown(). But
soc_pcm_open() sequence uses DMA pointers in dmaengine_pcm_open()
before snd_soc_dai_driver startup().
Most generic DMA capable I2S drivers use snd_soc_dai_driver probe()
callback to init DMA pointers only once at probe. So move DMA init
to dw_i2s_dai_probe and drop shutdown() and startup() callbacks.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Kochetkov <fido_max@inbox.ru>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230512110343.66664-1-fido_max@inbox.ru
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
ujfalusi pushed a commit to ujfalusi/sof-linux that referenced this issue Feb 5, 2024
Currently, if `v3d_job_init()` fails (e.g. in the IGT test "bad-in-sync",
where we submit an invalid in-sync to the IOCTL), then we end up with
the following NULL pointer dereference:

[   34.146279] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000078
[   34.146301] Mem abort info:
[   34.146306]   ESR = 0x0000000096000005
[   34.146315]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[   34.146322]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[   34.146328]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[   34.146334]   FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
[   34.146340] Data abort info:
[   34.146345]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[   34.146351]   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[   34.146357]   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[   34.146366] user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=00000001232e6000
[   34.146375] [0000000000000078] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000
[   34.146399] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [thesofproject#1] PREEMPT SMP
[   34.146406] Modules linked in: rfcomm snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq snd_seq_device algif_hash aes_neon_bs aes_neon_blk algif_skcipher af_alg bnep hid_logitech_hidpp brcmfmac_wcc brcmfmac brcmutil hci_uart vc4 btbcm cfg80211 bluetooth bcm2835_v4l2(C) snd_soc_hdmi_codec binfmt_misc cec drm_display_helper hid_logitech_dj bcm2835_mmal_vchiq(C) drm_dma_helper drm_kms_helper videobuf2_v4l2 raspberrypi_hwmon ecdh_generic videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops ecc videobuf2_common rfkill videodev libaes snd_soc_core dwc2 i2c_brcmstb snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_bcm2835(C) i2c_bcm2835 pwm_bcm2835 snd_pcm mc v3d snd_timer snd gpu_sched drm_shmem_helper nvmem_rmem uio_pdrv_genirq uio i2c_dev drm fuse dm_mod drm_panel_orientation_quirks backlight configfs ip_tables x_tables ipv6
[   34.146556] CPU: 1 PID: 1890 Comm: v3d_submit_csd Tainted: G         C         6.7.0-rc3-g49ddab089611 thesofproject#68
[   34.146563] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.5 (DT)
[   34.146569] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[   34.146575] pc : drm_sched_job_cleanup+0x3c/0x190 [gpu_sched]
[   34.146611] lr : v3d_submit_csd_ioctl+0x1b4/0x460 [v3d]
[   34.146653] sp : ffffffc083cbbb80
[   34.146658] x29: ffffffc083cbbb90 x28: ffffff81035afc00 x27: ffffffe77a641168
[   34.146668] x26: ffffff81056a8000 x25: 0000000000000058 x24: 0000000000000000
[   34.146677] x23: ffffff81065e2000 x22: ffffff81035afe00 x21: ffffffc083cbbcf0
[   34.146686] x20: ffffff81035afe00 x19: 00000000ffffffea x18: 0000000000000000
[   34.146694] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffffe7989e34b0 x15: 0000000000000000
[   34.146703] x14: 0000000004000004 x13: ffffff81035afe80 x12: ffffffc083cb8000
[   34.146711] x11: cc57e05dfbe5ef00 x10: cc57e05dfbe5ef00 x9 : ffffffe77a64131c
[   34.146719] x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f
[   34.146727] x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : ffffff81fefb03f0 x3 : ffffffc083cbba40
[   34.146736] x2 : ffffff81056a8000 x1 : ffffffe7989e35e8 x0 : 0000000000000000
[   34.146745] Call trace:
[   34.146748]  drm_sched_job_cleanup+0x3c/0x190 [gpu_sched]
[   34.146768]  v3d_submit_csd_ioctl+0x1b4/0x460 [v3d]
[   34.146791]  drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe0/0x120 [drm]
[   34.147029]  drm_ioctl+0x264/0x408 [drm]
[   34.147135]  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x9c/0xe0
[   34.147152]  invoke_syscall+0x4c/0x118
[   34.147162]  el0_svc_common+0xb8/0xf0
[   34.147168]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x40
[   34.147174]  el0_svc+0x38/0x88
[   34.147184]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0x100
[   34.147191]  el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x198
[   34.147201] Code: aa0003f4 f90007e8 f9401008 aa0803e0 (b8478c09)
[   34.147210] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

This happens because we are calling `drm_sched_job_cleanup()` twice:
once at `v3d_job_init()` and again when we call `v3d_job_cleanup()`.

To mitigate this issue, we can return to the same approach that we used
to use before 464c61e: deallocate the job after `v3d_job_init()`
fails and assign it to NULL. Then, when we call `v3d_job_cleanup()`, job
is NULL and the function returns.

Fixes: 464c61e ("drm/v3d: Decouple job allocation from job initiation")
Signed-off-by: Maíra Canal <mcanal@igalia.com>
Reviewed-by: Iago Toral Quiroga <itoral@igalia.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240109142857.1122704-1-mcanal@igalia.com
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