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new github detections
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Patrick Bareiss committed Jan 17, 2025
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1 change: 0 additions & 1 deletion detections/cloud/github_enterprise_remove_organization.yml
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required_fields:
- actor
- actor_id
- actor_ip
- actor_is_bot
- actor_location.country_code
- business
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78 changes: 78 additions & 0 deletions detections/cloud/github_enterprise_repository_archived.yml
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name: GitHub Enterprise Repository Archived
id: 8367cb99-bae1-4748-ae3b-0927bb381424
version: 1
date: '2025-01-17'
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects when a repository is archived in GitHub Enterprise.
The detection monitors GitHub Enterprise audit logs for repository archival events by tracking actor details,
repository information, and associated metadata. For a SOC, identifying repository archival is important as it could
indicate attempts to make critical code inaccessible or preparation for repository deletion. While archiving is a legitimate
feature, unauthorized archival of active repositories could signal account compromise, insider threats, or attempts to disrupt
development operations. The impact of unauthorized repository archival includes loss of active development access, disruption
to workflows and CI/CD pipelines, and potential business delays if critical repositories are affected. Additionally, archived
repositories may be targeted for subsequent deletion, potentially resulting in permanent loss of intellectual property if
proper backups are not maintained.
data_source:
- GitHub Enterprise Audit Logs
search: '`github_enterprise` action=repo.archived
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by actor, actor_id, actor_is_bot, actor_location.country_code, business, business_id, org, org_id, repo, repo_id, user_agent, visibility, action
| eval user=actor
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `github_enterprise_repository_deleted_filter`'
how_to_implement: You must ingest GitHub Enterprise logs using Audit log streaming as described in this documentation https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/streaming-the-audit-log-for-your-enterprise#setting-up-streaming-to-splunk using a Splunk HTTP Event Collector.
known_false_positives: unknown
references:
- https://www.googlecloudcommunity.com/gc/Community-Blog/Monitoring-for-Suspicious-GitHub-Activity-with-Google-Security/ba-p/763610
- https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/streaming-the-audit-log-for-your-enterprise#setting-up-streaming-to-splunk
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
tags:
analytic_story:
- GitHub Malicious Activity
asset_type: GitHub
confidence: 90
impact: 30
message: $user$ archived a repository in GitHub Enterprise
mitre_attack_id:
- T1485
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- actor
- actor_id
- actor_is_bot
- actor_location.country_code
- business
- business_id
- org
- org_id
- repo
- repo_id
- user_agent
risk_score: 27
security_domain: network
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/github_archived_repository/github.json
source: http:github
sourcetype: httpevent


1 change: 0 additions & 1 deletion detections/cloud/github_enterprise_repository_deleted.yml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ tags:
required_fields:
- actor
- actor_id
- actor_ip
- actor_is_bot
- actor_location.country_code
- business
Expand Down
79 changes: 79 additions & 0 deletions detections/cloud/github_organizations_repository_archived.yml
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name: GitHub Organizations Repository Archived
id: 4f568a0e-896f-4d94-a2f7-fa6d82ab1f77
version: 1
date: '2025-01-17'
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects when a repository is archived in GitHub Organizations.
The detection monitors GitHub Organizations audit logs for repository archival events by tracking actor details,
repository information, and associated metadata. For a SOC, identifying repository archival is important as it could
indicate attempts to make critical code inaccessible or preparation for repository deletion. While archiving is a legitimate
feature, unauthorized archival of active repositories could signal account compromise, insider threats, or attempts to disrupt
development operations. The impact of unauthorized repository archival includes loss of active development access, disruption
to workflows and CI/CD pipelines, and potential business delays if critical repositories are affected. Additionally, archived
repositories may be targeted for subsequent deletion, potentially resulting in permanent loss of intellectual property if
proper backups are not maintained.
data_source:
- GitHub Organizations Audit Logs
search: '`github_organizations` vendor_action=repo.archived
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by actor, actor_id, actor_is_bot, actor_location.country_code, business, business_id, org, org_id, repo, repo_id, user_agent, visibility, vendor_action
| eval user=actor
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `github_organizations_repository_deleted_filter`'
how_to_implement: You must ingest GitHub Organizations logs using Splunk Add-on for Github using a Personal Access Token https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/AddOns/released/GitHub/Configureinputs .
known_false_positives: unknown
references:
- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/AddOns/released/GitHub/Configureinputs
- https://www.googlecloudcommunity.com/gc/Community-Blog/Monitoring-for-Suspicious-GitHub-Activity-with-Google-Security/ba-p/763610
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
tags:
analytic_story:
- GitHub Malicious Activity
asset_type: GitHub
confidence: 90
impact: 30
message: $user$ archived a repository in GitHub Organizations
mitre_attack_id:
- T1485
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- actor
- actor_id
- actor_is_bot
- actor_location.country_code
- business
- business_id
- org
- org_id
- repo
- repo_id
- user
- user_agent
- user_id
risk_score: 27
security_domain: network
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/github_archived_repository/github.json
source: github
sourcetype: github:cloud:audit

79 changes: 79 additions & 0 deletions detections/cloud/github_organizations_repository_deleted.yml
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name: GitHub Organizations Repository Deleted
id: 9ff4ca95-fdae-4eea-9ffa-6d8e1c202a71
version: 1
date: '2025-01-17'
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic identifies when a repository is deleted within a GitHub organization.
The detection monitors GitHub Organizations audit logs for repository deletion events by tracking actor details,
repository information, and associated metadata. This behavior is concerning for SOC teams as malicious actors may
attempt to delete repositories to destroy source code, intellectual property, or evidence of compromise. Repository
deletion can result in permanent loss of code, documentation, and project history if proper backups are not maintained.
Additionally, unauthorized repository deletion could indicate account compromise, insider threats, or attempts to disrupt
business operations. The impact of a repository deletion attack includes loss of intellectual property, disruption to
development workflows, and potential financial losses from lost work. Early detection of unauthorized repository deletions
allows security teams to investigate potential compromises and restore from backups if needed.
data_source:
- GitHub Organizations Audit Logs
search: '`github_organizations` vendor_action=repo.destroy
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by actor, actor_id, actor_is_bot, actor_location.country_code, business, business_id, org, org_id, repo, repo_id, user_agent, visibility, vendor_action
| eval user=actor
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `github_organizations_repository_deleted_filter`'
how_to_implement: You must ingest GitHub Organizations logs using Splunk Add-on for Github using a Personal Access Token https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/AddOns/released/GitHub/Configureinputs .
known_false_positives: unknown
references:
- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/AddOns/released/GitHub/Configureinputs
- https://www.googlecloudcommunity.com/gc/Community-Blog/Monitoring-for-Suspicious-GitHub-Activity-with-Google-Security/ba-p/763610
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
tags:
analytic_story:
- GitHub Malicious Activity
asset_type: GitHub
confidence: 90
impact: 30
message: $user$ deleted a repository in GitHub Organizations
mitre_attack_id:
- T1485
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- actor
- actor_id
- actor_is_bot
- actor_location.country_code
- business
- business_id
- org
- org_id
- repo
- repo_id
- user
- user_agent
- user_id
risk_score: 27
security_domain: network
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/github_delete_repository/github.json
source: github
sourcetype: github:cloud:audit

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