Import changes to fix lpass subsystem restart #3
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set default restart_mode to RESET_SUBSYS_SUBSYSTEM so Q6 can restart Change-Id: I7e74c94bce33789dfdd7bd375f2fd74f8291f6fd
Q6 Watchdog Bite can happen sometimes while still in process of restarting, so just ignore a duplicate restart instead of panic Change-Id: I4df993368869a7d6e8247319cb85ea51c6a33405
Change-Id: Id656dd071192cdda729989b984e48f7e6144dfbf
Change-Id: Ia4da2ee0ae33f19eb468cb010c3348c65597f0dd
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shr-project
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Jun 2, 2019
Bluetooth: Properly check L2CAP config option output buffer length
shr-project
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We can end up allocating a new compression stream with GFP_KERNEL from
within the IO path, which may result is nested (recursive) IO operations.
That can introduce problems if the IO path in question is a reclaimer,
holding some locks that will deadlock nested IOs.
Allocate streams and working memory using GFP_NOIO flag, forbidding
recursive IO and FS operations.
An example:
[ 747.233722] inconsistent {IN-RECLAIM_FS-W} -> {RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} usage.
[ 747.233724] git/20158 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
[ 747.233725] (jbd2_handle){+.+.?.}, at: [<ffffffff811e31db>] start_this_handle+0x4ca/0x555
[ 747.233733] {IN-RECLAIM_FS-W} state was registered at:
[ 747.233735] [<ffffffff8107b8e9>] __lock_acquire+0x8da/0x117b
[ 747.233738] [<ffffffff8107c950>] lock_acquire+0x10c/0x1a7
[ 747.233740] [<ffffffff811e323e>] start_this_handle+0x52d/0x555
[ 747.233742] [<ffffffff811e331a>] jbd2__journal_start+0xb4/0x237
[ 747.233744] [<ffffffff811cc6c7>] __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x108/0x17e
[ 747.233748] [<ffffffff811a90bf>] ext4_dirty_inode+0x32/0x61
[ 747.233750] [<ffffffff8115f37e>] __mark_inode_dirty+0x16b/0x60c
[ 747.233754] [<ffffffff81150ad6>] iput+0x11e/0x274
[ 747.233757] [<ffffffff8114bfbd>] __dentry_kill+0x148/0x1b8
[ 747.233759] [<ffffffff8114c9d9>] shrink_dentry_list+0x274/0x44a
[ 747.233761] [<ffffffff8114d38a>] prune_dcache_sb+0x4a/0x55
[ 747.233763] [<ffffffff8113b1ad>] super_cache_scan+0xfc/0x176
[ 747.233767] [<ffffffff810fa089>] shrink_slab.part.14.constprop.25+0x2a2/0x4d3
[ 747.233770] [<ffffffff810fcccb>] shrink_zone+0x74/0x140
[ 747.233772] [<ffffffff810fd924>] kswapd+0x6b7/0x930
[ 747.233774] [<ffffffff81058887>] kthread+0x107/0x10f
[ 747.233778] [<ffffffff814fadff>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 747.233783] irq event stamp: 138297
[ 747.233784] hardirqs last enabled at (138297): [<ffffffff8107aff3>] debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x113/0x12f
[ 747.233786] hardirqs last disabled at (138296): [<ffffffff8107af13>] debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x33/0x12f
[ 747.233788] softirqs last enabled at (137818): [<ffffffff81040f89>] __do_softirq+0x2d3/0x3e9
[ 747.233792] softirqs last disabled at (137813): [<ffffffff81041292>] irq_exit+0x41/0x95
[ 747.233794]
other info that might help us debug this:
[ 747.233796] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 747.233797] CPU0
[ 747.233798] ----
[ 747.233799] lock(jbd2_handle);
[ 747.233801] <Interrupt>
[ 747.233801] lock(jbd2_handle);
[ 747.233803]
*** DEADLOCK ***
[ 747.233805] 5 locks held by git/20158:
[ 747.233806] #0: (sb_writers#7){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81155411>] mnt_want_write+0x24/0x4b
[ 747.233811] #1: (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#2/1){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81145087>] lock_rename+0xd9/0xe3
[ 747.233817] #2: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#11){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8114f8e2>] lock_two_nondirectories+0x3f/0x6b
[ 747.233822] #3: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#11/4){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8114f909>] lock_two_nondirectories+0x66/0x6b
[ 747.233827] #4: (jbd2_handle){+.+.?.}, at: [<ffffffff811e31db>] start_this_handle+0x4ca/0x555
[ 747.233831]
stack backtrace:
[ 747.233834] CPU: 2 PID: 20158 Comm: git Not tainted 4.1.0-rc7-next-20150615-dbg-00016-g8bdf555-dirty torvalds#211
[ 747.233837] ffff8800a56cea40 ffff88010d0a75f8 ffffffff814f446d ffffffff81077036
[ 747.233840] ffffffff823a84b0 ffff88010d0a7638 ffffffff814f3849 0000000000000001
[ 747.233843] 000000000000000a ffff8800a56cf6f8 ffff8800a56cea40 ffffffff810795dd
[ 747.233846] Call Trace:
[ 747.233849] [<ffffffff814f446d>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x6e
[ 747.233852] [<ffffffff81077036>] ? up+0x39/0x3e
[ 747.233854] [<ffffffff814f3849>] print_usage_bug.part.23+0x25b/0x26a
[ 747.233857] [<ffffffff810795dd>] ? print_shortest_lock_dependencies+0x182/0x182
[ 747.233859] [<ffffffff8107a9c9>] mark_lock+0x384/0x56d
[ 747.233862] [<ffffffff8107ac11>] mark_held_locks+0x5f/0x76
[ 747.233865] [<ffffffffa023d2f3>] ? zcomp_strm_alloc+0x25/0x73 [zram]
[ 747.233867] [<ffffffff8107d13b>] lockdep_trace_alloc+0xb2/0xb5
[ 747.233870] [<ffffffff8112bac7>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x32/0x1e2
[ 747.233873] [<ffffffffa023d2f3>] zcomp_strm_alloc+0x25/0x73 [zram]
[ 747.233876] [<ffffffffa023d428>] zcomp_strm_multi_find+0xe7/0x173 [zram]
[ 747.233879] [<ffffffffa023d58b>] zcomp_strm_find+0xc/0xe [zram]
[ 747.233881] [<ffffffffa023f292>] zram_bvec_rw+0x2ca/0x7e0 [zram]
[ 747.233885] [<ffffffffa023fa8c>] zram_make_request+0x1fa/0x301 [zram]
[ 747.233889] [<ffffffff812142f8>] generic_make_request+0x9c/0xdb
[ 747.233891] [<ffffffff8121442e>] submit_bio+0xf7/0x120
[ 747.233895] [<ffffffff810f1c0c>] ? __test_set_page_writeback+0x1a0/0x1b8
[ 747.233897] [<ffffffff811a9d00>] ext4_io_submit+0x2e/0x43
[ 747.233899] [<ffffffff811a9efa>] ext4_bio_write_page+0x1b7/0x300
[ 747.233902] [<ffffffff811a2106>] mpage_submit_page+0x60/0x77
[ 747.233905] [<ffffffff811a25b0>] mpage_map_and_submit_buffers+0x10f/0x21d
[ 747.233907] [<ffffffff811a6814>] ext4_writepages+0xc8c/0xe1b
[ 747.233910] [<ffffffff810f3f77>] do_writepages+0x23/0x2c
[ 747.233913] [<ffffffff810ea5d1>] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x84/0x8b
[ 747.233915] [<ffffffff810ea657>] filemap_flush+0x1c/0x1e
[ 747.233917] [<ffffffff811a3851>] ext4_alloc_da_blocks+0xb8/0x117
[ 747.233919] [<ffffffff811af52a>] ext4_rename+0x132/0x6dc
[ 747.233921] [<ffffffff8107ac11>] ? mark_held_locks+0x5f/0x76
[ 747.233924] [<ffffffff811afafd>] ext4_rename2+0x29/0x2b
[ 747.233926] [<ffffffff811427ea>] vfs_rename+0x540/0x636
[ 747.233928] [<ffffffff81146a01>] SyS_renameat2+0x359/0x44d
[ 747.233931] [<ffffffff81146b26>] SyS_rename+0x1e/0x20
[ 747.233933] [<ffffffff814faa17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
[minchan@kernel.org: add stable mark]
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Kyeongdon Kim <kyeongdon.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Francisco Franco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
shr-project
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The scenario is: 1. create lots of node blocks 2. sync 3. write lots of inline_data -> got panic due to no free space In that case, we should flush node blocks when writing inline_data in #3, and trigger gc as well. Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
shr-project
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Jan 24, 2022
This moves ARM over to the asm-generic/unaligned.h header. This has the
benefit of better code generated especially for ARMv7 on gcc 4.7+
compilers.
As Arnd Bergmann, points out: The asm-generic version uses the "struct"
version for native-endian unaligned access and the "byteshift" version
for the opposite endianess. The current ARM version however uses the
"byteshift" implementation for both.
Thanks to Nicolas Pitre for the excellent analysis:
Test case:
int foo (int *x) { return get_unaligned(x); }
long long bar (long long *x) { return get_unaligned(x); }
With the current ARM version:
foo:
ldrb r3, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B]
ldrb r1, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B]
ldrb r2, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)]
mov r3, r3, asl torvalds#16 @ tmp154, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B],
ldrb r0, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B]
orr r3, r3, r1, asl #8 @, tmp155, tmp154, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B],
orr r3, r3, r2 @ tmp157, tmp155, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)]
orr r0, r3, r0, asl torvalds#24 @,, tmp157, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B],
bx lr @
bar:
stmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} @,
mov r2, #0 @ tmp184,
ldrb r5, [r0, #6] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B]
ldrb r4, [r0, #5] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B]
ldrb ip, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B]
ldrb r1, [r0, #4] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B]
mov r5, r5, asl torvalds#16 @ tmp175, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B],
ldrb r7, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B]
orr r5, r5, r4, asl #8 @, tmp176, tmp175, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B],
ldrb r6, [r0, #7] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B]
orr r5, r5, r1 @ tmp178, tmp176, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B]
ldrb r4, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)]
mov ip, ip, asl torvalds#16 @ tmp188, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B],
ldrb r1, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B]
orr ip, ip, r7, asl #8 @, tmp189, tmp188, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B],
orr r3, r5, r6, asl torvalds#24 @,, tmp178, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B],
orr ip, ip, r4 @ tmp191, tmp189, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)]
orr ip, ip, r1, asl torvalds#24 @, tmp194, tmp191, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B],
mov r1, r3 @,
orr r0, r2, ip @ tmp171, tmp184, tmp194
ldmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7}
bx lr
In both cases the code is slightly suboptimal. One may wonder why
wasting r2 with the constant 0 in the second case for example. And all
the mov's could be folded in subsequent orr's, etc.
Now with the asm-generic version:
foo:
ldr r0, [r0, #0] @ unaligned @,* x
bx lr @
bar:
mov r3, r0 @ x, x
ldr r0, [r0, #0] @ unaligned @,* x
ldr r1, [r3, #4] @ unaligned @,
bx lr @
This is way better of course, but only because this was compiled for
ARMv7. In this case the compiler knows that the hardware can do
unaligned word access. This isn't that obvious for foo(), but if we
remove the get_unaligned() from bar as follows:
long long bar (long long *x) {return *x; }
then the resulting code is:
bar:
ldmia r0, {r0, r1} @ x,,
bx lr @
So this proves that the presumed aligned vs unaligned cases does have
influence on the instructions the compiler may use and that the above
unaligned code results are not just an accident.
Still... this isn't fully conclusive without at least looking at the
resulting assembly fron a pre ARMv6 compilation. Let's see with an
ARMv5 target:
foo:
ldrb r3, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp139,* x
ldrb r1, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp140,
ldrb r2, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp143,
ldrb r0, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp146,
orr r3, r3, r1, asl #8 @, tmp142, tmp139, tmp140,
orr r3, r3, r2, asl torvalds#16 @, tmp145, tmp142, tmp143,
orr r0, r3, r0, asl torvalds#24 @,, tmp145, tmp146,
bx lr @
bar:
stmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} @,
ldrb r2, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp139,* x
ldrb r7, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp140,
ldrb r3, [r0, #4] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp149,
ldrb r6, [r0, #5] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp150,
ldrb r5, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp143,
ldrb r4, [r0, #6] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp153,
ldrb r1, [r0, #7] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp156,
ldrb ip, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp146,
orr r2, r2, r7, asl #8 @, tmp142, tmp139, tmp140,
orr r3, r3, r6, asl #8 @, tmp152, tmp149, tmp150,
orr r2, r2, r5, asl torvalds#16 @, tmp145, tmp142, tmp143,
orr r3, r3, r4, asl torvalds#16 @, tmp155, tmp152, tmp153,
orr r0, r2, ip, asl torvalds#24 @,, tmp145, tmp146,
orr r1, r3, r1, asl torvalds#24 @,, tmp155, tmp156,
ldmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7}
bx lr
Compared to the initial results, this is really nicely optimized and I
couldn't do much better if I were to hand code it myself.
Change-Id: I91ea5a5e83de4bbdbb53883fe0dbf00719a8e382
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <rob.herring@calxeda.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Tofee
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Aug 12, 2022
…ernel/git/at91/linux into arm/fixes AT91 fixes for 5.19 shr-distribution#3 It contains one fix for LAN966 based SoCs fixing the frequency of sys_clk. sys_clk is feeding different IPs so having proper frequency for it in DT is necessary for proper working of different drivers. * tag 'at91-fixes-5.19-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/at91/linux: ARM: dts: lan966x: fix sys_clk frequency Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220721075705.1739915-1-claudiu.beznea@microchip.com Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
shr-project
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Aug 13, 2022
commit 2b12993 upstream. tl;dr: The Enhanced IBRS mitigation for Spectre v2 does not work as documented for RET instructions after VM exits. Mitigate it with a new one-entry RSB stuffing mechanism and a new LFENCE. == Background == Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) was designed to help mitigate Branch Target Injection and Speculative Store Bypass, i.e. Spectre, attacks. IBRS prevents software run in less privileged modes from affecting branch prediction in more privileged modes. IBRS requires the MSR to be written on every privilege level change. To overcome some of the performance issues of IBRS, Enhanced IBRS was introduced. eIBRS is an "always on" IBRS, in other words, just turn it on once instead of writing the MSR on every privilege level change. When eIBRS is enabled, more privileged modes should be protected from less privileged modes, including protecting VMMs from guests. == Problem == Here's a simplification of how guests are run on Linux' KVM: void run_kvm_guest(void) { // Prepare to run guest VMRESUME(); // Clean up after guest runs } The execution flow for that would look something like this to the processor: 1. Host-side: call run_kvm_guest() 2. Host-side: VMRESUME 3. Guest runs, does "CALL guest_function" 4. VM exit, host runs again 5. Host might make some "cleanup" function calls 6. Host-side: RET from run_kvm_guest() Now, when back on the host, there are a couple of possible scenarios of post-guest activity the host needs to do before executing host code: * on pre-eIBRS hardware (legacy IBRS, or nothing at all), the RSB is not touched and Linux has to do a 32-entry stuffing. * on eIBRS hardware, VM exit with IBRS enabled, or restoring the host IBRS=1 shortly after VM exit, has a documented side effect of flushing the RSB except in this PBRSB situation where the software needs to stuff the last RSB entry "by hand". IOW, with eIBRS supported, host RET instructions should no longer be influenced by guest behavior after the host retires a single CALL instruction. However, if the RET instructions are "unbalanced" with CALLs after a VM exit as is the RET in #6, it might speculatively use the address for the instruction after the CALL in #3 as an RSB prediction. This is a problem since the (untrusted) guest controls this address. Balanced CALL/RET instruction pairs such as in step #5 are not affected. == Solution == The PBRSB issue affects a wide variety of Intel processors which support eIBRS. But not all of them need mitigation. Today, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT triggers an RSB filling sequence that mitigates PBRSB. Systems setting RSB_VMEXIT need no further mitigation - i.e., eIBRS systems which enable legacy IBRS explicitly. However, such systems (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) do not set RSB_VMEXIT and most of them need a new mitigation. Therefore, introduce a new feature flag X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE which triggers a lighter-weight PBRSB mitigation versus RSB_VMEXIT. The lighter-weight mitigation performs a CALL instruction which is immediately followed by a speculative execution barrier (INT3). This steers speculative execution to the barrier -- just like a retpoline -- which ensures that speculation can never reach an unbalanced RET. Then, ensure this CALL is retired before continuing execution with an LFENCE. In other words, the window of exposure is opened at VM exit where RET behavior is troublesome. While the window is open, force RSB predictions sampling for RET targets to a dead end at the INT3. Close the window with the LFENCE. There is a subset of eIBRS systems which are not vulnerable to PBRSB. Add these systems to the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] as NO_EIBRS_PBRSB. Future systems that aren't vulnerable will set ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO. [ bp: Massage, incorporate review comments from Andy Cooper. ] Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This fixes device reboot/lockup after return from sleep.
Changes are imported from https://github.com/CyanogenMod/hp-kernel-tenderloin/tree/ics