Skip to content
New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

WiFi+Bluetooth module not added into the kernel from Ubuntu kernel #9

Closed
VenomIND opened this issue Apr 18, 2020 · 4 comments
Closed
Assignees

Comments

@VenomIND
Copy link

VenomIND commented Apr 18, 2020

Issue: My WiFi + Bluetooth modules are added into the Ubuntu 20.04 5.4 kernel .. but none of those working in pop OS.

Expected solution: Please add those module from default Ubuntu 5.4 lts kernel. rtw88(8723DE)

Device info :
Os: Pop-OS 20.04 beta (Upgrade 19.10)
Model- HP-da0326tu
Wireless module- Realtek RTL8723DE .
Processor: Intel i3-7100U
RAM-8 GB

@jackpot51 jackpot51 self-assigned this Apr 18, 2020
@jackpot51
Copy link
Member

We have this module in /lib/modules/5.4.0-7624-generic/kernel/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/rtw88.ko

Can you confirm you have that file?

@VenomIND
Copy link
Author

@jackpot51 Thanks for your efforts and quick response.. I really appreciate it .. I upgraded from 19.10 which doesn't work but after downloading the new ISO of 20.04 it worked after reinstall... I really like Pop-OS .. although I can't afford system 76 device yet (because of student) but it's in my wishlist .. ☺️☺️ again thank you.

@jackpot51
Copy link
Member

Glad to hear a fresh install worked better! We're still working on beta upgrade issues, thanks for reporting!

@VenomIND
Copy link
Author

Yes.. @jackpot51 I have seen your interview on LearnLinuxTV YouTube channel.. it was amazing.. I'm from India and System76 laptops are not shipping to India currently I guess.. so can I expect availability in upcoming 2-3 years ?☺️☺️

jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 13, 2020
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1881927

[ Upstream commit 20a785a ]

This BUG halt was reported a while back, but the patch somehow got
missed:

PID: 2879   TASK: c16adaa0  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "sctpn"
 #0 [f418dd28] crash_kexec at c04a7d8c
 #1 [f418dd7c] oops_end at c0863e02
 #2 [f418dd90] do_invalid_op at c040aaca
 #3 [f418de28] error_code (via invalid_op) at c08631a5
    EAX: f34baac0  EBX: 00000090  ECX: f418deb0  EDX: f5542950  EBP: 00000000
    DS:  007b      ESI: f34ba800  ES:  007b      EDI: f418dea0  GS:  00e0
    CS:  0060      EIP: c046fa5e  ERR: ffffffff  EFLAGS: 00010286
 #4 [f418de5c] add_timer at c046fa5e
 #5 [f418de68] sctp_do_sm at f8db8c77 [sctp]
 #6 [f418df30] sctp_primitive_SHUTDOWN at f8dcc1b5 [sctp]
 #7 [f418df48] inet_shutdown at c080baf9
 #8 [f418df5c] sys_shutdown at c079eedf
 #9 [f418df7] sys_socketcall at c079fe88
    EAX: ffffffda  EBX: 0000000d  ECX: bfceea90  EDX: 0937af98
    DS:  007b      ESI: 0000000c  ES:  007b      EDI: b7150ae4
    SS:  007b      ESP: bfceea7c  EBP: bfceeaa8  GS:  0033
    CS:  0073      EIP: b775c424  ERR: 00000066  EFLAGS: 00000282

It appears that the side effect that starts the shutdown timer was processed
multiple times, which can happen as multiple paths can trigger it.  This of
course leads to the BUG halt in add_timer getting called.

Fix seems pretty straightforward, just check before the timer is added if its
already been started.  If it has mod the timer instead to min(current
expiration, new expiration)

Its been tested but not confirmed to fix the problem, as the issue has only
occured in production environments where test kernels are enjoined from being
installed.  It appears to be a sane fix to me though.  Also, recentely,
Jere found a reproducer posted on list to confirm that this resolves the
issues

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: jere.leppanen@nokia.com
CC: marcelo.leitner@gmail.com
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 4, 2020
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1893048

[ Upstream commit b0f3b87 ]

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=208565

PID: 257    TASK: ecdd0000  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "init"
  #0 [<c0b420ec>] (__schedule) from [<c0b423c8>]
  #1 [<c0b423c8>] (schedule) from [<c0b459d4>]
  #2 [<c0b459d4>] (rwsem_down_read_failed) from [<c0b44fa0>]
  #3 [<c0b44fa0>] (down_read) from [<c044233c>]
  #4 [<c044233c>] (f2fs_truncate_blocks) from [<c0442890>]
  #5 [<c0442890>] (f2fs_truncate) from [<c044d408>]
  #6 [<c044d408>] (f2fs_evict_inode) from [<c030be18>]
  #7 [<c030be18>] (evict) from [<c030a558>]
  #8 [<c030a558>] (iput) from [<c047c600>]
  #9 [<c047c600>] (f2fs_sync_node_pages) from [<c0465414>]
 #10 [<c0465414>] (f2fs_write_checkpoint) from [<c04575f4>]
 #11 [<c04575f4>] (f2fs_sync_fs) from [<c0441918>]
 #12 [<c0441918>] (f2fs_do_sync_file) from [<c0441098>]
 #13 [<c0441098>] (f2fs_sync_file) from [<c0323fa0>]
 #14 [<c0323fa0>] (vfs_fsync_range) from [<c0324294>]
 #15 [<c0324294>] (do_fsync) from [<c0324014>]
 #16 [<c0324014>] (sys_fsync) from [<c0108bc0>]

This can be caused by flush_dirty_inode() in f2fs_sync_node_pages() where
iput() requires f2fs_lock_op() again resulting in livelock.

Reported-by: Zhiguo Niu <Zhiguo.Niu@unisoc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 19, 2020
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1896795

[ Upstream commit 22fe5a2 ]

The aliases were never released causing the following leaks:

  Indirect leak of 1224 byte(s) in 9 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7feefb830628 in malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x107628)
    #1 0x56332c8f1b62 in __perf_pmu__new_alias util/pmu.c:322
    #2 0x56332c8f401f in pmu_add_cpu_aliases_map util/pmu.c:778
    #3 0x56332c792ce9 in __test__pmu_event_aliases tests/pmu-events.c:295
    #4 0x56332c792ce9 in test_aliases tests/pmu-events.c:367
    #5 0x56332c76a09b in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:410
    #6 0x56332c76a09b in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:440
    #7 0x56332c76ce69 in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:695
    #8 0x56332c76ce69 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:807
    #9 0x56332c7d2214 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:312
    #10 0x56332c6701a8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:364
    #11 0x56332c6701a8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:408
    #12 0x56332c6701a8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:538
    #13 0x7feefb359cc9 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

Fixes: 956a783 ("perf test: Test pmu-events aliases")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200915031819.386559-11-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <paolo.pisati@canonical.com>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 19, 2020
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1896795

[ Upstream commit b12eea5 ]

The evsel->unit borrows a pointer of pmu event or alias instead of
owns a string.  But tool event (duration_time) passes a result of
strdup() caused a leak.

It was found by ASAN during metric test:

  Direct leak of 210 byte(s) in 70 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fe366fca0b5 in strdup (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x920b5)
    #1 0x559fbbcc6ea3 in add_event_tool util/parse-events.c:414
    #2 0x559fbbcc6ea3 in parse_events_add_tool util/parse-events.c:1414
    #3 0x559fbbd8474d in parse_events_parse util/parse-events.y:439
    #4 0x559fbbcc95da in parse_events__scanner util/parse-events.c:2096
    #5 0x559fbbcc95da in __parse_events util/parse-events.c:2141
    #6 0x559fbbc28555 in check_parse_id tests/pmu-events.c:406
    #7 0x559fbbc28555 in check_parse_id tests/pmu-events.c:393
    #8 0x559fbbc28555 in check_parse_cpu tests/pmu-events.c:415
    #9 0x559fbbc28555 in test_parsing tests/pmu-events.c:498
    #10 0x559fbbc0109b in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:410
    #11 0x559fbbc0109b in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:440
    #12 0x559fbbc03e69 in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:695
    #13 0x559fbbc03e69 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:807
    #14 0x559fbbc691f4 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:312
    #15 0x559fbbb071a8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:364
    #16 0x559fbbb071a8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:408
    #17 0x559fbbb071a8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:538
    #18 0x7fe366b68cc9 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

Fixes: f0fbb11 ("perf stat: Implement duration_time as a proper event")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200915031819.386559-6-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <paolo.pisati@canonical.com>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 19, 2020
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1896795

[ Upstream commit d26383d ]

The following leaks were detected by ASAN:

  Indirect leak of 360 byte(s) in 9 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fecc305180e in calloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10780e)
    #1 0x560578f6dce5 in perf_pmu__new_format util/pmu.c:1333
    #2 0x560578f752fc in perf_pmu_parse util/pmu.y:59
    #3 0x560578f6a8b7 in perf_pmu__format_parse util/pmu.c:73
    #4 0x560578e07045 in test__pmu tests/pmu.c:155
    #5 0x560578de109b in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:410
    #6 0x560578de109b in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:440
    #7 0x560578de401a in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:661
    #8 0x560578de401a in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:807
    #9 0x560578e49354 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:312
    #10 0x560578ce71a8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:364
    #11 0x560578ce71a8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:408
    #12 0x560578ce71a8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:538
    #13 0x7fecc2b7acc9 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

Fixes: cff7f95 ("perf tests: Move pmu tests into separate object")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200915031819.386559-12-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <paolo.pisati@canonical.com>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 11, 2020
…vents

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1902137

[ Upstream commit bef69bd ]

It was reported that 'perf stat' crashed when using with armv8_pmu (CPU)
events with the task mode.  As 'perf stat' uses an empty cpu map for
task mode but armv8_pmu has its own cpu mask, it has confused which map
it should use when accessing file descriptors and this causes segfaults:

  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x0000000000603fc8 in perf_evsel__close_fd_cpu (evsel=<optimized out>,
      cpu=<optimized out>) at evsel.c:122
  #1  perf_evsel__close_cpu (evsel=evsel@entry=0x716e950, cpu=7) at evsel.c:156
  #2  0x00000000004d4718 in evlist__close (evlist=0x70a7cb0) at util/evlist.c:1242
  #3  0x0000000000453404 in __run_perf_stat (argc=3, argc@entry=1, argv=0x30,
      argv@entry=0xfffffaea2f90, run_idx=119, run_idx@entry=1701998435)
      at builtin-stat.c:929
  #4  0x0000000000455058 in run_perf_stat (run_idx=1701998435, argv=0xfffffaea2f90,
      argc=1) at builtin-stat.c:947
  #5  cmd_stat (argc=1, argv=0xfffffaea2f90) at builtin-stat.c:2357
  #6  0x00000000004bb888 in run_builtin (p=p@entry=0x9764b8 <commands+288>,
      argc=argc@entry=4, argv=argv@entry=0xfffffaea2f90) at perf.c:312
  #7  0x00000000004bbb54 in handle_internal_command (argc=argc@entry=4,
      argv=argv@entry=0xfffffaea2f90) at perf.c:364
  #8  0x0000000000435378 in run_argv (argcp=<synthetic pointer>,
      argv=<synthetic pointer>) at perf.c:408
  #9  main (argc=4, argv=0xfffffaea2f90) at perf.c:538

To fix this, I simply used the given cpu map unless the evsel actually
is not a system-wide event (like uncore events).

Fixes: 7736627 ("perf stat: Use affinity for closing file descriptors")
Reported-by: Wei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Barry Song <song.bao.hua@hisilicon.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201007081311.1831003-1-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian May <ian.may@canonical.com>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 11, 2020
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1902254

[BUG]
With a crafted image, btrfs can panic at insert_inline_extent_backref():

  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:1857!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 1117 Comm: btrfs-transacti Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ #9
  RIP: 0010:insert_inline_extent_backref+0xcc/0xe0
  RSP: 0018:ffffac4dc1287be8 EFLAGS: 00010293
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000007 RCX: 0000000000000001
  RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
  RBP: ffffac4dc1287c28 R08: ffffac4dc1287ab8 R09: ffffac4dc1287ac0
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: ffff8febef88a540 R14: ffff8febeaa7bc30 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8febf7a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f663ace94c0 CR3: 0000000235698006 CR4: 00000000000206f0
  Call Trace:
  ? _cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
  __btrfs_inc_extent_ref.isra.64+0x7e/0x240
  ? btrfs_merge_delayed_refs+0xa5/0x330
  __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x653/0x1120
  btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xdb/0x1b0
  btrfs_commit_transaction+0x52/0x950
  ? start_transaction+0x94/0x450
  transaction_kthread+0x163/0x190
  kthread+0x105/0x140
  ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0x560/0x560
  ? kthread_destroy_worker+0x50/0x50
  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
  Modules linked in:
  ---[ end trace 2ad8b3de903cf825 ]---

[CAUSE]
Due to extent tree corruption (still valid by itself, but bad cross
ref), we can allocate an extent which is still in extent tree.  The
offending tree block of that case is from csum tree.  The newly
allocated tree block is also for csum tree.

Then we will try to insert a tree block ref for the existing tree block
ref.

For a tree extent item, tree block can never be shared directly by the
same tree twice.  We have such BUG_ON() to prevent such problem, but
this is not a proper error handling.

[FIX]
Replace that BUG_ON() with proper error message and leaf dump for debug
build.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202829
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 07cce5c)
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mfo@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kelsey Skunberg <kelsey.skunberg@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian May <ian.may@canonical.com>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 11, 2020
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1902254

[BUG]
With a crafted image, btrfs can panic at btrfs_del_csums():

  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:3188!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 1156 Comm: btrfs-transacti Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ #9
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x16c/0x180
  RSP: 0018:ffff976141257ab8 EFLAGS: 00010202
  RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff898a6b890930 RCX: 0000000004b70000
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff976141257bae RDI: ffff976141257acf
  RBP: ffff976141257b10 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffff9761412579a8
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff976141257abe
  R13: 0000000000000003 R14: ffff898a6a8be578 R15: ffff976141257bae
  FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff898a77a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f779d9cd624 CR3: 000000022b2b4006 CR4: 00000000000206f0
  Call Trace:
  truncate_one_csum+0xac/0xf0
  btrfs_del_csums+0x24f/0x3a0
  __btrfs_free_extent.isra.72+0x5a7/0xbe0
  __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x539/0x1120
  btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xdb/0x1b0
  btrfs_commit_transaction+0x52/0x950
  ? start_transaction+0x94/0x450
  transaction_kthread+0x163/0x190
  kthread+0x105/0x140
  ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0x560/0x560
  ? kthread_destroy_worker+0x50/0x50
  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
  Modules linked in:
  ---[ end trace 93bf9db00e6c374e ]---

[CAUSE]
This crafted image has a tricky key order corruption:

  checksum tree key (CSUM_TREE ROOT_ITEM 0)
  node 29741056 level 1 items 14 free 107 generation 19 owner CSUM_TREE
          ...
          key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 73785344) block 29757440 gen 19
          key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 77594624) block 29753344 gen 19
          ...

  leaf 29757440 items 5 free space 150 generation 19 owner CSUM_TREE
          item 0 key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 73785344) itemoff 2323 itemsize 1672
                  range start 73785344 end 75497472 length 1712128
          item 1 key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 75497472) itemoff 2319 itemsize 4
                  range start 75497472 end 75501568 length 4096
          item 2 key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 75501568) itemoff 579 itemsize 1740
                  range start 75501568 end 77283328 length 1781760
          item 3 key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 77283328) itemoff 575 itemsize 4
                  range start 77283328 end 77287424 length 4096
          item 4 key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 4120596480) itemoff 275 itemsize 300 <<<
                  range start 4120596480 end 4120903680 length 307200
  leaf 29753344 items 3 free space 1936 generation 19 owner CSUM_TREE
          item 0 key (18446744073457893366 EXTENT_CSUM 77594624) itemoff 2323 itemsize 1672
                  range start 77594624 end 79306752 length 1712128
          ...

Note the item 4 key of leaf 29757440, which is obviously too large, and
even larger than the first key of the next leaf.

However it still follows the key order in that tree block, thus tree
checker is unable to detect it at read time, since tree checker can only
work inside one leaf, thus such complex corruption can't be detected in
advance.

[FIX]
The next time to detect such problem is at tree block merge time,
which is in push_node_left(), balance_node_right(), push_leaf_left() or
push_leaf_right().

Now we check if the key order of the right-most key of the left node is
larger than the left-most key of the right node.

By this we don't need to call the full tree-checker, while still keeping
the key order correct as key order in each node is already checked by
tree checker thus we only need to check the above two slots.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202833
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit d16c702)
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mfo@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kelsey Skunberg <kelsey.skunberg@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian May <ian.may@canonical.com>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 22, 2021
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1926368

commit 90bd070 upstream.

The following deadlock is detected:

  truncate -> setattr path is waiting for pending direct IO to be done (inode->i_dio_count become zero) with inode->i_rwsem held (down_write).

  PID: 14827  TASK: ffff881686a9af80  CPU: 20  COMMAND: "ora_p005_hrltd9"
   #0  __schedule at ffffffff818667cc
   #1  schedule at ffffffff81866de6
   #2  inode_dio_wait at ffffffff812a2d04
   #3  ocfs2_setattr at ffffffffc05f322e [ocfs2]
   #4  notify_change at ffffffff812a5a09
   #5  do_truncate at ffffffff812808f5
   #6  do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.18 at ffffffff81280cf2
   #7  sys_ftruncate at ffffffff81280d8e
   #8  do_syscall_64 at ffffffff81003949
   #9  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff81a001ad

dio completion path is going to complete one direct IO (decrement
inode->i_dio_count), but before that it hung at locking inode->i_rwsem:

   #0  __schedule+700 at ffffffff818667cc
   #1  schedule+54 at ffffffff81866de6
   #2  rwsem_down_write_failed+536 at ffffffff8186aa28
   #3  call_rwsem_down_write_failed+23 at ffffffff8185a1b7
   #4  down_write+45 at ffffffff81869c9d
   #5  ocfs2_dio_end_io_write+180 at ffffffffc05d5444 [ocfs2]
   #6  ocfs2_dio_end_io+85 at ffffffffc05d5a85 [ocfs2]
   #7  dio_complete+140 at ffffffff812c873c
   #8  dio_aio_complete_work+25 at ffffffff812c89f9
   #9  process_one_work+361 at ffffffff810b1889
  #10  worker_thread+77 at ffffffff810b233d
  #11  kthread+261 at ffffffff810b7fd5
  #12  ret_from_fork+62 at ffffffff81a0035e

Thus above forms ABBA deadlock.  The same deadlock was mentioned in
upstream commit 28f5a8a ("ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock
in ocfs2_setattr()").  It seems that that commit only removed the
cluster lock (the victim of above dead lock) from the ABBA deadlock
party.

End-user visible effects: Process hang in truncate -> ocfs2_setattr path
and other processes hang at ocfs2_dio_end_io_write path.

This is to fix the deadlock itself.  It removes inode_lock() call from
dio completion path to remove the deadlock and add ip_alloc_sem lock in
setattr path to synchronize the inode modifications.

[wen.gang.wang@oracle.com: remove the "had_alloc_lock" as suggested]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210402171344.1605-1-wen.gang.wang@oracle.com

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210331203654.3911-1-wen.gang.wang@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 22, 2021
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1929455

[ Upstream commit bbd6f0a ]

In bnxt_rx_pkt(), the RX buffers are expected to complete in order.
If the RX consumer index indicates an out of order buffer completion,
it means we are hitting a hardware bug and the driver will abort all
remaining RX packets and reset the RX ring.  The RX consumer index
that we pass to bnxt_discard_rx() is not correct.  We should be
passing the current index (tmp_raw_cons) instead of the old index
(raw_cons).  This bug can cause us to be at the wrong index when
trying to abort the next RX packet.  It can crash like this:

 #0 [ffff9bbcdf5c39a8] machine_kexec at ffffffff9b05e007
 #1 [ffff9bbcdf5c3a00] __crash_kexec at ffffffff9b111232
 #2 [ffff9bbcdf5c3ad0] panic at ffffffff9b07d61e
 #3 [ffff9bbcdf5c3b50] oops_end at ffffffff9b030978
 #4 [ffff9bbcdf5c3b78] no_context at ffffffff9b06aaf0
 #5 [ffff9bbcdf5c3bd8] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff9b06ae2e
 #6 [ffff9bbcdf5c3c28] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff9b06af24
 #7 [ffff9bbcdf5c3c38] __do_page_fault at ffffffff9b06b67e
 #8 [ffff9bbcdf5c3cb0] do_page_fault at ffffffff9b06bb12
 #9 [ffff9bbcdf5c3ce0] page_fault at ffffffff9bc015c5
    [exception RIP: bnxt_rx_pkt+237]
    RIP: ffffffffc0259cdd  RSP: ffff9bbcdf5c3d98  RFLAGS: 00010213
    RAX: 000000005dd8097f  RBX: ffff9ba4cb11b7e0  RCX: ffffa923cf6e9000
    RDX: 0000000000000fff  RSI: 0000000000000627  RDI: 0000000000001000
    RBP: ffff9bbcdf5c3e60   R8: 0000000000420003   R9: 000000000000020d
    R10: ffffa923cf6ec138  R11: ffff9bbcdf5c3e83  R12: ffff9ba4d6f928c0
    R13: ffff9ba4cac28080  R14: ffff9ba4cb11b7f0  R15: ffff9ba4d5a30000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018

Fixes: a1b0e4e ("bnxt_en: Improve RX consumer index validity check.")
Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi <pavan.chebbi@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kelsey Skunberg <kelsey.skunberg@canonical.com>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 24, 2021
commit 57f0ff0 upstream.

It's later supposed to be either a correct address or NULL. Without the
initialization, it may contain an undefined value which results in the
following segmentation fault:

  # perf top --sort comm -g --ignore-callees=do_idle

terminates with:

  #0  0x00007ffff56b7685 in __strlen_avx2 () from /lib64/libc.so.6
  #1  0x00007ffff55e3802 in strdup () from /lib64/libc.so.6
  #2  0x00005555558cb139 in hist_entry__init (callchain_size=<optimized out>, sample_self=true, template=0x7fffde7fb110, he=0x7fffd801c250) at util/hist.c:489
  #3  hist_entry__new (template=template@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:564
  #4  0x00005555558cb4ba in hists__findnew_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, entry=entry@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420,
      sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:657
  #5  0x00005555558cba1b in __hists__add_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, al=0x7fffde7fb420, sym_parent=<optimized out>, bi=bi@entry=0x0, mi=mi@entry=0x0,
      sample=sample@entry=0x7fffde7fb4b0, sample_self=true, ops=0x0, block_info=0x0) at util/hist.c:288
  #6  0x00005555558cbb70 in hists__add_entry (sample_self=true, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, mi=0x0, bi=0x0, sym_parent=<optimized out>, al=<optimized out>, hists=0x5555561d9e38)
      at util/hist.c:1056
  #7  iter_add_single_cumulative_entry (iter=0x7fffde7fb460, al=<optimized out>) at util/hist.c:1056
  #8  0x00005555558cc8a4 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=iter@entry=0x7fffde7fb460, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420, max_stack_depth=<optimized out>, arg=arg@entry=0x7fffffff7db0)
      at util/hist.c:1231
  #9  0x00005555557cdc9a in perf_event__process_sample (machine=<optimized out>, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, evsel=<optimized out>, event=<optimized out>, tool=0x7fffffff7db0)
      at builtin-top.c:842
  #10 deliver_event (qe=<optimized out>, qevent=<optimized out>) at builtin-top.c:1202
  #11 0x00005555558a9318 in do_flush (show_progress=false, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:244
  #12 __ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP, timestamp=timestamp@entry=0) at util/ordered-events.c:323
  #13 0x00005555558a9789 in __ordered_events__flush (timestamp=<optimized out>, how=<optimized out>, oe=<optimized out>) at util/ordered-events.c:339
  #14 ordered_events__flush (how=OE_FLUSH__TOP, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:341
  #15 ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP) at util/ordered-events.c:339
  #16 0x00005555557cd631 in process_thread (arg=0x7fffffff7db0) at builtin-top.c:1114
  #17 0x00007ffff7bb817a in start_thread () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
  #18 0x00007ffff5656dc3 in clone () from /lib64/libc.so.6

If you look at the frame #2, the code is:

488	 if (he->srcline) {
489          he->srcline = strdup(he->srcline);
490          if (he->srcline == NULL)
491              goto err_rawdata;
492	 }

If he->srcline is not NULL (it is not NULL if it is uninitialized rubbish),
it gets strdupped and strdupping a rubbish random string causes the problem.

Also, if you look at the commit 1fb7d06, it adds the srcline property
into the struct, but not initializing it everywhere needed.

Committer notes:

Now I see, when using --ignore-callees=do_idle we end up here at line
2189 in add_callchain_ip():

2181         if (al.sym != NULL) {
2182                 if (perf_hpp_list.parent && !*parent &&
2183                     symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &parent_regex))
2184                         *parent = al.sym;
2185                 else if (have_ignore_callees && root_al &&
2186                   symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &ignore_callees_regex)) {
2187                         /* Treat this symbol as the root,
2188                            forgetting its callees. */
2189                         *root_al = al;
2190                         callchain_cursor_reset(cursor);
2191                 }
2192         }

And the al that doesn't have the ->srcline field initialized will be
copied to the root_al, so then, back to:

1211 int hist_entry_iter__add(struct hist_entry_iter *iter, struct addr_location *al,
1212                          int max_stack_depth, void *arg)
1213 {
1214         int err, err2;
1215         struct map *alm = NULL;
1216
1217         if (al)
1218                 alm = map__get(al->map);
1219
1220         err = sample__resolve_callchain(iter->sample, &callchain_cursor, &iter->parent,
1221                                         iter->evsel, al, max_stack_depth);
1222         if (err) {
1223                 map__put(alm);
1224                 return err;
1225         }
1226
1227         err = iter->ops->prepare_entry(iter, al);
1228         if (err)
1229                 goto out;
1230
1231         err = iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al);
1232         if (err)
1233                 goto out;
1234

That al at line 1221 is what hist_entry_iter__add() (called from
sample__resolve_callchain()) saw as 'root_al', and then:

        iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al);

will go on with al->srcline with a bogus value, I'll add the above
sequence to the cset and apply, thanks!

Signed-off-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
CC: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Fixes: 1fb7d06 ("perf report Use srcline from callchain for hist entries")
Link: https //lore.kernel.org/r/20210719145332.29747-1-mpetlan@redhat.com
Reported-by: Juri Lelli <jlelli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 30, 2021
[ Upstream commit aba5dae ]

FD uses xyarray__entry that may return NULL if an index is out of
bounds. If NULL is returned then a segv happens as FD unconditionally
dereferences the pointer. This was happening in a case of with perf
iostat as shown below. The fix is to make FD an "int*" rather than an
int and handle the NULL case as either invalid input or a closed fd.

  $ sudo gdb --args perf stat --iostat  list
  ...
  Breakpoint 1, perf_evsel__alloc_fd (evsel=0x5555560951a0, ncpus=1, nthreads=1) at evsel.c:50
  50      {
  (gdb) bt
   #0  perf_evsel__alloc_fd (evsel=0x5555560951a0, ncpus=1, nthreads=1) at evsel.c:50
   #1  0x000055555585c188 in evsel__open_cpu (evsel=0x5555560951a0, cpus=0x555556093410,
      threads=0x555556086fb0, start_cpu=0, end_cpu=1) at util/evsel.c:1792
   #2  0x000055555585cfb2 in evsel__open (evsel=0x5555560951a0, cpus=0x0, threads=0x555556086fb0)
      at util/evsel.c:2045
   #3  0x000055555585d0db in evsel__open_per_thread (evsel=0x5555560951a0, threads=0x555556086fb0)
      at util/evsel.c:2065
   #4  0x00005555558ece64 in create_perf_stat_counter (evsel=0x5555560951a0,
      config=0x555555c34700 <stat_config>, target=0x555555c2f1c0 <target>, cpu=0) at util/stat.c:590
   #5  0x000055555578e927 in __run_perf_stat (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0, run_idx=0)
      at builtin-stat.c:833
   #6  0x000055555578f3c6 in run_perf_stat (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0, run_idx=0)
      at builtin-stat.c:1048
   #7  0x0000555555792ee5 in cmd_stat (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at builtin-stat.c:2534
   #8  0x0000555555835ed3 in run_builtin (p=0x555555c3f540 <commands+288>, argc=3,
      argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at perf.c:313
   #9  0x0000555555836154 in handle_internal_command (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at perf.c:365
   #10 0x000055555583629f in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe2ec, argv=0x7fffffffe2e0) at perf.c:409
   #11 0x0000555555836692 in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at perf.c:539
  ...
  (gdb) c
  Continuing.
  Error:
  The sys_perf_event_open() syscall returned with 22 (Invalid argument) for event (uncore_iio_0/event=0x83,umask=0x04,ch_mask=0xF,fc_mask=0x07/).
  /bin/dmesg | grep -i perf may provide additional information.

  Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0x00005555559b03ea in perf_evsel__close_fd_cpu (evsel=0x5555560951a0, cpu=1) at evsel.c:166
  166                     if (FD(evsel, cpu, thread) >= 0)

v3. fixes a bug in perf_evsel__run_ioctl where the sense of a branch was
    backward.

Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210918054440.2350466-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 20, 2021
commit 5d388fa upstream.

If a cell has 'nbits' equal to a multiple of BITS_PER_BYTE the logic

 *p &= GENMASK((cell->nbits%BITS_PER_BYTE) - 1, 0);

will become undefined behavior because nbits modulo BITS_PER_BYTE is 0, and we
subtract one from that making a large number that is then shifted more than the
number of bits that fit into an unsigned long.

UBSAN reports this problem:

 UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/nvmem/core.c:1386:8
 shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'unsigned long'
 CPU: 6 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc3+ #9
 Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev3+) with KB Backlight (DT)
 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
 Call trace:
  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x170
  show_stack+0x24/0x30
  dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x7c
  dump_stack+0x18/0x38
  ubsan_epilogue+0x10/0x54
  __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x180/0x194
  __nvmem_cell_read+0x1ec/0x21c
  nvmem_cell_read+0x58/0x94
  nvmem_cell_read_variable_common+0x4c/0xb0
  nvmem_cell_read_variable_le_u32+0x40/0x100
  a6xx_gpu_init+0x170/0x2f4
  adreno_bind+0x174/0x284
  component_bind_all+0xf0/0x264
  msm_drm_bind+0x1d8/0x7a0
  try_to_bring_up_master+0x164/0x1ac
  __component_add+0xbc/0x13c
  component_add+0x20/0x2c
  dp_display_probe+0x340/0x384
  platform_probe+0xc0/0x100
  really_probe+0x110/0x304
  __driver_probe_device+0xb8/0x120
  driver_probe_device+0x4c/0xfc
  __device_attach_driver+0xb0/0x128
  bus_for_each_drv+0x90/0xdc
  __device_attach+0xc8/0x174
  device_initial_probe+0x20/0x2c
  bus_probe_device+0x40/0xa4
  deferred_probe_work_func+0x7c/0xb8
  process_one_work+0x128/0x21c
  process_scheduled_works+0x40/0x54
  worker_thread+0x1ec/0x2a8
  kthread+0x138/0x158
  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Fix it by making sure there are any bits to mask out.

Fixes: 69aba79 ("nvmem: Add a simple NVMEM framework for consumers")
Cc: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211013124511.18726-1-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 22, 2021
commit e6e22e6 upstream.

System crash was seen when I/O was run against an NVMe target and aborts
were occurring.

Crash stack is:

    -- relevant crash stack --
    BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
    :
    #6 [ffffae1f8666bdd0] page_fault at ffffffffa740122e
       [exception RIP: qla_nvme_abort_work+339]
       RIP: ffffffffc0f592e3  RSP: ffffae1f8666be80  RFLAGS: 00010297
       RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff9b581fc8af80  RCX: ffffffffc0f83bd0
       RDX: 0000000000000001  RSI: ffff9b5839c6c7c8  RDI: 0000000008000000
       RBP: ffff9b6832f85000   R8: ffffffffc0f68160   R9: ffffffffc0f70652
       R10: ffffae1f862ffdc8  R11: 0000000000000300  R12: 000000000000010d
       R13: 0000000000000000  R14: ffff9b5839cea000  R15: 0ffff9b583fab170
       ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff   CS: 0010  SS: 0018
    #7 [ffffae1f8666be98] process_one_work at ffffffffa6aba184
    #8 [ffffae1f8666bed8] worker_thread at ffffffffa6aba39d
    #9 [ffffae1f8666bf10] kthread at ffffffffa6ac06ed

The crash was due to a stale SRB structure access after it was aborted.
Fix the issue by removing stale access.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210908164622.19240-5-njavali@marvell.com
Fixes: 2cabf10 ("scsi: qla2xxx: Fix hang on NVMe command timeouts")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Arun Easi <aeasi@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 22, 2021
[ Upstream commit 5ec0a6f ]

Host crashes when pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root() is called for VFs with
virtual buses. The virtual buses added to SR-IOV have bus->self set to NULL
and host crashes due to this.

  PID: 4481   TASK: ffff89c6941b0000  CPU: 53  COMMAND: "bash"
  ...
   #3 [ffff9a9481713808] oops_end at ffffffffb9025cd6
   #4 [ffff9a9481713828] page_fault_oops at ffffffffb906e417
   #5 [ffff9a9481713888] exc_page_fault at ffffffffb9a0ad14
   #6 [ffff9a94817138b0] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffffb9c00ace
      [exception RIP: pcie_capability_read_dword+28]
      RIP: ffffffffb952fd5c  RSP: ffff9a9481713960  RFLAGS: 00010246
      RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: ffff89c6b1096000  RCX: 0000000000000000
      RDX: ffff9a9481713990  RSI: 0000000000000024  RDI: 0000000000000000
      RBP: 0000000000000080   R8: 0000000000000008   R9: ffff89c64341a2f8
      R10: 0000000000000002  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffff89c648bab000
      R13: 0000000000000000  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff89c648bab0c8
      ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
   #7 [ffff9a9481713988] pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root at ffffffffb95359a6
   #8 [ffff9a94817139c0] bnxt_qplib_determine_atomics at ffffffffc08c1a33 [bnxt_re]
   #9 [ffff9a94817139d0] bnxt_re_dev_init at ffffffffc08ba2d1 [bnxt_re]

Per PCIe r5.0, sec 9.3.5.10, the AtomicOp Requester Enable bit in Device
Control 2 is reserved for VFs.  The PF value applies to all associated VFs.

Return -EINVAL if pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root() is called for a VF.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1631354585-16597-1-git-send-email-selvin.xavier@broadcom.com
Fixes: 35f5ace ("RDMA/bnxt_re: Enable global atomic ops if platform supports")
Fixes: 430a236 ("PCI: Add pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root()")
Signed-off-by: Selvin Xavier <selvin.xavier@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 7, 2022
[ Upstream commit f1797e4 ]

module_alloc() first tries to allocate module text within 24 bits direct
jump from kernel text, and tries a wider allocation if first one fails.

When first allocation fails the following is observed in kernel logs:

  vmap allocation for size 2400256 failed: use vmalloc=<size> to increase size
  systemd-udevd: vmalloc error: size 2395133, vm_struct allocation failed, mode:0xcc0(GFP_KERNEL), nodemask=(null)
  CPU: 0 PID: 127 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G        W         5.15.5-gentoo-PowerMacG4 #9
  Call Trace:
  [e2a53a50] [c0ba0048] dump_stack_lvl+0x80/0xb0 (unreliable)
  [e2a53a70] [c0540128] warn_alloc+0x11c/0x2b4
  [e2a53b50] [c0531be8] __vmalloc_node_range+0xd8/0x64c
  [e2a53c10] [c00338c0] module_alloc+0xa0/0xac
  [e2a53c40] [c027a368] load_module+0x2ae0/0x8148
  [e2a53e30] [c027fc78] sys_finit_module+0xfc/0x130
  [e2a53f30] [c0035098] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x28
  ...

Add __GFP_NOWARN flag to first allocation so that no warning appears
when it fails.

Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <erhard_f@mailbox.org>
Fixes: 2ec13df ("powerpc/modules: Load modules closer to kernel text")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/93c9b84d6ec76aaf7b4f03468e22433a6d308674.1638267035.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 7, 2022
[ Upstream commit af11dee ]

================================================================================
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/book3s_32.c:22:23
shift exponent -1 is negative
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.15.5-gentoo-PowerMacG4 #9
Call Trace:
[c214be60] [c0ba0048] dump_stack_lvl+0x80/0xb0 (unreliable)
[c214be80] [c0b99288] ubsan_epilogue+0x10/0x5c
[c214be90] [c0b98fe0] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x94/0x138
[c214bf00] [c1c0f010] kasan_init_region+0xd8/0x26c
[c214bf30] [c1c0ed84] kasan_init+0xc0/0x198
[c214bf70] [c1c08024] setup_arch+0x18/0x54c
[c214bfc0] [c1c037f0] start_kernel+0x90/0x33c
[c214bff0] [00003610] 0x3610
================================================================================

This happens when the directly mapped memory is a power of 2.

Fix it by checking the shift and set the result to 0 when shift is -1

Fixes: 7974c47 ("powerpc/32s: Implement dedicated kasan_init_region()")
Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <erhard_f@mailbox.org>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215169
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/15cbc3439d4ad988b225e2119ec99502a5cc6ad3.1638261744.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 7, 2022
[ Upstream commit df1f679 ]

KeyWest i2c @0xf8001003 irq 42 /uni-n@f8000000/i2c@f8001000
BUG: key c2d00cbc has not been registered!
------------[ cut here ]------------
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(1)
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4801 lockdep_init_map_type+0x4c0/0xb4c
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.15.5-gentoo-PowerMacG4 #9
NIP:  c01a9428 LR: c01a9428 CTR: 00000000
REGS: e1033cf0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (5.15.5-gentoo-PowerMacG4)
MSR:  00029032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI>  CR: 24002002  XER: 00000000

GPR00: c01a9428 e1033db0 c2d1cf20 00000016 00000004 00000001 c01c0630 e1033a73
GPR08: 00000000 00000000 00000000 e1033db0 24002004 00000000 f8729377 00000003
GPR16: c1829a9c 00000000 18305357 c1416fc0 c1416f80 c006ac60 c2d00ca8 c1416f00
GPR24: 00000000 c21586f0 c2160000 00000000 c2d00cbc c2170000 c216e1a0 c2160000
NIP [c01a9428] lockdep_init_map_type+0x4c0/0xb4c
LR [c01a9428] lockdep_init_map_type+0x4c0/0xb4c
Call Trace:
[e1033db0] [c01a9428] lockdep_init_map_type+0x4c0/0xb4c (unreliable)
[e1033df0] [c1c177b8] kw_i2c_add+0x334/0x424
[e1033e20] [c1c18294] pmac_i2c_init+0x9ec/0xa9c
[e1033e80] [c1c1a790] smp_core99_probe+0xbc/0x35c
[e1033eb0] [c1c03cb0] kernel_init_freeable+0x190/0x5a4
[e1033f10] [c000946c] kernel_init+0x28/0x154
[e1033f30] [c0035148] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c

Add missing lockdep_register_key()

Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <erhard_f@mailbox.org>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/69e4f55565bb45ebb0843977801b245af0c666fe.1638264741.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 28, 2022
[ Upstream commit f1797e4 ]

module_alloc() first tries to allocate module text within 24 bits direct
jump from kernel text, and tries a wider allocation if first one fails.

When first allocation fails the following is observed in kernel logs:

  vmap allocation for size 2400256 failed: use vmalloc=<size> to increase size
  systemd-udevd: vmalloc error: size 2395133, vm_struct allocation failed, mode:0xcc0(GFP_KERNEL), nodemask=(null)
  CPU: 0 PID: 127 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G        W         5.15.5-gentoo-PowerMacG4 #9
  Call Trace:
  [e2a53a50] [c0ba0048] dump_stack_lvl+0x80/0xb0 (unreliable)
  [e2a53a70] [c0540128] warn_alloc+0x11c/0x2b4
  [e2a53b50] [c0531be8] __vmalloc_node_range+0xd8/0x64c
  [e2a53c10] [c00338c0] module_alloc+0xa0/0xac
  [e2a53c40] [c027a368] load_module+0x2ae0/0x8148
  [e2a53e30] [c027fc78] sys_finit_module+0xfc/0x130
  [e2a53f30] [c0035098] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x28
  ...

Add __GFP_NOWARN flag to first allocation so that no warning appears
when it fails.

Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <erhard_f@mailbox.org>
Fixes: 2ec13df ("powerpc/modules: Load modules closer to kernel text")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/93c9b84d6ec76aaf7b4f03468e22433a6d308674.1638267035.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 28, 2022
[ Upstream commit af11dee ]

================================================================================
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/book3s_32.c:22:23
shift exponent -1 is negative
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.15.5-gentoo-PowerMacG4 #9
Call Trace:
[c214be60] [c0ba0048] dump_stack_lvl+0x80/0xb0 (unreliable)
[c214be80] [c0b99288] ubsan_epilogue+0x10/0x5c
[c214be90] [c0b98fe0] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x94/0x138
[c214bf00] [c1c0f010] kasan_init_region+0xd8/0x26c
[c214bf30] [c1c0ed84] kasan_init+0xc0/0x198
[c214bf70] [c1c08024] setup_arch+0x18/0x54c
[c214bfc0] [c1c037f0] start_kernel+0x90/0x33c
[c214bff0] [00003610] 0x3610
================================================================================

This happens when the directly mapped memory is a power of 2.

Fix it by checking the shift and set the result to 0 when shift is -1

Fixes: 7974c47 ("powerpc/32s: Implement dedicated kasan_init_region()")
Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <erhard_f@mailbox.org>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215169
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/15cbc3439d4ad988b225e2119ec99502a5cc6ad3.1638261744.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 28, 2022
[ Upstream commit df1f679 ]

KeyWest i2c @0xf8001003 irq 42 /uni-n@f8000000/i2c@f8001000
BUG: key c2d00cbc has not been registered!
------------[ cut here ]------------
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(1)
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4801 lockdep_init_map_type+0x4c0/0xb4c
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.15.5-gentoo-PowerMacG4 #9
NIP:  c01a9428 LR: c01a9428 CTR: 00000000
REGS: e1033cf0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (5.15.5-gentoo-PowerMacG4)
MSR:  00029032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI>  CR: 24002002  XER: 00000000

GPR00: c01a9428 e1033db0 c2d1cf20 00000016 00000004 00000001 c01c0630 e1033a73
GPR08: 00000000 00000000 00000000 e1033db0 24002004 00000000 f8729377 00000003
GPR16: c1829a9c 00000000 18305357 c1416fc0 c1416f80 c006ac60 c2d00ca8 c1416f00
GPR24: 00000000 c21586f0 c2160000 00000000 c2d00cbc c2170000 c216e1a0 c2160000
NIP [c01a9428] lockdep_init_map_type+0x4c0/0xb4c
LR [c01a9428] lockdep_init_map_type+0x4c0/0xb4c
Call Trace:
[e1033db0] [c01a9428] lockdep_init_map_type+0x4c0/0xb4c (unreliable)
[e1033df0] [c1c177b8] kw_i2c_add+0x334/0x424
[e1033e20] [c1c18294] pmac_i2c_init+0x9ec/0xa9c
[e1033e80] [c1c1a790] smp_core99_probe+0xbc/0x35c
[e1033eb0] [c1c03cb0] kernel_init_freeable+0x190/0x5a4
[e1033f10] [c000946c] kernel_init+0x28/0x154
[e1033f30] [c0035148] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c

Add missing lockdep_register_key()

Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <erhard_f@mailbox.org>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/69e4f55565bb45ebb0843977801b245af0c666fe.1638264741.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 18, 2022
[ Upstream commit 4224cfd ]

When bringing down the netdevice or system shutdown, a panic can be
triggered while accessing the sysfs path because the device is already
removed.

    [  755.549084] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.1: Shutdown was called
    [  756.404455] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.0: Shutdown was called
    ...
    [  757.937260] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
    [  758.031397] IP: [<ffffffff8ee11acb>] dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab/0x280

    crash> bt
    ...
    PID: 12649  TASK: ffff8924108f2100  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "amsd"
    ...
     #9 [ffff89240e1a38b0] page_fault at ffffffff8f38c778
        [exception RIP: dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab]
        RIP: ffffffff8ee11acb  RSP: ffff89240e1a3968  RFLAGS: 00010046
        RAX: 0000000000000246  RBX: ffff89243d874100  RCX: 0000000000001000
        RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000246  RDI: ffff89243d874090
        RBP: ffff89240e1a39c0   R8: 000000000001f080   R9: ffff8905ffc03c00
        R10: ffffffffc04680d4  R11: ffffffff8edde9fd  R12: 00000000000080d0
        R13: ffff89243d874090  R14: ffff89243d874080  R15: 0000000000000000
        ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
    #10 [ffff89240e1a39c8] mlx5_alloc_cmd_msg at ffffffffc04680f3 [mlx5_core]
    #11 [ffff89240e1a3a18] cmd_exec at ffffffffc046ad62 [mlx5_core]
    #12 [ffff89240e1a3ab8] mlx5_cmd_exec at ffffffffc046b4fb [mlx5_core]
    #13 [ffff89240e1a3ae8] mlx5_core_access_reg at ffffffffc0475434 [mlx5_core]
    #14 [ffff89240e1a3b40] mlx5e_get_fec_caps at ffffffffc04a7348 [mlx5_core]
    #15 [ffff89240e1a3bb0] get_fec_supported_advertised at ffffffffc04992bf [mlx5_core]
    #16 [ffff89240e1a3c08] mlx5e_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc049ab36 [mlx5_core]
    #17 [ffff89240e1a3ce8] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff8f25db46
    #18 [ffff89240e1a3d48] speed_show at ffffffff8f277208
    #19 [ffff89240e1a3dd8] dev_attr_show at ffffffff8f0b70e3
    #20 [ffff89240e1a3df8] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff8eedbedf
    #21 [ffff89240e1a3e18] kernfs_seq_show at ffffffff8eeda596
    #22 [ffff89240e1a3e28] seq_read at ffffffff8ee76d10
    #23 [ffff89240e1a3e98] kernfs_fop_read at ffffffff8eedaef5
    #24 [ffff89240e1a3ed8] vfs_read at ffffffff8ee4e3ff
    #25 [ffff89240e1a3f08] sys_read at ffffffff8ee4f27f
    #26 [ffff89240e1a3f50] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8f395f92

    crash> net_device.state ffff89443b0c0000
      state = 0x5  (__LINK_STATE_START| __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER)

To prevent this scenario, we also make sure that the netdevice is present.

Signed-off-by: suresh kumar <suresh2514@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 11, 2022
[ Upstream commit af68656 ]

While handling PCI errors (AER flow) driver tries to
disable NAPI [napi_disable()] after NAPI is deleted
[__netif_napi_del()] which causes unexpected system
hang/crash.

System message log shows the following:
=======================================
[ 3222.537510] EEH: Detected PCI bus error on PHB#384-PE#800000 [ 3222.537511] EEH: This PCI device has failed 2 times in the last hour and will be permanently disabled after 5 failures.
[ 3222.537512] EEH: Notify device drivers to shutdown [ 3222.537513] EEH: Beginning: 'error_detected(IO frozen)'
[ 3222.537514] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking
bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen)
[ 3222.537516] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth14)]IO error detected [ 3222.537650] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): bnx2x driver reports:
'need reset'
[ 3222.537651] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): Invoking
bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen)
[ 3222.537651] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth13)]IO error detected [ 3222.537729] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): bnx2x driver reports:
'need reset'
[ 3222.537729] EEH: Finished:'error_detected(IO frozen)' with aggregate recovery state:'need reset'
[ 3222.537890] EEH: Collect temporary log [ 3222.583481] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.0 [ 3222.583519] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow:
[ 3222.583744] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.583892] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows:
[ 3222.584079] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.584230] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.584378] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.1 [ 3222.584454] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.584491] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.584492] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow:
[ 3222.584677] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.584825] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows:
[ 3222.585011] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.585160] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.585309] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.585347] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.586872] RTAS: event: 5, Type: Platform Error (224), Severity: 2 [ 3222.586873] EEH: Reset without hotplug activity [ 3224.762767] EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset'
[ 3224.762770] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking
bnx2x->slot_reset()
[ 3224.762771] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14271(eth14)]IO slot reset initializing...
[ 3224.762887] bnx2x 0384:80:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142) [ 3224.768157] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14287(eth14)]IO slot reset
--> driver unload

Uninterruptible tasks
=====================
crash> ps | grep UN
     213      2  11  c000000004c89e00  UN   0.0       0      0  [eehd]
     215      2   0  c000000004c80000  UN   0.0       0      0
[kworker/0:2]
    2196      1  28  c000000004504f00  UN   0.1   15936  11136  wickedd
    4287      1   9  c00000020d076800  UN   0.0    4032   3008  agetty
    4289      1  20  c00000020d056680  UN   0.0    7232   3840  agetty
   32423      2  26  c00000020038c580  UN   0.0       0      0
[kworker/26:3]
   32871   4241  27  c0000002609ddd00  UN   0.1   18624  11648  sshd
   32920  10130  16  c00000027284a100  UN   0.1   48512  12608  sendmail
   33092  32987   0  c000000205218b00  UN   0.1   48512  12608  sendmail
   33154   4567  16  c000000260e51780  UN   0.1   48832  12864  pickup
   33209   4241  36  c000000270cb6500  UN   0.1   18624  11712  sshd
   33473  33283   0  c000000205211480  UN   0.1   48512  12672  sendmail
   33531   4241  37  c00000023c902780  UN   0.1   18624  11648  sshd

EEH handler hung while bnx2x sleeping and holding RTNL lock
===========================================================
crash> bt 213
PID: 213    TASK: c000000004c89e00  CPU: 11  COMMAND: "eehd"
  #0 [c000000004d477e0] __schedule at c000000000c70808
  #1 [c000000004d478b0] schedule at c000000000c70ee0
  #2 [c000000004d478e0] schedule_timeout at c000000000c76dec
  #3 [c000000004d479c0] msleep at c0000000002120cc
  #4 [c000000004d479f0] napi_disable at c000000000a06448
                                        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  #5 [c000000004d47a30] bnx2x_netif_stop at c0080000018dba94 [bnx2x]
  #6 [c000000004d47a60] bnx2x_io_slot_reset at c0080000018a551c [bnx2x]
  #7 [c000000004d47b20] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004c9bc
  #8 [c000000004d47b90] eeh_pe_report at c00000000004d1a8
  #9 [c000000004d47c40] eeh_handle_normal_event at c00000000004da64

And the sleeping source code
============================
crash> dis -ls c000000000a06448
FILE: ../net/core/dev.c
LINE: 6702

   6697  {
   6698          might_sleep();
   6699          set_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state);
   6700
   6701          while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state))
* 6702                  msleep(1);
   6703          while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NPSVC, &n->state))
   6704                  msleep(1);
   6705
   6706          hrtimer_cancel(&n->timer);
   6707
   6708          clear_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state);
   6709  }

EEH calls into bnx2x twice based on the system log above, first through
bnx2x_io_error_detected() and then bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), and executes
the following call chains:

bnx2x_io_error_detected()
  +-> bnx2x_eeh_nic_unload()
       +-> bnx2x_del_all_napi()
            +-> __netif_napi_del()

bnx2x_io_slot_reset()
  +-> bnx2x_netif_stop()
       +-> bnx2x_napi_disable()
            +->napi_disable()

Fix this by correcting the sequence of NAPI APIs usage,
that is delete the NAPI after disabling it.

Fixes: 7fa6f34 ("bnx2x: AER revised")
Reported-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <aelior@marvell.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220426153913.6966-1-manishc@marvell.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 3, 2022
commit 91a7cda upstream.

This fixes the following error caused by a race condition between
phydev->adjust_link() and a MDIO transaction in the phy interrupt
handler. The issue was reproduced with the ethernet FEC driver and a
micrel KSZ9031 phy.

[  146.195696] fec 2188000.ethernet eth0: MDIO read timeout
[  146.201779] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  146.206671] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 571 at drivers/net/phy/phy.c:942 phy_error+0x24/0x6c
[  146.214744] Modules linked in: bnep imx_vdoa imx_sdma evbug
[  146.220640] CPU: 0 PID: 571 Comm: irq/128-2188000 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc3-00080-gd569e86915b7 #9
[  146.229563] Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree)
[  146.236257]  unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14
[  146.241640]  show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x70
[  146.246841]  dump_stack_lvl from __warn+0xb4/0x24c
[  146.251772]  __warn from warn_slowpath_fmt+0x5c/0xd4
[  146.256873]  warn_slowpath_fmt from phy_error+0x24/0x6c
[  146.262249]  phy_error from kszphy_handle_interrupt+0x40/0x48
[  146.268159]  kszphy_handle_interrupt from irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78
[  146.274417]  irq_thread_fn from irq_thread+0xf0/0x1dc
[  146.279605]  irq_thread from kthread+0xe4/0x104
[  146.284267]  kthread from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
[  146.289164] Exception stack(0xe6fa1fb0 to 0xe6fa1ff8)
[  146.294448] 1fa0:                                     00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[  146.302842] 1fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[  146.311281] 1fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000
[  146.318262] irq event stamp: 12325
[  146.321780] hardirqs last  enabled at (12333): [<c01984c4>] __up_console_sem+0x50/0x60
[  146.330013] hardirqs last disabled at (12342): [<c01984b0>] __up_console_sem+0x3c/0x60
[  146.338259] softirqs last  enabled at (12324): [<c01017f0>] __do_softirq+0x2c0/0x624
[  146.346311] softirqs last disabled at (12319): [<c01300ac>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x178
[  146.354447] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

With the FEC driver phydev->adjust_link() calls fec_enet_adjust_link()
calls fec_stop()/fec_restart() and both these function reset and
temporary disable the FEC disrupting any MII transaction that
could be happening at the same time.

fec_enet_adjust_link() and phy_read() can be running at the same time
when we have one additional interrupt before the phy_state_machine() is
able to terminate.

Thread 1 (phylib WQ)       | Thread 2 (phy interrupt)
                           |
                           | phy_interrupt()            <-- PHY IRQ
                           |  handle_interrupt()
                           |   phy_read()
                           |   phy_trigger_machine()
                           |    --> schedule phylib WQ
                           |
                           |
phy_state_machine()        |
 phy_check_link_status()   |
  phy_link_change()        |
   phydev->adjust_link()   |
    fec_enet_adjust_link() |
     --> FEC reset         | phy_interrupt()            <-- PHY IRQ
                           |  phy_read()
                           |

Fix this by acquiring the phydev lock in phy_interrupt().

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220422152612.GA510015@francesco-nb.int.toradex.com/
Fixes: c974bdb ("net: phy: Use threaded IRQ, to allow IRQ from sleeping devices")
cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Francesco Dolcini <francesco.dolcini@toradex.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506060815.327382-1-francesco.dolcini@toradex.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 3, 2022
[ Upstream commit 4503cc7 ]

Do not allow to write timestamps on RX rings if PF is being configured.
When PF is being configured RX rings can be freed or rebuilt. If at the
same time timestamps are updated, the kernel will crash by dereferencing
null RX ring pointer.

PID: 1449   TASK: ff187d28ed658040  CPU: 34  COMMAND: "ice-ptp-0000:51"
 #0 [ff1966a94a713bb0] machine_kexec at ffffffff9d05a0be
 #1 [ff1966a94a713c08] __crash_kexec at ffffffff9d192e9d
 #2 [ff1966a94a713cd0] crash_kexec at ffffffff9d1941bd
 #3 [ff1966a94a713ce8] oops_end at ffffffff9d01bd54
 #4 [ff1966a94a713d08] no_context at ffffffff9d06bda4
 #5 [ff1966a94a713d60] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff9d06c10c
 #6 [ff1966a94a713da8] do_page_fault at ffffffff9d06cae4
 #7 [ff1966a94a713de0] page_fault at ffffffff9da0107e
    [exception RIP: ice_ptp_update_cached_phctime+91]
    RIP: ffffffffc076db8b  RSP: ff1966a94a713e98  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 16e3db9c6b7ccae4  RBX: ff187d269dd3c180  RCX: ff187d269cd4d018
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000000  RDI: 0000000000000000
    RBP: ff187d269cfcc644   R8: ff187d339b9641b0   R9: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000002  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ff187d269cfcc648
    R13: ffffffff9f128784  R14: ffffffff9d101b70  R15: ff187d269cfcc640
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #8 [ff1966a94a713ea0] ice_ptp_periodic_work at ffffffffc076dbef [ice]
 #9 [ff1966a94a713ee0] kthread_worker_fn at ffffffff9d101c1b
 #10 [ff1966a94a713f10] kthread at ffffffff9d101b4d
 #11 [ff1966a94a713f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff9da0023f

Fixes: 77a7811 ("ice: enable receive hardware timestamping")
Signed-off-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dave Cain <dcain@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Gurucharan <gurucharanx.g@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 14, 2022
commit 42252d0 upstream.

This patch fixes an invalid read showed by KASAN. A unlock will allocate a
"struct plock_op" and a followed send_op() will append it to a global
send_list data structure. In some cases a followed dev_read() moves it
to recv_list and dev_write() will cast it to "struct plock_xop" and access
fields which are only available in those structures. At this point an
invalid read happens by accessing those fields.

To fix this issue the "callback" field is moved to "struct plock_op" to
indicate that a cast to "plock_xop" is allowed and does the additional
"plock_xop" handling if set.

Example of the KASAN output which showed the invalid read:

[ 2064.296453] ==================================================================
[ 2064.304852] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.306491] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800ef227d8 by task dlm_controld/7484
[ 2064.308168]
[ 2064.308575] CPU: 0 PID: 7484 Comm: dlm_controld Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0+ #9
[ 2064.310292] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
[ 2064.311618] Call Trace:
[ 2064.312218]  dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x7b
[ 2064.313150]  print_address_description.constprop.8+0x21/0x150
[ 2064.314578]  ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.315610]  ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.316595]  kasan_report.cold.14+0x7f/0x11b
[ 2064.317674]  ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.318687]  dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.319629]  ? dev_read+0x4a0/0x4a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.320713]  ? bpf_lsm_kernfs_init_security+0x10/0x10
[ 2064.321926]  vfs_write+0x17e/0x930
[ 2064.322769]  ? __fget_light+0x1aa/0x220
[ 2064.323753]  ksys_write+0xf1/0x1c0
[ 2064.324548]  ? __ia32_sys_read+0xb0/0xb0
[ 2064.325464]  do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[ 2064.326387]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 2064.327606] RIP: 0033:0x7f807e4ba96f
[ 2064.328470] Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 39 87 f8 ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 31 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 7c 87 f8 ff 48
[ 2064.332902] RSP: 002b:00007ffd50cfe6e0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 2064.334658] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055cc3886eb30 RCX: 00007f807e4ba96f
[ 2064.336275] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00007ffd50cfe7e0 RDI: 0000000000000010
[ 2064.337980] RBP: 00007ffd50cfe7e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 2064.339560] R10: 000055cc3886eb30 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000055cc3886eb80
[ 2064.341237] R13: 000055cc3886eb00 R14: 000055cc3886f590 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 2064.342857]
[ 2064.343226] Allocated by task 12438:
[ 2064.344057]  kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2064.345079]  __kasan_kmalloc+0x84/0xa0
[ 2064.345933]  kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x13b/0x220
[ 2064.346953]  dlm_posix_unlock+0xec/0x720 [dlm]
[ 2064.348811]  do_lock_file_wait.part.32+0xca/0x1d0
[ 2064.351070]  fcntl_setlk+0x281/0xbc0
[ 2064.352879]  do_fcntl+0x5e4/0xfe0
[ 2064.354657]  __x64_sys_fcntl+0x11f/0x170
[ 2064.356550]  do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[ 2064.358259]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 2064.360745]
[ 2064.361511] Last potentially related work creation:
[ 2064.363957]  kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2064.365811]  __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xaf/0xc0
[ 2064.368100]  call_rcu+0x11b/0xf70
[ 2064.369785]  dlm_process_incoming_buffer+0x47d/0xfd0 [dlm]
[ 2064.372404]  receive_from_sock+0x290/0x770 [dlm]
[ 2064.374607]  process_recv_sockets+0x32/0x40 [dlm]
[ 2064.377290]  process_one_work+0x9a8/0x16e0
[ 2064.379357]  worker_thread+0x87/0xbf0
[ 2064.381188]  kthread+0x3ac/0x490
[ 2064.383460]  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 2064.385588]
[ 2064.386518] Second to last potentially related work creation:
[ 2064.389219]  kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2064.391043]  __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xaf/0xc0
[ 2064.393303]  call_rcu+0x11b/0xf70
[ 2064.394885]  dlm_process_incoming_buffer+0x47d/0xfd0 [dlm]
[ 2064.397694]  receive_from_sock+0x290/0x770 [dlm]
[ 2064.399932]  process_recv_sockets+0x32/0x40 [dlm]
[ 2064.402180]  process_one_work+0x9a8/0x16e0
[ 2064.404388]  worker_thread+0x87/0xbf0
[ 2064.406124]  kthread+0x3ac/0x490
[ 2064.408021]  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 2064.409834]
[ 2064.410599] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800ef22780
[ 2064.410599]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96
[ 2064.416495] The buggy address is located 88 bytes inside of
[ 2064.416495]  96-byte region [ffff88800ef22780, ffff88800ef227e0)
[ 2064.422045] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 2064.424635] page:00000000b6bef8bc refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xef22
[ 2064.428970] flags: 0xfffffc0000200(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 2064.432515] raw: 000fffffc0000200 ffffea0000d68b80 0000001400000014 ffff888001041780
[ 2064.436110] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 2064.439813] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 2064.442548]
[ 2064.443310] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 2064.445988]  ffff88800ef22680: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
[ 2064.449444]  ffff88800ef22700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
[ 2064.452941] >ffff88800ef22780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc
[ 2064.456383]                                                     ^
[ 2064.459386]  ffff88800ef22800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 2064.462788]  ffff88800ef22880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
[ 2064.466239] ==================================================================

reproducer in python:

import argparse
import struct
import fcntl
import os

parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()

parser.add_argument('-f', '--file',
		    help='file to use fcntl, must be on dlm lock filesystem e.g. gfs2')

args = parser.parse_args()

f = open(args.file, 'wb+')

lockdata = struct.pack('hhllhh', fcntl.F_WRLCK,0,0,0,0,0)
fcntl.fcntl(f, fcntl.F_SETLK, lockdata)
lockdata = struct.pack('hhllhh', fcntl.F_UNLCK,0,0,0,0,0)
fcntl.fcntl(f, fcntl.F_SETLK, lockdata)

Fixes: 586759f ("gfs2: nfs lock support for gfs2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 16, 2022
[ Upstream commit c3ed222 ]

Send along the already-allocated fattr along with nfs4_fs_locations, and
drop the memcpy of fattr.  We end up growing two more allocations, but this
fixes up a crash as:

PID: 790    TASK: ffff88811b43c000  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "ls"
 #0 [ffffc90000857920] panic at ffffffff81b9bfde
 #1 [ffffc900008579c0] do_trap at ffffffff81023a9b
 #2 [ffffc90000857a10] do_error_trap at ffffffff81023b78
 #3 [ffffc90000857a58] exc_stack_segment at ffffffff81be1f45
 #4 [ffffc90000857a80] asm_exc_stack_segment at ffffffff81c009de
 #5 [ffffc90000857b08] nfs_lookup at ffffffffa0302322 [nfs]
 #6 [ffffc90000857b70] __lookup_slow at ffffffff813a4a5f
 #7 [ffffc90000857c60] walk_component at ffffffff813a86c4
 #8 [ffffc90000857cb8] path_lookupat at ffffffff813a9553
 #9 [ffffc90000857cf0] filename_lookup at ffffffff813ab86b

Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com>
Fixes: 9558a00 ("NFS: Remove the label from the nfs4_lookup_res struct")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 16, 2022
commit 42252d0 upstream.

This patch fixes an invalid read showed by KASAN. A unlock will allocate a
"struct plock_op" and a followed send_op() will append it to a global
send_list data structure. In some cases a followed dev_read() moves it
to recv_list and dev_write() will cast it to "struct plock_xop" and access
fields which are only available in those structures. At this point an
invalid read happens by accessing those fields.

To fix this issue the "callback" field is moved to "struct plock_op" to
indicate that a cast to "plock_xop" is allowed and does the additional
"plock_xop" handling if set.

Example of the KASAN output which showed the invalid read:

[ 2064.296453] ==================================================================
[ 2064.304852] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.306491] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800ef227d8 by task dlm_controld/7484
[ 2064.308168]
[ 2064.308575] CPU: 0 PID: 7484 Comm: dlm_controld Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0+ #9
[ 2064.310292] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
[ 2064.311618] Call Trace:
[ 2064.312218]  dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x7b
[ 2064.313150]  print_address_description.constprop.8+0x21/0x150
[ 2064.314578]  ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.315610]  ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.316595]  kasan_report.cold.14+0x7f/0x11b
[ 2064.317674]  ? dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.318687]  dev_write+0x52b/0x5a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.319629]  ? dev_read+0x4a0/0x4a0 [dlm]
[ 2064.320713]  ? bpf_lsm_kernfs_init_security+0x10/0x10
[ 2064.321926]  vfs_write+0x17e/0x930
[ 2064.322769]  ? __fget_light+0x1aa/0x220
[ 2064.323753]  ksys_write+0xf1/0x1c0
[ 2064.324548]  ? __ia32_sys_read+0xb0/0xb0
[ 2064.325464]  do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[ 2064.326387]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 2064.327606] RIP: 0033:0x7f807e4ba96f
[ 2064.328470] Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 39 87 f8 ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 31 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 7c 87 f8 ff 48
[ 2064.332902] RSP: 002b:00007ffd50cfe6e0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 2064.334658] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055cc3886eb30 RCX: 00007f807e4ba96f
[ 2064.336275] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00007ffd50cfe7e0 RDI: 0000000000000010
[ 2064.337980] RBP: 00007ffd50cfe7e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 2064.339560] R10: 000055cc3886eb30 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000055cc3886eb80
[ 2064.341237] R13: 000055cc3886eb00 R14: 000055cc3886f590 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 2064.342857]
[ 2064.343226] Allocated by task 12438:
[ 2064.344057]  kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2064.345079]  __kasan_kmalloc+0x84/0xa0
[ 2064.345933]  kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x13b/0x220
[ 2064.346953]  dlm_posix_unlock+0xec/0x720 [dlm]
[ 2064.348811]  do_lock_file_wait.part.32+0xca/0x1d0
[ 2064.351070]  fcntl_setlk+0x281/0xbc0
[ 2064.352879]  do_fcntl+0x5e4/0xfe0
[ 2064.354657]  __x64_sys_fcntl+0x11f/0x170
[ 2064.356550]  do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[ 2064.358259]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 2064.360745]
[ 2064.361511] Last potentially related work creation:
[ 2064.363957]  kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2064.365811]  __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xaf/0xc0
[ 2064.368100]  call_rcu+0x11b/0xf70
[ 2064.369785]  dlm_process_incoming_buffer+0x47d/0xfd0 [dlm]
[ 2064.372404]  receive_from_sock+0x290/0x770 [dlm]
[ 2064.374607]  process_recv_sockets+0x32/0x40 [dlm]
[ 2064.377290]  process_one_work+0x9a8/0x16e0
[ 2064.379357]  worker_thread+0x87/0xbf0
[ 2064.381188]  kthread+0x3ac/0x490
[ 2064.383460]  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 2064.385588]
[ 2064.386518] Second to last potentially related work creation:
[ 2064.389219]  kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2064.391043]  __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xaf/0xc0
[ 2064.393303]  call_rcu+0x11b/0xf70
[ 2064.394885]  dlm_process_incoming_buffer+0x47d/0xfd0 [dlm]
[ 2064.397694]  receive_from_sock+0x290/0x770 [dlm]
[ 2064.399932]  process_recv_sockets+0x32/0x40 [dlm]
[ 2064.402180]  process_one_work+0x9a8/0x16e0
[ 2064.404388]  worker_thread+0x87/0xbf0
[ 2064.406124]  kthread+0x3ac/0x490
[ 2064.408021]  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 2064.409834]
[ 2064.410599] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800ef22780
[ 2064.410599]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96
[ 2064.416495] The buggy address is located 88 bytes inside of
[ 2064.416495]  96-byte region [ffff88800ef22780, ffff88800ef227e0)
[ 2064.422045] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 2064.424635] page:00000000b6bef8bc refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xef22
[ 2064.428970] flags: 0xfffffc0000200(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 2064.432515] raw: 000fffffc0000200 ffffea0000d68b80 0000001400000014 ffff888001041780
[ 2064.436110] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 2064.439813] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 2064.442548]
[ 2064.443310] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 2064.445988]  ffff88800ef22680: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
[ 2064.449444]  ffff88800ef22700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
[ 2064.452941] >ffff88800ef22780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc
[ 2064.456383]                                                     ^
[ 2064.459386]  ffff88800ef22800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 2064.462788]  ffff88800ef22880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
[ 2064.466239] ==================================================================

reproducer in python:

import argparse
import struct
import fcntl
import os

parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()

parser.add_argument('-f', '--file',
		    help='file to use fcntl, must be on dlm lock filesystem e.g. gfs2')

args = parser.parse_args()

f = open(args.file, 'wb+')

lockdata = struct.pack('hhllhh', fcntl.F_WRLCK,0,0,0,0,0)
fcntl.fcntl(f, fcntl.F_SETLK, lockdata)
lockdata = struct.pack('hhllhh', fcntl.F_UNLCK,0,0,0,0,0)
fcntl.fcntl(f, fcntl.F_SETLK, lockdata)

Fixes: 586759f ("gfs2: nfs lock support for gfs2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
13r0ck pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 4, 2022
[ Upstream commit 3f6a57e ]

Fix the following use-after-free bug in igb_clean_tx_ring routine when
the NIC is running in XDP mode. The issue can be triggered redirecting
traffic into the igb NIC and then closing the device while the traffic
is flowing.

[   73.322719] CPU: 1 PID: 487 Comm: xdp_redirect Not tainted 5.18.3-apu2 #9
[   73.330639] Hardware name: PC Engines APU2/APU2, BIOS 4.0.7 02/28/2017
[   73.337434] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xa7/0xf0
[   73.362283] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000081f798 EFLAGS: 00010282
[   73.367761] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc90000420f80 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   73.375200] RDX: ffff88811ad22d00 RSI: ffff88811ad171e0 RDI: ffff88811ad171e0
[   73.382590] RBP: 0000000000000900 R08: ffffffff82298f28 R09: 0000000000000058
[   73.390008] R10: 0000000000000219 R11: ffffffff82280f40 R12: 0000000000000090
[   73.397356] R13: ffff888102343a40 R14: ffff88810359e0e4 R15: 0000000000000000
[   73.404806] FS:  00007ff38d31d740(0000) GS:ffff88811ad00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   73.413129] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   73.419096] CR2: 000055cff35f13f8 CR3: 0000000106391000 CR4: 00000000000406e0
[   73.426565] Call Trace:
[   73.429087]  <TASK>
[   73.431314]  igb_clean_tx_ring+0x43/0x140 [igb]
[   73.436002]  igb_down+0x1d7/0x220 [igb]
[   73.439974]  __igb_close+0x3c/0x120 [igb]
[   73.444118]  igb_xdp+0x10c/0x150 [igb]
[   73.447983]  ? igb_pci_sriov_configure+0x70/0x70 [igb]
[   73.453362]  dev_xdp_install+0xda/0x110
[   73.457371]  dev_xdp_attach+0x1da/0x550
[   73.461369]  do_setlink+0xfd0/0x10f0
[   73.465166]  ? __nla_validate_parse+0x89/0xc70
[   73.469714]  rtnl_setlink+0x11a/0x1e0
[   73.473547]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x145/0x3d0
[   73.477709]  ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x130/0x130
[   73.482258]  netlink_rcv_skb+0x8d/0x110
[   73.486229]  netlink_unicast+0x230/0x340
[   73.490317]  netlink_sendmsg+0x215/0x470
[   73.494395]  __sys_sendto+0x179/0x190
[   73.498268]  ? move_addr_to_user+0x37/0x70
[   73.502547]  ? __sys_getsockname+0x84/0xe0
[   73.506853]  ? netlink_setsockopt+0x1c1/0x4a0
[   73.511349]  ? __sys_setsockopt+0xc8/0x1d0
[   73.515636]  __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30
[   73.519603]  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x80
[   73.523399]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[   73.528712] RIP: 0033:0x7ff38d41f20c
[   73.551866] RSP: 002b:00007fff3b945a68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[   73.559640] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ff38d41f20c
[   73.567066] RDX: 0000000000000034 RSI: 00007fff3b945b30 RDI: 0000000000000003
[   73.574457] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   73.581852] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff3b945ab0
[   73.589179] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00007fff3b945b30
[   73.596545]  </TASK>
[   73.598842] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Fixes: 9cbc948 ("igb: add XDP support")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jesse Brandeburg <jesse.brandeburg@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e5c01d549dc37bff18e46aeabd6fb28a7bcf84be.1655388571.git.lorenzo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
13r0ck pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 8, 2022
commit 4f40a5b upstream.

This was missed in c3ed222 ("NFSv4: Fix free of uninitialized
nfs4_label on referral lookup.") and causes a panic when mounting
with '-o trunkdiscovery':

PID: 1604   TASK: ffff93dac3520000  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "mount.nfs"
 #0 [ffffb79140f738f8] machine_kexec at ffffffffaec64bee
 #1 [ffffb79140f73950] __crash_kexec at ffffffffaeda67fd
 #2 [ffffb79140f73a18] crash_kexec at ffffffffaeda76ed
 #3 [ffffb79140f73a30] oops_end at ffffffffaec2658d
 #4 [ffffb79140f73a50] general_protection at ffffffffaf60111e
    [exception RIP: nfs_fattr_init+0x5]
    RIP: ffffffffc0c18265  RSP: ffffb79140f73b08  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff93dac304a800  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: ffffb79140f73bb0  RSI: ffff93dadc8cbb40  RDI: d03ee11cfaf6bd50
    RBP: ffffb79140f73be8   R8: ffffffffc0691560   R9: 0000000000000006
    R10: ffff93db3ffd3df8  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffff93dac4040000
    R13: ffff93dac2848e00  R14: ffffb79140f73b60  R15: ffffb79140f73b30
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #5 [ffffb79140f73b08] _nfs41_proc_get_locations at ffffffffc0c73d53 [nfsv4]
 #6 [ffffb79140f73bf0] nfs4_proc_get_locations at ffffffffc0c83e90 [nfsv4]
 #7 [ffffb79140f73c60] nfs4_discover_trunking at ffffffffc0c83fb7 [nfsv4]
 #8 [ffffb79140f73cd8] nfs_probe_fsinfo at ffffffffc0c0f95f [nfs]
 #9 [ffffb79140f73da0] nfs_probe_server at ffffffffc0c1026a [nfs]
    RIP: 00007f6254fce26e  RSP: 00007ffc69496ac8  RFLAGS: 00000246
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda  RBX: 0000000000000000  RCX: 00007f6254fce26e
    RDX: 00005600220a82a0  RSI: 00005600220a64d0  RDI: 00005600220a6520
    RBP: 00007ffc69496c50   R8: 00005600220a8710   R9: 003035322e323231
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000246  R12: 00007ffc69496c50
    R13: 00005600220a8440  R14: 0000000000000010  R15: 0000560020650ef9
    ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5  CS: 0033  SS: 002b

Fixes: c3ed222 ("NFSv4: Fix free of uninitialized nfs4_label on referral lookup.")
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 13, 2022
[ Upstream commit cbdeaee ]

There is a null-ptr-deref when xps sysfs alloc failed:
  BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in sysfs_do_create_link_sd+0x40/0xd0
  Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000030 by task gssproxy/457

  CPU: 5 PID: 457 Comm: gssproxy Not tainted 6.0.0-09040-g02357b27ee03 #9
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
   kasan_report+0xa3/0x120
   sysfs_do_create_link_sd+0x40/0xd0
   rpc_sysfs_client_setup+0x161/0x1b0
   rpc_new_client+0x3fc/0x6e0
   rpc_create_xprt+0x71/0x220
   rpc_create+0x1d4/0x350
   gssp_rpc_create+0xc3/0x160
   set_gssp_clnt+0xbc/0x140
   write_gssp+0x116/0x1a0
   proc_reg_write+0xd6/0x130
   vfs_write+0x177/0x690
   ksys_write+0xb9/0x150
   do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

When the xprt_switch sysfs alloc failed, should not add xprt and
switch sysfs to it, otherwise, maybe null-ptr-deref; also initialize
the 'xps_sysfs' to NULL to avoid oops when destroy it.

Fixes: 2a338a5 ("sunrpc: add a symlink from rpc-client directory to the xprt_switch")
Fixes: d408ebe ("sunrpc: add add sysfs directory per xprt under each xprt_switch")
Fixes: baea994 ("sunrpc: add xprt_switch direcotry to sunrpc's sysfs")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 13, 2022
[ Upstream commit 3788210 ]

When KASAN is enabled, below log might be dumped with Intel EHL hardware:
[   48.583597] ==================================================================
[   48.585921] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hdac_hda_dai_hw_params+0x20a/0x22b [snd_soc_hdac_hda]
[   48.587995] Write of size 4 at addr ffff888103489708 by task pulseaudio/759

[   48.589237] CPU: 2 PID: 759 Comm: pulseaudio Tainted: G     U      E     5.15.71-intel-ese-standard-lts #9
[   48.591272] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Elkhart Lake Embedded Platform/ElkhartLake LPDDR4x T3 CRB, BIOS EHLSFWI1.R00.4251.A01.2206130432 06/13/2022
[   48.593010] Call Trace:
[   48.593648]  <TASK>
[   48.593852]  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48
[   48.594404]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140
[   48.595174]  ? hdac_hda_dai_hw_params+0x20a/0x22b [snd_soc_hdac_hda]
[   48.595868]  ? hdac_hda_dai_hw_params+0x20a/0x22b [snd_soc_hdac_hda]
[   48.596519]  kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
[   48.597003]  ? hdac_hda_dai_hw_params+0x20a/0x22b [snd_soc_hdac_hda]
[   48.597885]  hdac_hda_dai_hw_params+0x20a/0x22b [snd_soc_hdac_hda]

HDAC_LAST_DAI_ID is last index id, pcm buffer array size should
be +1 to avoid out of bound access.

Fixes: 608b8c3 ("ASoC: hdac_hda: add support for HDMI/DP as a HDA codec")
Reviewed-by: Kai Vehmanen <kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Chang <junxiao.chang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Furong Zhou <furong.zhou@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221109234023.3111035-1-junxiao.chang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 13, 2022
commit 89d21e2 upstream.

test_bpf tail call tests end up as:

  test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 85 PASS
  test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 111 PASS
  test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 145 PASS
  test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 170 PASS
  test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 190 PASS
  test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1
  BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xf1b4e000
  Faulting instruction address: 0xbe86b710
  Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
  BE PAGE_SIZE=4K MMU=Hash PowerMac
  Modules linked in: test_bpf(+)
  CPU: 0 PID: 97 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4+ #195
  Hardware name: PowerMac3,1 750CL 0x87210 PowerMac
  NIP:  be86b710 LR: be857e88 CTR: be86b704
  REGS: f1b4df20 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted  (6.1.0-rc4+)
  MSR:  00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI>  CR: 28008242  XER: 00000000
  DAR: f1b4e000 DSISR: 42000000
  GPR00: 00000001 f1b4dfe c11d2280 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000002 00000000
  GPR08: f1b4e000 be86b704 f1b4e000 00000000 00000000 100d816a f2440000 fe73baa8
  GPR16: f2458000 00000000 c1941ae4 f1fe2248 00000045 c0de0000 f2458030 00000000
  GPR24: 000003e8 0000000f f2458000 f1b4dc90 3e584b46 00000000 f24466a0 c1941a00
  NIP [be86b710] 0xbe86b710
  LR [be857e88] __run_one+0xec/0x264 [test_bpf]
  Call Trace:
  [f1b4dfe] [00000002] 0x2 (unreliable)
  Instruction dump:
  XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
  XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

This is a tentative to write above the stack. The problem is encoutered
with tests added by commit 38608ee ("bpf, tests: Add load store
test case for tail call")

This happens because tail call is done to a BPF prog with a different
stack_depth. At the time being, the stack is kept as is when the caller
tail calls its callee. But at exit, the callee restores the stack based
on its own properties. Therefore here, at each run, r1 is erroneously
increased by 32 - 16 = 16 bytes.

This was done that way in order to pass the tail call count from caller
to callee through the stack. As powerpc32 doesn't have a red zone in
the stack, it was necessary the maintain the stack as is for the tail
call. But it was not anticipated that the BPF frame size could be
different.

Let's take a new approach. Use register r4 to carry the tail call count
during the tail call, and save it into the stack at function entry if
required. This means the input parameter must be in r3, which is more
correct as it is a 32 bits parameter, then tail call better match with
normal BPF function entry, the down side being that we move that input
parameter back and forth between r3 and r4. That can be optimised later.

Doing that also has the advantage of maximising the common parts between
tail calls and a normal function exit.

With the fix, tail call tests are now successfull:

  test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 53 PASS
  test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 115 PASS
  test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 154 PASS
  test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 165 PASS
  test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 101 PASS
  test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 141 PASS
  test_bpf: #6 Tail call error path, max count reached jited:1 994 PASS
  test_bpf: #7 Tail call count preserved across function calls jited:1 140975 PASS
  test_bpf: #8 Tail call error path, NULL target jited:1 110 PASS
  test_bpf: #9 Tail call error path, index out of range jited:1 69 PASS
  test_bpf: test_tail_calls: Summary: 10 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [10/10 JIT'ed]

Suggested-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Fixes: 51c66ad ("powerpc/bpf: Implement extended BPF on PPC32")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Tested-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/757acccb7fbfc78efa42dcf3c974b46678198905.1669278887.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
13r0ck pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 13, 2023
[ Upstream commit e40b801 ]

There is a certain chance to trigger the following panic:

PID: 5900   TASK: ffff88c1c8af4100  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "kworker/1:48"
 #0 [ffff9456c1cc79a0] machine_kexec at ffffffff870665b7
 #1 [ffff9456c1cc79f0] __crash_kexec at ffffffff871b4c7a
 #2 [ffff9456c1cc7ab0] crash_kexec at ffffffff871b5b60
 #3 [ffff9456c1cc7ac0] oops_end at ffffffff87026ce7
 #4 [ffff9456c1cc7ae0] page_fault_oops at ffffffff87075715
 #5 [ffff9456c1cc7b58] exc_page_fault at ffffffff87ad0654
 #6 [ffff9456c1cc7b80] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff87c00b62
    [exception RIP: ib_alloc_mr+19]
    RIP: ffffffffc0c9cce3  RSP: ffff9456c1cc7c38  RFLAGS: 00010202
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: 0000000000000002  RCX: 0000000000000004
    RDX: 0000000000000010  RSI: 0000000000000000  RDI: 0000000000000000
    RBP: ffff88c1ea281d00   R8: 000000020a34ffff   R9: ffff88c1350bbb20
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000010  R14: ffff88c1ab040a50  R15: ffff88c1ea281d00
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffff9456c1cc7c60] smc_ib_get_memory_region at ffffffffc0aff6df [smc]
 #8 [ffff9456c1cc7c88] smcr_buf_map_link at ffffffffc0b0278c [smc]
 #9 [ffff9456c1cc7ce0] __smc_buf_create at ffffffffc0b03586 [smc]

The reason here is that when the server tries to create a second link,
smc_llc_srv_add_link() has no protection and may add a new link to
link group. This breaks the security environment protected by
llc_conf_mutex.

Fixes: 2d2209f ("net/smc: first part of add link processing as SMC server")
Signed-off-by: D. Wythe <alibuda@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
13r0ck pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 13, 2023
[ Upstream commit 91621be ]

When --overwrite and --max-size options of perf record are used
together, a segmentation fault occurs. The following is an example:

  # perf record -e sched:sched* --overwrite --max-size 1K -a -- sleep 1
  [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
  perf: Segmentation fault
  Obtained 12 stack frames.
  ./perf/perf(+0x197673) [0x55f99710b673]
  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x3ef0f) [0x7fa45f3cff0f]
  ./perf/perf(+0x8eb40) [0x55f997002b40]
  ./perf/perf(+0x1f6882) [0x55f99716a882]
  ./perf/perf(+0x794c2) [0x55f996fed4c2]
  ./perf/perf(+0x7b7c7) [0x55f996fef7c7]
  ./perf/perf(+0x9074b) [0x55f99700474b]
  ./perf/perf(+0x12e23c) [0x55f9970a223c]
  ./perf/perf(+0x12e54a) [0x55f9970a254a]
  ./perf/perf(+0x7db60) [0x55f996ff1b60]
  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xe6) [0x7fa45f3b2c86]
  ./perf/perf(+0x7dfe9) [0x55f996ff1fe9]
  Segmentation fault (core dumped)

backtrace of the core file is as follows:

  (gdb) bt
  #0  record__bytes_written (rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:234
  #1  record__output_max_size_exceeded (rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:242
  #2  record__write (map=0x0, size=12816, bf=0x55f9978da2e0, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:263
  #3  process_synthesized_event (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, event=event@entry=0x55f9978da2e0, sample=sample@entry=0x0, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658) at builtin-record.c:618
  #4  0x000055f99716a883 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, process=process@entry=0x55f997002aa0 <process_synthesized_event>, evlist=0x55f9978928b0, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658,
      from=from@entry=0) at util/synthetic-events.c:1895
  #5  0x000055f99716a91f in perf_event__synthesize_id_index (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, process=process@entry=0x55f997002aa0 <process_synthesized_event>, evlist=<optimized out>, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658)
      at util/synthetic-events.c:1905
  #6  0x000055f996fed4c3 in record__synthesize (tail=tail@entry=true, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:1997
  #7  0x000055f996fef7c8 in __cmd_record (argc=argc@entry=2, argv=argv@entry=0x7ffc67551260, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:2802
  #8  0x000055f99700474c in cmd_record (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at builtin-record.c:4258
  #9  0x000055f9970a223d in run_builtin (p=0x55f997564d88 <commands+264>, argc=10, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:330
  #10 0x000055f9970a254b in handle_internal_command (argc=10, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:384
  #11 0x000055f996ff1b61 in run_argv (argcp=<synthetic pointer>, argv=<synthetic pointer>) at perf.c:428
  #12 main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:562

The reason is that record__bytes_written accesses the freed memory rec->thread_data,
The process is as follows:
  __cmd_record
    -> record__free_thread_data
      -> zfree(&rec->thread_data)         // free rec->thread_data
    -> record__synthesize
      -> perf_event__synthesize_id_index
        -> process_synthesized_event
          -> record__write
            -> record__bytes_written      // access rec->thread_data

We add a member variable "thread_bytes_written" in the struct "record"
to save the data size written by the threads.

Fixes: 6d57581 ("perf record: Add support for limit perf output file size")
Signed-off-by: Yang Jihong <yangjihong1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiwei Sun <jiwei.sun@windriver.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAM9d7ci_TRrqBQVQNW8=GwakUr7SsZpYxaaty-S4bxF8zJWyqw@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
13r0ck pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 13, 2023
commit 60eed1e upstream.

code path:

ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents
 ocfs2_move_extents
  ocfs2_defrag_extent
   __ocfs2_move_extent
    + ocfs2_journal_access_di
    + ocfs2_split_extent  //sub-paths call jbd2_journal_restart
    + ocfs2_journal_dirty //crash by jbs2 ASSERT

crash stacks:

PID: 11297  TASK: ffff974a676dcd00  CPU: 67  COMMAND: "defragfs.ocfs2"
 #0 [ffffb25d8dad3900] machine_kexec at ffffffff8386fe01
 #1 [ffffb25d8dad3958] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8395959d
 #2 [ffffb25d8dad3a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff8395a45d
 #3 [ffffb25d8dad3a38] oops_end at ffffffff83836d3f
 #4 [ffffb25d8dad3a58] do_trap at ffffffff83833205
 #5 [ffffb25d8dad3aa0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff83833aa6
 #6 [ffffb25d8dad3ac0] invalid_op at ffffffff84200d18
    [exception RIP: jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x2ba]
    RIP: ffffffffc09ca54a  RSP: ffffb25d8dad3b70  RFLAGS: 00010207
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff9706eedc5248  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000001  RSI: ffff97337029ea28  RDI: ffff9706eedc5250
    RBP: ffff9703c3520200   R8: 000000000f46b0b2   R9: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000001  R11: 00000001000000fe  R12: ffff97337029ea28
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: ffff9703de59bf60  R15: ffff9706eedc5250
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffffb25d8dad3ba8] ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc137fb95 [ocfs2]
 #8 [ffffb25d8dad3be8] __ocfs2_move_extent at ffffffffc139a950 [ocfs2]
 #9 [ffffb25d8dad3c80] ocfs2_defrag_extent at ffffffffc139b2d2 [ocfs2]

Analysis

This bug has the same root cause of 'commit 7f27ec9 ("ocfs2: call
ocfs2_journal_access_di() before ocfs2_journal_dirty() in
ocfs2_write_end_nolock()")'.  For this bug, jbd2_journal_restart() is
called by ocfs2_split_extent() during defragmenting.

How to fix

For ocfs2_split_extent() can handle journal operations totally by itself.
Caller doesn't need to call journal access/dirty pair, and caller only
needs to call journal start/stop pair.  The fix method is to remove
journal access/dirty from __ocfs2_move_extent().

The discussion for this patch:
https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2023-February/000647.html

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230217003717.32469-1-heming.zhao@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
13r0ck pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 15, 2023
[ Upstream commit 05bb016 ]

ACPICA commit 770653e3ba67c30a629ca7d12e352d83c2541b1e

Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia:

  #0    0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302
  #1.2  0x000020d0f660777f in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f
  #1.1  0x000020d0f660777f in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f
  #1    0x000020d0f660777f in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:387 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f
  #2    0x000020d0f660b96d in handlepointer_overflow_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:809 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4196d
  #3    0x000020d0f660b50d in compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:815 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4150d
  #4    0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302
  #5    0x000021e4213e2369 in acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state*, struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dsmethod.c:605 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x262369
  #6    0x000021e421437fac in acpi_ps_parse_aml(struct acpi_walk_state*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psparse.c:550 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2b7fac
  #7    0x000021e4214464d2 in acpi_ps_execute_method(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psxface.c:244 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2c64d2
  #8    0x000021e4213aa052 in acpi_ns_evaluate(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nseval.c:250 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x22a052
  #9    0x000021e421413dd8 in acpi_ns_init_one_device(acpi_handle, u32, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:735 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x293dd8
  #10   0x000021e421429e98 in acpi_ns_walk_namespace(acpi_object_type, acpi_handle, u32, u32, acpi_walk_callback, acpi_walk_callback, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nswalk.c:298 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a9e98
  #11   0x000021e4214131ac in acpi_ns_initialize_devices(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:268 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2931ac
  #12   0x000021e42147c40d in acpi_initialize_objects(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utxfinit.c:304 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2fc40d
  #13   0x000021e42126d603 in acpi::acpi_impl::initialize_acpi(acpi::acpi_impl*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:224 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0xed603

Add a simple check that avoids incrementing a pointer by zero, but
otherwise behaves as before. Note that our findings are against ACPICA
20221020, but the same code exists on master.

Link: acpica/acpica@770653e3
Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <robert.moore@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
13r0ck pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 15, 2023
[ Upstream commit 37c3b9f ]

The cited commit adds a compeletion to remove dependency on rtnl
lock. But it causes a deadlock for multiple encapsulations:

 crash> bt ffff8aece8a64000
 PID: 1514557  TASK: ffff8aece8a64000  CPU: 3    COMMAND: "tc"
  #0 [ffffa6d14183f368] __schedule at ffffffffb8ba7f45
  #1 [ffffa6d14183f3f8] schedule at ffffffffb8ba8418
  #2 [ffffa6d14183f418] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffb8ba8898
  #3 [ffffa6d14183f428] __mutex_lock at ffffffffb8baa7f8
  #4 [ffffa6d14183f4d0] mutex_lock_nested at ffffffffb8baabeb
  #5 [ffffa6d14183f4e0] mlx5e_attach_encap at ffffffffc0f48c17 [mlx5_core]
  #6 [ffffa6d14183f628] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc0f39680 [mlx5_core]
  #7 [ffffa6d14183f688] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc0f3b636 [mlx5_core]
  #8 [ffffa6d14183f6f0] mlx5e_tc_add_flow at ffffffffc0f3bcdf [mlx5_core]
  #9 [ffffa6d14183f728] mlx5e_configure_flower at ffffffffc0f3c1d1 [mlx5_core]
 #10 [ffffa6d14183f790] mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cls_flower at ffffffffc0f3d529 [mlx5_core]
 #11 [ffffa6d14183f7a0] mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cb at ffffffffc0f3d714 [mlx5_core]
 #12 [ffffa6d14183f7b0] tc_setup_cb_add at ffffffffb8931bb8
 #13 [ffffa6d14183f810] fl_hw_replace_filter at ffffffffc0dae901 [cls_flower]
 #14 [ffffa6d14183f8d8] fl_change at ffffffffc0db5c57 [cls_flower]
 #15 [ffffa6d14183f970] tc_new_tfilter at ffffffffb8936047
 #16 [ffffa6d14183fac8] rtnetlink_rcv_msg at ffffffffb88c7c31
 #17 [ffffa6d14183fb50] netlink_rcv_skb at ffffffffb8942853
 #18 [ffffa6d14183fbc0] rtnetlink_rcv at ffffffffb88c1835
 #19 [ffffa6d14183fbd0] netlink_unicast at ffffffffb8941f27
 #20 [ffffa6d14183fc18] netlink_sendmsg at ffffffffb8942245
 #21 [ffffa6d14183fc98] sock_sendmsg at ffffffffb887d482
 #22 [ffffa6d14183fcb8] ____sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb887d81a
 #23 [ffffa6d14183fd38] ___sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb88806e2
 #24 [ffffa6d14183fe90] __sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb88807a2
 #25 [ffffa6d14183ff28] __x64_sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb888080f
 #26 [ffffa6d14183ff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffffb8b9b6a8
 #27 [ffffa6d14183ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffb8c0007c
 crash> bt 0xffff8aeb07544000
 PID: 1110766  TASK: ffff8aeb07544000  CPU: 0    COMMAND: "kworker/u20:9"
  #0 [ffffa6d14e6b7bd8] __schedule at ffffffffb8ba7f45
  #1 [ffffa6d14e6b7c68] schedule at ffffffffb8ba8418
  #2 [ffffa6d14e6b7c88] schedule_timeout at ffffffffb8baef88
  #3 [ffffa6d14e6b7d10] wait_for_completion at ffffffffb8ba968b
  #4 [ffffa6d14e6b7d60] mlx5e_take_all_encap_flows at ffffffffc0f47ec4 [mlx5_core]
  #5 [ffffa6d14e6b7da0] mlx5e_rep_update_flows at ffffffffc0f3e734 [mlx5_core]
  #6 [ffffa6d14e6b7df8] mlx5e_rep_neigh_update at ffffffffc0f400bb [mlx5_core]
  #7 [ffffa6d14e6b7e50] process_one_work at ffffffffb80acc9c
  #8 [ffffa6d14e6b7ed0] worker_thread at ffffffffb80ad012
  #9 [ffffa6d14e6b7f10] kthread at ffffffffb80b615d
 #10 [ffffa6d14e6b7f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffb8001b2f

After the first encap is attached, flow will be added to encap
entry's flows list. If neigh update is running at this time, the
following encaps of the flow can't hold the encap_tbl_lock and
sleep. If neigh update thread is waiting for that flow's init_done,
deadlock happens.

Fix it by holding lock outside of the for loop. If neigh update is
running, prevent encap flows from offloading. Since the lock is held
outside of the for loop, concurrent creation of encap entries is not
allowed. So remove unnecessary wait_for_completion call for res_ready.

Fixes: 95435ad ("net/mlx5e: Only access fully initialized flows in neigh update")
Signed-off-by: Chris Mi <cmi@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
13r0ck pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 15, 2023
[ Upstream commit 5e6e080 ]

Since flush bios are implemented as writes with no data and
the preflush flag per Christoph's comment [1].

And we need to change it in rnbd accordingly. Otherwise, I
got splatting when create fs from rnbd client.

[  464.028545] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  464.028553] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 65 at block/blk-core.c:751 submit_bio_noacct+0x32c/0x5d0
[ ... ]
[  464.028668] CPU: 0 PID: 65 Comm: kworker/0:1H Tainted: G           OE      6.4.0-rc1 #9
[  464.028671] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
[  464.028673] Workqueue: ib-comp-wq ib_cq_poll_work [ib_core]
[  464.028717] RIP: 0010:submit_bio_noacct+0x32c/0x5d0
[  464.028720] Code: 03 0f 85 51 fe ff ff 48 8b 43 18 8b 88 04 03 00 00 85 c9 0f 85 3f fe ff ff e9 be fd ff ff 0f b6 d0 3c 0d 74 26 83 fa 01 74 21 <0f> 0b b8 0a 00 00 00 e9 56 fd ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 70 a1 03 00 84 c0
[  464.028722] RSP: 0018:ffffaf3680b57c68 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  464.028724] RAX: 0000000000060802 RBX: ffffa09dcc18bf00 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  464.028726] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa09dde081d00
[  464.028727] RBP: ffffaf3680b57c98 R08: ffffa09dde081d00 R09: ffffa09e38327200
[  464.028729] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa09dde081d00
[  464.028730] R13: ffffa09dcb06e1e8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000200000
[  464.028733] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa09e3bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  464.028735] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  464.028736] CR2: 000055a4e8206c40 CR3: 0000000119f06000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
[  464.028738] Call Trace:
[  464.028740]  <TASK>
[  464.028746]  submit_bio+0x1b/0x80
[  464.028748]  rnbd_srv_rdma_ev+0x50d/0x10c0 [rnbd_server]
[  464.028754]  ? percpu_ref_get_many.constprop.0+0x55/0x140 [rtrs_server]
[  464.028760]  ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
[  464.028769]  process_io_req+0x1dc/0x450 [rtrs_server]
[  464.028775]  rtrs_srv_inv_rkey_done+0x67/0xb0 [rtrs_server]
[  464.028780]  __ib_process_cq+0xbc/0x1f0 [ib_core]
[  464.028793]  ib_cq_poll_work+0x2b/0xa0 [ib_core]
[  464.028804]  process_one_work+0x2a9/0x580

[1]. https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZFHgefWofVt24tRl@infradead.org/

Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang <guoqing.jiang@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230512034631.28686-1-guoqing.jiang@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mmstick pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 26, 2023
[ Upstream commit 99d4850 ]

Found by leak sanitizer:
```
==1632594==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

Direct leak of 21 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f2953a7077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439
    #1 0x556701d6fbbf in perf_env__read_cpuid util/env.c:369
    #2 0x556701d70589 in perf_env__cpuid util/env.c:465
    #3 0x55670204bba2 in x86__is_amd_cpu arch/x86/util/env.c:14
    #4 0x5567020487a2 in arch__post_evsel_config arch/x86/util/evsel.c:83
    #5 0x556701d8f78b in evsel__config util/evsel.c:1366
    #6 0x556701ef5872 in evlist__config util/record.c:108
    #7 0x556701cd6bcd in test__PERF_RECORD tests/perf-record.c:112
    #8 0x556701cacd07 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:236
    #9 0x556701cacfac in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:265
    #10 0x556701cadddb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:402
    #11 0x556701caf2aa in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:559
    #12 0x556701d3b557 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323
    #13 0x556701d3bac8 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377
    #14 0x556701d3be90 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421
    #15 0x556701d3c3f8 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537
    #16 0x7f2952a46189 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 21 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
```

Fixes: f7b58cb ("perf mem/c2c: Add load store event mappings for AMD")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613235416.1650755-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mmstick pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 26, 2023
[ Upstream commit b684c09 ]

ppc_save_regs() skips one stack frame while saving the CPU register states.
Instead of saving current R1, it pulls the previous stack frame pointer.

When vmcores caused by direct panic call (such as `echo c >
/proc/sysrq-trigger`), are debugged with gdb, gdb fails to show the
backtrace correctly. On further analysis, it was found that it was because
of mismatch between r1 and NIP.

GDB uses NIP to get current function symbol and uses corresponding debug
info of that function to unwind previous frames, but due to the
mismatching r1 and NIP, the unwinding does not work, and it fails to
unwind to the 2nd frame and hence does not show the backtrace.

GDB backtrace with vmcore of kernel without this patch:

---------
(gdb) bt
 #0  0xc0000000002a53e8 in crash_setup_regs (oldregs=<optimized out>,
    newregs=0xc000000004f8f8d8) at ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h:69
 #1  __crash_kexec (regs=<optimized out>) at kernel/kexec_core.c:974
 #2  0x0000000000000063 in ?? ()
 #3  0xc000000003579320 in ?? ()
---------

Further analysis revealed that the mismatch occurred because
"ppc_save_regs" was saving the previous stack's SP instead of the current
r1. This patch fixes this by storing current r1 in the saved pt_regs.

GDB backtrace with vmcore of patched kernel:

--------
(gdb) bt
 #0  0xc0000000002a53e8 in crash_setup_regs (oldregs=0x0, newregs=0xc00000000670b8d8)
    at ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h:69
 #1  __crash_kexec (regs=regs@entry=0x0) at kernel/kexec_core.c:974
 #2  0xc000000000168918 in panic (fmt=fmt@entry=0xc000000001654a60 "sysrq triggered crash\n")
    at kernel/panic.c:358
 #3  0xc000000000b735f8 in sysrq_handle_crash (key=<optimized out>) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:155
 #4  0xc000000000b742cc in __handle_sysrq (key=key@entry=99, check_mask=check_mask@entry=false)
    at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:602
 #5  0xc000000000b7506c in write_sysrq_trigger (file=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>,
    count=2, ppos=<optimized out>) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:1163
 #6  0xc00000000069a7bc in pde_write (ppos=<optimized out>, count=<optimized out>,
    buf=<optimized out>, file=<optimized out>, pde=0xc00000000362cb40) at fs/proc/inode.c:340
 #7  proc_reg_write (file=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>, count=<optimized out>,
    ppos=<optimized out>) at fs/proc/inode.c:352
 #8  0xc0000000005b3bbc in vfs_write (file=file@entry=0xc000000006aa6b00,
    buf=buf@entry=0x61f498b4f60 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x61f498b4f60>,
    count=count@entry=2, pos=pos@entry=0xc00000000670bda0) at fs/read_write.c:582
 #9  0xc0000000005b4264 in ksys_write (fd=<optimized out>,
    buf=0x61f498b4f60 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x61f498b4f60>, count=2)
    at fs/read_write.c:637
 #10 0xc00000000002ea2c in system_call_exception (regs=0xc00000000670be80, r0=<optimized out>)
    at arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c:171
 #11 0xc00000000000c270 in system_call_vectored_common ()
    at arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt_64.S:192
--------

Nick adds:
  So this now saves regs as though it was an interrupt taken in the
  caller, at the instruction after the call to ppc_save_regs, whereas
  previously the NIP was there, but R1 came from the caller's caller and
  that mismatch is what causes gdb's dwarf unwinder to go haywire.

Signed-off-by: Aditya Gupta <adityag@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: d16a58f ("powerpc: Improve ppc_save_regs()")
Reivewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20230615091047.90433-1-adityag@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mmstick pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 9, 2023
…nel range

[ Upstream commit e2ceb1d ]

Because of what seems to be a typo, a 6Ghz-only phy for which the BDF
does not allow the 7115Mhz channel will fail to register:

  WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 106 at net/wireless/core.c:907 wiphy_register+0x914/0x954
  Modules linked in: ath11k_pci sbsa_gwdt
  CPU: 2 PID: 106 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7-next-20230418-00549-g1e096a17625a-dirty #9
  Hardware name: Freebox V7R Board (DT)
  Workqueue: ath11k_qmi_driver_event ath11k_qmi_driver_event_work
  pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
  pc : wiphy_register+0x914/0x954
  lr : ieee80211_register_hw+0x67c/0xc10
  sp : ffffff800b123aa0
  x29: ffffff800b123aa0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
  x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000006 x24: ffffffc008d51418
  x23: ffffffc008cb0838 x22: ffffff80176c2460 x21: 0000000000000168
  x20: ffffff80176c0000 x19: ffffff80176c03e0 x18: 0000000000000014
  x17: 00000000cbef338c x16: 00000000d2a26f21 x15: 00000000ad6bb85f
  x14: 0000000000000020 x13: 0000000000000020 x12: 00000000ffffffbd
  x11: 0000000000000208 x10: 00000000fffffdf7 x9 : ffffffc009394718
  x8 : ffffff80176c0528 x7 : 000000007fffffff x6 : 0000000000000006
  x5 : 0000000000000005 x4 : ffffff800b304284 x3 : ffffff800b304284
  x2 : ffffff800b304d98 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
  Call trace:
   wiphy_register+0x914/0x954
   ieee80211_register_hw+0x67c/0xc10
   ath11k_mac_register+0x7c4/0xe10
   ath11k_core_qmi_firmware_ready+0x1f4/0x570
   ath11k_qmi_driver_event_work+0x198/0x590
   process_one_work+0x1b8/0x328
   worker_thread+0x6c/0x414
   kthread+0x100/0x104
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
  ath11k_pci 0002:01:00.0: ieee80211 registration failed: -22
  ath11k_pci 0002:01:00.0: failed register the radio with mac80211: -22
  ath11k_pci 0002:01:00.0: failed to create pdev core: -22

Signed-off-by: Maxime Bizon <mbizon@freebox.fr>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <quic_kvalo@quicinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230421145445.2612280-1-mbizon@freebox.fr
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mmstick pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 14, 2023
[ Upstream commit 93a3319 ]

The cited commit holds encap tbl lock unconditionally when setting
up dests. But it may cause the following deadlock:

 PID: 1063722  TASK: ffffa062ca5d0000  CPU: 13   COMMAND: "handler8"
  #0 [ffffb14de05b7368] __schedule at ffffffffa1d5aa91
  #1 [ffffb14de05b7410] schedule at ffffffffa1d5afdb
  #2 [ffffb14de05b7430] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa1d5b528
  #3 [ffffb14de05b7440] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa1d5d6cb
  #4 [ffffb14de05b74e8] mutex_lock_nested at ffffffffa1d5ddeb
  #5 [ffffb14de05b74f8] mlx5e_tc_tun_encap_dests_set at ffffffffc12f2096 [mlx5_core]
  #6 [ffffb14de05b7568] post_process_attr at ffffffffc12d9fc5 [mlx5_core]
  #7 [ffffb14de05b75a0] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc12de877 [mlx5_core]
  #8 [ffffb14de05b75f0] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc12e0eef [mlx5_core]
  #9 [ffffb14de05b7660] mlx5e_tc_add_flow at ffffffffc12e12f7 [mlx5_core]
 #10 [ffffb14de05b76b8] mlx5e_configure_flower at ffffffffc12e1686 [mlx5_core]
 #11 [ffffb14de05b7720] mlx5e_rep_indr_offload at ffffffffc12e3817 [mlx5_core]
 #12 [ffffb14de05b7730] mlx5e_rep_indr_setup_tc_cb at ffffffffc12e388a [mlx5_core]
 #13 [ffffb14de05b7740] tc_setup_cb_add at ffffffffa1ab2ba8
 #14 [ffffb14de05b77a0] fl_hw_replace_filter at ffffffffc0bdec2f [cls_flower]
 #15 [ffffb14de05b7868] fl_change at ffffffffc0be6caa [cls_flower]
 #16 [ffffb14de05b7908] tc_new_tfilter at ffffffffa1ab71f0

[1031218.028143]  wait_for_completion+0x24/0x30
[1031218.028589]  mlx5e_update_route_decap_flows+0x9a/0x1e0 [mlx5_core]
[1031218.029256]  mlx5e_tc_fib_event_work+0x1ad/0x300 [mlx5_core]
[1031218.029885]  process_one_work+0x24e/0x510

Actually no need to hold encap tbl lock if there is no encap action.
Fix it by checking if encap action exists or not before holding
encap tbl lock.

Fixes: 37c3b9f ("net/mlx5e: Prevent encap offload when neigh update is running")
Signed-off-by: Chris Mi <cmi@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 20, 2023
[ Upstream commit 7962ef1 ]

In 3cb4d5e ("perf trace: Free syscall tp fields in
evsel->priv") it only was freeing if strcmp(evsel->tp_format->system,
"syscalls") returned zero, while the corresponding initialization of
evsel->priv was being performed if it was _not_ zero, i.e. if the tp
system wasn't 'syscalls'.

Just stop looking for that and free it if evsel->priv was set, which
should be equivalent.

Also use the pre-existing evsel_trace__delete() function.

This resolves these leaks, detected with:

  $ make EXTRA_CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" BUILD_BPF_SKEL=1 CORESIGHT=1 O=/tmp/build/perf-tools-next -C tools/perf install-bin

  =================================================================
  ==481565==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f7343cba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097)
      #1 0x987966 in zalloc (/home/acme/bin/perf+0x987966)
      #2 0x52f9b9 in evsel_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:307
      #3 0x52f9b9 in evsel__syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:333
      #4 0x52f9b9 in evsel__init_raw_syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:458
      #5 0x52f9b9 in perf_evsel__raw_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:480
      #6 0x540e8b in trace__add_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3212
      #7 0x540e8b in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3891
      #8 0x540e8b in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5156
      #9 0x5ef262 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323
      #10 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377
      #11 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421
      #12 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537
      #13 0x7f7342c4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f)

  Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f7343cba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097)
      #1 0x987966 in zalloc (/home/acme/bin/perf+0x987966)
      #2 0x52f9b9 in evsel_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:307
      #3 0x52f9b9 in evsel__syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:333
      #4 0x52f9b9 in evsel__init_raw_syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:458
      #5 0x52f9b9 in perf_evsel__raw_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:480
      #6 0x540dd1 in trace__add_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3205
      #7 0x540dd1 in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3891
      #8 0x540dd1 in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5156
      #9 0x5ef262 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323
      #10 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377
      #11 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421
      #12 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537
      #13 0x7f7342c4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f)

  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 80 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
  [root@quaco ~]#

With this we plug all leaks with "perf trace sleep 1".

Fixes: 3cb4d5e ("perf trace: Free syscall tp fields in evsel->priv")
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230719202951.534582-5-acme@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mmstick pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 11, 2023
commit d8b90d6 upstream.

When scanning namespaces, it is possible to get valid data from the first
call to nvme_identify_ns() in nvme_alloc_ns(), but not from the second
call in nvme_update_ns_info_block().  In particular, if the NSID becomes
inactive between the two commands, a storage device may return a buffer
filled with zero as per 4.1.5.1.  In this case, we can get a kernel crash
due to a divide-by-zero in blk_stack_limits() because ns->lba_shift will
be set to zero.

PID: 326      TASK: ffff95fec3cd8000  CPU: 29   COMMAND: "kworker/u98:10"
 #0 [ffffad8f8702f9e0] machine_kexec at ffffffff91c76ec7
 #1 [ffffad8f8702fa38] __crash_kexec at ffffffff91dea4fa
 #2 [ffffad8f8702faf8] crash_kexec at ffffffff91deb788
 #3 [ffffad8f8702fb00] oops_end at ffffffff91c2e4bb
 #4 [ffffad8f8702fb20] do_trap at ffffffff91c2a4ce
 #5 [ffffad8f8702fb70] do_error_trap at ffffffff91c2a595
 #6 [ffffad8f8702fbb0] exc_divide_error at ffffffff928506e6
 #7 [ffffad8f8702fbd0] asm_exc_divide_error at ffffffff92a00926
    [exception RIP: blk_stack_limits+434]
    RIP: ffffffff92191872  RSP: ffffad8f8702fc80  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff95efa0c91800  RCX: 0000000000000001
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000001  RDI: 0000000000000001
    RBP: 00000000ffffffff   R8: ffff95fec7df35a8   R9: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff95fed33c09a8
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #8 [ffffad8f8702fce0] nvme_update_ns_info_block at ffffffffc06d3533 [nvme_core]
 #9 [ffffad8f8702fd18] nvme_scan_ns at ffffffffc06d6fa7 [nvme_core]

This happened when the check for valid data was moved out of nvme_identify_ns()
into one of the callers.  Fix this by checking in both callers.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218186
Fixes: 0dd6fff ("nvme: bring back auto-removal of deleted namespaces during sequential scan")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mmstick pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 2, 2024
[ Upstream commit e3e82fc ]

When creating ceq_0 during probing irdma, cqp.sc_cqp will be sent as a
cqp_request to cqp->sc_cqp.sq_ring. If the request is pending when
removing the irdma driver or unplugging its aux device, cqp.sc_cqp will be
dereferenced as wrong struct in irdma_free_pending_cqp_request().

  PID: 3669   TASK: ffff88aef892c000  CPU: 28  COMMAND: "kworker/28:0"
   #0 [fffffe0000549e38] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff810e3a34
   #1 [fffffe0000549e40] nmi_handle at ffffffff810788b2
   #2 [fffffe0000549ea0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8107938f
   #3 [fffffe0000549eb8] do_nmi at ffffffff81079582
   #4 [fffffe0000549ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff82e016b4
      [exception RIP: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+1291]
      RIP: ffffffff8127e72b  RSP: ffff88aa841ef778  RFLAGS: 00000046
      RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff88b01f849700  RCX: ffffffff8127e47e
      RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000004  RDI: ffffffff83857ec0
      RBP: ffff88afe3e4efc8   R8: ffffed15fc7c9dfa   R9: ffffed15fc7c9dfa
      R10: 0000000000000001  R11: ffffed15fc7c9df9  R12: 0000000000740000
      R13: ffff88b01f849708  R14: 0000000000000003  R15: ffffed1603f092e1
      ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0000
  -- <NMI exception stack> --
   #5 [ffff88aa841ef778] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8127e72b
   #6 [ffff88aa841ef7b0] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff82c22aa4
   #7 [ffff88aa841ef7c8] __wake_up_common_lock at ffffffff81257363
   #8 [ffff88aa841ef888] irdma_free_pending_cqp_request at ffffffffa0ba12cc [irdma]
   #9 [ffff88aa841ef958] irdma_cleanup_pending_cqp_op at ffffffffa0ba1469 [irdma]
   #10 [ffff88aa841ef9c0] irdma_ctrl_deinit_hw at ffffffffa0b2989f [irdma]
   #11 [ffff88aa841efa28] irdma_remove at ffffffffa0b252df [irdma]
   #12 [ffff88aa841efae8] auxiliary_bus_remove at ffffffff8219afdb
   #13 [ffff88aa841efb00] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff821882e6
   #14 [ffff88aa841efb38] bus_remove_device at ffffffff82184278
   #15 [ffff88aa841efb88] device_del at ffffffff82179d23
   #16 [ffff88aa841efc48] ice_unplug_aux_dev at ffffffffa0eb1c14 [ice]
   #17 [ffff88aa841efc68] ice_service_task at ffffffffa0d88201 [ice]
   #18 [ffff88aa841efde8] process_one_work at ffffffff811c589a
   #19 [ffff88aa841efe60] worker_thread at ffffffff811c71ff
   #20 [ffff88aa841eff10] kthread at ffffffff811d87a0
   #21 [ffff88aa841eff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff82e0022f

Fixes: 44d9e52 ("RDMA/irdma: Implement device initialization definitions")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130081415.891006-1-lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn
Suggested-by: "Ismail, Mustafa" <mustafa.ismail@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shifeng Li <lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mmstick pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 8, 2024
commit b35858b upstream.

Validate @smb->WordCount to avoid reading off the end of @smb and thus
causing the following KASAN splat:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs]
  Read of size 2 at addr ffff88801c024ec5 by task cifsd/1328

  CPU: 1 PID: 1328 Comm: cifsd Not tainted 6.7.0-rc5 #9
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
  rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80
   print_report+0xcf/0x650
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? __phys_addr+0x46/0x90
   kasan_report+0xd8/0x110
   ? smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs]
   ? smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs]
   kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0
   smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs]
   checkSMB+0x162/0x370 [cifs]
   ? __pfx_checkSMB+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
   cifs_handle_standard+0xbc/0x2f0 [cifs]
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   cifs_demultiplex_thread+0xed1/0x1360 [cifs]
   ? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x136/0x210
   ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90
   ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x136/0x210
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? __kthread_parkme+0xce/0xf0
   ? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
   kthread+0x18d/0x1d0
   ? kthread+0xdb/0x1d0
   ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
   ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60
   ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
   </TASK>

This fixes CVE-2023-6606.

Reported-by: j51569436@gmail.com
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218218
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mmstick pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 6, 2024
[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ]

ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    #6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    #7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    #8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    #9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    #10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    #11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    #12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    #13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    #14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    #15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    #16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    #17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    #18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    #19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    #20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    #21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    #22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    #23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mmstick pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 6, 2024
…PLES event"

commit 5b3cde1 upstream.

This reverts commit 7d1405c.

This causes segfaults in some cases, as reported by Milian:

  ```
  sudo /usr/bin/perf record -z --call-graph dwarf -e cycles -e
  raw_syscalls:sys_enter ls
  ...
  [ perf record: Woken up 3 times to write data ]
  malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted)
  Aborted
  ```

  Backtrace with GDB + debuginfod:

  ```
  malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted)

  Thread 1 "perf" received signal SIGABRT, Aborted.
  __pthread_kill_implementation (threadid=<optimized out>, signo=signo@entry=6,
  no_tid=no_tid@entry=0) at pthread_kill.c:44
  Downloading source file /usr/src/debug/glibc/glibc/nptl/pthread_kill.c
  44            return INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERROR_P (ret) ? INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERRNO
  (ret) : 0;
  (gdb) bt
  #0  __pthread_kill_implementation (threadid=<optimized out>,
  signo=signo@entry=6, no_tid=no_tid@entry=0) at pthread_kill.c:44
  #1  0x00007ffff6ea8eb3 in __pthread_kill_internal (threadid=<optimized out>,
  signo=6) at pthread_kill.c:78
  #2  0x00007ffff6e50a30 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../sysdeps/posix/
  raise.c:26
  #3  0x00007ffff6e384c3 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79
  #4  0x00007ffff6e39354 in __libc_message_impl (fmt=fmt@entry=0x7ffff6fc22ea
  "%s\n") at ../sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c:132
  #5  0x00007ffff6eb3085 in malloc_printerr (str=str@entry=0x7ffff6fc5850
  "malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted)") at malloc.c:5772
  #6  0x00007ffff6eb657c in _int_malloc (av=av@entry=0x7ffff6ff6ac0
  <main_arena>, bytes=bytes@entry=368) at malloc.c:4081
  #7  0x00007ffff6eb877e in __libc_calloc (n=<optimized out>,
  elem_size=<optimized out>) at malloc.c:3754
  #8  0x000055555569bdb6 in perf_session.do_write_header ()
  #9  0x00005555555a373a in __cmd_record.constprop.0 ()
  #10 0x00005555555a6846 in cmd_record ()
  #11 0x000055555564db7f in run_builtin ()
  #12 0x000055555558ed77 in main ()
  ```

  Valgrind memcheck:
  ```
  ==45136== Invalid write of size 8
  ==45136==    at 0x2B38A5: perf_event__synthesize_id_sample (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x157069: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==  Address 0x6a866a8 is 0 bytes after a block of size 40 alloc'd
  ==45136==    at 0x4849BF3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675)
  ==45136==    by 0x3574AB: zalloc (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x1570E0: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==
  ==45136== Syscall param write(buf) points to unaddressable byte(s)
  ==45136==    at 0x575953D: __libc_write (write.c:26)
  ==45136==    by 0x575953D: write (write.c:24)
  ==45136==    by 0x35761F: ion (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x357778: writen (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x1548F7: record__write (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x15708A: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==  Address 0x6a866a8 is 0 bytes after a block of size 40 alloc'd
  ==45136==    at 0x4849BF3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675)
  ==45136==    by 0x3574AB: zalloc (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x1570E0: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==    by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf)
  ==45136==
 -----

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-perf-users/23879991.0LEYPuXRzz@milian-workstation/
Reported-by: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com>
Tested-by: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 6.8+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Zl9ksOlHJHnKM70p@x1
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mmstick pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 6, 2024
commit 9d274c1 upstream.

We have been seeing crashes on duplicate keys in
btrfs_set_item_key_safe():

  BTRFS critical (device vdb): slot 4 key (450 108 8192) new key (450 108 8192)
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 3139 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0 #6
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x11f/0x290 [btrfs]

With the following stack trace:

  #0  btrfs_set_item_key_safe (fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620:4)
  #1  btrfs_drop_extents (fs/btrfs/file.c:411:4)
  #2  log_one_extent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4732:9)
  #3  btrfs_log_changed_extents (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4955:9)
  #4  btrfs_log_inode (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6626:9)
  #5  btrfs_log_inode_parent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7070:8)
  #6  btrfs_log_dentry_safe (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7171:8)
  #7  btrfs_sync_file (fs/btrfs/file.c:1933:8)
  #8  vfs_fsync_range (fs/sync.c:188:9)
  #9  vfs_fsync (fs/sync.c:202:9)
  #10 do_fsync (fs/sync.c:212:9)
  #11 __do_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:225:9)
  #12 __se_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
  #13 __x64_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
  #14 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52:14)
  #15 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83:7)
  #16 entry_SYSCALL_64+0xaf/0x14c (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)

So we're logging a changed extent from fsync, which is splitting an
extent in the log tree. But this split part already exists in the tree,
triggering the BUG().

This is the state of the log tree at the time of the crash, dumped with
drgn (https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/main/contrib/btrfs_tree.py)
to get more details than btrfs_print_leaf() gives us:

  >>> print_extent_buffer(prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]["eb"])
  leaf 33439744 level 0 items 72 generation 9 owner 18446744073709551610
  leaf 33439744 flags 0x100000000000000
  fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677
  chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da
          item 0 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160
                  generation 7 transid 9 size 8192 nbytes 8473563889606862198
                  block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
                  sequence 204 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)
                  atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  ctime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
                  mtime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
                  otime 17592186044416.000000000 (559444-03-08 01:40:16)
          item 1 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16110 itemsize 13
                  index 195 namelen 3 name: 193
          item 2 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 16073 itemsize 37
                  location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR
                  transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6
                  name: user.a
                  data a
          item 3 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 16020 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 1 (regular)
                  extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  extent data offset 0 nr 4096 ram 12288
                  extent compression 0 (none)
          item 4 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 15967 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 4096 nr 8192
          item 5 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 15914 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096
  ...

So the real problem happened earlier: notice that items 4 (4k-12k) and 5
(8k-12k) overlap. Both are prealloc extents. Item 4 straddles i_size and
item 5 starts at i_size.

Here is the state of the filesystem tree at the time of the crash:

  >>> root = prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[2]["inode"].root
  >>> ret, nodes, slots = btrfs_search_slot(root, BtrfsKey(450, 0, 0))
  >>> print_extent_buffer(nodes[0])
  leaf 30425088 level 0 items 184 generation 9 owner 5
  leaf 30425088 flags 0x100000000000000
  fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677
  chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da
  	...
          item 179 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 4907 itemsize 160
                  generation 7 transid 7 size 4096 nbytes 12288
                  block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
                  sequence 6 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)
                  atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  ctime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  mtime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  otime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
          item 180 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 4894 itemsize 13
                  index 195 namelen 3 name: 193
          item 181 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 4857 itemsize 37
                  location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR
                  transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6
                  name: user.a
                  data a
          item 182 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 4804 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 1 (regular)
                  extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 12288
                  extent compression 0 (none)
          item 183 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 4751 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096

Item 5 in the log tree corresponds to item 183 in the filesystem tree,
but nothing matches item 4. Furthermore, item 183 is the last item in
the leaf.

btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() is responsible for logging prealloc extents
beyond i_size. It first truncates any previously logged prealloc extents
that start beyond i_size. Then, it walks the filesystem tree and copies
the prealloc extent items to the log tree.

If it hits the end of a leaf, then it calls btrfs_next_leaf(), which
unlocks the tree and does another search. However, while the filesystem
tree is unlocked, an ordered extent completion may modify the tree. In
particular, it may insert an extent item that overlaps with an extent
item that was already copied to the log tree.

This may manifest in several ways depending on the exact scenario,
including an EEXIST error that is silently translated to a full sync,
overlapping items in the log tree, or this crash. This particular crash
is triggered by the following sequence of events:

- Initially, the file has i_size=4k, a regular extent from 0-4k, and a
  prealloc extent beyond i_size from 4k-12k. The prealloc extent item is
  the last item in its B-tree leaf.
- The file is fsync'd, which copies its inode item and both extent items
  to the log tree.
- An xattr is set on the file, which sets the
  BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING flag.
- The range 4k-8k in the file is written using direct I/O. i_size is
  extended to 8k, but the ordered extent is still in flight.
- The file is fsync'd. Since BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING is set, this
  calls copy_inode_items_to_log(), which calls
  btrfs_log_prealloc_extents().
- btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() finds the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the
  filesystem tree. Since it starts before i_size, it skips it. Since it
  is the last item in its B-tree leaf, it calls btrfs_next_leaf().
- btrfs_next_leaf() unlocks the path.
- The ordered extent completion runs, which converts the 4k-8k part of
  the prealloc extent to written and inserts the remaining prealloc part
  from 8k-12k.
- btrfs_next_leaf() does a search and finds the new prealloc extent
  8k-12k.
- btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() copies the 8k-12k prealloc extent into
  the log tree. Note that it overlaps with the 4k-12k prealloc extent
  that was copied to the log tree by the first fsync.
- fsync calls btrfs_log_changed_extents(), which tries to log the 4k-8k
  extent that was written.
- This tries to drop the range 4k-8k in the log tree, which requires
  adjusting the start of the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the log tree to
  8k.
- btrfs_set_item_key_safe() sees that there is already an extent
  starting at 8k in the log tree and calls BUG().

Fix this by detecting when we're about to insert an overlapping file
extent item in the log tree and truncating the part that would overlap.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mmstick pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 6, 2024
commit be346c1 upstream.

The code in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() estimates number of necessary
transaction credits using ocfs2_calc_extend_credits().  This however does
not take into account that the IO could be arbitrarily large and can
contain arbitrary number of extents.

Extent tree manipulations do often extend the current transaction but not
in all of the cases.  For example if we have only single block extents in
the tree, ocfs2_mark_extent_written() will end up calling
ocfs2_replace_extent_rec() all the time and we will never extend the
current transaction and eventually exhaust all the transaction credits if
the IO contains many single block extents.  Once that happens a
WARN_ON(jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) <= 0) is triggered in
jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() and subsequently OCFS2 aborts in response to
this error.  This was actually triggered by one of our customers on a
heavily fragmented OCFS2 filesystem.

To fix the issue make sure the transaction always has enough credits for
one extent insert before each call of ocfs2_mark_extent_written().

Heming Zhao said:

------
PANIC: "Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device dm-1): panic forced after error"

PID: xxx  TASK: xxxx  CPU: 5  COMMAND: "SubmitThread-CA"
  #0 machine_kexec at ffffffff8c069932
  #1 __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c1338fa
  #2 panic at ffffffff8c1d69b9
  #3 ocfs2_handle_error at ffffffffc0c86c0c [ocfs2]
  #4 __ocfs2_abort at ffffffffc0c88387 [ocfs2]
  #5 ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc0c51e98 [ocfs2]
  #6 ocfs2_split_extent at ffffffffc0c27ea3 [ocfs2]
  #7 ocfs2_change_extent_flag at ffffffffc0c28053 [ocfs2]
  #8 ocfs2_mark_extent_written at ffffffffc0c28347 [ocfs2]
  #9 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write at ffffffffc0c2bef9 [ocfs2]
#10 ocfs2_dio_end_io at ffffffffc0c2c0f5 [ocfs2]
#11 dio_complete at ffffffff8c2b9fa7
#12 do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff8c2bc09f
#13 ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffc0c2b653 [ocfs2]
#14 generic_file_direct_write at ffffffff8c1dcf14
#15 __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff8c1dd07b
#16 ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffc0c49f1f [ocfs2]
#17 aio_write at ffffffff8c2cc72e
#18 kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8c248dde
#19 do_io_submit at ffffffff8c2ccada
#20 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8c004984
#21 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8c8000ba

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240617095543.6971-1-jack@suse.cz
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240614145243.8837-1-jack@suse.cz
Fixes: c15471f ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
Labels
None yet
Projects
None yet
Development

No branches or pull requests

2 participants