openledger · OpenLedgerApp · Dec 18, 2018 · Aug 21, 2018 · Aug 21, 2018 · Aug 21, 2018
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
@@ -48,4 +48,17 @@ Number             | Title                                                    |
 [38](bsip-0038.md) | Add target collateral ratio option to short positions                       | Abit More | Protocol | Installed
 [39](bsip-0039.md) | Automatically approve proposals by the proposer                             | Fabian Schuh | Protocol | Draft
 [40](bsip-0040.md) | Custom active permission                             | Stefan Schießl | Protocol | Draft
+[41](bsip-0041.md) | Reduce MSSR of bitCNY from 1.1 to 1.05               | Jerry Liu      | Protocol | Draft
 [42](bsip-0042.md) | Adjust price feed to influence trading price of SmartCoins                  | Abit More | Protocol | Draft
+[43](bsip-0043.md) | Market Fee Sharing                                                          | OpenLedgerApp | Protocol | Accepted
+[44](bsip-0044.md) | Hashed Time-Locked Contract                                                 | Ryan R. Fox | Protocol | Accepted
+[45](bsip-0045.md) | Add bitAsset Backing Collateral flag/permission                             | Customminer | Protocol | Draft
+[46](https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/pull/111) | Escrow Concepts                              | Taconator | Informational | Draft
+[47](https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/pull/114) | An Explicit Voting Operation                 | Fabian Schuh | Protocol | Draft
+[48](https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/pull/115) | Add Flag to Asset to Prevent Manipulating Max Supply | Fabian Schuh | Protocol | Draft
+[50](https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/pull/) | Stealth development, Phase II                              | Chris Sanborn | Informational | Draft
+[51](https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/pull/) | New operations for Confidential Asset (CA) transactions    | Chris Sanborn | Protocol      | Draft
+[52](https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/pull/) | Ring signatures for untraceability of Stealth transactions | Chris Sanborn | Protocol      | Draft
+[53](https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/pull/116) | Blockchain scanning for inbound Stealth transactions    | Chris Sanborn | Protocol      | Draft
+[54](https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/pull/) | Deterministic addresses for Stealth wallets                | Chris Sanborn | Informational | Draft
+[55](https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/pull/) | Metadata hiding via Garlic Routing and other means         | Chris Sanborn | Informational | Draft
diff --git a/bsip-0021.md b/bsip-0021.md
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ for each asset_holder in coin_age_hashmap {
 
 # Copyright
 
-N/A - Consider this BSIP entirely open-source/MIT-licensed, I am not the originator of the concept of 'coin-age' (several proof-of-stake cryptocurrencies make use of coin-age for finding stakable coins).
+This document is placed in the public domain.
 
 # See Also
 * [List account balances - Graphene documentation](http://docs.bitshares.org/api/database.html#id8)

diff --git a/bsip-0022.md b/bsip-0022.md
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ Please do raise your concerns, propose improvements and engage in the BSIP creat
 
 # Copyright
 
-This document is placed in the public domain, 100% open source & should be considered MIT licensed.
+This document is placed in the public domain.
 
 # See Also
 

diff --git a/bsip-0023.md b/bsip-0023.md
@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ The Bitshares starship drops out of hyperspace in planet Bitcoin's orbit, the cr
 
 # Copyright
 
-This document is placed in the public domain, 100% open source & should be considered MIT licensed.
+This document is placed in the public domain.
 
 # See Also
 

diff --git a/bsip-0024.md b/bsip-0024.md
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ Would there even be a difference in voting behaviour betwen the two? Perhaps it
 
 # Copyright
 
-This document is placed in the public domain, 100% open source & should be considered MIT licensed.
+This document is placed in the public domain.
 
 # See Also
 

diff --git a/bsip-0040.md b/bsip-0040.md
@@ -7,11 +7,11 @@
       Fabian Schuh <https://github.com/xeroc>
       Abit <https://github.com/abitmore>
       Peter Conrad <https://github.com/pmconrad>
-    Status: Draft
+    Status: Milestone 1 accepted, other Milestones postponed
     Type: Protocol
     Created: 2018-07-25
     Discussion: https://github.com/bitshares/bitshares-core/issues/1061
-    Worker: <Id of worker proposal>
+    Worker: 	1.14.120
 
 # Abstract
 

diff --git a/bsip-0041.md b/bsip-0041.md
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+    BSIP: 0041
+    Title: Reduce MSSR of bitCNY from 1.1 to 1.05
+    Author: Jerry Liu <bitcrab@qq.com>
+    Status: Draft
+    Type: Protocol
+    Created: 2018-08-17
+    Discussion: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26928.0
+    Worker: no
+
+### **Abstract**
+We here propose to reduce the Maximum short squeeze ratio (MSSR) of bitCNY from 1.1 to 1.05, to lower the shorting incentive.
+
+### **Motivation**
+BitShares is a financial system with leverage, here in the traders there are BTS longers and shorters, surely the traders are finding their chance to make profit in trading, if shorters can always find chance to make big profit by shorting BTS, that’s not a good news to BTS ecosystem, from the perspective of the whole BTS ecosystem consisted of DEX and smartcoin, we need to review the rules continually, while guaranteeing fairness and the risks always be released in time, we also need to try optimize the rules to encourage BTS longers, to provide enough incentive to make BTS ecosystem to grow up.
+
+
+### **Rationale**
+Currently there are 2 key smartcoin parameters which are maintained by witnesses, they are MCR(Maintenance collateral ratio ) and MSSR(Maximum short squeeze ratio) , now MCR=1.75 and MSSR=1.1.
+
+When a debt position is margin called, the placed sell orders is at price feed price/MSSR, so MSSR determine the discount of collateral force selling the higher MSSR, the bigger the discount.
+
+So high MSSR benefits the filling of margin call sell orders and help to release risks rapidly, however at the same time, high MSSR means buying margin call orders is with big discount, so it encourage BTS shorters to accumulate smartcoins and wait or even try to make margin call happen and get cheaper collateral. This does not do good to the ecosystem grow up.
+
+We need to release risks rapidly while margin call happen, we also need to try to lower the shorting incentive, so we need a balance, what a MSSR is appropriate depend on the liquidity of the market and also some other factors.
+
+bitCNY have a very good liquidity, BTS/bitCNY pair in DEX is the pair with highest BTS volume on the earth, after in 19th July the hard fork activated the target CR feature, the sell pressure comes from margin called orders decreased greatly,  we are sure that the for bitCNY black swan has very very little chance to happen, it’s the time to reduce MSSR to push bitCNY ecosysm move forward. 
+
+### **Specification**
+Witnesses adjust the MSSR of bitCNY from 1.1 to 1.05 while publishing feed price.
+
+### Discussion
+#### Will this change be implemented to bitUSD and other smartcoins?
+This time, no! bitUSD and other smartcoins has a much lower liquidity than bitCNY, a high MSSR need to be kept to guarantee the rapid settlement of margin called dept positions.
+
+#### How to make sure a strong consensus is reached?
+China community has discussed about this change for years, however, target CR feature + good bitCNY liquidity make current time the good time to do the change, in the forum thread, about 70% of the voters support this change, if necessary, a opinion survey worker proposal will be created to collect stake based opinion.
+As MSSR comes from witness publishing, so when BTS community reach a strong consensus to do the change, we need witnesses to apply the change based on the community consensus 
+
+### **Summary for Shareholders**
+Reduce shorting incentive while guaranteeing fairness and safe is an important logic for the ecosystem to evolve.
+
+### **Copyright**
+This document is placed in the public domain.
diff --git a/bsip-0042.md b/bsip-0042.md
@@ -1,19 +1,18 @@
     BSIP: 0042
     Title: Adjust price feed to influence trading price of SmartCoins
     Author: Abit More <https://github.com/abitmore>
-    Status: Draft
+    Status: Up for voting
     Type: Protocol
     Created: 2018-08-22
-    Discussions: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26948.0
-                 https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26315.0
-                 https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26966.0
     Workers: 1.14.118 (pro), 1.14.119 (con)
 
 # Abstract
 
 We here propose to dynamically adjust price feed in order to influence trading
 price of smart coins to achieve tighter peg.
 
+This BSIP is constantly evaluated in terms of being accepted or rejected,see the last section *Constant voting evaluation* for details.
+
 # Motivation
 
 To get mass adoption, it's better that the SmartCoins can peg to targets more
@@ -154,13 +153,33 @@ Witnesses should make their own decisions on whether to set a hard limit and
 how much should it be if need to set one, generally, to reduce impacts caused
 by bugs.
 
+It will be good to apply the change to bitCNY first, which has much better liquidity 
+than other smartcoins. After witnesses and community learned enough in the process 
+it can be also applied to bitUSD.
+
 # Discussion
 
-[To be added]
+- https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26948.0
+- https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26315.0
+- https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26966.0
 
 # Summary for Shareholders
 
-[To be added]
+The peg of SmartCoin to the underlying asset is crucial to create trust for SmartCoin holders, in combination with a force settlement offset that is considered fair. This BSIP seeks to adress the issue of volatility with respect to the peg by allowing the witnesses to implement (within boundaries) their own price feed strategy that is targeted to uphold the peg and provide a fair force settlement offset.
+
+This is a crucial intrusion into the open market mechanics and is thus not a strict directive to the witnesses, furthermore this BSIP is constantly evaluated, and if it becomes rejected  (see the next section), witnesses are bound to return to the former price feed mechanisms.
+
+# Constant voting evaluation
+
+This BSIP has a pro and a con worker and has an ever evaluated state of accepted and rejected.
+
+- **Accepted**:
+The pro worker is active in terms of receiving payout from the reserve pool AND its votes surpass the con worker.
+
+- **Rejected**:
+The pro worker is NOT active (is not receiving funds from reserve pool) OR the votes of the con worker surpass the pro worker. If the pro worker expires, this BSIP is also considered rejected.
+
+The earliest that this worker can become active is 7th September 2018.
 
 # Copyright
 

diff --git a/bsip-0043.md b/bsip-0043.md
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+    BSIP: 0043
+    Title: Market fee sharing
+    Authors: OpenLedgerApp <https://github.com/OpenLedgerApp>
+    Status: Draft
+    Type: Protocol
+    Created: 2018-08-23
+    Updated: 2018-10-19
+    Discussion: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/102
+    Worker:
+
+
+# Abstract
+
+When creating a new asset, the asset owner is the only beneficiary of the market fees in the current implementation. And one of the ways to increase the community growth is the market fee percentage. For example, one can decrease the market fee and it will result in somewhat larger number of trades with this asset. In this way the asset owner might get a bigger profit during to increasing the trade volume with this asset.
+
+However, there might be another opportunity to promote the asset and stimulate the trading - use native Bitshares referral program. At this time unfortunately an assets owner is not able to share market fees with registrars and referrers to stimulate them to market the asset trading, so we suggest to add this possibility. Furthermore, enabling this feature for MPAs (e.g. bitCNY or bitUSD) can provide additional bounty for Bitshares registrars and referrals which can lead to more traders joining to the ecosystem.
+
+An asset owner defines the **market_fee_reward_percent**  in asset options - what percentage of the market fee he wants to share with the registrar.
+**market_fee** * **market_fee_reward_percent** goes the registrar.
+**market_fee** * (1 - **market_fee_reward_percent**) goes to the asset owner.
+
+Registrar splits the reward between itself and its referrers by defining **reward_percent**, which defines referrer's percentage. 
+It is defined per each other using the already existing BitShares mechanism. 
+
+Market fee reward is accumulated on the user account.
+
+Each user decides when he wants to claim the market fee reward and move it to their active balance.
+
+# Motivation
+
+To make promoting BitShares and bringing new users much more attractive to registrars and referrers by sharing UIAs and MPAs market fees with them.
+
+# Rationale
+When *fill_order_operation* executing at the moment of market fee calculation there will be calculate the reward for the registrar used the parameter **market_fee_reward_percent**. Then this **market_fee_reward_percent** of the market fee is split between the registrar and referrer according to the referrer_rewards_percentage, which is set up during the new account registration by registrar (please see the parameters for *register_account*).
+
+# Specifications
+Market fee rewards accumulated on special vesting balances.
+
+## **market_fee_reward_percent** asset option
+Percent of market fee that will be paid to buyer's registrar. Set by asset owner.
+if **market_fee_reward_percent** = 0 or absent - the old mechanism is used. Market fees are accumulated in the asset and can be claimed.
+
+## **market_sharing_whitelist** asset option
+An optional list of accounts (configurable by the asset owner) could provide increased control over who is eligible to get market rewards.
+If whitelist empty or absent - there is no filtering. This means that everyone is in the whitelist by default if it is empty.
+
+## graphene::chain::database modifications
+**pay_market_fees(seller, recv_asset_object, receives_amount)** - Split pay to asset owner fee, registrar fee and referrer fee. If the registrar is not in the **market_sharing_whitelist**, *split_pay* will not happen and the entire fee goes to Asset owner.
+**calculate_market_fee(trade_asset, trade_amount)** - Calculate value for previous function.
+**fill_limit_order(order, pays, receives, cull_if_small, fill_price, is_maker)** - Append hardfork (HARDFORK_REWARD_TIME) check. Use old or new version of *pay_market_fees()* function.
+
+## asset_create_evaluator, asset_update_evaluator modifications
+Append hardfork (HARDFORK_REWARD_TIME) check. Validate additional asset options. Apply additional asset options (**market_fee_reward_percent**, **market_sharing_whitelist**)
+
+# Description
+
+# Summary for Shareholders
+The new modification - market fee sharing - will allow to bring in new clients for BitShares by making it financially lucrative for registrars and referrers. This modification is interesting mostly so asset owners and registrars/referrers.
+
+# Copyright
+This document is placed in the public domain.
+
+# See Also
+https://github.com/bitshares/bitshares-core/issues/1268
+
+https://github.com/bitshares/bitshares-core/pull/1419