JFFS2 corruption that results in kernel panic #59
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This is userspace dying, not a kernel bug: |
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userspace dying because of a corrupted shared library that was in rofs. How could that shared library get in rwfs? How could we debug that? |
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Your rofs is corrupt by the looks? You could try booting with |
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i'm sure the rwfs is corrupt. i just don't understand how the .so got affected. the rwfs should be empty or mostly empty. |
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I guess it would have same root cause to issue 53. |
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After a new report I searched for the error and found several reports, but also a proposed patch. That patch highlighted the issue and lead to a patch being merged in 4.5. The library isn't in rwfs, but the directory is because it was modified. The bug is reading the directories when mounting the file system gets confused by stale copies still in the flash and marks child directories as having unallowable hard links. See https://lists.ozlabs.org/pipermail/openbmc/2016-March/002340.html |
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I think we have this under control as of aeb4718. Closing for now, please re-open if you see this again. |
amboar
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Apr 7, 2017
[ Upstream commit 48cac18 ] Andrey reported a use-after-free in IPv6 stack. Issue here is that we free the socket while it still has skb in TX path and in some queues. It happens here because IPv6 reassembly unit messes skb->truesize, breaking skb_set_owner_w() badly. We fixed a similar issue for IPV4 in commit 8282f27 ("inet: frag: Always orphan skbs inside ip_defrag()") Acked-by: Joe Stringer <joe@ovn.org> ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sock_wfree+0x118/0x120 Read of size 8 at addr ffff880062da0060 by task a.out/4140 page:ffffea00018b6800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head) raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180130013 raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff88006741f140 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected CPU: 0 PID: 4140 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3+ openbmc#59 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 dump_stack+0x292/0x398 lib/dump_stack.c:51 describe_address mm/kasan/report.c:262 kasan_report_error+0x121/0x560 mm/kasan/report.c:370 kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:392 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:413 sock_flag ./arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:324 sock_wfree+0x118/0x120 net/core/sock.c:1631 skb_release_head_state+0xfc/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:655 skb_release_all+0x15/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:668 __kfree_skb+0x15/0x20 net/core/skbuff.c:684 kfree_skb+0x16e/0x4e0 net/core/skbuff.c:705 inet_frag_destroy+0x121/0x290 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c:304 inet_frag_put ./include/net/inet_frag.h:133 nf_ct_frag6_gather+0x1125/0x38b0 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c:617 ipv6_defrag+0x21b/0x350 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv6_hooks.c:68 nf_hook_entry_hookfn ./include/linux/netfilter.h:102 nf_hook_slow+0xc3/0x290 net/netfilter/core.c:310 nf_hook ./include/linux/netfilter.h:212 __ip6_local_out+0x52c/0xaf0 net/ipv6/output_core.c:160 ip6_local_out+0x2d/0x170 net/ipv6/output_core.c:170 ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1722 ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1742 rawv6_push_pending_frames net/ipv6/raw.c:613 rawv6_sendmsg+0x2cff/0x4130 net/ipv6/raw.c:927 inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:744 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:635 sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:645 sock_write_iter+0x326/0x620 net/socket.c:848 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:499 __vfs_write+0x483/0x760 fs/read_write.c:512 vfs_write+0x187/0x530 fs/read_write.c:560 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:607 SyS_write+0xfb/0x230 fs/read_write.c:599 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:203 RIP: 0033:0x7ff26e6f5b79 RSP: 002b:00007ff268e0ed98 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ff268e0f9c0 RCX: 00007ff26e6f5b79 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020f50fe1 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ff26ebc1220 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ff268e0f9c0 R14: 00007ff26efec040 R15: 0000000000000003 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff880062da0000 which belongs to the cache RAWv6 of size 1504 The buggy address ffff880062da0060 is located 96 bytes inside of 1504-byte region [ffff880062da0000, ffff880062da05e0) Freed by task 4113: save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:57 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:502 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:514 kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:578 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352 slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374 slab_free mm/slub.c:2951 kmem_cache_free+0xb2/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:2973 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1377 __sk_destruct+0x49c/0x6e0 net/core/sock.c:1452 sk_destruct+0x47/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1460 __sk_free+0x57/0x230 net/core/sock.c:1468 sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1479 sock_put ./include/net/sock.h:1638 sk_common_release+0x31e/0x4e0 net/core/sock.c:2782 rawv6_close+0x54/0x80 net/ipv6/raw.c:1214 inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:425 inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:431 sock_release+0x8d/0x1e0 net/socket.c:599 sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1063 __fput+0x332/0x7f0 fs/file_table.c:208 ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244 task_work_run+0x19b/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:116 exit_task_work ./include/linux/task_work.h:21 do_exit+0x186b/0x2800 kernel/exit.c:839 do_group_exit+0x149/0x420 kernel/exit.c:943 SYSC_exit_group kernel/exit.c:954 SyS_exit_group+0x1d/0x20 kernel/exit.c:952 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:203 Allocated by task 4115: save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:57 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:502 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:514 kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:605 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:544 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:432 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708 slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716 kmem_cache_alloc+0x1af/0x250 mm/slub.c:2721 sk_prot_alloc+0x65/0x2a0 net/core/sock.c:1334 sk_alloc+0x105/0x1010 net/core/sock.c:1396 inet6_create+0x44d/0x1150 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:183 __sock_create+0x4f6/0x880 net/socket.c:1199 sock_create net/socket.c:1239 SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1269 SyS_socket+0xf9/0x230 net/socket.c:1249 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:203 Memory state around the buggy address: ffff880062d9ff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff880062d9ff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff880062da0000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff880062da0080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff880062da0100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
eddiejames
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When the controller supports the Read LE Resolv List size feature, the maximum list size are read and now stored. Before patch: < HCI Command: LE Read White List... (0x08|0x000f) plen 0 openbmc#55 [hci0] 17.979791 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 5 openbmc#56 [hci0] 17.980629 LE Read White List Size (0x08|0x000f) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Size: 25 < HCI Command: LE Clear White List (0x08|0x0010) plen 0 openbmc#57 [hci0] 17.980786 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 openbmc#58 [hci0] 17.981627 LE Clear White List (0x08|0x0010) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Read Maximum Dat.. (0x08|0x002f) plen 0 openbmc#59 [hci0] 17.981786 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 12 openbmc#60 [hci0] 17.982636 LE Read Maximum Data Length (0x08|0x002f) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Max TX octets: 251 Max TX time: 17040 Max RX octets: 251 Max RX time: 17040 After patch: < HCI Command: LE Read White List... (0x08|0x000f) plen 0 openbmc#55 [hci0] 13.338168 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 5 openbmc#56 [hci0] 13.338842 LE Read White List Size (0x08|0x000f) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Size: 25 < HCI Command: LE Clear White List (0x08|0x0010) plen 0 openbmc#57 [hci0] 13.339029 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 openbmc#58 [hci0] 13.339939 LE Clear White List (0x08|0x0010) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Read Resolving L.. (0x08|0x002a) plen 0 openbmc#59 [hci0] 13.340152 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 5 openbmc#60 [hci0] 13.340952 LE Read Resolving List Size (0x08|0x002a) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Size: 25 < HCI Command: LE Read Maximum Dat.. (0x08|0x002f) plen 0 openbmc#61 [hci0] 13.341180 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 12 openbmc#62 [hci0] 13.341898 LE Read Maximum Data Length (0x08|0x002f) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Max TX octets: 251 Max TX time: 17040 Max RX octets: 251 Max RX time: 17040 Signed-off-by: Ankit Navik <ankit.p.navik@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
eddiejames
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Jul 10, 2018
Check for Resolv list supported by controller. So check the supported commmand first before issuing this command i.e.,HCI_OP_LE_CLEAR_RESOLV_LIST Before patch: < HCI Command: LE Read White List... (0x08|0x000f) plen 0 openbmc#55 [hci0] 13.338168 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 5 openbmc#56 [hci0] 13.338842 LE Read White List Size (0x08|0x000f) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Size: 25 < HCI Command: LE Clear White List (0x08|0x0010) plen 0 openbmc#57 [hci0] 13.339029 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 openbmc#58 [hci0] 13.339939 LE Clear White List (0x08|0x0010) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Read Resolving L.. (0x08|0x002a) plen 0 openbmc#59 [hci0] 13.340152 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 5 openbmc#60 [hci0] 13.340952 LE Read Resolving List Size (0x08|0x002a) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Size: 25 < HCI Command: LE Read Maximum Dat.. (0x08|0x002f) plen 0 openbmc#61 [hci0] 13.341180 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 12 openbmc#62 [hci0] 13.341898 LE Read Maximum Data Length (0x08|0x002f) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Max TX octets: 251 Max TX time: 17040 Max RX octets: 251 Max RX time: 17040 After patch: < HCI Command: LE Read White List... (0x08|0x000f) plen 0 openbmc#55 [hci0] 28.919131 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 5 openbmc#56 [hci0] 28.920016 LE Read White List Size (0x08|0x000f) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Size: 25 < HCI Command: LE Clear White List (0x08|0x0010) plen 0 openbmc#57 [hci0] 28.920164 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 openbmc#58 [hci0] 28.920873 LE Clear White List (0x08|0x0010) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Read Resolving L.. (0x08|0x002a) plen 0 openbmc#59 [hci0] 28.921109 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 5 openbmc#60 [hci0] 28.922016 LE Read Resolving List Size (0x08|0x002a) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Size: 25 < HCI Command: LE Clear Resolving... (0x08|0x0029) plen 0 openbmc#61 [hci0] 28.922166 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 openbmc#62 [hci0] 28.922872 LE Clear Resolving List (0x08|0x0029) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Read Maximum Dat.. (0x08|0x002f) plen 0 openbmc#63 [hci0] 28.923117 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 12 openbmc#64 [hci0] 28.924030 LE Read Maximum Data Length (0x08|0x002f) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) Max TX octets: 251 Max TX time: 17040 Max RX octets: 251 Max RX time: 17040 Signed-off-by: Ankit Navik <ankit.p.navik@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
shenki
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Oct 21, 2018
[ Upstream commit af3fb24 ] Since tun->flags might be shared by multiple tfile structures, it is better to make sure tun_get_user() is using the flags for the current tfile. Presence of the READ_ONCE() in tun_napi_frags_enabled() gave a hint of what could happen, but we need something stronger to please syzbot. kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 13647 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc5+ #59 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:dev_gro_receive+0x132/0x2720 net/core/dev.c:5427 Code: 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6e 20 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 6e 10 49 8d bd d0 00 00 00 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 59 20 00 00 4d 8b a5 d0 00 00 00 31 ff 41 81 e4 RSP: 0018:ffff8801c400f410 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff8618d325 RDX: 000000000000001a RSI: ffffffff86189f97 RDI: 00000000000000d0 RBP: ffff8801c400f608 R08: ffff8801c8fb4300 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffed0038801ed7 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8801d327d358 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8801c16dd8c0 R15: 0000000000000004 FS: 00007fe003615700(0000) GS:ffff8801dac00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fe1f3c43db8 CR3: 00000001bebb2000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: napi_gro_frags+0x3f4/0xc90 net/core/dev.c:5715 tun_get_user+0x31d5/0x42a0 drivers/net/tun.c:1922 tun_chr_write_iter+0xb9/0x154 drivers/net/tun.c:1967 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1808 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:474 [inline] __vfs_write+0x6b8/0x9f0 fs/read_write.c:487 vfs_write+0x1fc/0x560 fs/read_write.c:549 ksys_write+0x101/0x260 fs/read_write.c:598 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:610 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:607 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:607 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x457579 Code: 1d b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 eb b3 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007fe003614c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457579 RDX: 0000000000000012 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 000000000000000a RBP: 000000000072c040 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe0036156d4 R13: 00000000004c5574 R14: 00000000004d8e98 R15: 00000000ffffffff Modules linked in: RIP: 0010:dev_gro_receive+0x132/0x2720 net/core/dev.c:5427 Code: 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6e 20 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 6e 10 49 8d bd d0 00 00 00 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 59 20 00 00 4d 8b a5 d0 00 00 00 31 ff 41 81 e4 RSP: 0018:ffff8801c400f410 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff8618d325 RDX: 000000000000001a RSI: ffffffff86189f97 RDI: 00000000000000d0 RBP: ffff8801c400f608 R08: ffff8801c8fb4300 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffed0038801ed7 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8801d327d358 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8801c16dd8c0 R15: 0000000000000004 FS: 00007fe003615700(0000) GS:ffff8801dac00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fe1f3c43db8 CR3: 00000001bebb2000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Fixes: 90e33d4 ("tun: enable napi_gro_frags() for TUN/TAP driver") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
shenki
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[ Upstream commit 6dce3c2 ] When either "goto wait_interrupted;" or "goto wait_error;" paths are taken, socket lock has already been released. This patch fixes following syzbot splat : WARNING: bad unlock balance detected! 5.0.0-rc4+ #59 Not tainted ------------------------------------- syz-executor223/8256 is trying to release lock (sk_lock-AF_RXRPC) at: [<ffffffff86651353>] rxrpc_recvmsg+0x6d3/0x3099 net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c:598 but there are no more locks to release! other info that might help us debug this: 1 lock held by syz-executor223/8256: #0: 00000000fa9ed0f4 (slock-AF_RXRPC){+...}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:334 [inline] #0: 00000000fa9ed0f4 (slock-AF_RXRPC){+...}, at: release_sock+0x20/0x1c0 net/core/sock.c:2798 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 8256 Comm: syz-executor223 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc4+ #59 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_unlock_imbalance_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3391 [inline] print_unlock_imbalance_bug.cold+0x114/0x123 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3368 __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3601 [inline] lock_release+0x67e/0xa00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3860 sock_release_ownership include/net/sock.h:1471 [inline] release_sock+0x183/0x1c0 net/core/sock.c:2808 rxrpc_recvmsg+0x6d3/0x3099 net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c:598 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:794 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:801 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0xd0/0x110 net/socket.c:797 __sys_recvfrom+0x1ff/0x350 net/socket.c:1845 __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:1863 [inline] __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:1859 [inline] __x64_sys_recvfrom+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1859 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x446379 Code: e8 2c b3 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 2b 09 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007fe5da89fd98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006dbc28 RCX: 0000000000446379 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006dbc20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006dbc2c R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 20c49ba5e353f7cf Fixes: 248f219 ("rxrpc: Rewrite the data and ack handling code") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
amboar
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Nov 26, 2020
commit 1eca16b upstream. Since commit f959dcd ("dma-direct: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference") an error is reported when we load vdpa_sim and virtio-vdpa: [ 129.351207] net eth0: Unexpected TXQ (0) queue failure: -12 It seems that dma_mask is not initialized. This patch initializes dma_mask() and calls dma_set_mask_and_coherent() to fix the problem. Full log: [ 128.548628] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 128.553268] WARNING: CPU: 23 PID: 1105 at kernel/dma/mapping.c:149 dma_map_page_attrs+0x14c/0x1d0 [ 128.562139] Modules linked in: virtio_net net_failover failover virtio_vdpa vdpa_sim vringh vhost_iotlb vdpa xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_counter nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink tun bridge stp llc iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rfkill intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common isst_if_common sunrpc skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel ipmi_ssif kvm mgag200 i2c_algo_bit irqbypass drm_kms_helper crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul syscopyarea ghash_clmulni_intel iTCO_wdt sysfillrect iTCO_vendor_support sysimgblt rapl fb_sys_fops dcdbas intel_cstate drm acpi_ipmi ipmi_si mei_me dell_smbios intel_uncore ipmi_devintf mei i2c_i801 dell_wmi_descriptor wmi_bmof pcspkr lpc_ich i2c_smbus ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi sg ahci libahci libata megaraid_sas tg3 crc32c_intel wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log [ 128.562188] dm_mod [ 128.651334] CPU: 23 PID: 1105 Comm: NetworkManager Tainted: G S I 5.10.0-rc1+ openbmc#59 [ 128.659939] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R440/04JN2K, BIOS 2.8.1 06/30/2020 [ 128.667419] RIP: 0010:dma_map_page_attrs+0x14c/0x1d0 [ 128.672384] Code: 1c 25 28 00 00 00 0f 85 97 00 00 00 48 83 c4 10 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d c3 4c 89 da eb d7 48 89 f2 48 2b 50 18 48 89 d0 eb 8d 0f 0b <0f> 0b 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb c3 48 89 d9 48 8b 40 40 e8 2d a0 aa [ 128.691131] RSP: 0018:ffffae0f0151f3c8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 128.696357] RAX: ffffffffc06b7400 RBX: 00000000000005fa RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 128.703488] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: ffffcee3c7861200 RDI: ffff9e2bc16cd000 [ 128.710620] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 128.717754] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9e472cb291f8 [ 128.724886] R13: ffff9e2bc14da780 R14: ffff9e472bc20000 R15: ffff9e2bc1b14940 [ 128.732020] FS: 00007f887bae23c0(0000) GS:ffff9e4ac01c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 128.740105] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 128.745852] CR2: 0000562bc09de998 CR3: 00000003c156c006 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [ 128.752982] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 128.760114] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 128.767247] PKRU: 55555554 [ 128.769961] Call Trace: [ 128.772418] virtqueue_add+0x81e/0xb00 [ 128.776176] virtqueue_add_inbuf_ctx+0x26/0x30 [ 128.780625] try_fill_recv+0x3a2/0x6e0 [virtio_net] [ 128.785509] virtnet_open+0xf9/0x180 [virtio_net] [ 128.790217] __dev_open+0xe8/0x180 [ 128.793620] __dev_change_flags+0x1a7/0x210 [ 128.797808] dev_change_flags+0x21/0x60 [ 128.801646] do_setlink+0x328/0x10e0 [ 128.805227] ? __nla_validate_parse+0x121/0x180 [ 128.809757] ? __nla_parse+0x21/0x30 [ 128.813338] ? inet6_validate_link_af+0x5c/0xf0 [ 128.817871] ? cpumask_next+0x17/0x20 [ 128.821535] ? __snmp6_fill_stats64.isra.54+0x6b/0x110 [ 128.826676] ? __nla_validate_parse+0x47/0x180 [ 128.831120] __rtnl_newlink+0x541/0x8e0 [ 128.834962] ? __nla_reserve+0x38/0x50 [ 128.838713] ? security_sock_rcv_skb+0x2a/0x40 [ 128.843158] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x2c/0x1e0 [ 128.847518] ? netlink_attachskb+0x1d8/0x220 [ 128.851793] ? skb_queue_tail+0x1b/0x50 [ 128.855641] ? fib6_clean_node+0x43/0x170 [ 128.859652] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 [ 128.863406] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x3a3/0x420 [ 128.868110] rtnl_newlink+0x43/0x60 [ 128.871602] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x12c/0x380 [ 128.875701] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.39+0x110/0x110 [ 128.880147] netlink_rcv_skb+0x50/0x100 [ 128.883987] netlink_unicast+0x1a5/0x280 [ 128.887913] netlink_sendmsg+0x23d/0x470 [ 128.891839] sock_sendmsg+0x5b/0x60 [ 128.895331] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1ef/0x260 [ 128.899255] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x5c/0x90 [ 128.903702] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xc0 [ 128.907369] ? dev_forward_change+0x130/0x130 [ 128.911731] ? sysctl_head_finish.part.29+0x24/0x40 [ 128.916616] ? new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1b0 [ 128.920628] ? mntput_no_expire+0x47/0x240 [ 128.924727] __sys_sendmsg+0x57/0xa0 [ 128.928309] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [ 128.931887] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 128.936937] RIP: 0033:0x7f88792e3857 [ 128.940518] Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 0b ed ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 44 ed ff ff 48 [ 128.959263] RSP: 002b:00007ffdca60dea0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [ 128.966827] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 00007f88792e3857 [ 128.973960] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffdca60def0 RDI: 000000000000000c [ 128.981095] RBP: 00007ffdca60def0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 128.988224] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 128.995357] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffdca60e0a8 R15: 00007ffdca60e09c [ 129.002492] CPU: 23 PID: 1105 Comm: NetworkManager Tainted: G S I 5.10.0-rc1+ openbmc#59 [ 129.011093] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R440/04JN2K, BIOS 2.8.1 06/30/2020 [ 129.018571] Call Trace: [ 129.021027] dump_stack+0x57/0x6a [ 129.024346] __warn.cold.14+0xe/0x3d [ 129.027925] ? dma_map_page_attrs+0x14c/0x1d0 [ 129.032283] report_bug+0xbd/0xf0 [ 129.035602] handle_bug+0x44/0x80 [ 129.038922] exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x60 [ 129.042589] asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20 [ 129.046602] RIP: 0010:dma_map_page_attrs+0x14c/0x1d0 [ 129.051566] Code: 1c 25 28 00 00 00 0f 85 97 00 00 00 48 83 c4 10 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d c3 4c 89 da eb d7 48 89 f2 48 2b 50 18 48 89 d0 eb 8d 0f 0b <0f> 0b 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb c3 48 89 d9 48 8b 40 40 e8 2d a0 aa [ 129.070311] RSP: 0018:ffffae0f0151f3c8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 129.075536] RAX: ffffffffc06b7400 RBX: 00000000000005fa RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 129.082669] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: ffffcee3c7861200 RDI: ffff9e2bc16cd000 [ 129.089803] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 129.096936] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9e472cb291f8 [ 129.104068] R13: ffff9e2bc14da780 R14: ffff9e472bc20000 R15: ffff9e2bc1b14940 [ 129.111200] virtqueue_add+0x81e/0xb00 [ 129.114952] virtqueue_add_inbuf_ctx+0x26/0x30 [ 129.119399] try_fill_recv+0x3a2/0x6e0 [virtio_net] [ 129.124280] virtnet_open+0xf9/0x180 [virtio_net] [ 129.128984] __dev_open+0xe8/0x180 [ 129.132390] __dev_change_flags+0x1a7/0x210 [ 129.136575] dev_change_flags+0x21/0x60 [ 129.140415] do_setlink+0x328/0x10e0 [ 129.143994] ? __nla_validate_parse+0x121/0x180 [ 129.148528] ? __nla_parse+0x21/0x30 [ 129.152107] ? inet6_validate_link_af+0x5c/0xf0 [ 129.156639] ? cpumask_next+0x17/0x20 [ 129.160306] ? __snmp6_fill_stats64.isra.54+0x6b/0x110 [ 129.165443] ? __nla_validate_parse+0x47/0x180 [ 129.169890] __rtnl_newlink+0x541/0x8e0 [ 129.173731] ? __nla_reserve+0x38/0x50 [ 129.177483] ? security_sock_rcv_skb+0x2a/0x40 [ 129.181928] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x2c/0x1e0 [ 129.186286] ? netlink_attachskb+0x1d8/0x220 [ 129.190560] ? skb_queue_tail+0x1b/0x50 [ 129.194401] ? fib6_clean_node+0x43/0x170 [ 129.198411] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 [ 129.202163] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x3a3/0x420 [ 129.206869] rtnl_newlink+0x43/0x60 [ 129.210361] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x12c/0x380 [ 129.214462] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.39+0x110/0x110 [ 129.218908] netlink_rcv_skb+0x50/0x100 [ 129.222747] netlink_unicast+0x1a5/0x280 [ 129.226672] netlink_sendmsg+0x23d/0x470 [ 129.230599] sock_sendmsg+0x5b/0x60 [ 129.234090] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1ef/0x260 [ 129.238015] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x5c/0x90 [ 129.242461] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xc0 [ 129.246128] ? dev_forward_change+0x130/0x130 [ 129.250487] ? sysctl_head_finish.part.29+0x24/0x40 [ 129.255368] ? new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1b0 [ 129.259381] ? mntput_no_expire+0x47/0x240 [ 129.263478] __sys_sendmsg+0x57/0xa0 [ 129.267058] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [ 129.270639] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 129.275689] RIP: 0033:0x7f88792e3857 [ 129.279268] Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 0b ed ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 44 ed ff ff 48 [ 129.298015] RSP: 002b:00007ffdca60dea0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [ 129.305581] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 00007f88792e3857 [ 129.312712] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffdca60def0 RDI: 000000000000000c [ 129.319846] RBP: 00007ffdca60def0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 129.326978] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 129.334109] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffdca60e0a8 R15: 00007ffdca60e09c [ 129.341249] ---[ end trace c551e8028fbaf59d ]--- [ 129.351207] net eth0: Unexpected TXQ (0) queue failure: -12 [ 129.360445] net eth0: Unexpected TXQ (0) queue failure: -12 [ 129.824428] net eth0: Unexpected TXQ (0) queue failure: -12 Fixes: 2c53d0f ("vdpasim: vDPA device simulator") Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201027175914.689278-1-lvivier@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
shenki
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Sep 21, 2022
commit cecf8e1 upstream. Since the check_user_trigger() is called outside of RCU read lock, this list_for_each_entry_rcu() caused a suspicious RCU usage warning. # echo hist:keys=pid > events/sched/sched_stat_runtime/trigger # cat events/sched/sched_stat_runtime/trigger [ 43.167032] [ 43.167418] ============================= [ 43.167992] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 43.168567] 5.19.0-rc5-00029-g19ebe4651abf #59 Not tainted [ 43.169283] ----------------------------- [ 43.169863] kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c:145 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! ... However, this file->triggers list is safe when it is accessed under event_mutex is held. To fix this warning, adds a lockdep_is_held check to the list_for_each_entry_rcu(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/166226474977.223837.1992182913048377113.stgit@devnote2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 7491e2c ("tracing: Add a probe that attaches to trace events") Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
thangqn-ampere
pushed a commit
to ampere-openbmc/linux
that referenced
this issue
Oct 4, 2022
commit cecf8e1 upstream. Since the check_user_trigger() is called outside of RCU read lock, this list_for_each_entry_rcu() caused a suspicious RCU usage warning. # echo hist:keys=pid > events/sched/sched_stat_runtime/trigger # cat events/sched/sched_stat_runtime/trigger [ 43.167032] [ 43.167418] ============================= [ 43.167992] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 43.168567] 5.19.0-rc5-00029-g19ebe4651abf openbmc#59 Not tainted [ 43.169283] ----------------------------- [ 43.169863] kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c:145 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! ... However, this file->triggers list is safe when it is accessed under event_mutex is held. To fix this warning, adds a lockdep_is_held check to the list_for_each_entry_rcu(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/166226474977.223837.1992182913048377113.stgit@devnote2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 7491e2c ("tracing: Add a probe that attaches to trace events") Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
shenki
pushed a commit
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this issue
Aug 18, 2023
commit 1728137 upstream. l2cap_sock_release(sk) frees sk. However, sk's children are still alive and point to the already free'd sk's address. To fix this, l2cap_sock_release(sk) also cleans sk's children. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0xb7/0x100 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1650 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888104617aa8 by task kworker/u3:0/276 CPU: 0 PID: 276 Comm: kworker/u3:0 Not tainted 6.2.0-00001-gef397bd4d5fb-dirty #59 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci2 hci_rx_work Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x72/0x95 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:306 [inline] print_report+0x175/0x478 mm/kasan/report.c:417 kasan_report+0xb1/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:517 l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0xb7/0x100 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1650 l2cap_chan_ready+0x10e/0x1e0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1386 l2cap_config_req+0x753/0x9f0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4480 l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5739 [inline] l2cap_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6509 [inline] l2cap_recv_frame+0xe2e/0x43c0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7788 l2cap_recv_acldata+0x6ed/0x7e0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:8506 hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3813 [inline] hci_rx_work+0x66e/0xbc0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4048 process_one_work+0x4ea/0x8e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x364/0x8e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x1b9/0x200 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308 </TASK> Allocated by task 288: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:374 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x82/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:383 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:968 [inline] __kmalloc+0x5a/0x140 mm/slab_common.c:981 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:584 [inline] sk_prot_alloc+0x113/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:2040 sk_alloc+0x36/0x3c0 net/core/sock.c:2093 l2cap_sock_alloc.constprop.0+0x39/0x1c0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1852 l2cap_sock_create+0x10d/0x220 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1898 bt_sock_create+0x183/0x290 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:132 __sock_create+0x226/0x380 net/socket.c:1518 sock_create net/socket.c:1569 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1606 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1591 [inline] __sys_socket+0x112/0x200 net/socket.c:1639 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1652 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1650 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1650 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Freed by task 288: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:523 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline] ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:200 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190 mm/kasan/common.c:244 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1781 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1807 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3787 [inline] __kmem_cache_free+0x88/0x1f0 mm/slub.c:3800 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2076 [inline] __sk_destruct+0x347/0x430 net/core/sock.c:2168 sk_destruct+0x9c/0xb0 net/core/sock.c:2183 __sk_free+0x82/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2194 sk_free+0x7c/0xa0 net/core/sock.c:2205 sock_put include/net/sock.h:1991 [inline] l2cap_sock_kill+0x256/0x2b0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1257 l2cap_sock_release+0x1a7/0x220 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1428 __sock_release+0x80/0x150 net/socket.c:650 sock_close+0x19/0x30 net/socket.c:1368 __fput+0x17a/0x5c0 fs/file_table.c:320 task_work_run+0x132/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:179 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120 kernel/entry/common.c:203 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x21/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:296 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888104617800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 680 bytes inside of 1024-byte region [ffff888104617800, ffff888104617c00) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000dbca6a80 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888104614000 pfn:0x104614 head:00000000dbca6a80 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 subpages_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2) raw: 0200000000010200 ffff888100041dc0 ffffea0004212c10 ffffea0004234b10 raw: ffff888104614000 0000000000080002 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888104617980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888104617a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff888104617a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888104617b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888104617b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Ack: This bug is found by FuzzBT with a modified Syzkaller. Other contributors are Ruoyu Wu and Hui Peng. Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <iam@sung-woo.kim> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
amboar
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this issue
May 20, 2024
commit fb7a0d3 upstream. Christoph reported a splat hinting at a corrupted snd_una: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 38 at net/mptcp/protocol.c:1005 __mptcp_clean_una+0x4b3/0x620 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1005 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 38 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc1-gbbeac67456c9 #59 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events mptcp_worker RIP: 0010:__mptcp_clean_una+0x4b3/0x620 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1005 Code: be 06 01 00 00 bf 06 01 00 00 e8 a8 12 e7 fe e9 00 fe ff ff e8 8e 1a e7 fe 0f b7 ab 3e 02 00 00 e9 d3 fd ff ff e8 7d 1a e7 fe <0f> 0b 4c 8b bb e0 05 00 00 e9 74 fc ff ff e8 6a 1a e7 fe 0f 0b e9 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000013fd48 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881029bd280 RCX: ffffffff82382fe4 RDX: ffff8881003cbd00 RSI: ffffffff823833c3 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff888138ba8000 R13: 0000000000000106 R14: ffff8881029bd908 R15: ffff888126560000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f604a5dae38 CR3: 0000000101dac002 CR4: 0000000000170ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> __mptcp_clean_una_wakeup net/mptcp/protocol.c:1055 [inline] mptcp_clean_una_wakeup net/mptcp/protocol.c:1062 [inline] __mptcp_retrans+0x7f/0x7e0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2615 mptcp_worker+0x434/0x740 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2767 process_one_work+0x1e0/0x560 kernel/workqueue.c:3254 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3335 [inline] worker_thread+0x3c7/0x640 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x121/0x170 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243 </TASK> When fallback to TCP happens early on a client socket, snd_nxt is not yet initialized and any incoming ack will copy such value into snd_una. If the mptcp worker (dumbly) tries mptcp-level re-injection after such ack, that would unconditionally trigger a send buffer cleanup using 'bad' snd_una values. We could easily disable re-injection for fallback sockets, but such dumb behavior already helped catching a few subtle issues and a very low to zero impact in practice. Instead address the issue always initializing snd_nxt (and write_seq, for consistency) at connect time. Fixes: 8fd7380 ("mptcp: fallback in case of simultaneous connect") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com> Closes: multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next#485 Tested-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240429-upstream-net-20240429-mptcp-snd_nxt-init-connect-v1-1-59ceac0a7dcb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Sep 18, 2024
25216af ("PCI: Add managed pcim_intx()") moved the allocation step for pci_intx()'s device resource from pcim_enable_device() to pcim_intx(). As before, pcim_enable_device() sets pci_dev.is_managed to true; and it is never set to false again. Due to the lifecycle of a struct pci_dev, it can happen that a second driver obtains the same pci_dev after a first driver ran. If one driver uses pcim_enable_device() and the other doesn't, this causes the other driver to run into managed pcim_intx(), which will try to allocate when called for the first time. Allocations might sleep, so calling pci_intx() while holding spinlocks becomes then invalid, which causes lockdep warnings and could cause deadlocks: ======================================================== WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected 6.11.0-rc6+ openbmc#59 Tainted: G W -------------------------------------------------------- CPU 0/KVM/1537 just changed the state of lock: ffffa0f0cff965f0 (&vdev->irqlock){-...}-{2:2}, at: vfio_intx_handler+0x21/0xd0 [vfio_pci_core] but this lock took another, HARDIRQ-unsafe lock in the past: (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0} and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. other info that might help us debug this: Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(fs_reclaim); local_irq_disable(); lock(&vdev->irqlock); lock(fs_reclaim); <Interrupt> lock(&vdev->irqlock); *** DEADLOCK *** Have pcim_enable_device()'s release function, pcim_disable_device(), set pci_dev.is_managed to false so that subsequent drivers using the same struct pci_dev do not implicitly run into managed code. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240905072556.11375-2-pstanner@redhat.com Fixes: 25216af ("PCI: Add managed pcim_intx()") Reported-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240903094431.63551744.alex.williamson@redhat.com/ Suggested-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner <pstanner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Tested-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
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While doing power cycling to debug another issue, the rwfs got corrupted and we had to netboot to recover: No files were created in overlay since first initial flash of this system.
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