jffs2 backtrace on 4.10 #127
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A fix is in the spi-nor repo and the warning should be removed in 4.11. May you could pull the commit in linux-openbmc when it is merged in the linux tree |
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[ Upstream commit 62f8f4d ] Dmitry reported crashes in DCCP stack [1] Problem here is that when I got rid of listener spinlock, I missed the fact that DCCP stores a complex state in struct dccp_request_sock, while TCP does not. Since multiple cpus could access it at the same time, we need to add protection. [1] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dccp_feat_activate_values+0x967/0xab0 net/dccp/feat.c:1541 at addr ffff88003713be68 Read of size 8 by task syz-executor2/8457 CPU: 2 PID: 8457 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc7+ openbmc#127 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] dump_stack+0x292/0x398 lib/dump_stack.c:51 kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:162 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:200 [inline] kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:289 [inline] kasan_report.part.1+0x20e/0x4e0 mm/kasan/report.c:311 kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:332 [inline] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x29/0x30 mm/kasan/report.c:332 dccp_feat_activate_values+0x967/0xab0 net/dccp/feat.c:1541 dccp_create_openreq_child+0x464/0x610 net/dccp/minisocks.c:121 dccp_v6_request_recv_sock+0x1f6/0x1960 net/dccp/ipv6.c:457 dccp_check_req+0x335/0x5a0 net/dccp/minisocks.c:186 dccp_v6_rcv+0x69e/0x1d00 net/dccp/ipv6.c:711 ip6_input_finish+0x46d/0x17a0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:279 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ip6_input+0xdb/0x590 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:322 dst_input include/net/dst.h:507 [inline] ip6_rcv_finish+0x289/0x890 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ipv6_rcv+0x12ec/0x23d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:203 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ae5/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4190 __netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4228 process_backlog+0xe5/0x6c0 net/core/dev.c:4839 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5202 [inline] net_rx_action+0xe70/0x1900 net/core/dev.c:5267 __do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:284 do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:902 </IRQ> do_softirq.part.17+0x1e8/0x230 kernel/softirq.c:328 do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:176 [inline] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x1f2/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:181 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:31 [inline] rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:971 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0xbb0/0x23d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:123 ip6_finish_output+0x302/0x960 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:148 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:246 [inline] ip6_output+0x1cb/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:162 ip6_xmit+0xcdf/0x20d0 include/net/dst.h:501 inet6_csk_xmit+0x320/0x5f0 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:179 dccp_transmit_skb+0xb09/0x1120 net/dccp/output.c:141 dccp_xmit_packet+0x215/0x760 net/dccp/output.c:280 dccp_write_xmit+0x168/0x1d0 net/dccp/output.c:362 dccp_sendmsg+0x79c/0xb10 net/dccp/proto.c:796 inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:744 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:635 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:645 SYSC_sendto+0x660/0x810 net/socket.c:1687 SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1655 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 RIP: 0033:0x4458b9 RSP: 002b:00007f8ceb77bb58 EFLAGS: 00000282 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000017 RCX: 00000000004458b9 RDX: 0000000000000023 RSI: 0000000020e60000 RDI: 0000000000000017 RBP: 00000000006e1b90 R08: 00000000200f9fe1 R09: 0000000000000020 R10: 0000000000008010 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 00000000007080a8 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f8ceb77c9c0 R15: 00007f8ceb77c700 Object at ffff88003713be50, in cache kmalloc-64 size: 64 Allocated: PID = 8446 save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:57 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:502 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:514 [inline] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:605 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x82/0x270 mm/slub.c:2738 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:490 [inline] dccp_feat_entry_new+0x214/0x410 net/dccp/feat.c:467 dccp_feat_push_change+0x38/0x220 net/dccp/feat.c:487 __feat_register_sp+0x223/0x2f0 net/dccp/feat.c:741 dccp_feat_propagate_ccid+0x22b/0x2b0 net/dccp/feat.c:949 dccp_feat_server_ccid_dependencies+0x1b3/0x250 net/dccp/feat.c:1012 dccp_make_response+0x1f1/0xc90 net/dccp/output.c:423 dccp_v6_send_response+0x4ec/0xc20 net/dccp/ipv6.c:217 dccp_v6_conn_request+0xaba/0x11b0 net/dccp/ipv6.c:377 dccp_rcv_state_process+0x51e/0x1650 net/dccp/input.c:606 dccp_v6_do_rcv+0x213/0x350 net/dccp/ipv6.c:632 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:893 [inline] __sk_receive_skb+0x36f/0xcc0 net/core/sock.c:479 dccp_v6_rcv+0xba5/0x1d00 net/dccp/ipv6.c:742 ip6_input_finish+0x46d/0x17a0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:279 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ip6_input+0xdb/0x590 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:322 dst_input include/net/dst.h:507 [inline] ip6_rcv_finish+0x289/0x890 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ipv6_rcv+0x12ec/0x23d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:203 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ae5/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4190 __netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4228 process_backlog+0xe5/0x6c0 net/core/dev.c:4839 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5202 [inline] net_rx_action+0xe70/0x1900 net/core/dev.c:5267 __do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:284 Freed: PID = 15 save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:57 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:502 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:514 [inline] kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:578 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1355 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1377 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:2954 [inline] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:3874 dccp_feat_entry_destructor.part.4+0x48/0x60 net/dccp/feat.c:418 dccp_feat_entry_destructor net/dccp/feat.c:416 [inline] dccp_feat_list_pop net/dccp/feat.c:541 [inline] dccp_feat_activate_values+0x57f/0xab0 net/dccp/feat.c:1543 dccp_create_openreq_child+0x464/0x610 net/dccp/minisocks.c:121 dccp_v6_request_recv_sock+0x1f6/0x1960 net/dccp/ipv6.c:457 dccp_check_req+0x335/0x5a0 net/dccp/minisocks.c:186 dccp_v6_rcv+0x69e/0x1d00 net/dccp/ipv6.c:711 ip6_input_finish+0x46d/0x17a0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:279 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ip6_input+0xdb/0x590 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:322 dst_input include/net/dst.h:507 [inline] ip6_rcv_finish+0x289/0x890 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ipv6_rcv+0x12ec/0x23d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:203 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ae5/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4190 __netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4228 process_backlog+0xe5/0x6c0 net/core/dev.c:4839 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5202 [inline] net_rx_action+0xe70/0x1900 net/core/dev.c:5267 __do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:284 Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88003713bd00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88003713bd80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88003713be00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ Fixes: 079096f ("tcp/dccp: install syn_recv requests into ehash table") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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When syzkaller team brought us a C repro for the crash [1] that had been reported many times in the past, I finally could find the root cause. If FlowLabel info is merged by fl6_merge_options(), we leave part of the opt_space storage provided by udp/raw/l2tp with random value in opt_space.tot_len, unless a control message was provided at sendmsg() time. Then ip6_setup_cork() would use this random value to perform a kzalloc() call. Undefined behavior and crashes. Fix is to properly set tot_len in fl6_merge_options() At the same time, we can also avoid consuming memory and cpu cycles to clear it, if every option is copied via a kmemdup(). This is the change in ip6_setup_cork(). [1] kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [openbmc#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 6613 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc4+ openbmc#127 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 task: ffff8801cb64a100 task.stack: ffff8801cc350000 RIP: 0010:ip6_setup_cork+0x274/0x15c0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1168 RSP: 0018:ffff8801cc357550 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8801cc357748 RCX: 0000000000000010 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffff842bd1d9 RDI: 0000000000000014 RBP: ffff8801cc357620 R08: ffff8801cb17f380 R09: ffff8801cc357b10 R10: ffff8801cb64a100 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8801cc357ab0 R13: ffff8801cc357b10 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8801c3bbf0c0 FS: 00007f9c5c459700(0000) GS:ffff8801db200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020324000 CR3: 00000001d1cf2000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000020001010 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 Call Trace: ip6_make_skb+0x282/0x530 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1729 udpv6_sendmsg+0x2769/0x3380 net/ipv6/udp.c:1340 inet_sendmsg+0x11f/0x5e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 SYSC_sendto+0x358/0x5a0 net/socket.c:1750 SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1718 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x4520a9 RSP: 002b:00007f9c5c458c08 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000718000 RCX: 00000000004520a9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020fd1000 RDI: 0000000000000016 RBP: 0000000000000086 R08: 0000000020e0afe4 R09: 000000000000001c R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00000000004bb1ee R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 0000000000000016 R15: 0000000000000029 Code: e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 ea 0f 00 00 48 8d 79 04 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 45 8b 74 24 04 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 RIP: ip6_setup_cork+0x274/0x15c0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1168 RSP: ffff8801cc357550 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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…ully The 0day bot reports the below failure which happens occasionally, with their randconfig testing (once every ~100 boots). The Code points at the private pointer ->driver_data being NULL, which hints at a race of sorts where the private driver_data descriptor has disappeared by the time we get to run the workqueue. So let's check that pointer before we continue with issuing the command to the drive. This fix is of the brown paper bag nature but considering that IDE is long deprecated, let's do that so that random testing which happens to enable CONFIG_IDE during randconfig builds, doesn't fail because of this. Besides, failing the TEST_UNIT_READY command because the drive private data is gone is something which we could simply do anyway, to denote that there was a problem communicating with the device. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000001c0 IP: cdrom_check_status *pde = 00000000 Oops: 0000 [openbmc#1] SMP CPU: 1 PID: 155 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8 openbmc#127 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events_freezable_power_ disk_events_workfn task: 4fe90980 task.stack: 507ac000 EIP: cdrom_check_status+0x2c/0x90 EFLAGS: 00210246 CPU: 1 EAX: 00000000 EBX: 4fefec00 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000 ESI: 00000003 EDI: ffffffff EBP: 467a9340 ESP: 507aded0 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 CR0: 80050033 CR2: 000001c0 CR3: 06e0f000 CR4: 00000690 Call Trace: ? ide_cdrom_check_events_real ? cdrom_check_events ? disk_check_events ? process_one_work ? process_one_work ? worker_thread ? kthread ? process_one_work ? __kthread_create_on_node ? ret_from_fork Code: 53 83 ec 14 89 c3 89 d1 be 03 00 00 00 65 a1 14 00 00 00 89 44 24 10 31 c0 8b 43 18 c7 44 24 04 00 00 00 00 c7 04 24 00 00 00 00 <8a> 80 c0 01 00 00 c7 44 24 08 00 00 00 00 83 e0 03 c7 44 24 0c EIP: cdrom_check_status+0x2c/0x90 SS:ESP: 0068:507aded0 CR2: 00000000000001c0 ---[ end trace 2410e586dd8f88b2 ]--- Reported-and-tested-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 864e2a1 ] When syzkaller team brought us a C repro for the crash [1] that had been reported many times in the past, I finally could find the root cause. If FlowLabel info is merged by fl6_merge_options(), we leave part of the opt_space storage provided by udp/raw/l2tp with random value in opt_space.tot_len, unless a control message was provided at sendmsg() time. Then ip6_setup_cork() would use this random value to perform a kzalloc() call. Undefined behavior and crashes. Fix is to properly set tot_len in fl6_merge_options() At the same time, we can also avoid consuming memory and cpu cycles to clear it, if every option is copied via a kmemdup(). This is the change in ip6_setup_cork(). [1] kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 6613 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc4+ #127 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 task: ffff8801cb64a100 task.stack: ffff8801cc350000 RIP: 0010:ip6_setup_cork+0x274/0x15c0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1168 RSP: 0018:ffff8801cc357550 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8801cc357748 RCX: 0000000000000010 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffff842bd1d9 RDI: 0000000000000014 RBP: ffff8801cc357620 R08: ffff8801cb17f380 R09: ffff8801cc357b10 R10: ffff8801cb64a100 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8801cc357ab0 R13: ffff8801cc357b10 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8801c3bbf0c0 FS: 00007f9c5c459700(0000) GS:ffff8801db200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020324000 CR3: 00000001d1cf2000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000020001010 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 Call Trace: ip6_make_skb+0x282/0x530 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1729 udpv6_sendmsg+0x2769/0x3380 net/ipv6/udp.c:1340 inet_sendmsg+0x11f/0x5e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 SYSC_sendto+0x358/0x5a0 net/socket.c:1750 SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1718 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x4520a9 RSP: 002b:00007f9c5c458c08 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000718000 RCX: 00000000004520a9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020fd1000 RDI: 0000000000000016 RBP: 0000000000000086 R08: 0000000020e0afe4 R09: 000000000000001c R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00000000004bb1ee R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 0000000000000016 R15: 0000000000000029 Code: e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 ea 0f 00 00 48 8d 79 04 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 45 8b 74 24 04 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 RIP: ip6_setup_cork+0x274/0x15c0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1168 RSP: ffff8801cc357550 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Aug 19, 2021
[ Upstream commit 5dd0a6b ] During testing of f263a81 ("bpf: Track subprog poke descriptors correctly and fix use-after-free") under various failure conditions, for example, when jit_subprogs() fails and tries to clean up the program to be run under the interpreter, we ran into the following freeze: [...] #127/8 tailcall_bpf2bpf_3:FAIL [...] [ 92.041251] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run+0x1b9d/0x2e20 [ 92.042408] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800da67f68 by task test_progs/682 [ 92.043707] [ 92.044030] CPU: 1 PID: 682 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G O 5.13.0-53301-ge6c08cb33a30-dirty #87 [ 92.045542] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 92.046785] Call Trace: [ 92.047171] ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0 [ 92.047773] ? __bpf_prog_run_args32+0x8b/0xb0 [ 92.048389] ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0 [ 92.049019] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130 [...] // few hundred [similar] lines more [ 92.659025] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130 [ 92.659845] ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0 [ 92.660738] ? __bpf_prog_run_args32+0x8b/0xb0 [ 92.661528] ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0 [ 92.662378] ? print_usage_bug+0x50/0x50 [ 92.663221] ? print_usage_bug+0x50/0x50 [ 92.664077] ? bpf_ksym_find+0x9c/0xe0 [ 92.664887] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130 [ 92.665624] ? kernel_text_address+0xf5/0x100 [ 92.666529] ? __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30 [ 92.667725] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x2f/0x50 [ 92.668854] ? ___bpf_prog_run+0x15d4/0x2e20 [ 92.670185] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130 [ 92.671130] ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0 [ 92.672020] ? __bpf_prog_run_args32+0x8b/0xb0 [ 92.672860] ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0 [ 92.675159] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130 [ 92.677074] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd5/0x130 [ 92.678662] ? ___bpf_prog_run+0x15d4/0x2e20 [ 92.680046] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130 [ 92.681285] ? __bpf_prog_run32+0x6b/0x90 [ 92.682601] ? __bpf_prog_run64+0x90/0x90 [ 92.683636] ? lock_downgrade+0x370/0x370 [ 92.684647] ? mark_held_locks+0x44/0x90 [ 92.685652] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130 [ 92.686752] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x79/0x100 [ 92.688004] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130 [ 92.688573] ? __cant_migrate+0x2b/0x80 [ 92.689192] ? bpf_test_run+0x2f4/0x510 [ 92.689869] ? bpf_test_timer_continue+0x1c0/0x1c0 [ 92.690856] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0x90/0x90 [ 92.691506] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x61/0x80 [ 92.692128] ? eth_type_trans+0x128/0x240 [ 92.692737] ? __build_skb+0x46/0x50 [ 92.693252] ? bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x65e/0xc50 [ 92.693954] ? bpf_prog_test_run_raw_tp+0x2d0/0x2d0 [ 92.694639] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x100 [ 92.695162] ? bpf_prog_inc+0x23/0x30 [ 92.695685] ? __sys_bpf+0xb40/0x2c80 [ 92.696324] ? bpf_link_get_from_fd+0x90/0x90 [ 92.697150] ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90 [ 92.698007] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x124/0x220 [ 92.699045] ? finish_task_switch+0xe6/0x370 [ 92.700072] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x79/0x100 [ 92.701233] ? finish_task_switch+0x11d/0x370 [ 92.702264] ? __switch_to+0x2c0/0x740 [ 92.703148] ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90 [ 92.704155] ? __x64_sys_bpf+0x45/0x50 [ 92.705146] ? do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 [ 92.706953] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [...] Turns out that the program rejection from e411901 ("bpf: allow for tailcalls in BPF subprograms for x64 JIT") is buggy since env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable is never true. Commit ebf7d1f ("bpf, x64: rework pro/epilogue and tailcall handling in JIT") added a tracker into check_max_stack_depth() which propagates the tail_call_reachable condition throughout the subprograms. This info is then assigned to the subprogram's func[i]->aux->tail_call_reachable. However, in the case of the rejection check upon JIT failure, env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable is used. func[0]->aux->tail_call_reachable which represents the main program's information did not propagate this to the outer env->prog->aux, though. Add this propagation into check_max_stack_depth() where it needs to belong so that the check can be done reliably. Fixes: ebf7d1f ("bpf, x64: rework pro/epilogue and tailcall handling in JIT") Fixes: e411901 ("bpf: allow for tailcalls in BPF subprograms for x64 JIT") Co-developed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/618c34e3163ad1a36b1e82377576a6081e182f25.1626123173.git.daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Sep 18, 2024
Add 3 test cases for skb dynptr used in tp_btf: - test_dynptr_skb_tp_btf: use skb dynptr in tp_btf and make sure it is read-only. - skb_invalid_ctx_fentry/skb_invalid_ctx_fexit: bpf_dynptr_from_skb should fail in fentry/fexit. In test_dynptr_skb_tp_btf, to trigger the tracepoint in kfree_skb, test_pkt_access is used for its test_run, as in kfree_skb.c. Because the test process is different from others, a new setup type is defined, i.e., SETUP_SKB_PROG_TP. The result is like: $ ./test_progs -t 'dynptr/test_dynptr_skb_tp_btf' openbmc#84/14 dynptr/test_dynptr_skb_tp_btf:OK openbmc#84 dynptr:OK openbmc#127 kfunc_dynptr_param:OK Summary: 2/1 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED $ ./test_progs -t 'dynptr/skb_invalid_ctx_f' openbmc#84/85 dynptr/skb_invalid_ctx_fentry:OK openbmc#84/86 dynptr/skb_invalid_ctx_fexit:OK openbmc#84 dynptr:OK openbmc#127 kfunc_dynptr_param:OK Summary: 2/2 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Also fix two coding style nits (change spaces to tabs). Signed-off-by: Philo Lu <lulie@linux.alibaba.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240911033719.91468-6-lulie@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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I was booting a 4.10 based kernel with the upstream mtd driver appied and I got this one:
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