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deps: upgrade openssl sources to 1.0.1u
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This just replaces all sources of openssl-1.0.1u.tar.gz
into deps/openssl/openssl.

PR-URL: #8718
Reviewed-By: Fedor Indutny <fedor@indutny.com>
Reviewed-By: Myles Borins <mborins@us.ibm.com>
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shigeki authored and rvagg committed Sep 22, 2016
1 parent 1ba6d16 commit 4a9da21
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Showing 177 changed files with 1,651 additions and 38,121 deletions.
162 changes: 161 additions & 1 deletion deps/openssl/openssl/CHANGES
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -2,6 +2,166 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________

Changes between 1.0.1t and 1.0.1u [22 Sep 2016]

*) OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth

A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a
large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded
memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of
Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default
configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds using
the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
(CVE-2016-6304)
[Matt Caswell]

*) In order to mitigate the SWEET32 attack, the DES ciphers were moved from
HIGH to MEDIUM.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Gaetan
Leurent (INRIA)
(CVE-2016-2183)
[Rich Salz]

*) OOB write in MDC2_Update()

An overflow can occur in MDC2_Update() either if called directly or
through the EVP_DigestUpdate() function using MDC2. If an attacker
is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous
call to EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check
can overflow resulting in a heap corruption.

The amount of data needed is comparable to SIZE_MAX which is impractical
on most platforms.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
(CVE-2016-6303)
[Stephen Henson]

*) Malformed SHA512 ticket DoS

If a server uses SHA512 for TLS session ticket HMAC it is vulnerable to a
DoS attack where a malformed ticket will result in an OOB read which will
ultimately crash.

The use of SHA512 in TLS session tickets is comparatively rare as it requires
a custom server callback and ticket lookup mechanism.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
(CVE-2016-6302)
[Stephen Henson]

*) OOB write in BN_bn2dec()

The function BN_bn2dec() does not check the return value of BN_div_word().
This can cause an OOB write if an application uses this function with an
overly large BIGNUM. This could be a problem if an overly large certificate
or CRL is printed out from an untrusted source. TLS is not affected because
record limits will reject an oversized certificate before it is parsed.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
(CVE-2016-2182)
[Stephen Henson]

*) OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio()

The function TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_obj2txt(): the return value is
the total length the OID text representation would use and not the amount
of data written. This will result in OOB reads when large OIDs are
presented.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
(CVE-2016-2180)
[Stephen Henson]

*) Pointer arithmetic undefined behaviour

Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic

A common idiom in the codebase is to check limits in the following manner:
"p + len > limit"

Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
limit == p + SIZE

"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
message).

The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
undefined behaviour.

For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken
(CVE-2016-2177)
[Matt Caswell]

*) Constant time flag not preserved in DSA signing

Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.

This issue was reported by César Pereida (Aalto University), Billy Brumley
(Tampere University of Technology), and Yuval Yarom (The University of
Adelaide and NICTA).
(CVE-2016-2178)
[César Pereida]

*) DTLS buffered message DoS

In a DTLS connection where handshake messages are delivered out-of-order
those messages that OpenSSL is not yet ready to process will be buffered
for later use. Under certain circumstances, a flaw in the logic means that
those messages do not get removed from the buffer even though the handshake
has been completed. An attacker could force up to approx. 15 messages to
remain in the buffer when they are no longer required. These messages will
be cleared when the DTLS connection is closed. The default maximum size for
a message is 100k. Therefore the attacker could force an additional 1500k
to be consumed per connection. By opening many simulataneous connections an
attacker could cause a DoS attack through memory exhaustion.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Quan Luo.
(CVE-2016-2179)
[Matt Caswell]

*) DTLS replay protection DoS

A flaw in the DTLS replay attack protection mechanism means that records
that arrive for future epochs update the replay protection "window" before
the MAC for the record has been validated. This could be exploited by an
attacker by sending a record for the next epoch (which does not have to
decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means
that all subsequent legitimate packets are dropped causing a denial of
service for a specific DTLS connection.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OCAP audit team.
(CVE-2016-2181)
[Matt Caswell]

*) Certificate message OOB reads

In OpenSSL 1.0.2 and earlier some missing message length checks can result
in OOB reads of up to 2 bytes beyond an allocated buffer. There is a
theoretical DoS risk but this has not been observed in practice on common
platforms.

The messages affected are client certificate, client certificate request
and server certificate. As a result the attack can only be performed
against a client or a server which enables client authentication.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
(CVE-2016-6306)
[Stephen Henson]

Changes between 1.0.1s and 1.0.1t [3 May 2016]

*) Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -8195,7 +8355,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k

*) Source code cleanups: use const where appropriate, eliminate casts,
use void * instead of char * in lhash.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]

*) Bugfix: ssl3_send_server_key_exchange was not restartable
(the state was not changed to SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B, and because of
Expand Down
93 changes: 65 additions & 28 deletions deps/openssl/openssl/CONTRIBUTING
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,38 +1,75 @@
HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
----------------------------
HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO PATCHES OpenSSL
------------------------------------

Development is coordinated on the openssl-dev mailing list (see
http://www.openssl.org for information on subscribing). If you
would like to submit a patch, send it to rt@openssl.org with
the string "[PATCH]" in the subject. Please be sure to include a
textual explanation of what your patch does.

You can also make GitHub pull requests. If you do this, please also send
mail to rt@openssl.org with a brief description and a link to the PR so
that we can more easily keep track of it.
(Please visit https://www.openssl.org/community/getting-started.html for
other ideas about how to contribute.)

Development is coordinated on the openssl-dev mailing list (see the
above link or https://mta.openssl.org for information on subscribing).
If you are unsure as to whether a feature will be useful for the general
OpenSSL community please discuss it on the openssl-dev mailing list first.
Someone may be already working on the same thing or there may be a good
reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
OpenSSL community you might want to discuss it on the openssl-dev mailing
list first. Someone may be already working on the same thing or there
may be a good reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.

Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow our coding style
(see https://www.openssl.org/policies/codingstyle.html) and compile without
warnings using the --strict-warnings flag. OpenSSL compiles on many varied
platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features.
The best way to submit a patch is to make a pull request on GitHub.
(It is not necessary to send mail to rt@openssl.org to open a ticket!)
If you think the patch could use feedback from the community, please
start a thread on openssl-dev.

Our preferred format for patch files is "git format-patch" output. For example
to provide a patch file containing the last commit in your local git repository
use the following command:
You can also submit patches by sending it as mail to rt@openssl.org.
Please include the word "PATCH" and an explanation of what the patch
does in the subject line. If you do this, our preferred format is "git
format-patch" output. For example to provide a patch file containing the
last commit in your local git repository use the following command:

# git format-patch --stdout HEAD^ >mydiffs.patch
% git format-patch --stdout HEAD^ >mydiffs.patch

Another method of creating an acceptable patch file without using git is as
follows:

# cd openssl-work
# [your changes]
# ./Configure dist; make clean
# cd ..
# diff -ur openssl-orig openssl-work > mydiffs.patch
% cd openssl-work
...make your changes...
% ./Configure dist; make clean
% cd ..
% diff -ur openssl-orig openssl-work >mydiffs.patch

Note that pull requests are generally easier for the team, and community, to
work with. Pull requests benefit from all of the standard GitHub features,
including code review tools, simpler integration, and CI build support.

No matter how a patch is submitted, the following items will help make
the acceptance and review process faster:

1. Anything other than trivial contributions will require a contributor
licensing agreement, giving us permission to use your code. See
https://www.openssl.org/policies/cla.html for details.

2. All source files should start with the following text (with
appropriate comment characters at the start of each line and the
year(s) updated):

Copyright 20xx-20yy The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html

3. Patches should be as current as possible. When using GitHub, please
expect to have to rebase and update often. Note that we do not accept merge
commits. You will be asked to remove them before a patch is considered
acceptable.

4. Patches should follow our coding style (see
https://www.openssl.org/policies/codingstyle.html) and compile without
warnings. Where gcc or clang is availble you should use the
--strict-warnings Configure option. OpenSSL compiles on many varied
platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features.

5. When at all possible, patches should include tests. These can either be
added to an existing test, or completely new. Please see test/README
for information on the test framework.

6. New features or changed functionality must include documentation. Please
look at the "pod" files in doc/apps, doc/crypto and doc/ssl for examples of
our style.
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion deps/openssl/openssl/Configure
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ my @experimental = ();

# This is what $depflags will look like with the above defaults
# (we need this to see if we should advise the user to run "make depend"):
my $default_depflags = " -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST";
my $default_depflags = " -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2 -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST -DOPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS";

# Explicit "no-..." options will be collected in %disabled along with the defaults.
# To remove something from %disabled, use "enable-foo" (unless it's experimental).
Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion deps/openssl/openssl/Makefile
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
## Makefile for OpenSSL
##

VERSION=1.0.1t
VERSION=1.0.1u
MAJOR=1
MINOR=0.1
SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion deps/openssl/openssl/Makefile.bak
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
## Makefile for OpenSSL
##

VERSION=1.0.1t
VERSION=1.0.1u
MAJOR=1
MINOR=0.1
SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
Expand Down
14 changes: 14 additions & 0 deletions deps/openssl/openssl/NEWS
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -5,6 +5,20 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.

Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1t and OpenSSL 1.0.1u [22 Sep 2016]

o OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth (CVE-2016-6304)
o SWEET32 Mitigation (CVE-2016-2183)
o OOB write in MDC2_Update() (CVE-2016-6303)
o Malformed SHA512 ticket DoS (CVE-2016-6302)
o OOB write in BN_bn2dec() (CVE-2016-2182)
o OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio() (CVE-2016-2180)
o Pointer arithmetic undefined behaviour (CVE-2016-2177)
o Constant time flag not preserved in DSA signing (CVE-2016-2178)
o DTLS buffered message DoS (CVE-2016-2179)
o DTLS replay protection DoS (CVE-2016-2181)
o Certificate message OOB reads (CVE-2016-6306)

Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1s and OpenSSL 1.0.1t [3 May 2016]

o Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check (CVE-2016-2107)
Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion deps/openssl/openssl/README
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@

OpenSSL 1.0.1t 3 May 2016
OpenSSL 1.0.1u 22 Sep 2016

Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
Expand Down
14 changes: 4 additions & 10 deletions deps/openssl/openssl/apps/app_rand.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -124,16 +124,10 @@ int app_RAND_load_file(const char *file, BIO *bio_e, int dont_warn)
char buffer[200];

#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
/*
* allocate 2 to dont_warn not to use RAND_screen() via
* -no_rand_screen option in s_client
*/
if (dont_warn != 2) {
BIO_printf(bio_e, "Loading 'screen' into random state -");
BIO_flush(bio_e);
RAND_screen();
BIO_printf(bio_e, " done\n");
}
BIO_printf(bio_e, "Loading 'screen' into random state -");
BIO_flush(bio_e);
RAND_screen();
BIO_printf(bio_e, " done\n");
#endif

if (file == NULL)
Expand Down
2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions deps/openssl/openssl/apps/apps.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -2241,6 +2241,8 @@ int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *pargc,
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no_alt_chains"))
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-allow_proxy_certs"))
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS;
else
return 0;

Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion deps/openssl/openssl/apps/enc.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex salt value\n");
goto end;
}
} else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(salt, sizeof salt) < 0)
} else if (RAND_bytes(salt, sizeof salt) <= 0)
goto end;
/*
* If -P option then don't bother writing
Expand Down
4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions deps/openssl/openssl/apps/passwd.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ static int do_passwd(int passed_salt, char **salt_p, char **salt_malloc_p,
if (*salt_malloc_p == NULL)
goto err;
}
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 2) < 0)
if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 2) <= 0)
goto err;
(*salt_p)[0] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[0] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */
(*salt_p)[1] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[1] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */
Expand All @@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ static int do_passwd(int passed_salt, char **salt_p, char **salt_malloc_p,
if (*salt_malloc_p == NULL)
goto err;
}
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 8) < 0)
if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 8) <= 0)
goto err;

for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
Expand Down
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