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Update dependency requests to v2.31.0 [SECURITY] (#1310)
[![Mend Renovate](https://app.renovatebot.com/images/banner.svg)](https://renovatebot.com) This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Change | Age | Adoption | Passing | Confidence | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | [requests](https://togithub.com/psf/requests) ([changelog](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/master/HISTORY.md)) | `==2.29.0` -> `==2.31.0` | [![age](https://badges.renovateapi.com/packages/pypi/requests/2.31.0/age-slim)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [![adoption](https://badges.renovateapi.com/packages/pypi/requests/2.31.0/adoption-slim)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [![passing](https://badges.renovateapi.com/packages/pypi/requests/2.31.0/compatibility-slim/2.29.0)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [![confidence](https://badges.renovateapi.com/packages/pypi/requests/2.31.0/confidence-slim/2.29.0)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | | [requests](https://togithub.com/psf/requests) ([changelog](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/master/HISTORY.md)) | `==2.30.0` -> `==2.31.0` | [![age](https://badges.renovateapi.com/packages/pypi/requests/2.31.0/age-slim)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [![adoption](https://badges.renovateapi.com/packages/pypi/requests/2.31.0/adoption-slim)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [![passing](https://badges.renovateapi.com/packages/pypi/requests/2.31.0/compatibility-slim/2.30.0)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [![confidence](https://badges.renovateapi.com/packages/pypi/requests/2.31.0/confidence-slim/2.30.0)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | ### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts #### [CVE-2023-32681](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/security/advisories/GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q) ### Impact Since Requests v2.3.0, Requests has been vulnerable to potentially leaking `Proxy-Authorization` headers to destination servers, specifically during redirects to an HTTPS origin. This is a product of how `rebuild_proxies` is used to recompute and [reattach the `Proxy-Authorization` header](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/f2629e9e3c7ce3c3c8c025bcd8db551101cbc773/requests/sessions.py#L319-L328) to requests when redirected. Note this behavior has _only_ been observed to affect proxied requests when credentials are supplied in the URL user information component (e.g. `https://username:password@proxy:8080`). **Current vulnerable behavior(s):** 1. HTTP → HTTPS: **leak** 2. HTTPS → HTTP: **no leak** 3. HTTPS → HTTPS: **leak** 4. HTTP → HTTP: **no leak** For HTTP connections sent through the proxy, the proxy will identify the header in the request itself and remove it prior to forwarding to the destination server. However when sent over HTTPS, the `Proxy-Authorization` header must be sent in the CONNECT request as the proxy has no visibility into further tunneled requests. This results in Requests forwarding the header to the destination server unintentionally, allowing a malicious actor to potentially exfiltrate those credentials. The reason this currently works for HTTPS connections in Requests is the `Proxy-Authorization` header is also handled by urllib3 with our usage of the ProxyManager in adapters.py with [`proxy_manager_for`](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/f2629e9e3c7ce3c3c8c025bcd8db551101cbc773/requests/adapters.py#L199-L235). This will compute the required proxy headers in `proxy_headers` and pass them to the Proxy Manager, avoiding attaching them directly to the Request object. This will be our preferred option going forward for default usage. ### Patches Starting in Requests v2.31.0, Requests will no longer attach this header to redirects with an HTTPS destination. This should have no negative impacts on the default behavior of the library as the proxy credentials are already properly being handled by urllib3's ProxyManager. For users with custom adapters, this _may_ be potentially breaking if you were already working around this behavior. The previous functionality of `rebuild_proxies` doesn't make sense in any case, so we would encourage any users impacted to migrate any handling of Proxy-Authorization directly into their custom adapter. ### Workarounds For users who are not able to update Requests immediately, there is one potential workaround. You may disable redirects by setting `allow_redirects` to `False` on all calls through Requests top-level APIs. Note that if you're currently relying on redirect behaviors, you will need to capture the 3xx response codes and ensure a new request is made to the redirect destination. ``` import requests r = requests.get('http://github.com/', allow_redirects=False) ``` ### Credits This vulnerability was discovered and disclosed by the following individuals. Dennis Brinkrolf, Haxolot (https://haxolot.com/) Tobias Funke, (tobiasfunke93@​gmail.com) --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>psf/requests</summary> ### [`v2.31.0`](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/HEAD/HISTORY.md#​2310-2023-05-22) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/compare/v2.30.0...v2.31.0) **Security** - Versions of Requests between v2.3.0 and v2.30.0 are vulnerable to potential forwarding of `Proxy-Authorization` headers to destination servers when following HTTPS redirects. When proxies are defined with user info (https://user:pass@proxy:8080), Requests will construct a `Proxy-Authorization` header that is attached to the request to authenticate with the proxy. In cases where Requests receives a redirect response, it previously reattached the `Proxy-Authorization` header incorrectly, resulting in the value being sent through the tunneled connection to the destination server. Users who rely on defining their proxy credentials in the URL are *strongly* encouraged to upgrade to Requests 2.31.0+ to prevent unintentional leakage and rotate their proxy credentials once the change has been fully deployed. Users who do not use a proxy or do not supply their proxy credentials through the user information portion of their proxy URL are not subject to this vulnerability. Full details can be read in our [Github Security Advisory](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/security/advisories/GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q) and [CVE-2023-32681](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32681). ### [`v2.30.0`](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/HEAD/HISTORY.md#​2300-2023-05-03) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/compare/v2.29.0...v2.30.0) **Dependencies** -⚠️ Added support for urllib3 2.0.⚠️ This may contain minor breaking changes so we advise careful testing and reviewing https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/latest/v2-migration-guide.html prior to upgrading. Users who wish to stay on urllib3 1.x can pin to `urllib3<2`. </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: Branch creation - "" in timezone Australia/Sydney, Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined). 🚦 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about these updates again. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR has been generated by [Mend Renovate](https://www.mend.io/free-developer-tools/renovate/). View repository job log [here](https://app.renovatebot.com/dashboard#github/google/osv.dev). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiIzNS45OC4xIiwidXBkYXRlZEluVmVyIjoiMzUuOTguMSIsInRhcmdldEJyYW5jaCI6Im1hc3RlciJ9-->
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