fix(deps): update dependency @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable to v4.9.6 [security] - autoclosed

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Adoption	Passing	Confidence
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable (source)	4.8.2 -> 4.9.6

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2023-30541

Impact

A function in the implementation contract may be inaccessible if its selector clashes with one of the proxy's own selectors. Specifically, if the clashing function has a different signature with incompatible ABI encoding, the proxy could revert while attempting to decode the arguments from calldata.

The probability of an accidental clash is negligible, but one could be caused deliberately.

Patches

The issue has been fixed in v4.8.3.

Workarounds

If a function appears to be inaccessible for this reason, it may be possible to craft the calldata such that ABI decoding does not fail at the proxy and the function is properly proxied through.

References

https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/pull/4154

CVE-2023-30542

Impact

The proposal creation entrypoint (propose) in GovernorCompatibilityBravo allows the creation of proposals with a signatures array shorter than the calldatas array. This causes the additional elements of the latter to be ignored, and if the proposal succeeds the corresponding actions would eventually execute without any calldata. The ProposalCreated event correctly represents what will eventually execute, but the proposal parameters as queried through getActions appear to respect the original intended calldata.

Patches

This issue has been patched in v4.8.3.

Workarounds

Ensure that all proposals that pass through governance have equal length signatures and calldatas parameters.

CVE-2023-34234

Impact

By frontrunning the creation of a proposal, an attacker can become the proposer and gain the ability to cancel it. The attacker can do this repeatedly to try to prevent a proposal from being proposed at all.

This impacts the Governor contract in v4.9.0 only, and the GovernorCompatibilityBravo contract since v4.3.0.

Patches

The problem has been patched in 4.9.1 by introducing opt-in frontrunning protection.

Workarounds

Submit the proposal creation transaction to an endpoint with frontrunning protection.

Credit

Reported by Lior Abadi and Joaquin Pereyra from Coinspect.

References

https://www.coinspect.com/openzeppelin-governor-dos/

CVE-2023-34459

Impact

When the verifyMultiProof, verifyMultiProofCalldata, processMultiProof, or processMultiProofCalldata functions are in use, it is possible to construct merkle trees that allow forging a valid multiproof for an arbitrary set of leaves.

A contract may be vulnerable if it uses multiproofs for verification and the merkle tree that is processed includes a node with value 0 at depth 1 (just under the root). This could happen inadvertently for balanced trees with 3 leaves or less, if the leaves are not hashed. This could happen deliberately if a malicious tree builder includes such a node in the tree.

A contract is not vulnerable if it uses single-leaf proving (verify, verifyCalldata, processProof, or processProofCalldata), or if it uses multiproofs with a known tree that has hashed leaves. Standard merkle trees produced or validated with the @​openzeppelin/merkle-tree library are safe.

Patches

The problem has been patched in 4.9.2.

Workarounds

If you are using multiproofs: When constructing merkle trees hash the leaves and do not insert empty nodes in your trees. Using the @​openzeppelin/merkle-tree package eliminates this issue. Do not accept user-provided merkle roots without reconstructing at least the first level of the tree. Verify the merkle tree structure by reconstructing it from the leaves.

CVE-2023-40014

Impact

OpenZeppelin Contracts is a library for secure smart contract development. Starting in version 4.0.0 and prior to version 4.9.3, contracts using ERC2771Context along with a custom trusted forwarder may see _msgSender return address(0) in calls that originate from the forwarder with calldata shorter than 20 bytes. This combination of circumstances does not appear to be common, in particular it is not the case for MinimalForwarder from OpenZeppelin Contracts, or any deployed forwarder the team is aware of, given that the signer address is appended to all calls that originate from these forwarders.

Patches

The problem has been patched in v4.9.3.

CVE-2024-27094

Impact

The Base64.encode function encodes a bytes input by iterating over it in chunks of 3 bytes. When this input is not a multiple of 3, the last iteration may read parts of the memory that are beyond the input buffer.

Although the encode function pads the output for these cases, up to 4 bits of data are kept between the encoding and padding, corrupting the output if these bits were dirty (i.e. memory after the input is not 0). These conditions are more frequent in the following scenarios:

• A bytes memory struct is allocated just after the input and the first bytes of it are non-zero.
• The memory pointer is set to a non-empty memory location before allocating the input.

Developers should evaluate whether the extra bits can be maliciously manipulated by an attacker.

Patches

Upgrade to 5.0.2 or 4.9.6.

References

This issue was reported by the Independent Security Researcher Riley Holterhus through Immunefi (@​rileyholterhus on X)

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Release Notes

OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts-upgradeable (@​openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable)

v4.9.6

Compare Source

• Base64: Fix issue where dirty memory located just after the input buffer is affecting the result. (#​4929)

v4.9.5

Compare Source

• Multicall: Patch duplicated Address.functionDelegateCall.

v4.9.4

Compare Source

• ERC2771Context and Context: Introduce a _contextPrefixLength() getter, used to trim extra information appended to msg.data.
• Multicall: Make aware of non-canonical context (i.e. msg.sender is not _msgSender()), allowing compatibility with ERC2771Context.

v4.9.3

Compare Source

Note
This release contains a fix for GHSA-g4vp-m682-qqmp.

• ERC2771Context: Return the forwarder address whenever the msg.data of a call originating from a trusted forwarder is not long enough to contain the request signer address (i.e. msg.data.length is less than 20 bytes), as specified by ERC-2771. (#​4481)
• ERC2771Context: Prevent revert in _msgData() when a call originating from a trusted forwarder is not long enough to contain the request signer address (i.e. msg.data.length is less than 20 bytes). Return the full calldata in that case. (#​4484)

v4.9.2

Compare Source

• MerkleProof: Fix a bug in processMultiProof and processMultiProofCalldata that allows proving arbitrary leaves if the tree contains a node with value 0 at depth 1.

v4.9.1

Compare Source

• Governor: Add a mechanism to restrict the address of the proposer using a suffix in the description.

v4.9.0

Compare Source

• ReentrancyGuard: Add a _reentrancyGuardEntered function to expose the guard status. (#​3714)
• ERC721Wrapper: add a new extension of the ERC721 token which wraps an underlying token. Deposit and withdraw guarantee that the ownership of each token is backed by a corresponding underlying token with the same identifier. (#​3863)
• EnumerableMap: add a keys() function that returns an array containing all the keys. (#​3920)
• Governor: add a public cancel(uint256) function. (#​3983)
• Governor: Enable timestamp operation for blockchains without a stable block time. This is achieved by connecting a Governor's internal clock to match a voting token's EIP-6372 interface. (#​3934)
• Strings: add equal method. (#​3774)
• IERC5313: Add an interface for EIP-5313 that is now final. (#​4013)
• IERC4906: Add an interface for ERC-4906 that is now Final. (#​4012)
• StorageSlot: Add support for string and bytes. (#​4008)
• Votes, ERC20Votes, ERC721Votes: support timestamp checkpointing using EIP-6372. (#​3934)
• ERC4626: Add mitigation to the inflation attack through virtual shares and assets. (#​3979)
• Strings: add toString method for signed integers. (#​3773)
• ERC20Wrapper: Make the underlying variable private and add a public accessor. (#​4029)
• EIP712: add EIP-5267 support for better domain discovery. (#​3969)
• AccessControlDefaultAdminRules: Add an extension of AccessControl with additional security rules for the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE. (#​4009)
• SignatureChecker: Add isValidERC1271SignatureNow for checking a signature directly against a smart contract using ERC-1271. (#​3932)
• SafeERC20: Add a forceApprove function to improve compatibility with tokens behaving like USDT. (#​4067)
• ERC1967Upgrade: removed contract-wide oz-upgrades-unsafe-allow delegatecall annotation, replaced by granular annotation in UUPSUpgradeable. (#​3971)
• ERC20Wrapper: self wrapping and deposit by the wrapper itself are now explicitly forbidden. (#​4100)
• ECDSA: optimize bytes32 computation by using assembly instead of abi.encodePacked. (#​3853)
• ERC721URIStorage: Emit ERC-4906 MetadataUpdate in _setTokenURI. (#​4012)
• ShortStrings: Added a library for handling short strings in a gas efficient way, with fallback to storage for longer strings. (#​4023)
• SignatureChecker: Allow return data length greater than 32 from EIP-1271 signers. (#​4038)
• UUPSUpgradeable: added granular oz-upgrades-unsafe-allow-reachable annotation to improve upgrade safety checks on latest version of the Upgrades Plugins (starting with @openzeppelin/upgrades-core@1.21.0). (#​3971)
• Initializable: optimize _disableInitializers by using != instead of <. (#​3787)
• Ownable2Step: make acceptOwnership public virtual to enable usecases that require overriding it. (#​3960)
• UUPSUpgradeable.sol: Change visibility to the functions upgradeTo and upgradeToAndCall from external to public. (#​3959)
• TimelockController: Add the CallSalt event to emit on operation schedule. (#​4001)
• Reformatted codebase with latest version of Prettier Solidity. (#​3898)
• Math: optimize log256 rounding check. (#​3745)
• ERC20Votes: optimize by using unchecked arithmetic. (#​3748)
• Multicall: annotate multicall function as upgrade safe to not raise a flag for its delegatecall. (#​3961)
• ERC20Pausable, ERC721Pausable, ERC1155Pausable: Add note regarding missing public pausing functionality (#​4007)
• ECDSA: Add a function toDataWithIntendedValidatorHash that encodes data with version 0x00 following EIP-191. (#​4063)
• MerkleProof: optimize by using unchecked arithmetic. (#​3745)

Breaking changes

• EIP712: Addition of ERC5267 support requires support for user defined value types, which was released in Solidity version 0.8.8. This requires a pragma change from ^0.8.0 to ^0.8.8.
• EIP712: Optimization of the cache for the upgradeable version affects the way name and version are set. This is no longer done through an initializer, and is instead part of the implementation's constructor. As a consequence, all proxies using the same implementation will necessarily share the same name and version. Additionally, an implementation upgrade risks changing the EIP712 domain unless the same name and version are used when deploying the new implementation contract.

Deprecations

• ERC20Permit: Added the file IERC20Permit.sol and ERC20Permit.sol and deprecated draft-IERC20Permit.sol and draft-ERC20Permit.sol since EIP-2612 is no longer a Draft. Developers are encouraged to update their imports. (#​3793)
• Timers: The Timers library is now deprecated and will be removed in the next major release. (#​4062)
• ERC777: The ERC777 token standard is no longer supported by OpenZeppelin. Our implementation is now deprecated and will be removed in the next major release. The corresponding standard interfaces remain available. (#​4066)
• ERC1820Implementer: The ERC1820 pseudo-introspection mechanism is no longer supported by OpenZeppelin. Our implementation is now deprecated and will be removed in the next major release. The corresponding standard interfaces remain available. (#​4066)

v4.8.3

Compare Source

• GovernorCompatibilityBravo: Fix encoding of proposal data when signatures are missing.
• TransparentUpgradeableProxy: Fix transparency in case of selector clash with non-decodable calldata or payable mutability. (#​4154)

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[codecov]

Codecov Report

All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests ✅

Project coverage is 58.36%. Comparing base (85ed7af) to head (6cf4c35).
Report is 2 commits behind head on dev.

Additional details and impacted files

@@            Coverage Diff             @@
##              dev     #222      +/-   ##
==========================================
- Coverage   61.31%   58.36%   -2.96%     
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  Files          20       20              
  Lines         897      891       -6     
  Branches      227      227              
==========================================
- Hits          550      520      -30     
- Misses        345      369      +24     
  Partials        2        2              

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