rpcserver: Hash auth using random-keyed MAC. #2486
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This commit replaces the SHA256 hash of the HTTP Basic Authorization header with HMAC-SHA256. The MAC is performed using a random key read from the cryptographically random source at server creation. Storing the authentication details with a MAC unique to each startup hardens the server against certain classes of memory dumping attacks. While here, a server field that must be accessed atomically was moved to the top of the structure, to reduce the likelihood of misaligned access on architectures where that is forbidden.
davecgh
approved these changes
Dec 2, 2020
davecgh
changed the title
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This commit replaces the SHA256 hash of the HTTP Basic Authorization
header with HMAC-SHA256. The MAC is performed using a random key read
from the cryptographically random source at server creation.
Storing the authentication details with a MAC unique to each startup
hardens the server against certain classes of memory dumping attacks.
While here, a server field that must be accessed atomically was moved
to the top of the structure, to reduce the likelihood of misaligned
access on architectures where that is forbidden.