Update draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures.md

Co-authored-by: Andrew Whitehead <cywolf@gmail.com>

draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures.md

@@ -1671,7 +1671,7 @@ Procedure:
 
 This section will go through threats to the Prover's privacy. Note that a BBS proof is unlinkable against both the Verifiers and the Signer, as well as multiple Verifiers colluding with each other and Verifiers colluding with the Signer. Bear in mind that, those gurantees consearn only the proof value, as outputed by the `CoreProofGen` (Section (#coreproofgen)) and ofcourse the `ProofGen` (Section (#proof-generation-proofgen)) operations. Correspondingly, the unlinkability property does not include other values that a Prover could either knowngly or unkowngly provide to a Verifier. Those values can include some of the disclsed messages, the `header` and `presentation_header` values, their network address etc.. Such threats, if exploited, could lead to correlation of the Prover's interactions with different Verifiers, resulting to fingerprinting attacks against the Prover's activity.
 
-The following sections will describe possible privacy threats, resulting from such values and side chanells, that could compromise the unlinkability property of the BBS proof. Note that, the following sections describe ways to minimize possible identifying information revealed during a BBS proof presentation, related to the BBS Signatures scheme. To minimize the privacy threats of an entire system, other protections may also need to be employed, for example, using an IP hiding proxy network like TOR ([@DMS04]).
+The following sections will describe possible privacy threats, resulting from such values and side channels, that could compromise the unlinkability property of the BBS proof. Note that, the following sections describe ways to minimize possible identifying information revealed during a BBS proof presentation, related to the BBS Signatures scheme. To minimize the privacy threats of an entire system, other protections may also need to be employed, for example, using an IP hiding proxy network like TOR ([@DMS04]).
 
 ## Header and Presentation Header