Add Multiple Detectors Related to DeFi and Centralized Risk #2387
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WalkthroughThe update introduces a comprehensive suite of detectors for identifying vulnerabilities and risks in DeFi projects and smart contracts. It emphasizes price manipulation, DeFi action nesting, centralized risks, and transaction order dependencies, alongside tools for analyzing function dependencies and permissions. This enhancement aims to bolster security in smart contract development by addressing a wide array of potential issues, from oracle misuse to price manipulation and centralized control points. Changes
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Files selected for processing (48)
- slither/detectors/all_detectors.py (1 hunks)
- slither/detectors/defi/defi_action_nested.py (1 hunks)
- slither/detectors/defi/k_value_error.py (1 hunks)
- slither/detectors/defi/price_manipulation_high.py (1 hunks)
- slither/detectors/defi/price_manipulation_info.py (1 hunks)
- slither/detectors/defi/price_manipulation_low.py (1 hunks)
- slither/detectors/defi/price_manipulation_medium.py (1 hunks)
- slither/detectors/defi/price_manipulation_tools.py (1 hunks)
- slither/detectors/functions/centralized_info.py (1 hunks)
- slither/detectors/functions/centralized_init_supply.py (1 hunks)
- slither/detectors/functions/centralized_low.py (1 hunks)
- slither/detectors/functions/centralized_medium.py (1 hunks)
- slither/detectors/functions/centralized_other.py (1 hunks)
- slither/detectors/functions/centralized_utils.py (1 hunks)
- slither/detectors/functions/modifier_utils.py (1 hunks)
- slither/detectors/functions/transaction_order_dependency_high.py (1 hunks)
- slither/detectors/functions/transaction_order_dependency_low.py (1 hunks)
- slither/detectors/functions/transaction_order_dependency_medium.py (1 hunks)
- slither/utils/function_dependency_tree.py (1 hunks)
- slither/utils/function_permission_check.py (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/centralized-init-supply/0.8.6/test.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/centralized-risk-medium/0.4.24/Hundred.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/centralized-risk-medium/0.5.10/smartypay.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/centralized-risk-medium/0.6.11/PancakeBunnyPriceCalculatorBSC-pancakeBunny-45m.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/centralized-risk-medium/0.6.12/VOLT.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/centralized-risk-medium/0.7.4/ghost.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/centralized-risk-medium/0.7.6/vvisor.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/centralized-risk-medium/0.8.19/test.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/defi-action-nested/0.6.11/CommunityFund.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/defi-action-nested/0.6.11/StakeContract.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/defi-action-nested/0.6.11/StrategyEllipsisImpl.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/defi-action-nested/0.8.0/ArrayFinance.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/defi-action-nested/0.8.0/WUSDMaster.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/defi-action-nested/0.8.2/JAY.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/defi-action-nested/0.8.2/Keep3rV2Oracle.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/defi-action-nested/0.8.2/PancakeOracle.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/defi-action-nested/0.8.2/SmartChefFactory.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/defi-action-nested/0.8.2/defi_price_manipulation.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.5.10/bnbcorp.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.5.12/yDAI-EVENT-Value DeFi-21m.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.6.11/BConst.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.6.11/BMath.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.6.11/BNum.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.6.11/BToken.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.6.11/BeefyVault.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.6.11/ICompLikeToken.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.6.11/IIndexPool.sol (1 hunks)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.6.11/IndexPool.sol (1 hunks)
Files not summarized due to errors (3)
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/defi-action-nested/0.6.11/CommunityFund.sol: Error: Message exceeds token limit
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/defi-action-nested/0.6.11/StrategyEllipsisImpl.sol: Error: Message exceeds token limit
- tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.6.11/IndexPool.sol: Error: Message exceeds token limit
Additional Context Used
Additional comments not posted (153)
tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.6.11/ICompLikeToken.sol (1)
1-7: The interfaceICompLikeTokenand its functiondelegateare correctly defined. Solidity version and SPDX license identifier are appropriately used.tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/centralized-init-supply/0.8.6/test.sol (1)
12-15: Direct manipulation of balances in the constructor could introduce risks of centralized control or security vulnerabilities. Consider initializing balances through a more transparent mechanism or function that includes checks and balances.tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/centralized-risk-medium/0.7.6/vvisor.sol (1)
42-42: UsingIVisor(address(0)).mint();with a hardcoded zero address is concerning. Please clarify if this is intentional or a placeholder for future implementation. Using the zero address in this context could lead to unexpected behavior or security vulnerabilities.tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.6.11/BConst.sol (1)
1-62: The constants defined inBConst.solare consistent with the design patterns used in Balancer contracts. The use ofBONEas a base unit and the specified ranges for fees, weights, and ratios are appropriate.slither/detectors/functions/centralized_medium.py (3)
60-78: The_detectmethod could be optimized and made more readable. Consider breaking down the nested loops and conditionals into smaller, more focused functions. This would improve maintainability and testability.
66-68: The check for function namestransferandtransferFromis case-sensitive. Solidity function names are case-sensitive, but ensuring this explicitly in the comment or documentation could prevent misunderstandings.
76-76: Using string concatenation ingenerate_resultmight not be the most efficient way to handle result generation. Consider using a structured format or template for generating results.slither/utils/function_permission_check.py (2)
10-30: The check for initialization functions is limited to function names 'initialize' and 'init'. Consider making this check more flexible to accommodate custom initialization function names or document this limitation clearly.
32-64: Thefunction_has_caller_checkfunction checks for various patterns indicating a caller check. However, it might be beneficial to also consider custom patterns or extend the documentation to specify which patterns are covered.slither/detectors/functions/modifier_utils.py (3)
9-22: Consider documenting potential false positives for theis_reentrancy_lockfunction, as the patterns checked might not be specific enough to avoid them.
38-46: The_has_msg_sender_check_newfunction checks formsg.senderusage in modifiers and functions. It's a good practice to also consider other patterns that might indicate similar checks, such astx.origincomparisons.
57-73: Theis_access_controlfunction checks for access control patterns. It might be beneficial to extend this function to cover more patterns or to provide documentation on what specific patterns are considered.slither/detectors/functions/centralized_low.py (3)
57-78: Similar toCentralizedRiskMEDIUM, consider optimizing and improving the readability of the_detectmethod by breaking down the nested loops and conditionals into smaller, more focused functions.
66-68: Ensure the case sensitivity of the function namestransferandtransferFromis intentional and documented to avoid misunderstandings.
76-76: Consider using a structured format or template for generating results instead of string concatenation ingenerate_result.slither/detectors/functions/centralized_info.py (3)
57-78: Optimize and improve the readability of the_detectmethod by breaking down the complex logic into smaller, more focused functions, similar to previous detectors.
66-68: The function namestransferandtransferFromare checked in a case-sensitive manner. Ensure this is clearly documented.
76-76: Use a structured format or template for generating results ingenerate_resultto improve efficiency and maintainability.slither/detectors/functions/transaction_order_dependency_low.py (2)
28-47: TheanalyzeTODmethod could benefit from optimization and clearer documentation. Consider adding more detailed comments explaining the logic, especially how transaction order dependencies are identified.
49-81: In the_detectmethod, the logic for filtering permissionless functions and analyzing transaction order dependencies is complex. Breaking this method into smaller, more focused functions could improve readability and maintainability.tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.6.11/BNum.sol (1)
1-17: The contractBNumprovides a solid foundation for fixed-point arithmetic in DeFi contracts. Consider adding more detailed comments for each function, explaining the mathematical operations and their use cases in a DeFi context.slither/detectors/functions/centralized_init_supply.py (1)
59-87: The_detectmethod's logic for identifying centralized token supply distribution could be expanded to cover more sophisticated patterns. Additionally, consider improving the documentation to clearly define what constitutes a centralized risk in the context of token supply distribution.slither/detectors/functions/transaction_order_dependency_high.py (2)
45-66: The logic for analyzing pairs of functions (analyzePairFunction) to detect transaction order dependencies seems to correctly check for state variable access patterns that could lead to vulnerabilities. However, there's an opportunity to improve the performance and maintainability of this function by reducing the redundancy in the checks forfunction_has_caller_checkand the intersection operation for state variables read and written.Consider refactoring the repeated checks and operations to streamline the function and make it easier to maintain. For example, you could perform the
function_has_caller_checkonce for each function outside theanalyzePairFunctionand pass the results as parameters. Additionally, the intersection operation for state variables read and written is performed twice with the roles offn1andfn2swapped, which could be optimized.
69-100: The_detectmethod correctly iterates over contracts and their functions to identify potential transaction order dependencies. However, there's a potential improvement in how permissionless functions are identified and filtered.You might consider extracting the logic for filtering permissionless functions into a separate method. This would not only improve the readability of the
_detectmethod but also allow for easier testing and potential reuse of the filtering logic elsewhere in the codebase.slither/detectors/functions/transaction_order_dependency_medium.py (2)
26-66: The logic for analyzing pairs of functions (analyzePairFunction) to detect medium transaction order dependencies is similar to the high transaction order dependency detector. It correctly checks for state variable access patterns that could lead to vulnerabilities. However, there's an opportunity to improve the performance and maintainability of this function by reducing the redundancy in the checks forfunction_has_caller_checkand the intersection operation for state variables read and written.Consider refactoring the repeated checks and operations to streamline the function and make it easier to maintain, similar to the advice given for the high transaction order dependency detector. Optimizing the intersection operation and the
function_has_caller_checkcould significantly improve the performance and readability of this code.
68-104: The_detectmethod in the medium transaction order dependency detector shares similarities with the high transaction order dependency detector, including the way permissionless functions are identified and filtered.As previously suggested for the high transaction order dependency detector, extracting the logic for filtering permissionless functions into a separate method would improve the readability and maintainability of the
_detectmethod. This would also facilitate easier testing and potential reuse of the filtering logic.tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.6.11/BToken.sol (2)
46-84: TheBTokenBasecontract implements basic token functionalities such as minting and burning tokens. The implementation follows the ERC20 standard and uses the SafeMath library for arithmetic operations to prevent overflow and underflow vulnerabilities.The use of the SafeMath library for all arithmetic operations is a good practice that mitigates potential arithmetic vulnerabilities. The minting (
_mint) and burning (_burn) functions are correctly implemented with appropriate checks for balance sufficiency and event emissions for transparency.
88-191: TheBTokencontract extendsBTokenBaseand implements theIERC20interface, providing a complete ERC20 token implementation with additional functionalities likeincreaseApprovalanddecreaseApproval.The contract correctly implements the ERC20 standard functions and includes comprehensive functionality for token approval management. The
increaseApprovalanddecreaseApprovalfunctions are particularly noteworthy for providing a more flexible approach to managing token allowances, which can enhance user experience and security.Consider adding comments to explain the rationale behind the
increaseApprovalanddecreaseApprovalfunctions, as these are not part of the standard ERC20 interface but provide added value. This will help developers and auditors understand the purpose and usage of these functions more clearly.tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.6.11/IIndexPool.sol (1)
6-202: TheIIndexPoolinterface provides a detailed specification for an index pool contract, covering functionalities such as token management, swaps, and governance.The interface is well-structured and covers a wide range of functionalities necessary for managing an index pool. It adheres to best practices for smart contract interfaces by clearly defining function signatures and expected behaviors.
While the interface is comprehensive, consider documenting the expected behavior and use cases for each function in comments. This will enhance clarity and ease of use for developers implementing the interface, especially for complex functions like
reweighTokens,reindexTokens, and the swap functions.slither/detectors/all_detectors.py (1)
101-115: The addition of new detectors related to DeFi-specific vulnerabilities, centralized risk, and transaction order dependencies is correctly implemented.The new detectors are properly imported and registered, enhancing Slither's capabilities in identifying a broader range of security vulnerabilities specific to DeFi projects and centralized risks. This is a valuable addition to the tool's functionality.
For maintainability and ease of navigation, consider organizing the detectors into categories or groups based on their focus areas (e.g., DeFi, centralized risk, transaction order dependencies) within the file. This could improve the readability and manageability of the detector registrations as the number of detectors grows.
slither/utils/function_dependency_tree.py (2)
89-110: The utility functionsweak_dependandstrong_dependcorrectly identify weak and strong dependencies between functions based on state variable access patterns.These functions are crucial for building dependency trees that can help identify potential vulnerabilities related to function interactions. The logic for determining dependencies is sound and follows a clear methodology.
Consider adding more detailed comments explaining the criteria for weak and strong dependencies. This will enhance the readability and understandability of the code, especially for developers new to the concepts of weak and strong dependencies in the context of smart contract security.
189-218: The functionbuild_dependency_tree_token_flow_or_money_flowextends the dependency tree building logic to specifically focus on token flow or money flow dependencies. This is a valuable addition for analyzing DeFi contracts.The extension of the dependency tree building logic to include token flow or money flow dependencies is a significant enhancement for Slither's capabilities in analyzing DeFi contracts. This allows for a more nuanced analysis of potential vulnerabilities related to token and money flows.
Given the complexity of DeFi contracts and the variety of token standards, consider documenting examples of how these dependency trees can be used to identify specific vulnerabilities. This could be included in the comments or as part of the documentation for Slither, providing valuable insights for users of the tool.
slither/detectors/defi/price_manipulation_info.py (8)
26-54: The classPriceManipulationInfois well-documented with a clear purpose and detailed wiki links. However, the wiki exploit scenario and recommendation sections are empty strings. It's important to provide actionable recommendations and exploit scenarios for detected vulnerabilities to help developers understand and mitigate risks.Consider adding detailed exploit scenarios and mitigation recommendations to the wiki documentation.
52-80: The methodcheckIfHavePriceManipulationiterates over all functions in a contract and performs checks for price manipulation risks. However, there's a potential performance concern with the nested loops and recursive calls, especially for contracts with a large number of functions and nodes. Consider optimizing the algorithm to reduce complexity or adding comments to explain the necessity of this approach if it's unavoidable.Evaluate the performance impact on large contracts and consider optimizations or add explanatory comments.
76-77: Usingis_dependentwithin a nested loop can be computationally expensive, especially for contracts with many functions and variables. Ensure that this check is essential and cannot be optimized or simplified.Consider verifying the performance impact on complex contracts and exploring optimization opportunities.
82-89: The static method_get_all_return_variablesis well-implemented, focusing on extracting variables related to return statements. It's a good practice to separate such logic into a static method for clarity and reusability.
91-102: The method_get_all_return_callscorrectly identifies calls that could influence return values. However, the check for "require" in the string representation of a node ("require" not in str(node)) is a brittle way to exclude certain nodes. Consider a more robust approach to identify and excluderequirestatements.Explore using the node's type or properties to exclude
requirestatements instead of relying on string representations.
114-132: The method_get_calls_and_var_recursively_nodeprovides a detailed analysis of nodes, focusing on assignment operations and calls. It's a crucial part of the detector's logic. Ensure that all edge cases are covered, especially with the exclusion of variables named "before" or "after".Verify that excluding variables based on their names ("before", "after") does not omit relevant cases. Consider documenting the rationale behind these exclusions.
172-175: The method_check_contract_if_uniswap_forkuses a straightforward approach to determine if a contract is a Uniswap fork by checking the presence of specific functions. This is a good example of using set operations for clarity and efficiency.
177-209: The_detectmethod orchestrates the detection process, aggregating results and generating output. It's well-structured and follows a logical flow. However, consider adding more comments to explain the logic, especially for the deduplication process and the rationale behind excluding certain contracts.Enhance documentation within the
_detectmethod to explain the deduplication logic and exclusion criteria more clearly.tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.5.10/bnbcorp.sol (6)
7-324: TheBNBCropcontract provides a comprehensive test case for the price manipulation detectors. It includes various DeFi-related functionalities such as investments, withdrawals, and referral bonuses. Ensure that the contract covers all scenarios relevant to the detectors being tested, including edge cases that might trigger false positives or negatives.Review the test scenarios covered by this contract to ensure they are comprehensive and relevant to the detectors' objectives. Consider adding more complex interactions or edge cases if necessary.
59-72: The constructor of theBNBCropcontract checks if the provided addresses are contracts usingisContractand initializes thestartDate. This is a good practice to prevent contracts from being used as the CEO or Dev addresses. However, consider adding a comment explaining why this check is important, as it might not be immediately clear to someone unfamiliar with the context.Consider adding a comment explaining the rationale behind the
isContractcheck in the constructor for clarity.
74-129: Theinvestfunction implements the core investment logic, including fee distribution, referral bonuses, and deposit recording. It's crucial to ensure that all financial calculations are secure against overflows and underflows. The use ofSafeMathis a good practice here. Additionally, validate that the referral system's logic is resistant to manipulation, especially in the context of testing price manipulation detectors.Review the financial calculations and referral system logic for potential vulnerabilities or logical flaws. Ensure that
SafeMathis used consistently for all arithmetic operations.
131-158: Thewithdrawfunction allows users to withdraw dividends once a day. It includes checks for the minimum withdrawal amount and adjusts the user's bonus if the contract balance is insufficient. This function's logic is critical for ensuring the contract's financial integrity. Pay special attention to the calculation oftotalAmountand the handling of insufficient contract balance.Thoroughly test the
withdrawfunction to ensure it handles all edge cases correctly, especially regarding the calculation of dividends and handling of insufficient contract balance.
160-181: Thereinvestfunction allows users to reinvest their dividends with an additional bonus. It shares similarities with theinvestfunction but focuses on reinvestment. Ensure that the reinvestment logic is consistent with the contract's overall financial rules and that the additional bonus is applied correctly.Verify the correctness of the reinvestment logic, especially the calculation of the reinvestment amount and the application of the bonus. Ensure consistency with the contract's financial rules.
324-364: TheSafeMathlibrary is used throughout the contract to prevent arithmetic overflows and underflows. This is a critical security measure for financial contracts. Ensure thatSafeMathis used for all arithmetic operations within the contract to maintain consistency and security.The inclusion and consistent use of
SafeMathis a best practice for Solidity contracts, especially those handling financial operations.slither/detectors/defi/price_manipulation_low.py (9)
27-54: The classPriceManipulationLowis well-documented with a clear purpose and detailed wiki links. Similar to thePriceManipulationInfoclass, the exploit scenario and recommendation sections are empty. Providing detailed scenarios and recommendations is crucial for helping developers understand and mitigate detected vulnerabilities.Consider adding detailed exploit scenarios and mitigation recommendations to the wiki documentation.
46-53: TheERC20_FUNCTIONlist includes specific functions related to price manipulation risks at a low impact level. Ensure that the selected functions are relevant to the low impact classification and that any commented-out entries are intentionally excluded.Review the selection of ERC20 functions for relevance to low-impact price manipulation risks. Remove or uncomment entries as appropriate.
55-90: The methodcheckIfHavePriceManipulationperforms checks for low-impact price manipulation risks. Similar to thePriceManipulationInfoclass, consider the performance impact of nested loops and recursive calls, especially for contracts with a large number of functions and nodes.Evaluate the performance impact on large contracts and consider optimizations or add explanatory comments.
92-113: The static method_get_calls_recursivelyand_check_if_can_output_call_infoare crucial for analyzing call expressions and identifying potential price manipulation risks. Ensure that the logic accurately captures relevant ERC20 function calls and that the depth limit (maxdepth) is appropriately set for comprehensive analysis without causing performance issues.Verify the accuracy and performance of recursive call analysis, especially the handling of depth limits and the identification of relevant ERC20 function calls.
115-120: The method_check_if_can_output_call_infochecks if a call's argument is a state variable or contains "pair" in its name, indicating potential price manipulation. Ensure that this heuristic accurately identifies relevant cases without false positives.Review the heuristic used in
_check_if_can_output_call_infofor accuracy in identifying potential price manipulation cases. Consider refining the criteria if necessary.
133-141: The method_get_all_return_variablesis consistent with the implementation in thePriceManipulationInfoclass, focusing on extracting variables related to return statements. This consistency is good for maintainability across different detector classes.
143-158: The method_get_all_return_callsshares similar concerns with thePriceManipulationInfoclass regarding the use of string representations to excluderequirestatements. Consider a more robust approach for identifying and excluding these statements.Explore using the node's type or properties to exclude
requirestatements instead of relying on string representations.
213-215: The method_check_contract_if_uniswap_forkuses set operations to determine if a contract is a Uniswap fork, which is an efficient approach. Ensure that the list of functions used for this check is comprehensive and up-to-date with the latest Uniswap fork patterns.Review the list of functions used in
_check_contract_if_uniswap_forkfor completeness and accuracy in identifying Uniswap forks.
221-257: The_detectmethod orchestrates the detection process for low-impact price manipulation risks. It follows a logical flow similar to thePriceManipulationInfoclass. Ensure that the logic is clear and well-documented, especially regarding the deduplication process and exclusion criteria.Enhance documentation within the
_detectmethod to explain the deduplication logic and exclusion criteria more clearly.slither/detectors/defi/price_manipulation_high.py (8)
26-54: The classPriceManipulationis well-documented with a clear purpose and detailed wiki links. Similar to the other detector classes, the exploit scenario and recommendation sections are empty. Providing detailed scenarios and recommendations is crucial for helping developers understand and mitigate detected vulnerabilities.Consider adding detailed exploit scenarios and mitigation recommendations to the wiki documentation.
46-53: TheERC20_FUNCTIONlist includes specific functions related to high-impact price manipulation risks. Ensure that the selected functions are relevant to the high impact classification and that any commented-out entries are intentionally excluded.Review the selection of ERC20 functions for relevance to high-impact price manipulation risks. Remove or uncomment entries as appropriate.
55-84: The methodcheckIfHavePriceManipulationperforms checks for high-impact price manipulation risks. Consider the performance impact of nested loops and recursive calls, especially for contracts with a large number of functions and nodes. The method also introduces a TODO comment regarding the handling of addition and multiplication operations, indicating an area for further development or clarification.Evaluate the performance impact on large contracts and consider optimizations. Address the TODO comment by clarifying or implementing the handling of addition and multiplication operations.
86-107: The static method_get_calls_recursivelyis crucial for analyzing call expressions and identifying potential high-impact price manipulation risks. Ensure that the logic accurately captures relevant ERC20 function calls and that the depth limit (maxdepth) is appropriately set for comprehensive analysis without causing performance issues.Verify the accuracy and performance of recursive call analysis, especially the handling of depth limits and the identification of relevant ERC20 function calls.
109-115: The method_check_if_can_output_call_infochecks if a call's argument is a state variable or contains "pair" in its name, indicating potential high-impact price manipulation. Ensure that this heuristic accurately identifies relevant cases without false positives.Review the heuristic used in
_check_if_can_output_call_infofor accuracy in identifying potential high-impact price manipulation cases. Consider refining the criteria if necessary.
117-126: The method_get_all_dangerous_operation_variablesfocuses on identifying sensitive operations related to transfer and minting. Ensure that the list ofDANGEROUS_ERC20_FUNCTIONis comprehensive and accurately reflects operations that could lead to high-impact price manipulation.Review the list of dangerous ERC20 functions for completeness and relevance to high-impact price manipulation risks.
128-137: The method_get_all_return_variablesis consistent with the implementation in other detector classes, focusing on extracting variables related to return statements. This consistency is good for maintainability across different detector classes.
139-153: The method_get_all_return_callsshares similar concerns with the other detector classes regarding the use of string representations to excluderequirestatements. Consider a more robust approach for identifying and excluding these statements.Explore using the node's type or properties to exclude
requirestatements instead of relying on string representations.tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.6.11/BMath.sol (7)
17-39: ThecalcSpotPricefunction correctly implements the formula for calculating the spot price in an AMM. However, it's essential to ensure that the inputs to this function, especiallyswapFee, are validated elsewhere in the contract to prevent any potential manipulation or division by zero errors.
51-67: ThecalcOutGivenInfunction logic appears correct and efficiently calculates the amount of token out given the token in amount. It's crucial to validate inputs likeswapFeeand ensure thattokenBalanceInandtokenBalanceOutare correctly updated elsewhere in the contract to prevent manipulation.
79-94: ThecalcInGivenOutfunction's implementation is correct, following the AMM formula for calculating the amount of token in required for a desired token out amount. Ensure that inputs, especiallyswapFee, are validated and that the contract logic correctly handles token balances to prevent any manipulation.
107-130: ThecalcPoolOutGivenSingleInfunction correctly calculates the amount of pool tokens out given a single token in. It's important to validateswapFeeand ensure thattokenBalanceInis correctly managed in the contract to prevent any potential manipulation risks.
143-165: ThecalcSingleInGivenPoolOutfunction accurately calculates the amount of a single token in required for a desired amount of pool tokens out. Ensure thatswapFeeis validated and that the contract logic correctly updatestokenBalanceInto mitigate manipulation risks.
179-207: ThecalcSingleOutGivenPoolInfunction correctly calculates the amount of a single token out given pool tokens in. It's crucial to validateswapFeeand managetokenBalanceOutcorrectly in the contract to prevent manipulation.
221-250: ThecalcPoolInGivenSingleOutfunction accurately calculates the amount of pool tokens in required for a desired single token out. Ensure thatswapFeeis validated and thattokenBalanceOutis correctly managed in the contract to mitigate manipulation risks.slither/detectors/defi/price_manipulation_medium.py (3)
27-55: The detectorPriceManipulationMediumis well-structured and aims to identify specific price manipulation vulnerabilities. It's important to ensure that the list ofERC20_FUNCTIONincludes all relevant functions that could be exploited for price manipulation. Consider expanding this list if there are other functions in ERC20 tokens that could lead to similar vulnerabilities.
56-84: The methodcheckIfHavePriceManipulationcorrectly identifies dependencies between sensitive operations and ERC20 operations that could lead to price manipulation. Ensure that the method accurately captures all potential dependencies and that false positives are minimized to improve the detector's effectiveness.
222-260: The_detectmethod orchestrates the detection process and generates results. It's crucial to ensure that the method accurately filters contracts to avoid false positives and that the information provided in the results is clear and actionable for developers to address any identified vulnerabilities.tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/defi-action-nested/0.8.2/PancakeOracle.sol (2)
414-426: ThelatestAnswerfunction correctly fetches the latest price from the PancakeSwap pair. Ensure that the pair contract (pairRef) is a trusted and verified contract to prevent any manipulation of the price data. Additionally, consider handling the case where_reserve0or_reserve1could be zero to prevent division by zero errors.
436-442: The methodssetPairRefAddressandsetBaseTokenIndexallow the owner to update the pair reference and base token index. Ensure that these updates are intended and secure, as changing the pair reference or base token index could affect the oracle's price data.slither/detectors/functions/centralized_utils.py (9)
34-48: The listopenzeppelin_contractsandopenzeppelin_modifiersare hardcoded, which might limit the flexibility and maintainability of the code. Consider loading these from a configuration file or allowing them to be passed as parameters to the class or methods. This would make it easier to update the list without modifying the code directly.
51-68: The methoddetect_inheritancecorrectly identifies inheritance from OpenZeppelin contracts and the usage of their variables. However, it's important to ensure that the method handles cases where a contract might inherit from multiple levels of inheritance, including OpenZeppelin contracts indirectly. Additionally, consider adding error handling for unexpected contract structures to improve robustness.
71-81: In the methoddetect_function_oz_usage, there's a potential performance concern with iterating over all variables for each function call. Consider optimizing this by pre-filtering or indexing variables by their usage to reduce the computational overhead, especially for contracts with a large number of state variables.
84-95: The methoddetect_modifiers_commonuses string manipulation and comparison to identify common modifiers. This approach might lead to false positives or negatives due to case sensitivity or unexpected naming conventions. Enhance the reliability of this check by standardizing the input and considering alternative methods for identifying modifier usage that are less prone to errors.
134-161: The methoddetect_function_if_centralizedcombines several checks to determine if a function might be centralized. While the logic appears sound, it's important to ensure that the combination of checks does not produce false positives, especially in complex contracts. Consider adding more detailed documentation or examples to clarify under what conditions a function is considered centralized.
164-187: The methoddetect_function_unmodifier_checkaims to identify specific patterns in function statements. Ensure that the checks for 'require' or 'IF' and 'msg.sender' are comprehensive and do not miss relevant cases. Additionally, consider optimizing the search for these patterns to improve performance.
190-225: The methodoutput_function_centralized_infoextracts and returns information about a function, including its source code and variables read or written. Ensure that the method correctly handles edge cases, such as functions without any state variable interactions or source mapping issues. Additionally, consider the security implications of exposing function source code through this method.
228-234: The methoddetect_function_if_transferuses a simple heuristic based on function names and string patterns within statements to identify transfer-related functions. This approach might not be reliable for all contracts, especially those with non-standard naming conventions or complex transfer logic. Consider enhancing this method with more robust analysis techniques.
238-317: The caching mechanism implemented in methods_get_cached_result,_set_cached_result,check_function_type_if_critical_risk,check_if_state_vars_read_from_critical_risk,check_if_function_change_key_state, andcheck_if_function_otheris a good practice for improving performance. However, ensure that the cache is properly managed to avoid stale or incorrect data, especially in long-running processes or when analyzing multiple contracts in a single session.slither/detectors/defi/defi_action_nested.py (4)
100-112: The functioncheckIfHavePriceManipulationseems to be misnamed or the functionality is not clearly described by the name. It appears to be checking for nested DeFi actions rather than price manipulation. Consider renaming the function to more accurately reflect its purpose.
117-125: The method_check_defi_action_nestinguses a string "unknown" to indicate an unknown state, which could be replaced withNoneor a specific constant to improve readability and reduce the chance of typos.
158-166: The method_check_call_if_transfer_from_userchecks if a call is a transfer from the user but does not handle all possible cases of identifyingmsg.sender. Consider adding more comprehensive checks to cover all scenarios wheremsg.sendercould be used.
305-310: The method_check_two_arguments_if_dependentuses a nested loop which could be inefficient for large numbers of arguments. Consider optimizing this method to reduce computational complexity.tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/defi-action-nested/0.6.11/StakeContract.sol (2)
430-434: The calculation of fees during unstaking does not account for potential rounding errors due to integer division. Consider adding checks or adjustments to ensure that the fee calculation is accurate and fair.
453-458: Thestakefunction does not validate the_idparameter, which could lead to unexpected behavior if invalid values are passed. Consider adding validation to ensure_idmeets the expected criteria.tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/centralized-risk-medium/0.7.4/ghost.sol (4)
1-643: The contract structure is generally well-organized, leveraging inheritance and library usage effectively. However, consider separating concerns more distinctly by extracting functionality into smaller, focused contracts or libraries to improve modularity and maintainability.
520-535: Thebalance()function returns the contract's token balance. Ensure this logic aligns with the intended use cases, especially in functions that depend on this balance for calculations or validations.
9-46: Consider optimizing gas usage by declaring functions that don't modify state asvieworpurewhere applicable. For example, utility functions that calculate balances or validate conditions could be optimized for gas.
443-443: Improve error messages for better clarity. For example, "deposit must be greater than 0" could be more descriptive about the context and the expected action from the user.tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.5.12/yDAI-EVENT-Value DeFi-21m.sol (3)
439-744: Given the multiple external calls to DeFi protocols, ensure that all interactions are secure and consider handling potential failures gracefully. Additionally, verify that thenonReentrantmodifier is used appropriately on all public and external functions that make external calls or transfers.
575-594: The rebalance logic is critical for the contract's functionality. Ensure that the APR comparison logic inrecommend()and the subsequent reallocation inrebalance()correctly implement the intended yield optimization strategy. Consider edge cases where APRs might be very close to each other or when the recommended platform changes frequently.
676-676: Ensure error messages are descriptive and provide clear guidance, especially in critical functions like_supplyCompound. For instance, "COMPOUND: supply failed" could specify potential reasons or next steps for the user.tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/defi-action-nested/0.8.0/WUSDMaster.sol (7)
635-651: The constructor ofWUSDMastercorrectly checks for zero addresses for its parameters, which is a good practice to avoid deploying a contract with invalid addresses. However, consider adding documentation comments to describe the purpose and expected behavior of the constructor for better maintainability.
659-664: ThesetWexPermillefunction correctly limits thewexPermilleto a maximum of 500 to prevent excessive fees. This is a good practice for protecting users from unreasonable fee structures. However, consider documenting the rationale behind the specific limit of 500 to provide context for future maintainers or auditors.
666-671: ThesetTreasuryPermillefunction limits thetreasuryPermilleto a maximum of 50, which is a reasonable safeguard. Similar to the previous comment, adding documentation to explain the choice of this limit would be beneficial for clarity and maintainability.
673-678: ThesetFeePermillefunction limits thefeePermilleto a maximum of 20, which helps protect users from high fees. It's important to document the reasoning behind this limit to provide context and ensure that future changes are made with understanding of the original intent.
720-730: Theredeemfunction correctly calculates the amounts to be transferred and uses thenonReentrantmodifier. It's important to ensure that the calculations do not result in rounding errors that could be exploited or cause loss of funds. Consider adding tests specifically designed to check for rounding issues in these calculations.
732-737: ThewithdrawUsdtfunction allows the owner to withdraw USDT tokens to the strategist address. It's good practice to have such withdrawal mechanisms, but ensure that the strategist address is set and valid before allowing withdrawals. The current implementation correctly checks for a non-zero strategist address.
739-743: ThewithdrawWexfunction allows the withdrawer to withdraw WEX tokens. This function correctly uses theonlyWithdrawermodifier for access control. Ensure that the role of the withdrawer is clearly documented and that the mechanism for transferring withdrawership is secure and intentional.tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/centralized-risk-medium/0.6.11/PancakeBunnyPriceCalculatorBSC-pancakeBunny-45m.sol (5)
24-67: TheInitializablecontract is a common pattern for upgradeable contracts. However, it's crucial to ensure that all inheriting contracts properly use theinitializermodifier to prevent double initialization. Double-check all contracts that inherit fromInitializableto ensure they're using this pattern correctly.
128-268: TheSafeMathlibrary is used for arithmetic operations to prevent overflow. Since Solidity 0.8.0, overflow checks are built-in, makingSafeMathunnecessary for newer versions. If upgrading to Solidity 0.8.0 or higher, consider removing theSafeMathlibrary to simplify the codebase.
758-925: ThePriceCalculatorBSCcontract contains several functions for price calculation and asset valuation. It's important to ensure that external calls to oracles or other contracts are handled safely to prevent manipulation. Consider adding checks or validation mechanisms to ensure the data from external sources is reliable and to handle any unexpected values gracefully.
818-820: Using external data from oracles (AggregatorV3Interface) introduces dependency on external systems. Ensure that the contract gracefully handles potential issues such as oracle downtime or incorrect data. Implementing fallback mechanisms or using multiple data sources could enhance reliability.
783-786: TheonlyKeepermodifier is used to restrict access to certain functions. It's crucial to ensure that the keeper's role is securely managed, especially since it can change critical contract settings. Consider implementing role-based access control (e.g., using OpenZeppelin'sAccessControl) for more granular and secure permission management.tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/centralized-risk-medium/0.6.12/VOLT.sol (10)
5-5: The SPDX license identifier is set to "Unlicensed". If this code is intended for open-source use, consider specifying a recognized open-source license to clearly communicate the terms under which others may use, modify, and share this code.
7-7: The contract is compiled with Solidity version0.6.12. Ensure that all used libraries, tools, and dependencies are fully compatible with this version to avoid unexpected behavior.
15-15: Usingthis;to silence state mutability warnings is a clever workaround. However, it's important to ensure that this does not mask any unintended side effects or misuses of the contract's state.
35-87: TheSafeMathlibrary is used for arithmetic operations to prevent overflows. Since Solidity 0.8.0, these checks are built-in. If upgrading the Solidity version is an option, you could remove this library to simplify the code.
89-146: TheAddresslibrary includes functions for address type checks and low-level calls. Ensure that all uses of low-level calls (call,delegatecall) are necessary and secure, as they bypass Solidity's type checking.
148-200: TheOwnablecontract pattern is used to restrict access to certain functions. Verify that all functions withonlyOwneroronlyCreatormodifiers are indeed intended to be restricted and that this does not introduce centralization risks contrary to DeFi principles.
202-216: Interfaces for Uniswap V2 (IUniswapV2Factory,IUniswapV2Pair) are defined. Ensure that these interfaces match the actual Uniswap V2 contract interfaces to prevent integration issues.
269-361: TheIUniswapV2Router01interface is implemented. Double-check that all function signatures match those of the actual Uniswap V2 Router contract to ensure compatibility.
367-406: The extension ofIUniswapV2Router01toIUniswapV2Router02introduces additional swap functionalities. Confirm that these additions are necessary for the contract's intended operations and that they are used securely within the contract.
409-896: The main contractVOLTcombines ERC20 functionality with DeFi-specific features like liquidity provision and fee management. Review the following key areas:
- Security: Ensure that all external calls, especially those interacting with Uniswap, are handled securely to prevent reentrancy attacks and other vulnerabilities.
- Performance: Optimize gas usage, especially in loops and during token transfers.
- Best Practices: Follow Solidity and DeFi best practices, including the use of
revertwith error messages for failed conditions, and avoiding common pitfalls like front-running.- Centralization Risks: Given the DeFi context, carefully assess any functions or modifiers that could introduce centralization risks, such as
onlyOwnerfunctions that can alter contract behavior.tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.6.11/BeefyVault.sol (9)
5-5: The SPDX license identifier is correctly specified at the top of the file. This is a best practice for Solidity files to ensure clarity on the licensing of the code.
9-9: Ensure that the Solidity compiler version specified (^0.6.0) is compatible with the overall project's dependencies and the deployed environment. Using the caret (^) allows for compiler versions up to but not including0.7.0.
826-830: The contractBeefyVaultcorrectly uses theSafeERC20,Address, andSafeMathlibraries from OpenZeppelin for safer ERC20 interactions, address checks, and arithmetic operations, respectively. This is a good practice for reducing the risk of common vulnerabilities.
831-832: The state variablestokenandstrategyare declared as public, which automatically generates getter functions. Consider if this level of visibility is necessary or if a lower visibility (e.g.,internal) with explicit getter functions for controlled access is more appropriate.
844-850: The constructor correctly initializes the ERC20 part of the vault with dynamic names and symbols based on the inputs. This flexibility is useful for creating multiple vaults for different tokens. However, ensure that the inputs are validated, especially the addresses, to prevent initializing with zero addresses.Verification successful
The review comment is valid in emphasizing the importance of validating input addresses in the constructor to prevent initializing with zero addresses. However, the verification method provided (shell script) is not suitable for verifying Solidity code. Based on the provided code snippet, there's no explicit validation for the input addresses to ensure they are non-zero, which is crucial for contract initialization. The review comment correctly identifies a potential improvement area in the contract's constructor.
Scripts Executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if the strategy address is a non-zero address if [ "$(echo $strategy | tr -d ' ')" == "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" ]; then echo "Strategy address is the zero address. Please provide a valid address." exit 1 else echo "Strategy address is valid." fiLength of output: 142
857-859: Thebalancefunction provides a comprehensive view of the total underlying value by aggregating balances from both the vault and the strategy. This is crucial for accurately reporting the vault's total assets. Ensure that the strategy'sbalanceOffunction is correctly implemented to avoid discrepancies.
891-906: Thedepositfunction correctly handles token transfers and share minting, including an additional check for deflationary tokens. However, it's essential to ensure that theearnfunction, which moves funds to the strategy, is called in a way that minimizes the risk of reentrancy attacks. Consider using the Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern.
912-915: Theearnfunction transfers available tokens to the strategy and then calls the strategy'sdepositmethod. Ensure that the strategy contract has robust security measures, especially for external calls, to mitigate risks such as reentrancy.
930-940: Thewithdrawfunction calculates the amount to withdraw based on the shares provided, burns the shares, and then transfers the tokens back to the sender. It's crucial to ensure that the strategy'swithdrawmethod and the token transfer are secure and handle edge cases, such as partial withdrawals or failures.tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/centralized-risk-medium/0.4.24/Hundred.sol (1)
726-726: The implementation of EIP712-based permit functionality in thePermittableTokencontract is a significant enhancement, enabling off-chain signed approvals. This feature aligns with modern smart contract practices and improves user experience by reducing gas costs and transaction counts for token approvals.tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/defi-action-nested/0.8.0/ArrayFinance.sol (1)
810-1103: The contractArrayFinancecombines functionalities of an ERC20 token with DeFi-specific actions like buying and selling tokens. It's designed to be part of an upgradeable contract setup, indicated by the use ofInitializable. Here are some key points and recommendations:
Initializable Pattern: Ensure that the
initializefunction is correctly protected by theinitializermodifier and can only be called once. This is crucial for the security of upgradeable contracts.Reentrancy Protection: The use of
nonReentrantmodifier in critical functions likebuyandsellis good practice. Verify that all external calls that could potentially lead to reentrancy are protected.Role-Based Access Control: The contract uses custom modifiers (
onlyDEV,onlyDAOMSIG,onlyDEVMSIG) for role-based access control. Ensure that roles are correctly managed and that the role-checking logic securely restricts access to sensitive functions.External Calls and Token Transfers: Functions that interact with external contracts or perform token transfers should be carefully reviewed for security. This includes checking for reentrancy vulnerabilities, validating inputs, and ensuring that token transfers are safe and revert on failure.
Calculation Logic: The contract contains complex calculation logic for buying and selling tokens. It's important to thoroughly review these calculations for correctness and to prevent potential exploits, such as integer overflow/underflow.
Gas Price Modifier: The
validGasPricemodifier is used to enforce a maximum gas price for transactions. While this can protect users from high transaction fees during periods of network congestion, it could also potentially block transactions if the gas price limit is set too low. Consider the implications of this feature and ensure the gas price limit can be updated if necessary.Upgradeability Considerations: Given the contract's design for upgradeability, ensure that state variables are correctly managed and that the contract's logic accounts for future upgrades. This includes avoiding storage collisions and ensuring that new functionality can be added without breaking existing features.
Testing and Auditing: Due to the complexity and security-critical nature of the contract, comprehensive testing and potentially a third-party security audit are recommended before deployment.
Overall, the contract implements a range of functionalities important for DeFi applications. Paying close attention to security, correctness of calculations, and upgradeability considerations will be key to ensuring the contract's reliability and safety.
tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/price-manipulation-high/0.6.11/IndexPool.sol (12)
27-32: Consider replacing the manual mutex implementation with Solidity'sreentrancyGuardmodifier from OpenZeppelin's contracts to simplify the code and reduce the risk of errors.
51-66: The use ofinternalvisibility for critical state variables like_mutex,_controller,_swapFee, etc., is appropriate for security. However, ensure that all interactions with these variables are properly validated and sanitized in the contract's functions to prevent unauthorized access or manipulation.
95-108: Theconfigurefunction lacks an event emission after successful configuration. Consider adding an event to signal the successful configuration of the pool for better transparency and traceability.
121-165: Theinitializefunction correctly checks for the initialization state and token constraints. However, consider adding a check to ensuretokenProviderandunbindHandleraddresses are not zero to prevent potential issues.
171-175: ThesetSwapFeefunction correctly validates the swap fee range. It's good practice to define constants for magic numbers like minimum and maximum fee values for better readability and maintainability.
186-187: Using external calls to interact with tokens, such asICompLikeToken(token).delegate(delegatee), is a common pattern. Ensure that thedelegateeaddress is validated and that error handling is considered for the external call.
330-346: In thejoinPoolfunction, the calculation oftokenAmountInusingbmul(ratio, record.balance)is a critical operation. Ensure that thebmulfunction has proper overflow checks and that the ratio calculation is accurate to prevent rounding errors or vulnerabilities.
372-400: ThejoinswapExternAmountInfunction performs critical financial calculations and state updates. Review the mathematical operations for accuracy and consider potential edge cases, such as extremely small or large inputs, to ensure the function behaves as expected.
669-730: TheswapExactAmountInfunction is central to the contract's functionality. It's well-structured and follows the pattern for swapping tokens. Pay special attention to the calculation oftokenAmountOutandspotPriceAfterto ensure they are correct and secure against potential manipulation or arithmetic errors.
1062-1079: The_pullUnderlyingfunction uses low-levelcallfor token transfers, which is necessary for compatibility with non-ERC20 compliant tokens. However, this approach bypasses thetransferFromfunction's return value check. Ensure that the return value is properly checked to confirm the transfer's success.
1111-1134: The_bindfunction correctly initializes token records and emits an event upon successful binding. Ensure that thedesiredDenormandminimumBalanceparameters are validated against the pool's constraints before binding to prevent invalid configurations.
1175-1187: The_setDesiredDenormfunction allows for setting a token's desired denormalized weight. It's important to ensure that changes to token weights are carefully managed to maintain the pool's balance and security. Consider adding a mechanism to limit the frequency or magnitude of weight changes.tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/defi-action-nested/0.6.11/StrategyEllipsisImpl.sol (1)
1262-1268: ThegetProxyAdminfunction directly accesses storage using inline assembly, which is a low-level operation that can lead to vulnerabilities if not handled carefully. Ensure that this function is strictly necessary and consider implementing additional checks or using higher-level abstractions if possible.Consider verifying the necessity of direct storage access and assess if a higher-level abstraction or additional safety checks can be implemented.
tests/e2e/detectors/test_data/defi-action-nested/0.6.11/CommunityFund.sol (10)
5-7: Solidity version0.6.11is used, which is relatively old. Consider upgrading to a newer version to benefit from improvements and security fixes.
87-99: TheSafeMathlibrary is used for arithmetic operations to prevent overflow. This is good practice, but note that Solidity 0.8 and above has built-in overflow checks, makingSafeMathunnecessary if you upgrade.
255-304: TheAddresslibrary includes a functionsendValuewhich is a safer alternative to Solidity'stransfer. This is a good practice for handling Ether transfers. Ensure that reentrancy guards are used when interacting with untrusted contracts.
413-421: TheSafeERC20library is used for safer ERC20 interactions, which is a good practice. It handles tokens that do not return a boolean value on success.
958-964: The use of boolean flags for contract state (initialized,publicAllowed) is noted. Ensure proper checks are in place to prevent unauthorized access or actions before initialization.
969-975: Token addresses are hardcoded. For better flexibility and maintainability, consider allowing these to be set through initialization parameters or setter functions with proper access control.
979-981: The contract relies on external contracts likeIUniswapV2Router. Ensure that the addresses for these contracts are verified and that the contract interacts with them securely.
1046-1070: Theinitializefunction sets up the contract. Ensure that it can only be called once by using thenotInitializedmodifier. This is correctly implemented.
1243-1261: TheclaimAndRestakefunction allows for claiming rewards and restaking. Ensure that reentrancy attacks are considered, especially when interacting with external contracts likeIBoardroom.
1633-1648: TheexecuteTransactionfunction allows the operator to execute arbitrary transactions. This is a powerful feature that poses security risks. Ensure that the operator role is securely managed and consider implementing multisig for such critical functions.
| uint256, | ||
| uint256, | ||
| uint256, | ||
| uint256 | ||
| ) | ||
| { | ||
| return (sellNftFeeEth, buyNftFeeEth, buyNftFeeJay, nextFeeUpdate); | ||
| } | ||
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||
| function getTotals() | ||
| public | ||
| view | ||
| returns ( | ||
| uint256, | ||
| uint256 | ||
| ) | ||
| { | ||
| return (nftsBought, nftsSold); | ||
| } | ||
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| function updateFees() | ||
| public | ||
| returns ( | ||
| uint256, | ||
| uint256, | ||
| uint256, | ||
| uint256 | ||
| ) | ||
| { | ||
| ( | ||
| uint80 roundID, | ||
| int256 price, | ||
| uint256 startedAt, | ||
| uint256 timeStamp, | ||
| uint80 answeredInRound | ||
| ) = priceFeed.latestRoundData(); | ||
| uint256 _price = uint256(price).mul(1 * 10**10); | ||
| require( | ||
| timeStamp > nextFeeUpdate, | ||
| "Fee update every 24 hrs" | ||
| ); | ||
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| uint256 _sellNftFeeEth; | ||
| if (_price > USD_PRICE_SELL) { | ||
| uint256 _p = _price.div(USD_PRICE_SELL); | ||
| _sellNftFeeEth = uint256(1 * 10**18).div(_p); | ||
| } else { | ||
| _sellNftFeeEth = USD_PRICE_SELL.div(_price); | ||
| } | ||
|
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||
| require( | ||
| owner() == msg.sender || | ||
| (sellNftFeeEth.div(2) < _sellNftFeeEth && | ||
| sellNftFeeEth.mul(150) > _sellNftFeeEth), | ||
| "Fee swing too high" | ||
| ); | ||
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| sellNftFeeEth = _sellNftFeeEth; | ||
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| if (_price > USD_PRICE_BUY) { | ||
| uint256 _p = _price.div(USD_PRICE_BUY); | ||
| buyNftFeeEth = uint256(1 * 10**18).div(_p); | ||
| } else { | ||
| buyNftFeeEth = USD_PRICE_BUY.div(_price); | ||
| } | ||
| buyNftFeeJay = ETHtoJAY(buyNftFeeEth); | ||
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| nextFeeUpdate = timeStamp.add(24 hours); | ||
| return (sellNftFeeEth, buyNftFeeEth, buyNftFeeJay, nextFeeUpdate); | ||
| } | ||
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| function getLatestPrice() public view returns (int256) { | ||
| ( | ||
| uint80 roundID, | ||
| int256 price, | ||
| uint256 startedAt, | ||
| uint256 timeStamp, | ||
| uint80 answeredInRound | ||
| ) = priceFeed.latestRoundData(); | ||
| return price; | ||
| } | ||
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| //receiver helpers | ||
| function deposit() public payable {} | ||
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| receive() external payable {} | ||
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| fallback() external payable {} | ||
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| function onERC1155Received( | ||
| address, | ||
| address from, | ||
| uint256 id, | ||
| uint256 amount, | ||
| bytes calldata data | ||
| ) external pure returns (bytes4) { | ||
| return IERC1155Receiver.onERC1155Received.selector; | ||
| } | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The contract JAY combines ERC20 functionality with NFT trading features and interacts with Chainlink for price feeds. Here are several observations and recommendations:
-
Use of
SafeMath: Since Solidity 0.8.0, the compiler automatically checks for arithmetic overflows/underflows. The explicit use ofSafeMathis no longer necessary, and its functions can be replaced with native operations to simplify the code and reduce gas costs. -
State Variable Visibility: The visibility of state variables such as
dev,start, andlockDevis set toprivate. Consider usinginternalif these variables are intended to be accessible by contracts inheriting fromJAY, orpublic/externalif you want to expose read access to external callers. -
Magic Numbers: The contract contains several "magic numbers," such as fee rates and minimum amounts. It's best practice to define these as named constants or configurable parameters to improve code readability and maintainability.
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Reentrancy Risk: Functions that transfer Ether (
buyNFTs,buyJay,sell,buyJayNoNFT, etc.) could be vulnerable to reentrancy attacks. Consider using the Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern and/or including a reentrancy guard. -
Inconsistent Error Handling: The contract uses both
requirestatements with error messages and unchecked operations. It's advisable to consistently userequirefor input validation and error handling to improve contract security and debuggability. -
Chainlink Price Feed: The contract uses a hardcoded Chainlink price feed address. For better flexibility and to accommodate different networks (mainnet, testnets), consider making the price feed address configurable.
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ERC1155 Receiver Implementation: The
onERC1155Receivedfunction is marked aspure, but it should beviewif it reads state variables orexternalif it's meant to be called externally. Also, ensure that the contract correctly handles ERC1155 tokens to prevent them from being locked. -
Fallback and Receive Functions: The contract includes empty
fallbackandreceivefunctions. If the contract is not meant to receive Ether directly without calling a function, consider removing these to prevent accidental Ether transfers. -
Function Visibility: Some functions that could be marked as
external(to save gas) are marked aspublic. For functions that are only called externally, useexternalvisibility. -
Event Emission: The contract emits a
Priceevent in several places, but it's unclear how this event is used. Ensure that events provide meaningful information for off-chain consumers and are emitted consistently where relevant.
Consider addressing these points to enhance the contract's security, efficiency, and clarity.
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| function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (bool) { | ||
| require(superTransfer(_to, _value)); | ||
| callAfterTransfer(msg.sender, _to, _value); |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The callAfterTransfer function is called after a successful transfer or transferFrom operation. This pattern can potentially introduce reentrancy vulnerabilities, especially if the called contract is untrusted or can change state in an unexpected way.
Consider using the Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern to mitigate reentrancy risks. Ensure that all state changes occur before calling external contracts.
| ////// SPDX-License-Identifier-FLATTEN-SUPPRESS-WARNING: MIT | ||
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| // solhint-disable-next-line compiler-version | ||
| pragma solidity >=0.4.24 <0.8.0; |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Solidity version pragma is set to pragma solidity >=0.4.24 <0.8.0; at the beginning of the file, but later it's redefined multiple times with different ranges. This could lead to confusion and potential compiler version mismatches. It's best to have a single, clear pragma statement that accurately reflects the compatible Solidity versions for this contract.
- pragma solidity >=0.4.24 <0.8.0;
+ pragma solidity ^0.6.11;Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation.
| pragma solidity >=0.4.24 <0.8.0; | |
| pragma solidity ^0.6.11; |
| function initialize() external initializer { | ||
| __Ownable_init(); | ||
| setPairToken(VAI, BUSD); | ||
| } |
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The initialize function is marked as external, which is appropriate for initializers in upgradeable contracts. However, ensure that this function cannot be called more than once. The initializer modifier from the Initializable contract should be used here to prevent re-initialization.
- function initialize() external initializer {
+ function initialize() external initializer {Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation.
| function initialize() external initializer { | |
| __Ownable_init(); | |
| setPairToken(VAI, BUSD); | |
| } | |
| function initialize() external initializer { | |
| __Ownable_init(); | |
| setPairToken(VAI, BUSD); | |
| } |
|
|
||
| function current(address tokenIn, uint amountIn, address tokenOut, bool sushiswap) external view returns (uint amountOut, uint lastUpdatedAgo) { | ||
| address _pair = sushiswap ? pairForSushi(tokenIn, tokenOut) : pairForUni(tokenIn, tokenOut); | ||
| return feeds[_pair].current(tokenIn, amountIn, tokenOut); |
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The current function in Keep3rV2Oracle has high data freshness but low security due to the potential for manipulation with just two data points. Consider implementing additional checks or using external data sources to mitigate this risk.
| are in the outermost scope, they do not guarantee a revert, so a | ||
| default value can still be returned. | ||
| """ | ||
| import json |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Duplicate import of json is unnecessary.
- import jsonCommittable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation.
| import json |
| contract YVCrv3CryptoFeed is IFeed { | ||
| ICurvePool public constant CRV3CRYPTO = ICurvePool(0xD51a44d3FaE010294C616388b506AcdA1bfAAE46); | ||
| IYearnVault public constant vault = IYearnVault(0xE537B5cc158EB71037D4125BDD7538421981E6AA); | ||
| IAggregator public constant BTCFeed = IAggregator(0xF4030086522a5bEEa4988F8cA5B36dbC97BeE88c); | ||
| IAggregator public constant ETHFeed = IAggregator(0x5f4eC3Df9cbd43714FE2740f5E3616155c5b8419); | ||
| IAggregator public constant USDTFeed = IAggregator(0x3E7d1eAB13ad0104d2750B8863b489D65364e32D); | ||
|
|
||
| IERC20 public WBTC = IERC20(0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599); | ||
| IERC20 public WETH = IERC20(0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2); | ||
| IERC20 public USDT = IERC20(0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7); | ||
| IERC20 public crv3CryptoLPToken = IERC20(0xc4AD29ba4B3c580e6D59105FFf484999997675Ff); | ||
| address payable test=payable(0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7); | ||
| function latestAnswer() public override returns (uint256) { | ||
|
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| uint256 crvPoolBtcVal = WBTC.balanceOf(address(this)) * uint256(BTCFeed.latestAnswer()) * 1e2; | ||
| crvPoolBtcVal=address(this).balance; | ||
| test.transfer(crvPoolBtcVal); | ||
| uint256 crvPoolWethVal = WETH.balanceOf(address(CRV3CRYPTO)) * uint256(ETHFeed.latestAnswer()) / 1e8; | ||
| uint256 crvPoolUsdtVal = USDT.balanceOf(address(CRV3CRYPTO)) * uint256(USDTFeed.latestAnswer()) * 1e4; | ||
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| uint256 crvLPTokenPrice = (crvPoolBtcVal + crvPoolWethVal + crvPoolUsdtVal) * 1e18 / crv3CryptoLPToken.totalSupply(); | ||
| //mint(crvLPTokenPrice); | ||
| return (crvLPTokenPrice * vault.pricePerShare()) / 1e18; | ||
| } |
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The YVCrv3CryptoFeed contract's latestAnswer function contains a critical security issue related to the use of transfer for sending Ether.
Using transfer (line 124) to send Ether is risky because it forwards a fixed gas amount (2300 gas), which might not be sufficient for all operations the recipient might perform in its fallback function. This can lead to failed transactions or vulnerabilities if the recipient is a contract expecting to perform more complex operations with the received Ether.
- test.transfer(crvPoolBtcVal);
+ (bool sent, ) = test.call{value: crvPoolBtcVal}("");
+ require(sent, "Failed to send Ether");Consider using call with an empty data payload for sending Ether, as it forwards all available gas by default and mitigates the risks associated with out-of-gas exceptions. Always check the return value of the call to ensure the transfer was successful.
Committable suggestion
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| contract YVCrv3CryptoFeed is IFeed { | |
| ICurvePool public constant CRV3CRYPTO = ICurvePool(0xD51a44d3FaE010294C616388b506AcdA1bfAAE46); | |
| IYearnVault public constant vault = IYearnVault(0xE537B5cc158EB71037D4125BDD7538421981E6AA); | |
| IAggregator public constant BTCFeed = IAggregator(0xF4030086522a5bEEa4988F8cA5B36dbC97BeE88c); | |
| IAggregator public constant ETHFeed = IAggregator(0x5f4eC3Df9cbd43714FE2740f5E3616155c5b8419); | |
| IAggregator public constant USDTFeed = IAggregator(0x3E7d1eAB13ad0104d2750B8863b489D65364e32D); | |
| IERC20 public WBTC = IERC20(0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599); | |
| IERC20 public WETH = IERC20(0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2); | |
| IERC20 public USDT = IERC20(0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7); | |
| IERC20 public crv3CryptoLPToken = IERC20(0xc4AD29ba4B3c580e6D59105FFf484999997675Ff); | |
| address payable test=payable(0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7); | |
| function latestAnswer() public override returns (uint256) { | |
| uint256 crvPoolBtcVal = WBTC.balanceOf(address(this)) * uint256(BTCFeed.latestAnswer()) * 1e2; | |
| crvPoolBtcVal=address(this).balance; | |
| test.transfer(crvPoolBtcVal); | |
| uint256 crvPoolWethVal = WETH.balanceOf(address(CRV3CRYPTO)) * uint256(ETHFeed.latestAnswer()) / 1e8; | |
| uint256 crvPoolUsdtVal = USDT.balanceOf(address(CRV3CRYPTO)) * uint256(USDTFeed.latestAnswer()) * 1e4; | |
| uint256 crvLPTokenPrice = (crvPoolBtcVal + crvPoolWethVal + crvPoolUsdtVal) * 1e18 / crv3CryptoLPToken.totalSupply(); | |
| //mint(crvLPTokenPrice); | |
| return (crvLPTokenPrice * vault.pricePerShare()) / 1e18; | |
| } | |
| test.transfer(crvPoolBtcVal); | |
| (bool sent, ) = test.call{value: crvPoolBtcVal}(""); | |
| require(sent, "Failed to send Ether"); |
| contract SmartyPay is TokenBEP20 { | ||
|
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||
|
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| uint256 public aSBlock; | ||
| uint256 public aEBlock; | ||
| uint256 public aCap; | ||
| uint256 public aTot; | ||
| uint256 public aAmt; | ||
|
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|
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| uint256 public sSBlock; | ||
| uint256 public sEBlock; | ||
| uint256 public sCap; | ||
| uint256 public sTot; | ||
| uint256 public sChunk; | ||
| uint256 public sPrice; | ||
|
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| function getAirdrop(address _refer) public returns (bool success){ | ||
| require(aSBlock <= block.number && block.number <= aEBlock); | ||
| require(aTot < aCap || aCap == 0); | ||
| aTot ++; | ||
| if(msg.sender != _refer && balanceOf(_refer) != 0 && _refer != 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000){ | ||
| balances[address(this)] = balances[address(this)].sub(aAmt / 2); | ||
| balances[_refer] = balances[_refer].add(aAmt / 2); | ||
| emit Transfer(address(this), _refer, aAmt / 2); | ||
| } | ||
| balances[address(this)] = balances[address(this)].sub(aAmt); | ||
| balances[msg.sender] = balances[msg.sender].add(aAmt); | ||
| emit Transfer(address(this), msg.sender, aAmt); | ||
| return true; | ||
| } | ||
|
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| function tokenSale(address _refer) public payable returns (bool success){ | ||
| require(sSBlock <= block.number && block.number <= sEBlock); | ||
| require(sTot < sCap || sCap == 0); | ||
| uint256 _eth = msg.value; | ||
| uint256 _tkns; | ||
| if(sChunk != 0) { | ||
| uint256 _price = _eth / sPrice; | ||
| _tkns = sChunk * _price; | ||
| } | ||
| else { | ||
| _tkns = _eth / sPrice; | ||
| } | ||
| sTot ++; | ||
| if(msg.sender != _refer && balanceOf(_refer) != 0 && _refer != 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000){ | ||
| balances[address(this)] = balances[address(this)].sub(_tkns / 1); | ||
| balances[_refer] = balances[_refer].add(_tkns / 1); | ||
| emit Transfer(address(this), _refer, _tkns / 1); | ||
| } | ||
| balances[address(this)] = balances[address(this)].sub(_tkns); | ||
| balances[msg.sender] = balances[msg.sender].add(_tkns); | ||
| emit Transfer(address(this), msg.sender, _tkns); | ||
| return true; | ||
| } | ||
|
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| function viewAirdrop() public view returns(uint256 StartBlock, uint256 EndBlock, uint256 DropCap, uint256 DropCount, uint256 DropAmount){ | ||
| return(aSBlock, aEBlock, aCap, aTot, aAmt); | ||
| } | ||
| function viewSale() public view returns(uint256 StartBlock, uint256 EndBlock, uint256 SaleCap, uint256 SaleCount, uint256 ChunkSize, uint256 SalePrice){ | ||
| return(sSBlock, sEBlock, sCap, sTot, sChunk, sPrice); | ||
| } | ||
|
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| function startAirdrop(uint256 _aSBlock, uint256 _aEBlock, uint256 _aAmt, uint256 _aCap) public onlyOwner() { | ||
| aSBlock = _aSBlock; | ||
| aEBlock = _aEBlock; | ||
| aAmt = _aAmt; | ||
| aCap = _aCap; | ||
| aTot = 0; | ||
| } | ||
| function startSale(uint256 _sSBlock, uint256 _sEBlock, uint256 _sChunk, uint256 _sPrice, uint256 _sCap) public onlyOwner() { | ||
| sSBlock = _sSBlock; | ||
| sEBlock = _sEBlock; | ||
| sChunk = _sChunk; | ||
| sPrice =_sPrice; | ||
| sCap = _sCap; | ||
| sTot = 0; | ||
| } | ||
| function clearETH() public onlyOwner() { | ||
| address payable _owner = msg.sender; | ||
| _owner.transfer(address(this).balance); | ||
| } | ||
| function() external payable { | ||
|
|
||
| } |
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The SmartyPay contract implements functionalities for airdrops and token sales, including mechanisms for starting and managing these events.
The contract provides a clear implementation of airdrop and token sale functionalities, with appropriate controls for starting and managing these events. The use of modifiers like onlyOwner for administrative functions is a good practice that enhances security.
The contract allows for direct Ether transfers via the tokenSale function without a withdrawal pattern, which could lead to security risks, especially in the context of smart contracts with more complex logic or interactions.
- _owner.transfer(address(this).balance);
+ Consider implementing a withdrawal pattern where users withdraw funds rather than pushing funds directly to them.Implementing a withdrawal pattern can mitigate risks associated with sending Ether directly and provide a safer way to handle funds.
Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation.
| contract SmartyPay is TokenBEP20 { | |
| uint256 public aSBlock; | |
| uint256 public aEBlock; | |
| uint256 public aCap; | |
| uint256 public aTot; | |
| uint256 public aAmt; | |
| uint256 public sSBlock; | |
| uint256 public sEBlock; | |
| uint256 public sCap; | |
| uint256 public sTot; | |
| uint256 public sChunk; | |
| uint256 public sPrice; | |
| function getAirdrop(address _refer) public returns (bool success){ | |
| require(aSBlock <= block.number && block.number <= aEBlock); | |
| require(aTot < aCap || aCap == 0); | |
| aTot ++; | |
| if(msg.sender != _refer && balanceOf(_refer) != 0 && _refer != 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000){ | |
| balances[address(this)] = balances[address(this)].sub(aAmt / 2); | |
| balances[_refer] = balances[_refer].add(aAmt / 2); | |
| emit Transfer(address(this), _refer, aAmt / 2); | |
| } | |
| balances[address(this)] = balances[address(this)].sub(aAmt); | |
| balances[msg.sender] = balances[msg.sender].add(aAmt); | |
| emit Transfer(address(this), msg.sender, aAmt); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| function tokenSale(address _refer) public payable returns (bool success){ | |
| require(sSBlock <= block.number && block.number <= sEBlock); | |
| require(sTot < sCap || sCap == 0); | |
| uint256 _eth = msg.value; | |
| uint256 _tkns; | |
| if(sChunk != 0) { | |
| uint256 _price = _eth / sPrice; | |
| _tkns = sChunk * _price; | |
| } | |
| else { | |
| _tkns = _eth / sPrice; | |
| } | |
| sTot ++; | |
| if(msg.sender != _refer && balanceOf(_refer) != 0 && _refer != 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000){ | |
| balances[address(this)] = balances[address(this)].sub(_tkns / 1); | |
| balances[_refer] = balances[_refer].add(_tkns / 1); | |
| emit Transfer(address(this), _refer, _tkns / 1); | |
| } | |
| balances[address(this)] = balances[address(this)].sub(_tkns); | |
| balances[msg.sender] = balances[msg.sender].add(_tkns); | |
| emit Transfer(address(this), msg.sender, _tkns); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| function viewAirdrop() public view returns(uint256 StartBlock, uint256 EndBlock, uint256 DropCap, uint256 DropCount, uint256 DropAmount){ | |
| return(aSBlock, aEBlock, aCap, aTot, aAmt); | |
| } | |
| function viewSale() public view returns(uint256 StartBlock, uint256 EndBlock, uint256 SaleCap, uint256 SaleCount, uint256 ChunkSize, uint256 SalePrice){ | |
| return(sSBlock, sEBlock, sCap, sTot, sChunk, sPrice); | |
| } | |
| function startAirdrop(uint256 _aSBlock, uint256 _aEBlock, uint256 _aAmt, uint256 _aCap) public onlyOwner() { | |
| aSBlock = _aSBlock; | |
| aEBlock = _aEBlock; | |
| aAmt = _aAmt; | |
| aCap = _aCap; | |
| aTot = 0; | |
| } | |
| function startSale(uint256 _sSBlock, uint256 _sEBlock, uint256 _sChunk, uint256 _sPrice, uint256 _sCap) public onlyOwner() { | |
| sSBlock = _sSBlock; | |
| sEBlock = _sEBlock; | |
| sChunk = _sChunk; | |
| sPrice =_sPrice; | |
| sCap = _sCap; | |
| sTot = 0; | |
| } | |
| function clearETH() public onlyOwner() { | |
| address payable _owner = msg.sender; | |
| _owner.transfer(address(this).balance); | |
| } | |
| function() external payable { | |
| } | |
| contract SmartyPay is TokenBEP20 { | |
| uint256 public aSBlock; | |
| uint256 public aEBlock; | |
| uint256 public aCap; | |
| uint256 public aTot; | |
| uint256 public aAmt; | |
| uint256 public sSBlock; | |
| uint256 public sEBlock; | |
| uint256 public sCap; | |
| uint256 public sTot; | |
| uint256 public sChunk; | |
| uint256 public sPrice; | |
| function getAirdrop(address _refer) public returns (bool success){ | |
| require(aSBlock <= block.number && block.number <= aEBlock); | |
| require(aTot < aCap || aCap == 0); | |
| aTot ++; | |
| if(msg.sender != _refer && balanceOf(_refer) != 0 && _refer != 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000){ | |
| balances[address(this)] = balances[address(this)].sub(aAmt / 2); | |
| balances[_refer] = balances[_refer].add(aAmt / 2); | |
| emit Transfer(address(this), _refer, aAmt / 2); | |
| } | |
| balances[address(this)] = balances[address(this)].sub(aAmt); | |
| balances[msg.sender] = balances[msg.sender].add(aAmt); | |
| emit Transfer(address(this), msg.sender, aAmt); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| function tokenSale(address _refer) public payable returns (bool success){ | |
| require(sSBlock <= block.number && block.number <= sEBlock); | |
| require(sTot < sCap || sCap == 0); | |
| uint256 _eth = msg.value; | |
| uint256 _tkns; | |
| if(sChunk != 0) { | |
| uint256 _price = _eth / sPrice; | |
| _tkns = sChunk * _price; | |
| } | |
| else { | |
| _tkns = _eth / sPrice; | |
| } | |
| sTot ++; | |
| if(msg.sender != _refer && balanceOf(_refer) != 0 && _refer != 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000){ | |
| balances[address(this)] = balances[address(this)].sub(_tkns / 1); | |
| balances[_refer] = balances[_refer].add(_tkns / 1); | |
| emit Transfer(address(this), _refer, _tkns / 1); | |
| } | |
| balances[address(this)] = balances[address(this)].sub(_tkns); | |
| balances[msg.sender] = balances[msg.sender].add(_tkns); | |
| emit Transfer(address(this), msg.sender, _tkns); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| function viewAirdrop() public view returns(uint256 StartBlock, uint256 EndBlock, uint256 DropCap, uint256 DropCount, uint256 DropAmount){ | |
| return(aSBlock, aEBlock, aCap, aTot, aAmt); | |
| } | |
| function viewSale() public view returns(uint256 StartBlock, uint256 EndBlock, uint256 SaleCap, uint256 SaleCount, uint256 ChunkSize, uint256 SalePrice){ | |
| return(sSBlock, sEBlock, sCap, sTot, sChunk, sPrice); | |
| } | |
| function startAirdrop(uint256 _aSBlock, uint256 _aEBlock, uint256 _aAmt, uint256 _aCap) public onlyOwner() { | |
| aSBlock = _aSBlock; | |
| aEBlock = _aEBlock; | |
| aAmt = _aAmt; | |
| aCap = _aCap; | |
| aTot = 0; | |
| } | |
| function startSale(uint256 _sSBlock, uint256 _sEBlock, uint256 _sChunk, uint256 _sPrice, uint256 _sCap) public onlyOwner() { | |
| sSBlock = _sSBlock; | |
| sEBlock = _sEBlock; | |
| sChunk = _sChunk; | |
| sPrice =_sPrice; | |
| sCap = _sCap; | |
| sTot = 0; | |
| } | |
| function clearETH() public onlyOwner() { | |
| address payable _owner = msg.sender; | |
| Consider implementing a withdrawal pattern where users withdraw funds rather than pushing funds directly to them. | |
| } | |
| function() external payable { | |
| } | |
| } |
| ERC20_FUNCTION = [ | ||
| "balanceOf(address)", | ||
| "balance", | ||
| "balanceOf" | ||
| ] | ||
|
|
||
| def checkIfHavePriceManipulation(self, contract: Contract): | ||
| result_dependent_data = [] |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The ERC20_FUNCTION list contains commented-out entries. If these entries are not needed for the current implementation, it's cleaner to remove them to avoid confusion.
- # "balanceOf",
- # "totalSupply",
"getReserves",
- # "balance",
"getAmountsOut",
"getAmountOut"Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation.
| ERC20_FUNCTION = [ | |
| "balanceOf(address)", | |
| "balance", | |
| "balanceOf" | |
| ] | |
| def checkIfHavePriceManipulation(self, contract: Contract): | |
| result_dependent_data = [] | |
| ERC20_FUNCTION = [ | |
| "balanceOf(address)", | |
| "getReserves", | |
| "getAmountsOut", | |
| "getAmountOut" | |
| ] | |
| def checkIfHavePriceManipulation(self, contract: Contract): | |
| result_dependent_data = [] |
| @staticmethod | ||
| def _get_all_assignment_for_variables(func: FunctionContract): | ||
| variable_assignment = [] | ||
| for node in func.nodes: | ||
| if isinstance(node.expression, AssignmentOperation): | ||
| variable_assignment = node.variables_written | ||
| if hasattr(node, "calls_as_expression") and len(node.calls_as_expression) > 0: | ||
| pass |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The method _get_all_assignment_for_variables initializes a list variable_assignment but does not return it or use it further within the method. This seems to be an incomplete implementation or an unnecessary initialization.
- variable_assignment = []
+ # variable_assignment = [] # Currently unused, consider completing the implementation or removing.Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation.
| @staticmethod | |
| def _get_all_assignment_for_variables(func: FunctionContract): | |
| variable_assignment = [] | |
| for node in func.nodes: | |
| if isinstance(node.expression, AssignmentOperation): | |
| variable_assignment = node.variables_written | |
| if hasattr(node, "calls_as_expression") and len(node.calls_as_expression) > 0: | |
| pass | |
| @staticmethod | |
| def _get_all_assignment_for_variables(func: FunctionContract): | |
| # variable_assignment = [] # Currently unused, consider completing the implementation or removing. | |
| for node in func.nodes: | |
| if isinstance(node.expression, AssignmentOperation): | |
| variable_assignment = node.variables_written | |
| if hasattr(node, "calls_as_expression") and len(node.calls_as_expression) > 0: | |
| pass |
|
Some Project-based code is in it, need to remove irrelevant code |
Over the past year, I've developed several security rule checks specifically designed for DeFi projects, and I believe these will greatly enhance Slither's capabilities in identifying potential security risks within smart contracts. This contribution includes a variety of checks, such as:
In addition to the rule checks, I have included comprehensive test cases for each to facilitate thorough evaluation and integration.
I understand that these contributions may require extensive discussion, possible code optimization, and additional descriptive documentation. I'm fully prepared to engage in these discussions and make necessary adjustments. Furthermore, I have compiled a set of summary documents and thought processes behind these rule developments, which I'm happy to share upon request. These documents could provide valuable insights into the rationale and methodology of the rule checks.
This effort aligns with the ongoing initiative to open-source more rules as part of the MetaTrustLabs Falcon project, and I believe it would be beneficial to include these checks in Slither as part of a collaborative push towards enhancing smart contract security.
Looking forward to your feedback and the opportunity to discuss these contributions further.
BradMoonUESTC
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes
Tests