crypto/boringssl: perform dummy seal when client resets keys too #1965
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This is yet more fallout from b17904e (also see 7d686e1). This time the missing dummy seal is for clients, after the initial epoch is reset (e.g. due to retry or version negotiation), which also causes the initial key material to be dervied again. When that happens, and if the client's PTO fires (e.g. because the server is slow to respond) that will trigger the client to create a new Initial packet that will fail to seal because the initial seal context expects a packet number of 0, while the actual packet number is greater than that as it's a retransmission. This only happens when the client's initial PTO fires because otherwise it would just send a Handshake packet instead, without using the initial key material.
rushilmehra
approved these changes
Mar 6, 2025
jrouviere
approved these changes
Mar 6, 2025
evanrittenhouse
approved these changes
Mar 6, 2025
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This is yet more fallout from b17904e (also see 7d686e1). This time the missing dummy seal is for clients, after the initial epoch is reset (e.g. due to retry or version negotiation), which also causes the initial key material to be dervied again.
When that happens, and if the client's PTO fires (e.g. because the server is slow to respond) that will trigger the client to create a new Initial packet that will fail to seal because the initial seal context expects a packet number of 0, while the actual packet number is greater than that as it's a retransmission.
This only happens when the client's initial PTO fires because otherwise it would just send a Handshake packet instead, without using the initial key material.