workflows: fix usage of untrusted input in check links #3029
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A user could create a branch with a particular name that would trigger a command injection because we use this input directly in the shell scripts generation. See more details in https://securitylab.github.com/resources/github-actions-untrusted-input/. This also updates the lychee action that no longer need an explicit GITHUB_TOKEN env variable lycheeverse/lychee-action#195 and reduce the permissions needed by the token in both check links workflows. Reported-by: Piergiorgio Ladisa <piergiorgio.ladisa@hotmail.it> Signed-off-by: Mahe Tardy <mahe.tardy@gmail.com>
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kevsecurity
approved these changes
Oct 22, 2024
ferozsalam
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Oct 22, 2024
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A user could create a branch with a particular name that would trigger a command injection because we use this input directly in the shell scripts generation. See more details in
https://securitylab.github.com/resources/github-actions-untrusted-input/.
This also updates the lychee action that no longer need an explicit GITHUB_TOKEN env variable lycheeverse/lychee-action#195 and reduce the permissions needed by the token in both check links workflows.
Reported-by: Piergiorgio Ladisa piergiorgio.ladisa@hotmail.it