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Protect connections between Brave and our Tor subprocess #12936
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[Copied from #12935.] The Firefox-based Tor Browser does two things:
We should do both of these. The first is easy; the second will require teaching net/socket and net/proxy about local sockets for socks proxies. Alternatively, we might let tor choose the port number, so that we don't conflict with either the Firefox-based Tor Browser's tor process or any other port number that any other process might be using. With tor's For the SOCKS port, there's also |
On the control channel, |
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State of affairs:
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Channel '' apparently happens for local builds, and we don't want it to step on the toes of release builds. fix #14592 This is a stop-gap measure until we use an OS-chosen socks port number or a local socket as in #12936. Auditors: @diracdeltas @bsclifton Test Plan: 1. Launch a local development build of Brave. 2. Laucnh a release build of Brave. 3. Confirm that Tor works in both.
Connecting to a Tor subprocess (#12934) over TCP sockets isn't necessarily the safest way to control and use a critical browser component. How can we harden this? Are there OS-specific measures we could use?
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