Включение поддержки аппаратной криптографии rk3568 #1

Salex406 · 2024-06-11T14:45:07Z

Применены следующие патчи: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-rockchip/list/?series=680909&archive=both
для включения аппаратного криптографического модуля

Не знаю, по какой причине они не вошли в оригинальный Linux, но мы их у себя применили, работают на вашей плате.
Для работы также требуется добавить сущность в dts

see https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-rockchip/list/?series=680909&archive=both

shcgit · 2024-06-18T04:14:28Z

Здравствуйте.
Подскажете как протестировать, бенчмарки снять?

…git/netfilter/nf netfilter pull request 24-04-11 Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: Patches #1 and #2 add missing rcu read side lock when iterating over expression and object type list which could race with module removal. Patch #3 prevents promisc packet from visiting the bridge/input hook to amend a recent fix to address conntrack confirmation race in br_netfilter and nf_conntrack_bridge. Patch #4 adds and uses iterate decorator type to fetch the current pipapo set backend datastructure view when netlink dumps the set elements. Patch #5 fixes removal of duplicate elements in the pipapo set backend. Patch torvalds#6 flowtable validates pppoe header before accessing it. Patch torvalds#7 fixes flowtable datapath for pppoe packets, otherwise lookup fails and pppoe packets follow classic path. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When disabling aRFS under the `priv->state_lock`, any scheduled aRFS works are canceled using the `cancel_work_sync` function, which waits for the work to end if it has already started. However, while waiting for the work handler, the handler will try to acquire the `state_lock` which is already acquired. The worker acquires the lock to delete the rules if the state is down, which is not the worker's responsibility since disabling aRFS deletes the rules. Add an aRFS state variable, which indicates whether the aRFS is enabled and prevent adding rules when the aRFS is disabled. Kernel log: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Tainted: G I ------------------------------------------------------ ethtool/386089 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88810f21ce68 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 but task is already holding lock: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x80/0xc90 arfs_handle_work+0x4b/0x3b0 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x1dc/0x4a0 worker_thread+0x1bf/0x3c0 kthread+0xd7/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)); lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by ethtool/386089: #0: ffffffff82ea7210 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 #1: ffffffff82e94c88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ethnl_default_set_doit+0xd3/0x240 #2: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core] stack backtrace: CPU: 15 PID: 386089 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G I 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x144/0x160 __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? save_trace+0x3e/0x360 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? __lock_acquire+0xa78/0x2c80 ? lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 ? ethnl_ops_begin+0xb0/0xb0 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0xf0/0xf0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x53f/0x8f0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e </TASK> Fixes: 45bf454 ("net/mlx5e: Enabling aRFS mechanism") Signed-off-by: Carolina Jubran <cjubran@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240411115444.374475-7-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Running a lot of VK CTS in parallel against nouveau, once every few hours you might see something like this crash. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 PGD 8000000114e6e067 P4D 8000000114e6e067 PUD 109046067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 7 PID: 53891 Comm: deqp-vk Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6+ torvalds#27 Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI/Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI-CF, BIOS F8 11/05/2021 RIP: 0010:gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0xe3/0x180 [nouveau] Code: c7 48 01 c8 49 89 45 58 85 d2 0f 84 95 00 00 00 41 0f b7 46 12 49 8b 7e 08 89 da 42 8d 2c f8 48 8b 47 08 41 83 c7 01 48 89 ee <48> 8b 40 08 ff d0 0f 1f 00 49 8b 7e 08 48 89 d9 48 8d 75 04 48 c1 RSP: 0000:ffffac20c5857838 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000004d8001 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 00000000004d8001 RSI: 00000000000006d8 RDI: ffffa07afe332180 RBP: 00000000000006d8 R08: ffffac20c5857ad0 R09: 0000000000ffff10 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffa07af27e2de0 R12: 000000000000001c R13: ffffac20c5857ad0 R14: ffffa07a96fe9040 R15: 000000000000001c FS: 00007fe395eed7c0(0000) GS:ffffa07e2c980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000011febe001 CR4: 00000000003706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ... ? gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0xe3/0x180 [nouveau] ? gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0x37/0x180 [nouveau] nvkm_vmm_iter+0x351/0xa20 [nouveau] ? __pfx_nvkm_vmm_ref_ptes+0x10/0x10 [nouveau] ? __pfx_gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0x10/0x10 [nouveau] ? __pfx_gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0x10/0x10 [nouveau] ? __lock_acquire+0x3ed/0x2170 ? __pfx_gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0x10/0x10 [nouveau] nvkm_vmm_ptes_get_map+0xc2/0x100 [nouveau] ? __pfx_nvkm_vmm_ref_ptes+0x10/0x10 [nouveau] ? __pfx_gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0x10/0x10 [nouveau] nvkm_vmm_map_locked+0x224/0x3a0 [nouveau] Adding any sort of useful debug usually makes it go away, so I hand wrote the function in a line, and debugged the asm. Every so often pt->memory->ptrs is NULL. This ptrs ptr is set in the nv50_instobj_acquire called from nvkm_kmap. If Thread A and Thread B both get to nv50_instobj_acquire around the same time, and Thread A hits the refcount_set line, and in lockstep thread B succeeds at refcount_inc_not_zero, there is a chance the ptrs value won't have been stored since refcount_set is unordered. Force a memory barrier here, I picked smp_mb, since we want it on all CPUs and it's write followed by a read. v2: use paired smp_rmb/smp_wmb. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: be55287 ("drm/nouveau/imem/nv50: embed nvkm_instobj directly into nv04_instobj") Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240411011510.2546857-1-airlied@gmail.com

Currently normal HugeTLB fault ends up crashing the kernel, as p4dp derived from p4d_offset() is an invalid address when PGTABLE_LEVEL = 5. A p4d level entry needs to be allocated when not available while walking the page table during HugeTLB faults. Let's call p4d_alloc() to allocate such entries when required instead of current p4d_offset(). Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffff80000000 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000005 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 52-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000081da9000 [ffffffff80000000] pgd=1000000082cec003, p4d=0000000082c32003, pud=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 108 Comm: high_addr_hugep Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4 torvalds#48 Hardware name: Foundation-v8A (DT) pstate: 01402005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : huge_pte_alloc+0xd4/0x334 lr : hugetlb_fault+0x1b8/0xc68 sp : ffff8000833bbc20 x29: ffff8000833bbc20 x28: fff000080080cb58 x27: ffff800082a7cc58 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: fff0000800378e40 x24: fff00008008d6c60 x23: 00000000de9dbf07 x22: fff0000800378e40 x21: 0004000000000000 x20: 0004000000000000 x19: ffffffff80000000 x18: 1ffe00010011d7a1 x17: 0000000000000001 x16: ffffffffffffffff x15: 0000000000000001 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff8000816120d0 x12: ffffffffffffffff x11: 0000000000000000 x10: fff00008008ebd0c x9 : 0004000000000000 x8 : 0000000000001255 x7 : fff00008003e2000 x6 : 00000000061d54b0 x5 : 0000000000001000 x4 : ffffffff80000000 x3 : 0000000000200000 x2 : 0000000000000004 x1 : 0000000080000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: huge_pte_alloc+0xd4/0x334 hugetlb_fault+0x1b8/0xc68 handle_mm_fault+0x260/0x29c do_page_fault+0xfc/0x47c do_translation_fault+0x68/0x74 do_mem_abort+0x44/0x94 el0_da+0x2c/0x9c el0t_64_sync_handler+0x70/0xc4 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 Code: aa000084 cb010084 b24c2c84 8b130c93 (f9400260) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a6bbf5d ("arm64: mm: Add definitions to support 5 levels of paging") Reported-by: Dev Jain <dev.jain@arm.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415094003.1812018-1-anshuman.khandual@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

On arm64, UBSAN traps can be decoded from the trap instruction. Add the add, sub, and mul overflow trap codes now that CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP exists. Seen under clang 19: Internal error: UBSAN: unrecognized failure code: 00000000f2005515 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240411-fix-ubsan-in-hardening-config-v1-0-e0177c80ffaa@kernel.org Fixes: 557f8c5 ("ubsan: Reintroduce signed overflow sanitizer") Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415182832.work.932-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

When I did hard offline test with hugetlb pages, below deadlock occurs: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ bash/46904 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffffabe68910 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60 but task is already holding lock: ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x6c/0x770 page_alloc_cpu_online+0x3c/0x70 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x397/0x5f0 __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0x71/0xe0 _cpu_up+0xeb/0x210 cpu_up+0x91/0xe0 cpuhp_bringup_mask+0x49/0xb0 bringup_nonboot_cpus+0xb7/0xe0 smp_init+0x25/0xa0 kernel_init_freeable+0x15f/0x3e0 kernel_init+0x15/0x1b0 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0 lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0 cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0 static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60 __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200 dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260 __page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0 memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70 hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x387/0x550 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(pcp_batch_high_lock); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); lock(pcp_batch_high_lock); rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by bash/46904: #0: ffff98f6c3bb23f0 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 #1: ffff98f6c328e488 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xf8/0x1d0 #2: ffff98ef83b31890 (kn->active#113){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x100/0x1d0 #3: ffffffffabf9db48 (mf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: memory_failure+0x44/0xc70 #4: ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40 stack backtrace: CPU: 10 PID: 46904 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x129/0x140 __lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0 lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0 cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0 static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60 __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200 dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260 __page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0 memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70 hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x387/0x550 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 RIP: 0033:0x7fc862314887 Code: 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 RSP: 002b:00007fff19311268 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 00007fc862314887 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 000056405645fe10 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 000056405645fe10 R08: 00007fc8623d1460 R09: 000000007fffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000000c R13: 00007fc86241b780 R14: 00007fc862417600 R15: 00007fc862416a00 In short, below scene breaks the lock dependency chain: memory_failure __page_handle_poison zone_pcp_disable -- lock(pcp_batch_high_lock) dissolve_free_huge_page __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio static_key_slow_dec cpus_read_lock -- rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock) Fix this by calling drain_all_pages() instead. This issue won't occur until commit a6b4085 ("mm: hugetlb: replace hugetlb_free_vmemmap_enabled with a static_key"). As it introduced rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock) in dissolve_free_huge_page() code path while lock(pcp_batch_high_lock) is already in the __page_handle_poison(). [linmiaohe@huawei.com: extend comment per Oscar] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: reflow block comment] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240407085456.2798193-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com Fixes: a6b4085 ("mm: hugetlb: replace hugetlb_free_vmemmap_enabled with a static_key") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents. When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump packet and soft lockup will be detected. net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate. PID: 33036 TASK: ffff949da6f20000 CPU: 23 COMMAND: "vhost-32980" #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663 [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20] RIP: ffffffff89792594 RSP: ffffa655314979e8 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: ffffffff89792500 RBX: ffffffff8af428a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000000003fd RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffffff8af428a0 RBP: 0000000000002710 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 000000000000000f R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8acbf64f R12: 0000000000000020 R13: ffffffff8acbf698 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594 torvalds#6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470 torvalds#7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6 torvalds#8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605 torvalds#9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558 torvalds#10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124 torvalds#11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07 torvalds#12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306 torvalds#13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765 torvalds#14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun] torvalds#15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun] torvalds#16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net] torvalds#17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost] torvalds#18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72 torvalds#19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors") Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <lei.chen@smartx.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415020247.2207781-1-lei.chen@smartx.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: Patch #1 amends a missing spot where the set iterator type is unset. This is fixing a issue in the previous pull request. Patch #2 fixes the delete set command abort path by restoring state of the elements. Reverse logic for the activate (abort) case otherwise element state is not restored, this requires to move the check for active/inactive elements to the set iterator callback. From the deactivate path, toggle the next generation bit and from the activate (abort) path, clear the next generation bitmask. Patch #3 skips elements already restored by delete set command from the abort path in case there is a previous delete element command in the batch. Check for the next generation bit just like it is done via set iteration to restore maps. netfilter pull request 24-04-18 * tag 'nf-24-04-18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: nf_tables: fix memleak in map from abort path netfilter: nf_tables: restore set elements when delete set fails netfilter: nf_tables: missing iterator type in lookup walk ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240418010948.3332346-1-pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

On arm64 machines, swsusp_save() faults if it attempts to access MEMBLOCK_NOMAP memory ranges. This can be reproduced in QEMU using UEFI when booting with rodata=off debug_pagealloc=off and CONFIG_KFENCE=n: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffff8000000000 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000007 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000eeb0b000 [ffffff8000000000] pgd=180000217fff9803, p4d=180000217fff9803, pud=180000217fff9803, pmd=180000217fff8803, pte=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000007 [#1] SMP Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000007 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: xt_multiport ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 libcrc32c iptable_filter bpfilter rfkill at803x snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg dwmac_generic stmmac_platform snd_hda_codec stmmac joydev pcs_xpcs snd_hda_core phylink ppdev lp parport ramoops reed_solomon ip_tables x_tables nls_iso8859_1 vfat multipath linear amdgpu amdxcp drm_exec gpu_sched drm_buddy hid_generic usbhid hid radeon video drm_suballoc_helper drm_ttm_helper ttm i2c_algo_bit drm_display_helper cec drm_kms_helper drm CPU: 0 PID: 3663 Comm: systemd-sleep Not tainted 6.6.2+ torvalds#76 Source Version: 4e22ed63a0a48e7a7cff9b98b7806d8d4add7dc0 Hardware name: Greatwall GW-XXXXXX-XXX/GW-XXXXXX-XXX, BIOS KunLun BIOS V4.0 01/19/2021 pstate: 600003c5 (nZCv DAIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : swsusp_save+0x280/0x538 lr : swsusp_save+0x280/0x538 sp : ffffffa034a3fa40 x29: ffffffa034a3fa40 x28: ffffff8000001000 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffffff8001400000 x25: ffffffc08113e248 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: 0000000000080000 x22: ffffffc08113e280 x21: 00000000000c69f2 x20: ffffff8000000000 x19: ffffffc081ae2500 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 6666662074736420 x16: 3030303030303030 x15: 3038666666666666 x14: 0000000000000b69 x13: ffffff9f89088530 x12: 00000000ffffffea x11: 00000000ffff7fff x10: 00000000ffff7fff x9 : ffffffc08193f0d0 x8 : 00000000000bffe8 x7 : c0000000ffff7fff x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffffffa0fff09dc8 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000027 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 000000000000004e Call trace: swsusp_save+0x280/0x538 swsusp_arch_suspend+0x148/0x190 hibernation_snapshot+0x240/0x39c hibernate+0xc4/0x378 state_store+0xf0/0x10c kobj_attr_store+0x14/0x24 The reason is swsusp_save() -> copy_data_pages() -> page_is_saveable() -> kernel_page_present() assuming that a page is always present when can_set_direct_map() is false (all of rodata_full, debug_pagealloc_enabled() and arm64_kfence_can_set_direct_map() false), irrespective of the MEMBLOCK_NOMAP ranges. Such MEMBLOCK_NOMAP regions should not be saved during hibernation. This problem was introduced by changes to the pfn_valid() logic in commit a7d9f30 ("arm64: drop pfn_valid_within() and simplify pfn_valid()"). Similar to other architectures, drop the !can_set_direct_map() check in kernel_page_present() so that page_is_savable() skips such pages. Fixes: a7d9f30 ("arm64: drop pfn_valid_within() and simplify pfn_valid()") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.14.x Suggested-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Suggested-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Co-developed-by: xiongxin <xiongxin@kylinos.cn> Signed-off-by: xiongxin <xiongxin@kylinos.cn> Signed-off-by: Yaxiong Tian <tianyaxiong@kylinos.cn> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240417025248.386622-1-tianyaxiong@kylinos.cn [catalin.marinas@arm.com: rework commit message] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Petr Machata says: ==================== mlxsw: Fixes This patchset fixes the following issues: - During driver de-initialization the driver unregisters the EMAD response trap by setting its action to DISCARD. However the manual only permits TRAP and FORWARD, and future firmware versions will enforce this. In patch #1, suppress the error message by aligning the driver to the manual and use a FORWARD (NOP) action when unregistering the trap. - The driver queries the Management Capabilities Mask (MCAM) register during initialization to understand if certain features are supported. However, not all firmware versions support this register, leading to the driver failing to load. Patches #2 and #3 fix this issue by treating an error in the register query as an indication that the feature is not supported. v2: - Patch #2: - Make mlxsw_env_max_module_eeprom_len_query() void ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cover.1713446092.git.petrm@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

At the time of LPAR boot up, partition firmware provides Open Firmware property ibm,dma-window for the PE. This property is provided on the PCI bus the PE is attached to. There are execptions where the partition firmware might not provide this property for the PE at the time of LPAR boot up. One of the scenario is where the firmware has frozen the PE due to some error condition. This PE is frozen for 24 hours or unless the whole system is reinitialized. Within this time frame, if the LPAR is booted, the frozen PE will be presented to the LPAR but ibm,dma-window property could be missing. Today, under these circumstances, the LPAR oopses with NULL pointer dereference, when configuring the PCI bus the PE is attached to. BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x000000c8 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000001024c0 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 7 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: Supported: Yes CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.4.0-150600.9-default #1 Hardware name: IBM,9043-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_023) hv:phyp pSeries NIP: c0000000001024c0 LR: c0000000001024b0 CTR: c000000000102450 REGS: c0000000037db5c0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.4.0-150600.9-default) MSR: 8000000002009033 <SF,VEC,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28000822 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c00000000010254c DAR: 00000000000000c8 DSISR: 00080000 IRQMASK: 0 ... NIP [c0000000001024c0] pci_dma_bus_setup_pSeriesLP+0x70/0x2a0 LR [c0000000001024b0] pci_dma_bus_setup_pSeriesLP+0x60/0x2a0 Call Trace: pci_dma_bus_setup_pSeriesLP+0x60/0x2a0 (unreliable) pcibios_setup_bus_self+0x1c0/0x370 __of_scan_bus+0x2f8/0x330 pcibios_scan_phb+0x280/0x3d0 pcibios_init+0x88/0x12c do_one_initcall+0x60/0x320 kernel_init_freeable+0x344/0x3e4 kernel_init+0x34/0x1d0 ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c Fixes: b1fc44e ("pseries/iommu/ddw: Fix kdump to work in absence of ibm,dma-window") Signed-off-by: Gaurav Batra <gbatra@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20240422205141.10662-1-gbatra@linux.ibm.com

syzbot was able to trigger a NULL deref in fib_validate_source() in an old tree [1]. It appears the bug exists in latest trees. All calls to __in_dev_get_rcu() must be checked for a NULL result. [1] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 2 PID: 3257 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.10.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:fib_validate_source+0xbf/0x15a0 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:425 Code: 18 f2 f2 f2 f2 42 c7 44 20 23 f3 f3 f3 f3 48 89 44 24 78 42 c6 44 20 27 f3 e8 5d 88 48 fc 4c 89 e8 48 c1 e8 03 48 89 44 24 18 <42> 80 3c 20 00 74 08 4c 89 ef e8 d2 15 98 fc 48 89 5c 24 10 41 bf RSP: 0018:ffffc900015fee40 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88800f7a4000 RCX: ffff88800f4f90c0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000004001eac RDI: ffff8880160c64c0 RBP: ffffc900015ff060 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88800f7a4000 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff88800f4f90c0 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88800f7a4000 FS: 00007f938acfe6c0(0000) GS:ffff888058c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f938acddd58 CR3: 000000001248e000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ip_route_use_hint+0x410/0x9b0 net/ipv4/route.c:2231 ip_rcv_finish_core+0x2c4/0x1a30 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:327 ip_list_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:612 [inline] ip_sublist_rcv+0x3ed/0xe50 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:638 ip_list_rcv+0x422/0x470 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:673 __netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5572 [inline] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x6b1/0x890 net/core/dev.c:5620 __netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:5672 [inline] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x9f9/0xdc0 net/core/dev.c:5764 netif_receive_skb_list+0x55/0x3e0 net/core/dev.c:5816 xdp_recv_frames net/bpf/test_run.c:257 [inline] xdp_test_run_batch net/bpf/test_run.c:335 [inline] bpf_test_run_xdp_live+0x1818/0x1d00 net/bpf/test_run.c:363 bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x81f/0x1170 net/bpf/test_run.c:1376 bpf_prog_test_run+0x349/0x3c0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3736 __sys_bpf+0x45c/0x710 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5115 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5201 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5199 [inline] __x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5199 Fixes: 02b2494 ("ipv4: use dst hint for ipv4 list receive") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240421184326.1704930-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

…active The default nna (node_nr_active) is used when the pool isn't tied to a specific NUMA node. This can happen in the following cases: 1. On NUMA, if per-node pwq init failure and the fallback pwq is used. 2. On NUMA, if a pool is configured to span multiple nodes. 3. On single node setups. 5797b1c ("workqueue: Implement system-wide nr_active enforcement for unbound workqueues") set the default nna->max to min_active because only #1 was being considered. For #2 and #3, using min_active means that the max concurrency in normal operation is pushed down to min_active which is currently 8, which can obviously lead to performance issues. exact value nna->max is set to doesn't really matter. #2 can only happen if the workqueue is intentionally configured to ignore NUMA boundaries and there's no good way to distribute max_active in this case. #3 is the default behavior on single node machines. Let's set it the default nna->max to max_active. This fixes the artificially lowered concurrency problem on single node machines and shouldn't hurt anything for other cases. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Shinichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> Fixes: 5797b1c ("workqueue: Implement system-wide nr_active enforcement for unbound workqueues") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/dm-devel/20240410084531.2134621-1-shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com/ Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

Yue Sun and xingwei lee reported a divide error bug in wq_update_node_max_active(): divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 PID: 21 Comm: cpuhp/1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:wq_update_node_max_active+0x369/0x6b0 kernel/workqueue.c:1605 Code: 24 bf 00 00 00 80 44 89 fe e8 83 27 33 00 41 83 fc ff 75 0d 41 81 ff 00 00 00 80 0f 84 68 01 00 00 e8 fb 22 33 00 44 89 f8 99 <41> f7 fc 89 c5 89 c7 44 89 ee e8 a8 24 33 00 89 ef 8b 5c 24 04 89 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000018fbb0 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 00000000000000ff RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff888100ada500 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000000ff RDI: 0000000080000000 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffff815b1fcd R09: 1ffff1100364ad72 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100364ad73 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000000000ff FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888135c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fb8c06ca6f8 CR3: 000000010d6c6000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> workqueue_offline_cpu+0x56f/0x600 kernel/workqueue.c:6525 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4e1/0x870 kernel/cpu.c:194 cpuhp_thread_fun+0x411/0x7d0 kernel/cpu.c:1092 smpboot_thread_fn+0x544/0xa10 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x2ed/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- After analysis, it happens when all of the CPUs in a workqueue's affinity get offine. The problem can be easily reproduced by: # echo 8 > /sys/devices/virtual/workqueue/<any-wq-name>/cpumask # echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu3/online Use the default max_actives for nodes when all of the CPUs in the workqueue's affinity get offline to fix the problem. Reported-by: Yue Sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com> Reported-by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAEkJfYPGS1_4JqvpSo0=FM0S1ytB8CEbyreLTtWpR900dUZymw@mail.gmail.com/ Fixes: 5797b1c ("workqueue: Implement system-wide nr_active enforcement for unbound workqueues") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

If stack_depot_save_flags() allocates memory it always drops __GFP_NOLOCKDEP flag. So when KASAN tries to track __GFP_NOLOCKDEP allocation we may end up with lockdep splat like bellow: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.9.0-rc3+ torvalds#49 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kswapd0/149 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88811346a920 (&xfs_nondir_ilock_class){++++}-{4:4}, at: xfs_reclaim_inode+0x3ac/0x590 [xfs] but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8bb33100 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0x5d9/0xad0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x7da/0x1030 lock_acquire+0x15d/0x400 fs_reclaim_acquire+0xb5/0x100 prepare_alloc_pages.constprop.0+0xc5/0x230 __alloc_pages+0x12a/0x3f0 alloc_pages_mpol+0x175/0x340 stack_depot_save_flags+0x4c5/0x510 kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x83/0x90 kmem_cache_alloc+0x15e/0x4a0 __alloc_object+0x35/0x370 __create_object+0x22/0x90 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x477/0x5b0 krealloc+0x5f/0x110 xfs_iext_insert_raw+0x4b2/0x6e0 [xfs] xfs_iext_insert+0x2e/0x130 [xfs] xfs_iread_bmbt_block+0x1a9/0x4d0 [xfs] xfs_btree_visit_block+0xfb/0x290 [xfs] xfs_btree_visit_blocks+0x215/0x2c0 [xfs] xfs_iread_extents+0x1a2/0x2e0 [xfs] xfs_buffered_write_iomap_begin+0x376/0x10a0 [xfs] iomap_iter+0x1d1/0x2d0 iomap_file_buffered_write+0x120/0x1a0 xfs_file_buffered_write+0x128/0x4b0 [xfs] vfs_write+0x675/0x890 ksys_write+0xc3/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x94/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79 Always preserve __GFP_NOLOCKDEP to fix this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240418141133.22950-1-ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com Fixes: cd11016 ("mm, kasan: stackdepot implementation. Enable stackdepot for SLAB") Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Reported-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/a0caa289-ca02-48eb-9bf2-d86fd47b71f4@redhat.com/ Reported-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/f9ff999a-e170-b66b-7caf-293f2b147ac2@opensource.wdc.com/ Suggested-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Tested-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

One of my CI runs popped the following lockdep splat ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.9.0-rc4+ #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ btrfs/471533 is trying to acquire lock: ffff92ba46980850 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0 but task is already holding lock: ffff92ba46980bd0 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x1c8f/0x2600 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}-{3:3}: down_read+0x42/0x170 btrfs_rename+0x607/0xb00 btrfs_rename2+0x2e/0x70 vfs_rename+0xaf8/0xfc0 do_renameat2+0x586/0x600 __x64_sys_rename+0x43/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#16){++++}-{3:3}: down_write+0x3f/0xc0 btrfs_inode_lock+0x40/0x70 prealloc_file_extent_cluster+0x1b0/0x370 relocate_file_extent_cluster+0xb2/0x720 relocate_data_extent+0x107/0x160 relocate_block_group+0x442/0x550 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x2cb/0x4b0 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x50/0x1b0 btrfs_balance+0x92f/0x13d0 btrfs_ioctl+0x1abf/0x2600 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x13e7/0x2180 lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2e0 __mutex_lock+0xbe/0xc00 btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0 btrfs_ioctl+0x206b/0x2600 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &fs_info->cleaner_mutex --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#16 --> &fs_info->subvol_sem Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&fs_info->subvol_sem); lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#16); lock(&fs_info->subvol_sem); lock(&fs_info->cleaner_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by btrfs/471533: #0: ffff92ba4319e420 (sb_writers#14){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x3b5/0x2600 #1: ffff92ba46980bd0 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x1c8f/0x2600 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 471533 Comm: btrfs Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4+ #1 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0 check_noncircular+0x148/0x160 ? lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2e0 __lock_acquire+0x13e7/0x2180 lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2e0 ? btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0 ? lock_is_held_type+0x9a/0x110 __mutex_lock+0xbe/0xc00 ? btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2e0 ? btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0 ? btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0 btrfs_quota_disable+0x54/0x4c0 btrfs_ioctl+0x206b/0x2600 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? __do_sys_statfs+0x61/0x70 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? reacquire_held_locks+0xd1/0x1f0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x307/0x8a0 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2e0 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? lock_release+0xca/0x2a0 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? do_user_addr_fault+0x35c/0x8a0 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x4b/0xc0 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xde/0x190 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f This happens because when we call rename we already have the inode mutex held, and then we acquire the subvol_sem if we are a subvolume. This makes the dependency inode lock -> subvol sem When we're running data relocation we will preallocate space for the data relocation inode, and we always run the relocation under the ->cleaner_mutex. This now creates the dependency of cleaner_mutex -> inode lock (from the prealloc) -> subvol_sem Qgroup delete is doing this in the opposite order, it is acquiring the subvol_sem and then it is acquiring the cleaner_mutex, which results in this lockdep splat. This deadlock can't happen in reality, because we won't ever rename the data reloc inode, nor is the data reloc inode a subvolume. However this is fairly easy to fix, simply take the cleaner mutex in the case where we are disabling qgroups before we take the subvol_sem. This resolves the lockdep splat. Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Issue reported by customer during SRIOV testing, call trace: When both i40e and the i40iw driver are loaded, a warning in check_flush_dependency is being triggered. This seems to be because of the i40e driver workqueue is allocated with the WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag, and the i40iw one is not. Similar error was encountered on ice too and it was fixed by removing the flag. Do the same for i40e too. [Feb 9 09:08] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ +0.000004] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM i40e:i40e_service_task [i40e] is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM infiniband:0x0 [ +0.000060] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 937 at kernel/workqueue.c:2966 check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120 [ +0.000007] Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq snd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore nls_utf8 cifs cifs_arc4 nls_ucs2_utils rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm cifs_md4 dns_resolver netfs qrtr rfkill sunrpc vfat fat intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common irdma intel_uncore_frequency intel_uncore_frequency_common ice ipmi_ssif isst_if_common skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp gnss coretemp ib_uverbs rapl intel_cstate ib_core iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support acpi_ipmi mei_me ipmi_si intel_uncore ioatdma i2c_i801 joydev pcspkr mei ipmi_devintf lpc_ich intel_pch_thermal i2c_smbus ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_pad xfs libcrc32c ast sd_mod drm_shmem_helper t10_pi drm_kms_helper sg ixgbe drm i40e ahci crct10dif_pclmul libahci crc32_pclmul igb crc32c_intel libata ghash_clmulni_intel i2c_algo_bit mdio dca wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse [ +0.000050] CPU: 0 PID: 937 Comm: kworker/0:3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2-Feb-net_dev-Qiueue-00279-gbd43c5687e05 #1 [ +0.000003] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600BPB/S2600BPB, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0013.121520200651 12/15/2020 [ +0.000001] Workqueue: i40e i40e_service_task [i40e] [ +0.000024] RIP: 0010:check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120 [ +0.000003] Code: ff 49 8b 54 24 18 48 8d 8b b0 00 00 00 49 89 e8 48 81 c6 b0 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 b0 97 fa 9f c6 05 8a cc 1f 02 01 e8 35 b3 fd ff <0f> 0b e9 10 ff ff ff 80 3d 78 cc 1f 02 00 75 94 e9 46 ff ff ff 90 [ +0.000002] RSP: 0018:ffffbd294976bcf8 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ +0.000002] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff94d4c483c000 RCX: 0000000000000027 [ +0.000001] RDX: ffff94d47f620bc8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff94d47f620bc0 [ +0.000001] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffff7fff [ +0.000001] R10: ffffbd294976bb98 R11: ffffffffa0be65e8 R12: ffff94c5451ea180 [ +0.000001] R13: ffff94c5ab5e8000 R14: ffff94c5c20b6e05 R15: ffff94c5f1330ab0 [ +0.000001] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff94d47f600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ +0.000002] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ +0.000001] CR2: 00007f9e6f1fca70 CR3: 0000000038e20004 CR4: 00000000007706f0 [ +0.000000] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ +0.000001] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ +0.000001] PKRU: 55555554 [ +0.000001] Call Trace: [ +0.000001] <TASK> [ +0.000002] ? __warn+0x80/0x130 [ +0.000003] ? check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120 [ +0.000002] ? report_bug+0x195/0x1a0 [ +0.000005] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 [ +0.000003] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70 [ +0.000002] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 [ +0.000006] ? check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120 [ +0.000002] ? check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120 [ +0.000002] __flush_workqueue+0x126/0x3f0 [ +0.000015] ib_cache_cleanup_one+0x1c/0xe0 [ib_core] [ +0.000056] __ib_unregister_device+0x6a/0xb0 [ib_core] [ +0.000023] ib_unregister_device_and_put+0x34/0x50 [ib_core] [ +0.000020] i40iw_close+0x4b/0x90 [irdma] [ +0.000022] i40e_notify_client_of_netdev_close+0x54/0xc0 [i40e] [ +0.000035] i40e_service_task+0x126/0x190 [i40e] [ +0.000024] process_one_work+0x174/0x340 [ +0.000003] worker_thread+0x27e/0x390 [ +0.000001] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000002] kthread+0xdf/0x110 [ +0.000002] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000002] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 [ +0.000003] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000001] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ +0.000004] </TASK> [ +0.000001] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 4d5957c ("i40e: remove WQ_UNBOUND and the task limit of our workqueue") Signed-off-by: Sindhu Devale <sindhu.devale@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Mateusz Polchlopek <mateusz.polchlopek@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov@intel.com> Tested-by: Robert Ganzynkowicz <robert.ganzynkowicz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423182723.740401-2-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

9f74a3d ("ice: Fix VF Reset paths when interface in a failed over aggregate"), the ice driver has acquired the LAG mutex in ice_reset_vf(). The commit placed this lock acquisition just prior to the acquisition of the VF configuration lock. If ice_reset_vf() acquires the configuration lock via the ICE_VF_RESET_LOCK flag, this could deadlock with ice_vc_cfg_qs_msg() because it always acquires the locks in the order of the VF configuration lock and then the LAG mutex. Lockdep reports this violation almost immediately on creating and then removing 2 VF: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.8.0-rc6 torvalds#54 Tainted: G W O ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/60:3/6771 is trying to acquire lock: ff40d43e099380a0 (&vf->cfg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] but task is already holding lock: ff40d43ea1961210 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0xb7/0x4d0 [ice] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40 lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0 ice_vc_cfg_qs_msg+0x45/0x690 [ice] ice_vc_process_vf_msg+0x4f5/0x870 [ice] __ice_clean_ctrlq+0x2b5/0x600 [ice] ice_service_task+0x2c9/0x480 [ice] process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0 worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0 kthread+0x104/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 -> #0 (&vf->cfg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add+0xe2/0xc50 validate_chain+0x558/0x800 __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40 lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0 ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ice_process_vflr_event+0x98/0xd0 [ice] ice_service_task+0x1cc/0x480 [ice] process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0 worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0 kthread+0x104/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&pf->lag_mutex); lock(&vf->cfg_lock); lock(&pf->lag_mutex); lock(&vf->cfg_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by kworker/60:3/6771: #0: ff40d43e05428b38 ((wq_completion)ice){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0 #1: ff50d06e05197e58 ((work_completion)(&pf->serv_task)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0 #2: ff40d43ea1960e50 (&pf->vfs.table_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_process_vflr_event+0x48/0xd0 [ice] #3: ff40d43ea1961210 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0xb7/0x4d0 [ice] stack backtrace: CPU: 60 PID: 6771 Comm: kworker/60:3 Tainted: G W O 6.8.0-rc6 torvalds#54 Hardware name: Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80 check_noncircular+0x12d/0x150 check_prev_add+0xe2/0xc50 ? save_trace+0x59/0x230 ? add_chain_cache+0x109/0x450 validate_chain+0x558/0x800 __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? lock_is_held_type+0xc7/0x120 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice] ? process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0 ice_process_vflr_event+0x98/0xd0 [ice] ice_service_task+0x1cc/0x480 [ice] process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0 worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x104/0x140 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> To avoid deadlock, we must acquire the LAG mutex only after acquiring the VF configuration lock. Fix the ice_reset_vf() to acquire the LAG mutex only after we either acquire or check that the VF configuration lock is held. Fixes: 9f74a3d ("ice: Fix VF Reset paths when interface in a failed over aggregate") Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Ertman <david.m.ertman@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Mateusz Polchlopek <mateusz.polchlopek@intel.com> Tested-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423182723.740401-5-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

…nix_gc(). syzbot reported a lockdep splat regarding unix_gc_lock and unix_state_lock(). One is called from recvmsg() for a connected socket, and another is called from GC for TCP_LISTEN socket. So, the splat is false-positive. Let's add a dedicated lock class for the latter to suppress the splat. Note that this change is not necessary for net-next.git as the issue is only applied to the old GC impl. [0]: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- kworker/u8:1/11 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] unix_notinflight+0x13d/0x390 net/unix/garbage.c:140 unix_detach_fds net/unix/af_unix.c:1819 [inline] unix_destruct_scm+0x221/0x350 net/unix/af_unix.c:1876 skb_release_head_state+0x100/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:1188 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1200 [inline] __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1216 [inline] kfree_skb_reason+0x16d/0x3b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1252 kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1262 [inline] manage_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2672 [inline] unix_stream_read_generic+0x1125/0x2700 net/unix/af_unix.c:2749 unix_stream_splice_read+0x239/0x320 net/unix/af_unix.c:2981 do_splice_read fs/splice.c:985 [inline] splice_file_to_pipe+0x299/0x500 fs/splice.c:1295 do_splice+0xf2d/0x1880 fs/splice.c:1379 __do_splice fs/splice.c:1436 [inline] __do_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1652 [inline] __se_sys_splice+0x331/0x4a0 fs/splice.c:1634 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(unix_gc_lock); lock(&u->lock); lock(unix_gc_lock); lock(&u->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kworker/u8:1/11: #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline] #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> Fixes: 47d8ac0 ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+fa379358c28cc87cc307@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa379358c28cc87cc307 Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424170443.9832-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter/IPVS fixes for net The following patchset contains two Netfilter/IPVS fixes for net: Patch #1 fixes SCTP checksumming for IPVS with gso packets, from Ismael Luceno. Patch #2 honor dormant flag from netdev event path to fix a possible double hook unregistration. * tag 'nf-24-04-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: nf_tables: honor table dormant flag from netdev release event path ipvs: Fix checksumming on GSO of SCTP packets ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240425090149.1359547-1-pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

We found below OOB crash: [ 33.452494] ================================================================== [ 33.453513] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in refresh_cpu_vm_stats.constprop.0+0xcc/0x2ec [ 33.454660] Write of size 164 at addr c1d03d30 by task swapper/0/0 [ 33.455515] [ 33.455767] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G O 6.1.25-mainline #1 [ 33.456880] Hardware name: Generic DT based system [ 33.457555] unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x18/0x1c [ 33.458326] show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0x4c [ 33.459072] dump_stack_lvl from print_report+0x158/0x4a4 [ 33.459863] print_report from kasan_report+0x9c/0x148 [ 33.460616] kasan_report from kasan_check_range+0x94/0x1a0 [ 33.461424] kasan_check_range from memset+0x20/0x3c [ 33.462157] memset from refresh_cpu_vm_stats.constprop.0+0xcc/0x2ec [ 33.463064] refresh_cpu_vm_stats.constprop.0 from tick_nohz_idle_stop_tick+0x180/0x53c [ 33.464181] tick_nohz_idle_stop_tick from do_idle+0x264/0x354 [ 33.465029] do_idle from cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x24 [ 33.465769] cpu_startup_entry from rest_init+0xf0/0xf4 [ 33.466528] rest_init from arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x18 [ 33.467397] [ 33.467644] The buggy address belongs to stack of task swapper/0/0 [ 33.468493] and is located at offset 112 in frame: [ 33.469172] refresh_cpu_vm_stats.constprop.0+0x0/0x2ec [ 33.469917] [ 33.470165] This frame has 2 objects: [ 33.470696] [32, 76) 'global_zone_diff' [ 33.470729] [112, 276) 'global_node_diff' [ 33.471294] [ 33.472095] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 33.472862] page:3cd72da8 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x41d03 [ 33.473944] flags: 0x1000(reserved|zone=0) [ 33.474565] raw: 00001000 ed741470 ed741470 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff 00000001 [ 33.475656] raw: 00000000 [ 33.476050] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 33.476816] [ 33.477061] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 33.477732] c1d03c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 33.478630] c1d03c80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 [ 33.479526] >c1d03d00: 00 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 [ 33.480415] ^ [ 33.481195] c1d03d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 [ 33.482088] c1d03e00: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 33.482978] ================================================================== We find the root cause of this OOB is that arm does not clear stale stack poison in the case of cpuidle. This patch refer to arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S to resolve this issue. From cited commit [1] that explain the problem Functions which the compiler has instrumented for KASAN place poison on the stack shadow upon entry and remove this poison prior to returning. In the case of cpuidle, CPUs exit the kernel a number of levels deep in C code. Any instrumented functions on this critical path will leave portions of the stack shadow poisoned. If CPUs lose context and return to the kernel via a cold path, we restore a prior context saved in __cpu_suspend_enter are forgotten, and we never remove the poison they placed in the stack shadow area by functions calls between this and the actual exit of the kernel. Thus, (depending on stackframe layout) subsequent calls to instrumented functions may hit this stale poison, resulting in (spurious) KASAN splats to the console. To avoid this, clear any stale poison from the idle thread for a CPU prior to bringing a CPU online. From cited commit [2] Extend to check for CONFIG_KASAN_STACK [1] commit 0d97e6d ("arm64: kasan: clear stale stack poison") [2] commit d56a9ef ("kasan, arm64: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK") Signed-off-by: Boy Wu <boy.wu@mediatek.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Fixes: 5615f69 ("ARM: 9016/2: Initialize the mapping of KASan shadow memory") Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Merge series from Jerome Brunet <jbrunet@baylibre.com>: This patchset fixes 2 problems on TDM which both find a solution by properly implementing the .trigger() callback for the TDM backend. ATM, enabling the TDM formatters is done by the .prepare() callback because handling the formatter is slow due to necessary calls to CCF. The first problem affects the TDMIN. Because .prepare() is called on DPCM backend first, the formatter are started before the FIFOs and this may cause a random channel shifts if the TDMIN use multiple lanes with more than 2 slots per lanes. Using trigger() allows to set the FE/BE order, solving the problem. There has already been an attempt to fix this 3y ago [1] and reverted [2] It triggered a 'sleep in irq' error on the period IRQ. The solution is to just use the bottom half of threaded IRQ. This is patch #1. Patch #2 and #3 remain mostly the same as 3y ago. For TDMOUT, the problem is on pause. ATM pause only stops the FIFO and the TDMOUT just starves. When it does, it will actually repeat the last sample continuously. Depending on the platform, if there is no high-pass filter on the analog path, this may translate to a constant position of the speaker membrane. There is no audible glitch but it may damage the speaker coil. Properly stopping the TDMOUT in pause solves the problem. There is behaviour change associated with that fix. Clocks used to be continuous on pause because of the problem above. They will now be gated on pause by default, as they should. The last change introduce the proper support for continuous clocks, if needed. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-amlogic/20211020114217.133153-1-jbrunet@baylibre.com [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-amlogic/20220421155725.2589089-1-narmstrong@baylibre.com

Currently, enabling SG_DEBUG in the kernel will cause nouveau to hit a BUG() on startup: kernel BUG at include/linux/scatterlist.h:187! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 7 PID: 930 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.9.0-rc3Lyude-Test+ torvalds#30 Hardware name: MSI MS-7A39/A320M GAMING PRO (MS-7A39), BIOS 1.I0 01/22/2019 RIP: 0010:sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0 Code: 69 88 32 01 83 e1 03 f6 c3 03 75 20 a8 01 75 1e 48 09 cb 41 89 54 24 08 49 89 1c 24 41 89 6c 24 0c 5b 5d 41 5c e9 7b b9 88 00 <0f> 0b 0f 0b 0f 0b 48 8b 05 5e 46 9a 01 eb b2 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 RSP: 0018:ffffa776017bf6a0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa77600d87000 RCX: 000000000000002b RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa77680d87000 RBP: 000000000000e000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff98f4c46aa508 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff98f4c46aa508 R13: ffff98f4c46aa008 R14: ffffa77600d4a000 R15: ffffa77600d4a018 FS: 00007feeb5aae980(0000) GS:ffff98f5c4dc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f22cb9a4520 CR3: 00000001043ba000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die+0x36/0x90 ? do_trap+0xdd/0x100 ? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0 ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80 ? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70 ? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0 nvkm_firmware_ctor+0x14a/0x250 [nouveau] nvkm_falcon_fw_ctor+0x42/0x70 [nouveau] ga102_gsp_booter_ctor+0xb4/0x1a0 [nouveau] r535_gsp_oneinit+0xb3/0x15f0 [nouveau] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? nvkm_udevice_new+0x95/0x140 [nouveau] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? ktime_get+0x47/0xb0 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f nvkm_subdev_oneinit_+0x4f/0x120 [nouveau] nvkm_subdev_init_+0x39/0x140 [nouveau] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f nvkm_subdev_init+0x44/0x90 [nouveau] nvkm_device_init+0x166/0x2e0 [nouveau] nvkm_udevice_init+0x47/0x70 [nouveau] nvkm_object_init+0x41/0x1c0 [nouveau] nvkm_ioctl_new+0x16a/0x290 [nouveau] ? __pfx_nvkm_client_child_new+0x10/0x10 [nouveau] ? __pfx_nvkm_udevice_new+0x10/0x10 [nouveau] nvkm_ioctl+0x126/0x290 [nouveau] nvif_object_ctor+0x112/0x190 [nouveau] nvif_device_ctor+0x23/0x60 [nouveau] nouveau_cli_init+0x164/0x640 [nouveau] nouveau_drm_device_init+0x97/0x9e0 [nouveau] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? pci_update_current_state+0x72/0xb0 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f nouveau_drm_probe+0x12c/0x280 [nouveau] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f local_pci_probe+0x45/0xa0 pci_device_probe+0xc7/0x270 really_probe+0xe6/0x3a0 __driver_probe_device+0x87/0x160 driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xc0 __driver_attach+0xec/0x1f0 ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 bus_for_each_dev+0x88/0xd0 bus_add_driver+0x116/0x220 driver_register+0x59/0x100 ? __pfx_nouveau_drm_init+0x10/0x10 [nouveau] do_one_initcall+0x5b/0x320 do_init_module+0x60/0x250 init_module_from_file+0x86/0xc0 idempotent_init_module+0x120/0x2b0 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x5e/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79 RIP: 0033:0x7feeb5cc20cd Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 1b cd 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffcf220b2c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055fdd2916aa0 RCX: 00007feeb5cc20cd RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000055fdd29161e0 RDI: 0000000000000035 RBP: 00007ffcf220b380 R08: 00007feeb5d8fb20 R09: 00007ffcf220b310 R10: 000055fdd2909dc0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055fdd29161e0 R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 000055fdd29203e0 R15: 000055fdd2909d80 </TASK> We hit this when trying to initialize firmware of type NVKM_FIRMWARE_IMG_DMA because we allocate our memory with dma_alloc_coherent, and DMA allocations can't be turned back into memory pages - which a scatterlist needs in order to map them. So, fix this by allocating the memory with vmalloc instead(). V2: * Fixup explanation as the prior one was bogus Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240429182318.189668-1-lyude@redhat.com

Currently we allocate all 3 levels of radix3 page tables using nvkm_gsp_mem_ctor(), which uses dma_alloc_coherent() for allocating all of the relevant memory. This can end up failing in scenarios where the system has very high memory fragmentation, and we can't find enough contiguous memory to allocate level 2 of the page table. Currently, this can result in runtime PM issues on systems where memory fragmentation is high - as we'll fail to allocate the page table for our suspend/resume buffer: kworker/10:2: page allocation failure: order:7, mode:0xcc0(GFP_KERNEL), nodemask=(null),cpuset=/,mems_allowed=0 CPU: 10 PID: 479809 Comm: kworker/10:2 Not tainted 6.8.6-201.ChopperV6.fc39.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: SLIMBOOK Executive/Executive, BIOS N.1.10GRU06 02/02/2024 Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x80 warn_alloc+0x165/0x1e0 ? __alloc_pages_direct_compact+0xb3/0x2b0 __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0xd7d/0xde0 __alloc_pages+0x32d/0x350 __dma_direct_alloc_pages.isra.0+0x16a/0x2b0 dma_direct_alloc+0x70/0x270 nvkm_gsp_radix3_sg+0x5e/0x130 [nouveau] r535_gsp_fini+0x1d4/0x350 [nouveau] nvkm_subdev_fini+0x67/0x150 [nouveau] nvkm_device_fini+0x95/0x1e0 [nouveau] nvkm_udevice_fini+0x53/0x70 [nouveau] nvkm_object_fini+0xb9/0x240 [nouveau] nvkm_object_fini+0x75/0x240 [nouveau] nouveau_do_suspend+0xf5/0x280 [nouveau] nouveau_pmops_runtime_suspend+0x3e/0xb0 [nouveau] pci_pm_runtime_suspend+0x67/0x1e0 ? __pfx_pci_pm_runtime_suspend+0x10/0x10 __rpm_callback+0x41/0x170 ? __pfx_pci_pm_runtime_suspend+0x10/0x10 rpm_callback+0x5d/0x70 ? __pfx_pci_pm_runtime_suspend+0x10/0x10 rpm_suspend+0x120/0x6a0 pm_runtime_work+0x98/0xb0 process_one_work+0x171/0x340 worker_thread+0x27b/0x3a0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xe5/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 Luckily, we don't actually need to allocate coherent memory for the page table thanks to being able to pass the GPU a radix3 page table for suspend/resume data. So, let's rewrite nvkm_gsp_radix3_sg() to use the sg allocator for level 2. We continue using coherent allocations for lvl0 and 1, since they only take a single page. V2: * Don't forget to actually jump to the next scatterlist when we reach the end of the scatterlist we're currently on when writing out the page table for level 2 Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@nvidia.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240429182318.189668-2-lyude@redhat.com

Sam Page (sam4k) working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative reported a UAF in the tipc_buf_append() error path: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88804d2a7c80 by task poc/8034 CPU: 1 PID: 8034 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.8.2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-5 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack linux/lib/dump_stack.c:88 dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 linux/lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description linux/mm/kasan/report.c:377 print_report+0xc4/0x620 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:601 kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183 skb_release_data+0x5af/0x880 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1026 skb_release_all linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1094 __kfree_skb linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1108 kfree_skb_reason+0x12d/0x210 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1144 kfree_skb linux/./include/linux/skbuff.h:1244 tipc_buf_append+0x425/0xb50 linux/net/tipc/msg.c:186 tipc_link_input+0x224/0x7c0 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1324 tipc_link_rcv+0x76e/0x2d70 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1824 tipc_rcv+0x45f/0x10f0 linux/net/tipc/node.c:2159 tipc_udp_recv+0x73b/0x8f0 linux/net/tipc/udp_media.c:390 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0xad2/0x1850 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2108 udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x131/0xb00 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2186 udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x165/0x3b0 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2346 __udp4_lib_rcv+0x2594/0x3400 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2422 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x30c/0x4e0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2e4/0x520 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308 ip_local_deliver+0x18e/0x1f0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254 dst_input linux/./include/net/dst.h:461 ip_rcv_finish linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308 ip_rcv+0x2c5/0x5d0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x199/0x1e0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5534 __netif_receive_skb+0x1f/0x1c0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5648 process_backlog+0x101/0x6b0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5976 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xba/0x550 linux/net/core/dev.c:6576 napi_poll linux/net/core/dev.c:6645 net_rx_action+0x95a/0xe90 linux/net/core/dev.c:6781 __do_softirq+0x21f/0x8e7 linux/kernel/softirq.c:553 do_softirq linux/kernel/softirq.c:454 do_softirq+0xb2/0xf0 linux/kernel/softirq.c:441 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x100/0x120 linux/kernel/softirq.c:381 local_bh_enable linux/./include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 rcu_read_unlock_bh linux/./include/linux/rcupdate.h:851 __dev_queue_xmit+0x871/0x3ee0 linux/net/core/dev.c:4378 dev_queue_xmit linux/./include/linux/netdevice.h:3169 neigh_hh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:526 neigh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:540 ip_finish_output2+0x169f/0x2550 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235 __ip_finish_output linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:313 __ip_finish_output+0x49e/0x950 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:295 ip_finish_output+0x31/0x310 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323 NF_HOOK_COND linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:303 ip_output+0x13b/0x2a0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:433 dst_output linux/./include/net/dst.h:451 ip_local_out linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 ip_send_skb+0x3e5/0x560 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492 udp_send_skb+0x73f/0x1530 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:963 udp_sendmsg+0x1a36/0x2b40 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:1250 inet_sendmsg+0x105/0x140 linux/net/ipv4/af_inet.c:850 sock_sendmsg_nosec linux/net/socket.c:730 __sock_sendmsg linux/net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x42c/0x4e0 linux/net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2203 __se_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2199 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0 linux/net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x270 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120 RIP: 0033:0x7f3434974f29 Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 37 8f 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff9154f2b8 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3434974f29 RDX: 00000000000032c8 RSI: 00007fff9154f300 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fff915532e0 R08: 00007fff91553360 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 000055ed86d261d0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> In the critical scenario, either the relevant skb is freed or its ownership is transferred into a frag_lists. In both cases, the cleanup code must not free it again: we need to clear the skb reference earlier. Fixes: 1149557 ("tipc: eliminate unnecessary linearization of incoming buffers") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-23852 Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/752f1ccf762223d109845365d07f55414058e5a3.1714484273.git.pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Symptom: When the hsuid attribute is set for the first time on an IQD Layer3 device while the corresponding network interface is already UP, the kernel will try to execute a napi function pointer that is NULL. Example: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ 2057.572696] illegal operation: 0001 ilc:1 [#1] SMP [ 2057.572702] Modules linked in: af_iucv qeth_l3 zfcp scsi_transport_fc sunrpc nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nf_tables_set nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables libcrc32c nfnetlink ghash_s390 prng xts aes_s390 des_s390 de s_generic sha3_512_s390 sha3_256_s390 sha512_s390 vfio_ccw vfio_mdev mdev vfio_iommu_type1 eadm_sch vfio ext4 mbcache jbd2 qeth_l2 bridge stp llc dasd_eckd_mod qeth dasd_mod qdio ccwgroup pkey zcrypt [ 2057.572739] CPU: 6 PID: 60182 Comm: stress_client Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.18.0-541.el8.s390x #1 [ 2057.572742] Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (LPAR) [ 2057.572744] Krnl PSW : 0704f00180000000 0000000000000002 (0x2) [ 2057.572748] R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:3 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 [ 2057.572751] Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 00000000a3b008d8 0000000000000000 [ 2057.572754] 00000000a3b008d8 cb923a29c779abc5 0000000000000000 00000000814cfd80 [ 2057.572756] 000000000000012c 0000000000000000 00000000a3b008d8 00000000a3b008d8 [ 2057.572758] 00000000bab6d500 00000000814cfd80 0000000091317e46 00000000814cfc68 [ 2057.572762] Krnl Code:#0000000000000000: 0000 illegal >0000000000000002: 0000 illegal 0000000000000004: 0000 illegal 0000000000000006: 0000 illegal 0000000000000008: 0000 illegal 000000000000000a: 0000 illegal 000000000000000c: 0000 illegal 000000000000000e: 0000 illegal [ 2057.572800] Call Trace: [ 2057.572801] ([<00000000ec639700>] 0xec639700) [ 2057.572803] [<00000000913183e2>] net_rx_action+0x2ba/0x398 [ 2057.572809] [<0000000091515f76>] __do_softirq+0x11e/0x3a0 [ 2057.572813] [<0000000090ce160c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x3c/0x58 [ 2057.572817] ([<0000000090d2cbd6>] do_softirq.part.1+0x56/0x60) [ 2057.572822] [<0000000090d2cc60>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80/0x98 [ 2057.572825] [<0000000091314706>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x2be/0xd70 [ 2057.572827] [<000003ff803dd6d6>] afiucv_hs_send+0x24e/0x300 [af_iucv] [ 2057.572830] [<000003ff803dd88a>] iucv_send_ctrl+0x102/0x138 [af_iucv] [ 2057.572833] [<000003ff803de72a>] iucv_sock_connect+0x37a/0x468 [af_iucv] [ 2057.572835] [<00000000912e7e90>] __sys_connect+0xa0/0xd8 [ 2057.572839] [<00000000912e9580>] sys_socketcall+0x228/0x348 [ 2057.572841] [<0000000091514e1a>] system_call+0x2a6/0x2c8 [ 2057.572843] Last Breaking-Event-Address: [ 2057.572844] [<0000000091317e44>] __napi_poll+0x4c/0x1d8 [ 2057.572846] [ 2057.572847] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Analysis: There is one napi structure per out_q: card->qdio.out_qs[i].napi The napi.poll functions are set during qeth_open(). Since commit 1cfef80 ("s390/qeth: Don't call dev_close/dev_open (DOWN/UP)") qeth_set_offline()/qeth_set_online() no longer call dev_close()/ dev_open(). So if qeth_free_qdio_queues() cleared card->qdio.out_qs[i].napi.poll while the network interface was UP and the card was offline, they are not set again. Reproduction: chzdev -e $devno layer2=0 ip link set dev $network_interface up echo 0 > /sys/bus/ccwgroup/devices/0.0.$devno/online echo foo > /sys/bus/ccwgroup/devices/0.0.$devno/hsuid echo 1 > /sys/bus/ccwgroup/devices/0.0.$devno/online -> Crash (can be enforced e.g. by af_iucv connect(), ip link down/up, ...) Note that a Completion Queue (CQ) is only enabled or disabled, when hsuid is set for the first time or when it is removed. Workarounds: - Set hsuid before setting the device online for the first time or - Use chzdev -d $devno; chzdev $devno hsuid=xxx; chzdev -e $devno; to set hsuid on an existing device. (this will remove and recreate the network interface) Fix: There is no need to free the output queues when a completion queue is added or removed. card->qdio.state now indicates whether the inbound buffer pool and the outbound queues are allocated. card->qdio.c_q indicates whether a CQ is allocated. Fixes: 1cfef80 ("s390/qeth: Don't call dev_close/dev_open (DOWN/UP)") Signed-off-by: Alexandra Winter <wintera@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240430091004.2265683-1-wintera@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

Using restricted DMA pools (CONFIG_DMA_RESTRICTED_POOL=y) in conjunction with dynamic SWIOTLB (CONFIG_SWIOTLB_DYNAMIC=y) leads to the following crash when initialising the restricted pools at boot-time: | Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008 | Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | pc : rmem_swiotlb_device_init+0xfc/0x1ec | lr : rmem_swiotlb_device_init+0xf0/0x1ec | Call trace: | rmem_swiotlb_device_init+0xfc/0x1ec | of_reserved_mem_device_init_by_idx+0x18c/0x238 | of_dma_configure_id+0x31c/0x33c | platform_dma_configure+0x34/0x80 faddr2line reveals that the crash is in the list validation code: include/linux/list.h:83 include/linux/rculist.h:79 include/linux/rculist.h:106 kernel/dma/swiotlb.c:306 kernel/dma/swiotlb.c:1695 because add_mem_pool() is trying to list_add_rcu() to a NULL 'mem->pools'. Fix the crash by initialising the 'mem->pools' list_head in rmem_swiotlb_device_init() before calling add_mem_pool(). Reported-by: Nikita Ioffe <ioffe@google.com> Tested-by: Nikita Ioffe <ioffe@google.com> Fixes: 1aaa736 ("swiotlb: allocate a new memory pool when existing pools are full") Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Since the input data length passed to zlib_compress_folios() can be arbitrary, always setting strm.avail_in to a multiple of PAGE_SIZE may cause read-in bytes to exceed the input range. Currently this triggers an assert in btrfs_compress_folios() on the debug kernel (see below). Fix strm.avail_in calculation for S390 hardware acceleration path. assertion failed: *total_in <= orig_len, in fs/btrfs/compression.c:1041 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/compression.c:1041! monitor event: 0040 ilc:2 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 325 Comm: kworker/u273:3 Not tainted 6.13.0-20241204.rc1.git6.fae3b21430ca.300.fc41.s390x+debug #1 Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 703 (z/VM 7.4.0) Workqueue: btrfs-delalloc btrfs_work_helper Krnl PSW : 0704d00180000000 0000021761df6538 (btrfs_compress_folios+0x198/0x1a0) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:1 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 0000000080000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000047 0000000000000000 0000000000000006 ffffff01757bb000 000001976232fcc0 000000000000130c 000001976232fcd0 000001976232fcc8 00000118ff4a0e30 0000000000000001 00000111821ab400 0000011100000000 0000021761df6534 000001976232fb58 Krnl Code: 0000021761df6528: c020006f5ef4 larl %r2,0000021762be2310 0000021761df652e: c0e5ffbd09d5 brasl %r14,00000217615978d8 #0000021761df6534: af000000 mc 0,0 >0000021761df6538: 0707 bcr 0,%r7 0000021761df653a: 0707 bcr 0,%r7 0000021761df653c: 0707 bcr 0,%r7 0000021761df653e: 0707 bcr 0,%r7 0000021761df6540: c004004bb7ec brcl 0,000002176276d518 Call Trace: [<0000021761df6538>] btrfs_compress_folios+0x198/0x1a0 ([<0000021761df6534>] btrfs_compress_folios+0x194/0x1a0) [<0000021761d97788>] compress_file_range+0x3b8/0x6d0 [<0000021761dcee7c>] btrfs_work_helper+0x10c/0x160 [<0000021761645760>] process_one_work+0x2b0/0x5d0 [<000002176164637e>] worker_thread+0x20e/0x3e0 [<000002176165221a>] kthread+0x15a/0x170 [<00000217615b859c>] __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [<00000217626e72d2>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x38 INFO: lockdep is turned off. Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<0000021761597924>] _printk+0x4c/0x58 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops Fixes: fd1e75d ("btrfs: make compression path to be subpage compatible") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.12+ Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Mikhail Zaslonko <zaslonko@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

DC driver is using two different values to define the maximum number of surfaces: MAX_SURFACES and MAX_SURFACE_NUM. Consolidate MAX_SURFACES as the unique definition for surface updates across DC. It fixes page fault faced by Cosmic users on AMD display versions that support two overlay planes, since the introduction of cursor overlay mode. [Nov26 21:33] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000051d0f08b [ +0.000015] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ +0.000006] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ +0.000005] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ +0.000007] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ +0.000006] CPU: 4 PID: 71 Comm: kworker/u32:6 Not tainted 6.10.0+ torvalds#300 [ +0.000006] Hardware name: Valve Jupiter/Jupiter, BIOS F7A0131 01/30/2024 [ +0.000007] Workqueue: events_unbound commit_work [drm_kms_helper] [ +0.000040] RIP: 0010:copy_stream_update_to_stream.isra.0+0x30d/0x750 [amdgpu] [ +0.000847] Code: 8b 10 49 89 94 24 f8 00 00 00 48 8b 50 08 49 89 94 24 00 01 00 00 8b 40 10 41 89 84 24 08 01 00 00 49 8b 45 78 48 85 c0 74 0b <0f> b6 00 41 88 84 24 90 64 00 00 49 8b 45 60 48 85 c0 74 3b 48 8b [ +0.000010] RSP: 0018:ffffc203802f79a0 EFLAGS: 00010206 [ +0.000009] RAX: 0000000051d0f08b RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: ffff9f964f0a8070 [ +0.000004] RDX: ffff9f9710f90e40 RSI: ffff9f96600c8000 RDI: ffff9f964f000000 [ +0.000004] RBP: ffffc203802f79f8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ +0.000005] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9f96600c8000 [ +0.000004] R13: ffff9f9710f90e40 R14: ffff9f964f000000 R15: ffff9f96600c8000 [ +0.000004] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f9970000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ +0.000005] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ +0.000005] CR2: 0000000051d0f08b CR3: 00000002e6a20000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 [ +0.000005] Call Trace: [ +0.000011] <TASK> [ +0.000010] ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27 [ +0.000012] ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x2d0 [ +0.000014] ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x180 [ +0.000009] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 [ +0.000013] ? copy_stream_update_to_stream.isra.0+0x30d/0x750 [amdgpu] [ +0.000739] ? dc_commit_state_no_check+0xd6c/0xe70 [amdgpu] [ +0.000470] update_planes_and_stream_state+0x49b/0x4f0 [amdgpu] [ +0.000450] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000009] ? commit_minimal_transition_state+0x239/0x3d0 [amdgpu] [ +0.000446] update_planes_and_stream_v2+0x24a/0x590 [amdgpu] [ +0.000464] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000009] ? sort+0x31/0x50 [ +0.000007] ? amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail+0x159f/0x3a30 [amdgpu] [ +0.000508] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000009] ? amdgpu_crtc_get_scanout_position+0x28/0x40 [amdgpu] [ +0.000377] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000009] ? drm_crtc_vblank_helper_get_vblank_timestamp_internal+0x160/0x390 [drm] [ +0.000058] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000005] ? dma_fence_default_wait+0x8c/0x260 [ +0.000010] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000005] ? wait_for_completion_timeout+0x13b/0x170 [ +0.000006] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000005] ? dma_fence_wait_timeout+0x108/0x140 [ +0.000010] ? commit_tail+0x94/0x130 [drm_kms_helper] [ +0.000024] ? process_one_work+0x177/0x330 [ +0.000008] ? worker_thread+0x266/0x3a0 [ +0.000006] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000004] ? kthread+0xd2/0x100 [ +0.000006] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000006] ? ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 [ +0.000004] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000005] ? ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ +0.000011] </TASK> Fixes: 1b04dcc ("drm/amd/display: Introduce overlay cursor mode") Suggested-by: Leo Li <sunpeng.li@amd.com> Link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/3693 Signed-off-by: Melissa Wen <mwen@igalia.com> Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Siqueira <Rodrigo.Siqueira@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Siqueira <Rodrigo.Siqueira@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> (cherry picked from commit 1c86c81) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

dm_get_plane_scale doesn't take into account plane scaled size equal to zero, leading to a kernel oops due to division by zero. Fix by setting out-scale size as zero when the dst size is zero, similar to what is done by drm_calc_scale(). This issue started with the introduction of cursor ovelay mode that uses this function to assess cursor mode changes via dm_crtc_get_cursor_mode() before checking plane state. [Dec17 17:14] Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ +0.000018] CPU: 5 PID: 1660 Comm: surface-DP-1 Not tainted 6.10.0+ torvalds#231 [ +0.000007] Hardware name: Valve Jupiter/Jupiter, BIOS F7A0131 01/30/2024 [ +0.000004] RIP: 0010:dm_get_plane_scale+0x3f/0x60 [amdgpu] [ +0.000553] Code: 44 0f b7 41 3a 44 0f b7 49 3e 83 e0 0f 48 0f a3 c2 73 21 69 41 28 e8 03 00 00 31 d2 41 f7 f1 31 d2 89 06 69 41 2c e8 03 00 00 <41> f7 f0 89 07 e9 d7 d8 7e e9 44 89 c8 45 89 c1 41 89 c0 eb d4 66 [ +0.000005] RSP: 0018:ffffa8df0de6b8a0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ +0.000006] RAX: 00000000000003e8 RBX: ffff9ac65c1f6e00 RCX: ffff9ac65d055500 [ +0.000003] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffa8df0de6b8b0 RDI: ffffa8df0de6b8b4 [ +0.000004] RBP: ffff9ac64e7a5800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000a00 [ +0.000003] R10: 00000000000000ff R11: 0000000000000054 R12: ffff9ac6d0700010 [ +0.000003] R13: ffff9ac65d054f00 R14: ffff9ac65d055500 R15: ffff9ac64e7a60a0 [ +0.000004] FS: 00007f869ea00640(0000) GS:ffff9ac970080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ +0.000004] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ +0.000003] CR2: 000055ca701becd0 CR3: 000000010e7f2000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 [ +0.000004] Call Trace: [ +0.000007] <TASK> [ +0.000006] ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27 [ +0.000009] ? die+0x2e/0x50 [ +0.000007] ? do_trap+0xca/0x110 [ +0.000007] ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90 [ +0.000006] ? dm_get_plane_scale+0x3f/0x60 [amdgpu] [ +0.000504] ? exc_divide_error+0x38/0x50 [ +0.000005] ? dm_get_plane_scale+0x3f/0x60 [amdgpu] [ +0.000488] ? asm_exc_divide_error+0x1a/0x20 [ +0.000011] ? dm_get_plane_scale+0x3f/0x60 [amdgpu] [ +0.000593] dm_crtc_get_cursor_mode+0x33f/0x430 [amdgpu] [ +0.000562] amdgpu_dm_atomic_check+0x2ef/0x1770 [amdgpu] [ +0.000501] drm_atomic_check_only+0x5e1/0xa30 [drm] [ +0.000047] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x832/0xcb0 [drm] [ +0.000050] ? __pfx_drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [drm] [ +0.000047] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xb3/0x100 [drm] [ +0.000062] drm_ioctl+0x27a/0x4f0 [drm] [ +0.000049] ? __pfx_drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [drm] [ +0.000055] amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x4e/0x90 [amdgpu] [ +0.000360] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xd0 [ +0.000010] do_syscall_64+0x82/0x190 [ +0.000008] ? __pfx_drm_mode_createblob_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [drm] [ +0.000044] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000006] ? drm_ioctl_kernel+0xb3/0x100 [drm] [ +0.000040] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000005] ? __check_object_size+0x50/0x220 [ +0.000007] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000005] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000005] ? drm_ioctl+0x2a4/0x4f0 [drm] [ +0.000039] ? __pfx_drm_mode_createblob_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [drm] [ +0.000043] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000005] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000005] ? __pm_runtime_suspend+0x69/0xc0 [ +0.000006] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000005] ? amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x71/0x90 [amdgpu] [ +0.000366] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000006] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x77/0x210 [ +0.000007] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000005] ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x190 [ +0.000006] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000006] ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x190 [ +0.000006] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000007] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ +0.000008] RIP: 0033:0x55bb7cd962bc [ +0.000007] Code: 4c 89 6c 24 18 4c 89 64 24 20 4c 89 74 24 28 0f 57 c0 0f 11 44 24 30 89 c7 48 8d 54 24 08 b8 10 00 00 00 be bc 64 38 c0 0f 05 <49> 89 c7 48 83 3b 00 74 09 4c 89 c7 ff 15 62 64 99 00 48 83 7b 18 [ +0.000005] RSP: 002b:00007f869e9f4da0 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ +0.000007] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f869e9f4fb8 RCX: 000055bb7cd962bc [ +0.000004] RDX: 00007f869e9f4da8 RSI: 00000000c03864bc RDI: 000000000000003b [ +0.000003] RBP: 000055bb9ddcbcc0 R08: 00007f86541b9920 R09: 0000000000000009 [ +0.000004] R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 00007f865406c6b0 [ +0.000003] R13: 00007f86541b5290 R14: 00007f865410b700 R15: 000055bb9ddcbc18 [ +0.000009] </TASK> Fixes: 1b04dcc ("drm/amd/display: Introduce overlay cursor mode") Link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/3729 Reported-by: Fabio Scaccabarozzi <fsvm88@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Fabio Scaccabarozzi <fsvm88@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Fabio Scaccabarozzi <fsvm88@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Melissa Wen <mwen@igalia.com> Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Siqueira <Rodrigo.Siqueira@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Siqueira <Rodrigo.Siqueira@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> (cherry picked from commit ab75a0d) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

die() can be called in exception handler, and therefore cannot sleep. However, die() takes spinlock_t which can sleep with PREEMPT_RT enabled. That causes the following warning: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 285, name: mutex preempt_count: 110001, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 285 Comm: mutex Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-00022-ge19049cf7d56-dirty torvalds#234 Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) Call Trace: dump_backtrace+0x1c/0x24 show_stack+0x2c/0x38 dump_stack_lvl+0x5a/0x72 dump_stack+0x14/0x1c __might_resched+0x130/0x13a rt_spin_lock+0x2a/0x5c die+0x24/0x112 do_trap_insn_illegal+0xa0/0xea _new_vmalloc_restore_context_a0+0xcc/0xd8 Oops - illegal instruction [#1] Switch to use raw_spinlock_t, which does not sleep even with PREEMPT_RT enabled. Fixes: 76d2a04 ("RISC-V: Init and Halt Code") Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241118091333.1185288-1-namcao@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

If GuC fails to load, the driver wedges, but in the process it tries to do stuff that may not be initialized yet. This moves the xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_init() to be done earlier: as its own doc says, it's a software-only initialization and should had been named with the _early() suffix. Move it to be called by xe_gt_init_early(), so the locks and seqno are initialized, avoiding a NULL ptr deref when wedging: xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: load failed: status: Reset = 0, BootROM = 0x50, UKernel = 0x00, MIA = 0x00, Auth = 0x01 xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: firmware signature verification failed xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* CRITICAL: Xe has declared device 0000:03:00.0 as wedged. ... BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 3908 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G U W 6.13.0-rc4-xe+ #3 Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client Platform/AlderLake-S ADP-S DDR5 UDIMM CRB, BIOS ADLSFWI1.R00.3275.A00.2207010640 07/01/2022 RIP: 0010:xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_reset+0x75/0x110 [xe] This can be easily triggered by poking the GuC binary to force a signature failure. There will still be an extra message, xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: GuC mmio request 0x4100: no reply 0x4100 but that's better than a NULL ptr deref. Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/3956 Fixes: c9474b7 ("drm/xe: Wedge the entire device") Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20250103001111.331684-2-lucas.demarchi@intel.com Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com> (cherry picked from commit 5001ef3) Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>

We found a timeout problem with the pldm command on our system. The reason is that the MCTP-I3C driver has a race condition when receiving multiple-packet messages in multi-thread, resulting in a wrong packet order problem. We identified this problem by adding a debug message to the mctp_i3c_read function. According to the MCTP spec, a multiple-packet message must be composed in sequence, and if there is a wrong sequence, the whole message will be discarded and wait for the next SOM. For example, SOM → Pkt Seq #2 → Pkt Seq #1 → Pkt Seq #3 → EOM. Therefore, we try to solve this problem by adding a mutex to the mctp_i3c_read function. Before the modification, when a command requesting a multiple-packet message response is sent consecutively, an error usually occurs within 100 loops. After the mutex, it can go through 40000 loops without any error, and it seems to run well. Fixes: c8755b2 ("mctp i3c: MCTP I3C driver") Signed-off-by: Leo Yang <Leo-Yang@quantatw.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250107031529.3296094-1-Leo-Yang@quantatw.com [pabeni@redhat.com: dropped already answered question from changelog] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

When cmd_alloc_index(), fails cmd_work_handler() needs to complete ent->slotted before returning early. Otherwise the task which issued the command may hang: mlx5_core 0000:01:00.0: cmd_work_handler:877:(pid 3880418): failed to allocate command entry INFO: task kworker/13:2:4055883 blocked for more than 120 seconds. Not tainted 4.19.90-25.44.v2101.ky10.aarch64 #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. kworker/13:2 D 0 4055883 2 0x00000228 Workqueue: events mlx5e_tx_dim_work [mlx5_core] Call trace: __switch_to+0xe8/0x150 __schedule+0x2a8/0x9b8 schedule+0x2c/0x88 schedule_timeout+0x204/0x478 wait_for_common+0x154/0x250 wait_for_completion+0x28/0x38 cmd_exec+0x7a0/0xa00 [mlx5_core] mlx5_cmd_exec+0x54/0x80 [mlx5_core] mlx5_core_modify_cq+0x6c/0x80 [mlx5_core] mlx5_core_modify_cq_moderation+0xa0/0xb8 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_tx_dim_work+0x54/0x68 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x1b0/0x448 worker_thread+0x54/0x468 kthread+0x134/0x138 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Fixes: 485d65e ("net/mlx5: Add a timeout to acquire the command queue semaphore") Signed-off-by: Chenguang Zhao <zhaochenguang@kylinos.cn> Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@nvidia.com> Acked-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250108030009.68520-1-zhaochenguang@kylinos.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Using the 'net' structure via 'current' is not recommended for different reasons. First, if the goal is to use it to read or write per-netns data, this is inconsistent with how the "generic" sysctl entries are doing: directly by only using pointers set to the table entry, e.g. table->data. Linked to that, the per-netns data should always be obtained from the table linked to the netns it had been created for, which may not coincide with the reader's or writer's netns. Another reason is that access to current->nsproxy->netns can oops if attempted when current->nsproxy had been dropped when the current task is exiting. This is what syzbot found, when using acct(2): Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5924 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00004-gccb98ccef0e5 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 RIP: 0010:proc_scheduler+0xc6/0x3c0 net/mptcp/ctrl.c:125 Code: 03 42 80 3c 38 00 0f 85 fe 02 00 00 4d 8b a4 24 08 09 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8d 7c 24 28 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 02 00 00 4d 8b 7c 24 28 48 8d 84 24 c8 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc900034774e8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff9200068ee9e RCX: ffffc90003477620 RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: ffffffff8b08f91e RDI: 0000000000000028 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffc90003477710 R09: 0000000000000040 R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 00000000726f7475 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffc90003477620 R14: ffffc90003477710 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fee3cd452d8 CR3: 000000007d116000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> proc_sys_call_handler+0x403/0x5d0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:601 __kernel_write_iter+0x318/0xa80 fs/read_write.c:612 __kernel_write+0xf6/0x140 fs/read_write.c:632 do_acct_process+0xcb0/0x14a0 kernel/acct.c:539 acct_pin_kill+0x2d/0x100 kernel/acct.c:192 pin_kill+0x194/0x7c0 fs/fs_pin.c:44 mnt_pin_kill+0x61/0x1e0 fs/fs_pin.c:81 cleanup_mnt+0x3ac/0x450 fs/namespace.c:1366 task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:239 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:43 [inline] do_exit+0xad8/0x2d70 kernel/exit.c:938 do_group_exit+0xd3/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1087 get_signal+0x2576/0x2610 kernel/signal.c:3017 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x90/0x7e0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:111 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x150/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fee3cb87a6a Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7fee3cb87a40. RSP: 002b:00007fffcccac688 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000037 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007fffcccac710 RCX: 00007fee3cb87a6a RDX: 0000000000000041 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 00007fffcccac6ac R09: 00007fffcccacac7 R10: 00007fffcccac710 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fee3cd49500 R13: 00007fffcccac6ac R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fee3cd4b000 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:proc_scheduler+0xc6/0x3c0 net/mptcp/ctrl.c:125 Code: 03 42 80 3c 38 00 0f 85 fe 02 00 00 4d 8b a4 24 08 09 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8d 7c 24 28 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 02 00 00 4d 8b 7c 24 28 48 8d 84 24 c8 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc900034774e8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff9200068ee9e RCX: ffffc90003477620 RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: ffffffff8b08f91e RDI: 0000000000000028 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffc90003477710 R09: 0000000000000040 R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 00000000726f7475 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffc90003477620 R14: ffffc90003477710 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fee3cd452d8 CR3: 000000007d116000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 ---------------- Code disassembly (best guess), 1 bytes skipped: 0: 42 80 3c 38 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rax,%r15,1) 5: 0f 85 fe 02 00 00 jne 0x309 b: 4d 8b a4 24 08 09 00 mov 0x908(%r12),%r12 12: 00 13: 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 movabs $0xdffffc0000000000,%rax 1a: fc ff df 1d: 49 8d 7c 24 28 lea 0x28(%r12),%rdi 22: 48 89 fa mov %rdi,%rdx 25: 48 c1 ea 03 shr $0x3,%rdx * 29: 80 3c 02 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rdx,%rax,1) <-- trapping instruction 2d: 0f 85 cc 02 00 00 jne 0x2ff 33: 4d 8b 7c 24 28 mov 0x28(%r12),%r15 38: 48 rex.W 39: 8d .byte 0x8d 3a: 84 24 c8 test %ah,(%rax,%rcx,8) Here with 'net.mptcp.scheduler', the 'net' structure is not really needed, because the table->data already has a pointer to the current scheduler, the only thing needed from the per-netns data. Simply use 'data', instead of getting (most of the time) the same thing, but from a longer and indirect way. Fixes: 6963c50 ("mptcp: only allow set existing scheduler for net.mptcp.scheduler") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+e364f774c6f57f2c86d1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/67769ecb.050a0220.3a8527.003f.GAE@google.com Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250108-net-sysctl-current-nsproxy-v1-2-5df34b2083e8@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Max Makarov reported kernel panic [1] in perf user callchain code. The reason for that is the race between uprobe_free_utask and bpf profiler code doing the perf user stack unwind and is triggered within uprobe_free_utask function: - after current->utask is freed and - before current->utask is set to NULL general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x9e759c37ee555c76: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI RIP: 0010:is_uprobe_at_func_entry+0x28/0x80 ... ? die_addr+0x36/0x90 ? exc_general_protection+0x217/0x420 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? is_uprobe_at_func_entry+0x28/0x80 perf_callchain_user+0x20a/0x360 get_perf_callchain+0x147/0x1d0 bpf_get_stackid+0x60/0x90 bpf_prog_9aac297fb833e2f5_do_perf_event+0x434/0x53b ? __smp_call_single_queue+0xad/0x120 bpf_overflow_handler+0x75/0x110 ... asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:__kmem_cache_free+0x1cb/0x350 ... ? uprobe_free_utask+0x62/0x80 ? acct_collect+0x4c/0x220 uprobe_free_utask+0x62/0x80 mm_release+0x12/0xb0 do_exit+0x26b/0xaa0 __x64_sys_exit+0x1b/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x80 It can be easily reproduced by running following commands in separate terminals: # while :; do bpftrace -e 'uprobe:/bin/ls:_start { printf("hit\n"); }' -c ls; done # bpftrace -e 'profile:hz:100000 { @[ustack()] = count(); }' Fixing this by making sure current->utask pointer is set to NULL before we start to release the utask object. [1] grafana/pyroscope#3673 Fixes: cfa7f3d ("perf,x86: avoid missing caller address in stack traces captured in uprobe") Reported-by: Max Makarov <maxpain@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250109141440.2692173-1-jolsa@kernel.org

In mana_driver_exit(), mana_debugfs_root gets cleanup before any of it's children (which happens later in the pci_unregister_driver()). Due to this, when mana driver is configured as a module and rmmod is invoked, following stack gets printed along with failure in rmmod command. [ 2399.317651] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098 [ 2399.318657] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 2399.319057] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 2399.319528] PGD 10eb68067 P4D 0 [ 2399.319914] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 2399.320308] CPU: 72 UID: 0 PID: 5815 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5+ torvalds#89 [ 2399.320986] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 09/28/2024 [ 2399.321892] RIP: 0010:down_write+0x1a/0x50 [ 2399.322303] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 54 49 89 fc e8 9d cd ff ff 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 <f0> 49 0f b1 14 24 75 17 65 48 8b 05 f6 84 dd 5f 49 89 44 24 08 4c [ 2399.323669] RSP: 0018:ff53859d6c663a70 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 2399.324061] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ff1d4eb505060180 RCX: ffffff8100000000 [ 2399.324620] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000064 RDI: 0000000000000098 [ 2399.325167] RBP: ff53859d6c663a78 R08: 00000000000009c4 R09: ff1d4eb4fac90000 [ 2399.325681] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000098 [ 2399.326185] R13: ff1d4e42e1a4a0c8 R14: ff1d4eb538ce0000 R15: 0000000000000098 [ 2399.326755] FS: 00007fe729570000(0000) GS:ff1d4eb2b7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2399.327269] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2399.327690] CR2: 0000000000000098 CR3: 00000001c0584005 CR4: 0000000000373ef0 [ 2399.328166] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 2399.328623] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 2399.329055] Call Trace: [ 2399.329243] <TASK> [ 2399.329379] ? show_regs+0x69/0x80 [ 2399.329602] ? __die+0x25/0x70 [ 2399.329856] ? page_fault_oops+0x271/0x550 [ 2399.330088] ? psi_group_change+0x217/0x470 [ 2399.330341] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x455/0x7b0 [ 2399.330667] ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x91/0x2f0 [ 2399.331004] ? exc_page_fault+0x73/0x160 [ 2399.331275] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [ 2399.343324] ? down_write+0x1a/0x50 [ 2399.343631] simple_recursive_removal+0x4d/0x2c0 [ 2399.343977] ? __pfx_remove_one+0x10/0x10 [ 2399.344251] debugfs_remove+0x45/0x70 [ 2399.344511] mana_destroy_rxq+0x44/0x400 [mana] [ 2399.344845] mana_destroy_vport+0x54/0x1c0 [mana] [ 2399.345229] mana_detach+0x2f1/0x4e0 [mana] [ 2399.345466] ? ida_free+0x150/0x160 [ 2399.345718] ? __cond_resched+0x1a/0x50 [ 2399.345987] mana_remove+0xf4/0x1a0 [mana] [ 2399.346243] mana_gd_remove+0x25/0x80 [mana] [ 2399.346605] pci_device_remove+0x41/0xb0 [ 2399.346878] device_remove+0x46/0x70 [ 2399.347150] device_release_driver_internal+0x1e3/0x250 [ 2399.347831] ? klist_remove+0x81/0xe0 [ 2399.348377] driver_detach+0x4b/0xa0 [ 2399.348906] bus_remove_driver+0x83/0x100 [ 2399.349435] driver_unregister+0x31/0x60 [ 2399.349919] pci_unregister_driver+0x40/0x90 [ 2399.350492] mana_driver_exit+0x1c/0xb50 [mana] [ 2399.351102] __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x184/0x320 [ 2399.351664] ? __fput+0x1a9/0x2d0 [ 2399.352200] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x12/0x20 [ 2399.352760] x64_sys_call+0x1e66/0x2140 [ 2399.353316] do_syscall_64+0x79/0x150 [ 2399.353813] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x49/0x230 [ 2399.354346] ? do_syscall_64+0x85/0x150 [ 2399.354816] ? irqentry_exit+0x1d/0x30 [ 2399.355287] ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x160 [ 2399.355756] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 2399.356302] RIP: 0033:0x7fe728d26aeb [ 2399.356776] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 45 33 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 15 33 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 2399.358372] RSP: 002b:00007ffff954d6f8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 [ 2399.359066] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005609156cc760 RCX: 00007fe728d26aeb [ 2399.359779] RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 00005609156cc7c8 [ 2399.360535] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2399.361261] R10: 00007fe728dbeac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffff954d950 [ 2399.361952] R13: 00005609156cc2a0 R14: 00007ffff954ee5f R15: 00005609156cc760 [ 2399.362688] </TASK> Fixes: 6607c17 ("net: mana: Enable debugfs files for MANA device") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shradha Gupta <shradhagupta@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski@linux.intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1736398991-764-1-git-send-email-shradhagupta@linux.microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

This reverts commit eaebeb9. Commit eaebeb9 ("mm: zswap: fix race between [de]compression and CPU hotunplug") used the CPU hotplug lock in zswap compress/decompress operations to protect against a race with CPU hotunplug making some per-CPU resources go away. However, zswap compress/decompress can be reached through reclaim while the lock is held, resulting in a potential deadlock as reported by syzbot: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.13.0-rc6-syzkaller-00006-g5428dc1906dd #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kswapd0/89 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8e7d2ed0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: acomp_ctx_get_cpu mm/zswap.c:886 [inline] ffffffff8e7d2ed0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: zswap_compress mm/zswap.c:908 [inline] ffffffff8e7d2ed0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: zswap_store_page mm/zswap.c:1439 [inline] ffffffff8e7d2ed0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: zswap_store+0xa74/0x1ba0 mm/zswap.c:1546 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8ea355a0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat mm/vmscan.c:6871 [inline] ffffffff8ea355a0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: kswapd+0xb58/0x2f30 mm/vmscan.c:7253 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 __fs_reclaim_acquire mm/page_alloc.c:3853 [inline] fs_reclaim_acquire+0x88/0x130 mm/page_alloc.c:3867 might_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:318 [inline] slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4070 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4148 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_node_noprof+0x40/0x3a0 mm/slub.c:4337 kmalloc_node_noprof include/linux/slab.h:924 [inline] alloc_worker kernel/workqueue.c:2638 [inline] create_worker+0x11b/0x720 kernel/workqueue.c:2781 workqueue_prepare_cpu+0xe3/0x170 kernel/workqueue.c:6628 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x48d/0x830 kernel/cpu.c:194 __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range kernel/cpu.c:965 [inline] cpuhp_invoke_callback_range kernel/cpu.c:989 [inline] cpuhp_up_callbacks kernel/cpu.c:1020 [inline] _cpu_up+0x2b3/0x580 kernel/cpu.c:1690 cpu_up+0x184/0x230 kernel/cpu.c:1722 cpuhp_bringup_mask+0xdf/0x260 kernel/cpu.c:1788 cpuhp_bringup_cpus_parallel+0xf9/0x160 kernel/cpu.c:1878 bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x2b/0x50 kernel/cpu.c:1892 smp_init+0x34/0x150 kernel/smp.c:1009 kernel_init_freeable+0x417/0x5d0 init/main.c:1569 kernel_init+0x1d/0x2b0 init/main.c:1466 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904 __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline] cpus_read_lock+0x42/0x150 kernel/cpu.c:490 acomp_ctx_get_cpu mm/zswap.c:886 [inline] zswap_compress mm/zswap.c:908 [inline] zswap_store_page mm/zswap.c:1439 [inline] zswap_store+0xa74/0x1ba0 mm/zswap.c:1546 swap_writepage+0x647/0xce0 mm/page_io.c:279 shmem_writepage+0x1248/0x1610 mm/shmem.c:1579 pageout mm/vmscan.c:696 [inline] shrink_folio_list+0x35ee/0x57e0 mm/vmscan.c:1374 shrink_inactive_list mm/vmscan.c:1967 [inline] shrink_list mm/vmscan.c:2205 [inline] shrink_lruvec+0x16db/0x2f30 mm/vmscan.c:5734 mem_cgroup_shrink_node+0x385/0x8e0 mm/vmscan.c:6575 mem_cgroup_soft_reclaim mm/memcontrol-v1.c:312 [inline] memcg1_soft_limit_reclaim+0x346/0x810 mm/memcontrol-v1.c:362 balance_pgdat mm/vmscan.c:6975 [inline] kswapd+0x17b3/0x2f30 mm/vmscan.c:7253 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(fs_reclaim); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); lock(fs_reclaim); rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by kswapd0/89: #0: ffffffff8ea355a0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat mm/vmscan.c:6871 [inline] #0: ffffffff8ea355a0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: kswapd+0xb58/0x2f30 mm/vmscan.c:7253 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 89 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc6-syzkaller-00006-g5428dc1906dd #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x13a/0x1b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2074 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2206 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904 __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline] cpus_read_lock+0x42/0x150 kernel/cpu.c:490 acomp_ctx_get_cpu mm/zswap.c:886 [inline] zswap_compress mm/zswap.c:908 [inline] zswap_store_page mm/zswap.c:1439 [inline] zswap_store+0xa74/0x1ba0 mm/zswap.c:1546 swap_writepage+0x647/0xce0 mm/page_io.c:279 shmem_writepage+0x1248/0x1610 mm/shmem.c:1579 pageout mm/vmscan.c:696 [inline] shrink_folio_list+0x35ee/0x57e0 mm/vmscan.c:1374 shrink_inactive_list mm/vmscan.c:1967 [inline] shrink_list mm/vmscan.c:2205 [inline] shrink_lruvec+0x16db/0x2f30 mm/vmscan.c:5734 mem_cgroup_shrink_node+0x385/0x8e0 mm/vmscan.c:6575 mem_cgroup_soft_reclaim mm/memcontrol-v1.c:312 [inline] memcg1_soft_limit_reclaim+0x346/0x810 mm/memcontrol-v1.c:362 balance_pgdat mm/vmscan.c:6975 [inline] kswapd+0x17b3/0x2f30 mm/vmscan.c:7253 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> Revert the change. A different fix for the race with CPU hotunplug will follow. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250107222236.2715883-1-yosryahmed@google.com Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Barry Song <baohua@kernel.org> Cc: Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou@linux.dev> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Kanchana P Sridhar <kanchana.p.sridhar@intel.com> Cc: Nhat Pham <nphamcs@gmail.com> Cc: Sam Sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com> Cc: Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

A livepatch module can contain a special relocation section .klp.rela.<objname>.<secname> to apply its relocations at the appropriate time and to additionally access local and unexported symbols. When <objname> points to another module, such relocations are processed separately from the regular module relocation process. For instance, only when the target <objname> actually becomes loaded. With CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX, when the livepatch core decides to apply these relocations, their processing results in the following bug: [ 25.827238] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000012ba [ 25.827819] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 25.828153] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 25.828588] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 25.829063] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 25.829742] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 452 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O K 6.13.0-rc4-00078-g059dd502b263 #7820 [ 25.830417] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [K]=LIVEPATCH [ 25.830768] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-20220807_005459-localhost 04/01/2014 [ 25.831651] RIP: 0010:memcmp+0x24/0x60 [ 25.832190] Code: [...] [ 25.833378] RSP: 0018:ffffa40b403a3ae8 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ 25.833637] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93bc81d8e700 RCX: ffffffffc0202000 [ 25.834072] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 00000000000012ba [ 25.834548] RBP: ffffa40b403a3b68 R08: ffffa40b403a3b30 R09: 0000004a00000002 [ 25.835088] R10: ffffffffffffd222 R11: f000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 25.835666] R13: ffffffffc02032ba R14: ffffffffc007d1e0 R15: 0000000000000004 [ 25.836139] FS: 00007fecef8c3080(0000) GS:ffff93bc8f900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 25.836519] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 25.836977] CR2: 00000000000012ba CR3: 0000000002f24000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 25.837442] Call Trace: [ 25.838297] <TASK> [ 25.841083] __write_relocate_add.constprop.0+0xc7/0x2b0 [ 25.841701] apply_relocate_add+0x75/0xa0 [ 25.841973] klp_write_section_relocs+0x10e/0x140 [ 25.842304] klp_write_object_relocs+0x70/0xa0 [ 25.842682] klp_init_object_loaded+0x21/0xf0 [ 25.842972] klp_enable_patch+0x43d/0x900 [ 25.843572] do_one_initcall+0x4c/0x220 [ 25.844186] do_init_module+0x6a/0x260 [ 25.844423] init_module_from_file+0x9c/0xe0 [ 25.844702] idempotent_init_module+0x172/0x270 [ 25.845008] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x69/0xc0 [ 25.845253] do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0 [ 25.845498] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 25.846056] RIP: 0033:0x7fecef9eb25d [ 25.846444] Code: [...] [ 25.847563] RSP: 002b:00007ffd0c5d6de8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [ 25.848082] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b03f05e470 RCX: 00007fecef9eb25d [ 25.848456] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000055b001e74e52 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 25.848969] RBP: 00007ffd0c5d6ea0 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 0000000000004100 [ 25.849411] R10: 00007fecefac7b20 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055b001e74e52 [ 25.849905] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055b03f05e440 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 25.850336] </TASK> [ 25.850553] Modules linked in: deku(OK+) uinput [ 25.851408] CR2: 00000000000012ba [ 25.852085] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The problem is that the .klp.rela.<objname>.<secname> relocations are processed after the module was already formed and mod->rw_copy was reset. However, the code in __write_relocate_add() calls module_writable_address() which translates the target address 'loc' still to 'loc + (mem->rw_copy - mem->base)', with mem->rw_copy now being 0. Fix the problem by returning directly 'loc' in module_writable_address() when the module is already formed. Function __write_relocate_add() knows to use text_poke() in such a case. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250107153507.14733-1-petr.pavlu@suse.com Fixes: 0c133b1 ("module: prepare to handle ROX allocations for text") Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com> Reported-by: Marek Maslanka <mmaslanka@google.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-modules/CAGcaFA2hdThQV6mjD_1_U+GNHThv84+MQvMWLgEuX+LVbAyDxg@mail.gmail.com/ Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Tested-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

Some of the core functions can only be called if the transport has been assigned. As Michal reported, a socket might have the transport at NULL, for example after a failed connect(), causing the following trace: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000a0 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 12faf8067 P4D 12faf8067 PUD 113670067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 1198 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2+ RIP: 0010:vsock_connectible_has_data+0x1f/0x40 Call Trace: vsock_bpf_recvmsg+0xca/0x5e0 sock_recvmsg+0xb9/0xc0 __sys_recvfrom+0xb3/0x130 __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e So we need to check the `vsk->transport` in vsock_bpf_recvmsg(), especially for connected sockets (stream/seqpacket) as we already do in __vsock_connectible_recvmsg(). Fixes: 634f1a7 ("vsock: support sockmap") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/5ca20d4c-1017-49c2-9516-f6f75fd331e9@rbox.co/ Tested-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co> Reported-by: syzbot+3affdbfc986ecd9200fd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/677f84a8.050a0220.25a300.01b3.GAE@google.com/ Tested-by: syzbot+3affdbfc986ecd9200fd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Luigi Leonardi <leonardi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

This commit addresses a circular locking dependency issue within the GFX isolation mechanism. The problem was identified by a warning indicating a potential deadlock due to inconsistent lock acquisition order. - The `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use` and `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_end_use` functions previously acquired `enforce_isolation_mutex` and called `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl`, leading to potential deadlocks. ie., If `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called while `enforce_isolation_mutex` is held, and `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler` is called while `kfd_sch_mutex` is held, it can create a circular dependency. By ensuring consistent lock usage, this fix resolves the issue: [ 606.297333] ====================================================== [ 606.297343] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 606.297353] 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof torvalds#19 Tainted: G OE [ 606.297365] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 606.297375] kworker/u96:3/3825 is trying to acquire lock: [ 606.297385] ffff9aa64e431cb8 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.297413] but task is already holding lock: [ 606.297423] ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.297725] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 606.297738] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 606.297749] -> #2 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 606.297765] __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930 [ 606.297776] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 606.297786] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298007] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298225] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.298412] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298603] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298866] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.298880] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.298890] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.298899] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.298908] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.298919] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.298929] -> #1 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 606.298947] __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930 [ 606.298956] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 606.298966] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x87/0x370 [amdgpu] [ 606.299190] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.299199] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.299208] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.299217] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.299227] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.299236] -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 606.299257] __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810 [ 606.299267] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 606.299276] __flush_work+0x250/0x610 [ 606.299286] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80 [ 606.299296] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.299509] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.299723] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.299909] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300101] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300355] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.300369] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.300378] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.300387] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.300396] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.300406] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.300416] other info that might help us debug this: [ 606.300428] Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work) --> &adev->enforce_isolation_mutex --> &adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex [ 606.300458] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 606.300468] CPU0 CPU1 [ 606.300476] ---- ---- [ 606.300484] lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex); [ 606.300494] lock(&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex); [ 606.300508] lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex); [ 606.300521] lock((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)); [ 606.300536] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 606.300546] 5 locks held by kworker/u96:3/3825: [ 606.300555] #0: ffff9aa5aa1f5d58 ((wq_completion)comp_1.1.0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680 [ 606.300577] #1: ffffaa53c3c97e40 ((work_completion)(&sched->work_run_job)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680 [ 606.300600] #2: ffff9aa64e463c98 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x1c3/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300837] #3: ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.301062] #4: ffffffff8c1a5660 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x70/0x610 [ 606.301083] stack backtrace: [ 606.301092] CPU: 14 PID: 3825 Comm: kworker/u96:3 Tainted: G OE 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof torvalds#19 [ 606.301109] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570S GAMING X/X570S GAMING X, BIOS F7 03/22/2024 [ 606.301124] Workqueue: comp_1.1.0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] [ 606.301140] Call Trace: [ 606.301146] <TASK> [ 606.301154] dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0 [ 606.301166] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [ 606.301175] print_circular_bug+0x26c/0x340 [ 606.301187] check_noncircular+0x157/0x170 [ 606.301197] ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x490 [ 606.301213] __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810 [ 606.301230] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 606.301239] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301250] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.301261] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 606.301274] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301284] __flush_work+0x250/0x610 [ 606.301293] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301305] ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 [ 606.301318] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 606.301331] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.301345] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80 [ 606.301356] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.301661] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.302050] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.302069] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.302452] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.302862] ? drm_sched_entity_error+0x82/0x190 [gpu_sched] [ 606.302890] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.303366] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.303388] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.303409] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.303424] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303437] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.303449] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303463] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.303476] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303489] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.303512] </TASK> v2: Refactor lock handling to resolve circular dependency (Alex) - Introduced a `sched_work` flag to defer the call to `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` until after releasing `enforce_isolation_mutex`. - This change ensures that `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called outside the critical section, preventing the circular dependency and deadlock. - The `sched_work` flag is set within the mutex-protected section if conditions are met, and the actual function call is made afterward. - This approach ensures consistent lock acquisition order. Fixes: afefd6f ("drm/amdgpu: Implement Enforce Isolation Handler for KGD/KFD serialization") Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam@amd.com> Suggested-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> (cherry picked from commit 0b6b2dd) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Fix a lockdep warning [1] observed during the write combining test. The warning indicates a potential nested lock scenario that could lead to a deadlock. However, this is a false positive alarm because the SF lock and its parent lock are distinct ones. The lockdep confusion arises because the locks belong to the same object class (i.e., struct mlx5_core_dev). To resolve this, the code has been refactored to avoid taking both locks. Instead, only the parent lock is acquired. [1] raw_ethernet_bw/2118 is trying to acquire lock: [ 213.619032] ffff88811dd75e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.620270] [ 213.620270] but task is already holding lock: [ 213.620943] ffff88810b585e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_wc_support_get+0x10c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.622045] [ 213.622045] other info that might help us debug this: [ 213.622778] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 213.622778] [ 213.623465] CPU0 [ 213.623815] ---- [ 213.624148] lock(&dev->wc_state_lock); [ 213.624615] lock(&dev->wc_state_lock); [ 213.625071] [ 213.625071] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 213.625071] [ 213.625805] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 213.625805] [ 213.626522] 4 locks held by raw_ethernet_bw/2118: [ 213.627019] #0: ffff88813f80d578 (&uverbs_dev->disassociate_srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.628088] #1: ffff88810fb23930 (&file->hw_destroy_rwsem){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: ib_init_ucontext+0x2d/0xf0 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.629094] #2: ffff88810fb23878 (&file->ucontext_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ib_init_ucontext+0x49/0xf0 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.630106] #3: ffff88810b585e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_wc_support_get+0x10c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.631185] [ 213.631185] stack backtrace: [ 213.631718] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2118 Comm: raw_ethernet_bw Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7_internal_net_next_mlx5_89a0ad0 #1 [ 213.632722] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 213.633785] Call Trace: [ 213.634099] [ 213.634393] dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0 [ 213.634806] print_deadlock_bug+0x278/0x3c0 [ 213.635265] __lock_acquire+0x15f4/0x2c40 [ 213.635712] lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2d0 [ 213.636120] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.636722] ? mlx5_ib_enable_lb+0x24/0xa0 [mlx5_ib] [ 213.637277] __mutex_lock+0x81/0xda0 [ 213.637697] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.638305] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.638902] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 213.639400] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.640016] mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.640615] set_ucontext_resp+0x68/0x2b0 [mlx5_ib] [ 213.641144] ? debug_mutex_init+0x33/0x40 [ 213.641586] mlx5_ib_alloc_ucontext+0x18e/0x7b0 [mlx5_ib] [ 213.642145] ib_init_ucontext+0xa0/0xf0 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.642679] ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_GET_CONTEXT+0x95/0xc0 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.643426] ? _copy_from_user+0x46/0x80 [ 213.643878] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0xa6b/0xc80 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.644426] ? ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_INVOKE_WRITE+0x130/0x130 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.645213] ? __lock_acquire+0xa99/0x2c40 [ 213.645675] ? lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2d0 [ 213.646101] ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.646625] ? reacquire_held_locks+0xcf/0x1f0 [ 213.647102] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x45d/0x770 [ 213.647586] ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xe0/0x170 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.648102] ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.648632] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x4d3/0xaa0 [ 213.649060] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x4a8/0x770 [ 213.649528] do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 [ 213.649947] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 [ 213.650478] RIP: 0033:0x7fa179b0737b [ 213.650893] Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 7d 2a 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 213.652619] RSP: 002b:00007ffd2e6d46e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 213.653390] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd2e6d47f8 RCX: 00007fa179b0737b [ 213.654084] RDX: 00007ffd2e6d47e0 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 213.654767] RBP: 00007ffd2e6d47c0 R08: 00007fa1799be010 R09: 0000000000000002 [ 213.655453] R10: 00007ffd2e6d4960 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd2e6d487c [ 213.656170] R13: 0000000000000027 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007ffd2e6d4f70 Fixes: d98995b ("net/mlx5: Reimplement write combining test") Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

Clear the port select structure on error so no stale values left after definers are destroyed. That's because the mlx5_lag_destroy_definers() always try to destroy all lag definers in the tt_map, so in the flow below lag definers get double-destroyed and cause kernel crash: mlx5_lag_port_sel_create() mlx5_lag_create_definers() mlx5_lag_create_definer() <- Failed on tt 1 mlx5_lag_destroy_definers() <- definers[tt=0] gets destroyed mlx5_lag_port_sel_create() mlx5_lag_create_definers() mlx5_lag_create_definer() <- Failed on tt 0 mlx5_lag_destroy_definers() <- definers[tt=0] gets double-destroyed Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000005 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000112ce2e00 [0000000000000008] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: iptable_raw bonding ip_gre ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 geneve ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel ipip tunnel4 ip_tunnel rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) mlx5_fwctl(OE) fwctl(OE) mlx5_core(OE) mlxdevm(OE) ib_core(OE) mlxfw(OE) memtrack(OE) mlx_compat(OE) openvswitch nsh nf_conncount psample xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xfrm_user xfrm_algo xt_addrtype iptable_filter iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter bridge stp llc netconsole overlay efi_pstore sch_fq_codel zram ip_tables crct10dif_ce qemu_fw_cfg fuse ipv6 crc_ccitt [last unloaded: mlx_compat(OE)] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/u53:2 Tainted: G OE 6.11.0+ #2 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Workqueue: mlx5_lag mlx5_do_bond_work [mlx5_core] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x24/0x2c0 [mlx5_core] lr : mlx5_lag_destroy_definer+0x54/0x100 [mlx5_core] sp : ffff800085fafb00 x29: ffff800085fafb00 x28: ffff0000da0c8000 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff0000da0c8000 x25: ffff0000da0c8000 x24: ffff0000da0c8000 x23: ffff0000c31f81a0 x22: 0400000000000000 x21: ffff0000da0c8000 x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000001 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000ffff8b0c9350 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800081390d18 x12: ffff800081dc3cc0 x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000b10 x9 : ffff80007ab7304c x8 : ffff0000d00711f0 x7 : 0000000000000004 x6 : 0000000000000190 x5 : ffff00027edb3010 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff0000d39b8000 x1 : ffff0000d39b8000 x0 : 0400000000000000 Call trace: mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x24/0x2c0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_lag_destroy_definer+0x54/0x100 [mlx5_core] mlx5_lag_destroy_definers+0xa0/0x108 [mlx5_core] mlx5_lag_port_sel_create+0x2d4/0x6f8 [mlx5_core] mlx5_activate_lag+0x60c/0x6f8 [mlx5_core] mlx5_do_bond_work+0x284/0x5c8 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x170/0x3e0 worker_thread+0x2d8/0x3e0 kthread+0x11c/0x128 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Code: a9025bf5 aa0003f6 a90363f7 f90023f9 (f9400400) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: dc48516 ("net/mlx5: Lag, add support to create definers for LAG") Signed-off-by: Mark Zhang <markzhang@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

Attempt to enable IPsec packet offload in tunnel mode in debug kernel generates the following kernel panic, which is happening due to two issues: 1. In SA add section, the should be _bh() variant when marking SA mode. 2. There is not needed flush_workqueue in SA delete routine. It is not needed as at this stage as it is removed from SADB and the running work will be canceled later in SA free. ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 6.12.0+ #4 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- charon/1337 [HC0[0]:SC0[4]:HE1:SE0] is trying to acquire: ffff88810f365020 (&xa->xa_lock#24){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_xfrm_del_state+0xca/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] and this task is already holding: ffff88813e0f0d48 (&x->lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: xfrm_state_delete+0x16/0x30 which would create a new lock dependency: (&x->lock){+.-.}-{3:3} -> (&xa->xa_lock#24){+.+.}-{3:3} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&x->lock){+.-.}-{3:3} ... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-safe at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 xfrm_timer_handler+0x91/0xd70 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1dd/0xa60 hrtimer_run_softirq+0x146/0x2e0 handle_softirqs+0x266/0x860 irq_exit_rcu+0x115/0x1a0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x90 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 default_idle+0x13/0x20 default_idle_call+0x67/0xa0 do_idle+0x2da/0x320 cpu_startup_entry+0x50/0x60 start_secondary+0x213/0x2a0 common_startup_64+0x129/0x138 to a SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe lock: (&xa->xa_lock#24){+.+.}-{3:3} ... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe at: ... lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock+0x2c/0x40 xa_set_mark+0x70/0x110 mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0xe48/0x2290 [mlx5_core] xfrm_dev_state_add+0x3bb/0xd70 xfrm_add_sa+0x2451/0x4a90 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 other info that might help us debug this: Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&xa->xa_lock#24); local_irq_disable(); lock(&x->lock); lock(&xa->xa_lock#24); <Interrupt> lock(&x->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by charon/1337: #0: ffffffff87f8f858 (&net->xfrm.xfrm_cfg_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x5e/0x90 #1: ffff88813e0f0d48 (&x->lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: xfrm_state_delete+0x16/0x30 the dependencies between SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock and the holding lock: -> (&x->lock){+.-.}-{3:3} ops: 29 { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 xfrm_alloc_spi+0xc0/0xe60 xfrm_alloc_userspi+0x5f6/0xbc0 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 IN-SOFTIRQ-W at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 xfrm_timer_handler+0x91/0xd70 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1dd/0xa60 hrtimer_run_softirq+0x146/0x2e0 handle_softirqs+0x266/0x860 irq_exit_rcu+0x115/0x1a0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x90 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 default_idle+0x13/0x20 default_idle_call+0x67/0xa0 do_idle+0x2da/0x320 cpu_startup_entry+0x50/0x60 start_secondary+0x213/0x2a0 common_startup_64+0x129/0x138 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 xfrm_alloc_spi+0xc0/0xe60 xfrm_alloc_userspi+0x5f6/0xbc0 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 } ... key at: [<ffffffff87f9cd20>] __key.18+0x0/0x40 the dependencies between the lock to be acquired and SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe lock: -> (&xa->xa_lock#24){+.+.}-{3:3} ops: 9 { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0xc5b/0x2290 [mlx5_core] xfrm_dev_state_add+0x3bb/0xd70 xfrm_add_sa+0x2451/0x4a90 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 SOFTIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock+0x2c/0x40 xa_set_mark+0x70/0x110 mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0xe48/0x2290 [mlx5_core] xfrm_dev_state_add+0x3bb/0xd70 xfrm_add_sa+0x2451/0x4a90 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0xc5b/0x2290 [mlx5_core] xfrm_dev_state_add+0x3bb/0xd70 xfrm_add_sa+0x2451/0x4a90 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 } ... key at: [<ffffffffa078ff60>] __key.48+0x0/0xfffffffffff210a0 [mlx5_core] ... acquired at: __lock_acquire+0x30a0/0x5040 lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 mlx5e_xfrm_del_state+0xca/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] xfrm_dev_state_delete+0x90/0x160 __xfrm_state_delete+0x662/0xae0 xfrm_state_delete+0x1e/0x30 xfrm_del_sa+0x1c2/0x340 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 stack backtrace: CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 1337 Comm: charon Not tainted 6.12.0+ #4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x74/0xd0 check_irq_usage+0x12e8/0x1d90 ? print_shortest_lock_dependencies_backwards+0x1b0/0x1b0 ? check_chain_key+0x1bb/0x4c0 ? __lockdep_reset_lock+0x180/0x180 ? check_path.constprop.0+0x24/0x50 ? mark_lock+0x108/0x2fb0 ? print_circular_bug+0x9b0/0x9b0 ? mark_lock+0x108/0x2fb0 ? print_usage_bug.part.0+0x670/0x670 ? check_prev_add+0x1c4/0x2310 check_prev_add+0x1c4/0x2310 __lock_acquire+0x30a0/0x5040 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 ? mlx5e_xfrm_del_state+0xca/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 ? __xfrm_state_delete+0x5f0/0xae0 ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 ? mlx5e_xfrm_del_state+0xca/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_xfrm_del_state+0xca/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] xfrm_dev_state_delete+0x90/0x160 __xfrm_state_delete+0x662/0xae0 xfrm_state_delete+0x1e/0x30 xfrm_del_sa+0x1c2/0x340 ? xfrm_get_sa+0x250/0x250 ? check_chain_key+0x1bb/0x4c0 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 ? copy_sec_ctx+0x270/0x270 ? check_chain_key+0x1bb/0x4c0 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 ? copy_sec_ctx+0x270/0x270 ? netlink_ack+0xd90/0xd90 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0xcd/0xb60 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 ? netlink_attachskb+0x730/0x730 ? lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 ? netlink_unicast+0x740/0x740 ? __might_fault+0xbb/0x170 ? netlink_unicast+0x740/0x740 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 ? fdget+0x163/0x1d0 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 ? __x64_sys_getpeername+0xb0/0xb0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x856/0xe30 ? lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 ? __task_pid_nr_ns+0x117/0x410 ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x284/0x400 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f7d31291ba4 Code: 7d e8 89 4d d4 e8 4c 42 f7 ff 44 8b 4d d0 4c 8b 45 c8 89 c3 44 8b 55 d4 8b 7d e8 b8 2c 00 00 00 48 8b 55 d8 48 8b 75 e0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 34 89 df 48 89 45 e8 e8 99 42 f7 ff 48 8b 45 RSP: 002b:00007f7d2ccd94f0 EFLAGS: 00000297 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007f7d31291ba4 RDX: 0000000000000028 RSI: 00007f7d2ccd96a0 RDI: 000000000000000a RBP: 00007f7d2ccd9530 R08: 00007f7d2ccd9598 R09: 000000000000000c R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000297 R12: 0000000000000028 R13: 00007f7d2ccd9598 R14: 00007f7d2ccd96a0 R15: 00000000000000e1 </TASK> Fixes: 4c24272 ("net/mlx5e: Listen to ARP events to update IPsec L2 headers in tunnel mode") Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

irq_chip functions may be called in raw spinlock context. Therefore, we must also use a raw spinlock for our own internal locking. This fixes the following lockdep splat: [ 5.349336] ============================= [ 5.353349] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 5.357361] 6.13.0-rc5+ torvalds#69 Tainted: G W [ 5.363031] ----------------------------- [ 5.367045] kworker/u17:1/44 is trying to lock: [ 5.371587] ffffff88018b02c0 (&chip->gpio_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8)) [ 5.380079] other info that might help us debug this: [ 5.385138] context-{5:5} [ 5.387762] 5 locks held by kworker/u17:1/44: [ 5.392123] #0: ffffff8800014958 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3204) [ 5.402260] #1: ffffffc082fcbdd8 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3205) [ 5.411528] #2: ffffff880172c900 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach (drivers/base/dd.c:1006) [ 5.419929] #3: ffffff88039c8268 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/internals.h:156 kernel/irq/manage.c:1596) [ 5.428331] #4: ffffff88039c80c8 (lock_class#2){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1614) [ 5.436472] stack backtrace: [ 5.439359] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/u17:1 Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc5+ torvalds#69 [ 5.448690] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 5.451656] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT) [ 5.455845] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 5.461699] Call trace: [ 5.464147] show_stack+0x18/0x24 C [ 5.467821] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123) [ 5.471501] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:130) [ 5.474824] __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4828 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4898 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5176) [ 5.478758] lock_acquire (arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h:40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:467 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5814) [ 5.482429] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:111 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162) [ 5.486797] xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8)) [ 5.490737] irq_enable (kernel/irq/internals.h:236 kernel/irq/chip.c:170 kernel/irq/chip.c:439 kernel/irq/chip.c:432 kernel/irq/chip.c:345) [ 5.494060] __irq_startup (kernel/irq/internals.h:241 kernel/irq/chip.c:180 kernel/irq/chip.c:250) [ 5.497645] irq_startup (kernel/irq/chip.c:270) [ 5.501143] __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1807) [ 5.504728] request_threaded_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:2208) Fixes: a32c7ca ("gpio: gpio-xilinx: Add interrupt support") Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@linux.dev> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250110163354.2012654-1-sean.anderson@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>

syzkaller reported such a BUG_ON(): ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/khugepaged.c:1835! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP ... CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 8009 Comm: syz.15.106 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc6 torvalds#22 Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 pstate: 00400005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : collapse_file+0xa44/0x1400 lr : collapse_file+0x88/0x1400 sp : ffff80008afe3a60 ... Call trace: collapse_file+0xa44/0x1400 (P) hpage_collapse_scan_file+0x278/0x400 madvise_collapse+0x1bc/0x678 madvise_vma_behavior+0x32c/0x448 madvise_walk_vmas.constprop.0+0xbc/0x140 do_madvise.part.0+0xdc/0x2c8 __arm64_sys_madvise+0x68/0x88 invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x34/0x128 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xd0 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x198 This indicates that the pgoff is unaligned. After analysis, I confirm the vma is mapped to /dev/zero. Such a vma certainly has vm_file, but it is set to anonymous by mmap_zero(). So even if it's mmapped by 2m-unaligned, it can pass the check in thp_vma_allowable_order() as it is an anonymous-mmap, but then be collapsed as a file-mmap. It seems the problem has existed for a long time, but actually, since we have khugepaged_max_ptes_none check before, we will skip collapse it as it is /dev/zero and so has no present page. But commit d8ea7cc limit the check for only khugepaged, so the BUG_ON() can be triggered by madvise_collapse(). Add vma_is_anonymous() check to make such vma be processed by hpage_collapse_scan_pmd(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250111034511.2223353-1-liushixin2@huawei.com Fixes: d8ea7cc ("mm/khugepaged: add flag to predicate khugepaged-only behavior") Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou@linux.dev> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Cc: Mattew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev> Cc: Nanyong Sun <sunnanyong@huawei.com> Cc: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

syz reports an out of bounds read: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_match fs/ocfs2/dir.c:334 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_search_dirblock+0x283/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:367 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88804d8b9982 by task syz-executor.2/14802 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 14802 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Sched_ext: serialise (enabled+all), task: runnable_at=-10ms Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x229/0x350 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0x164/0x530 mm/kasan/report.c:489 kasan_report+0x147/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602 ocfs2_match fs/ocfs2/dir.c:334 [inline] ocfs2_search_dirblock+0x283/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:367 ocfs2_find_entry_id fs/ocfs2/dir.c:414 [inline] ocfs2_find_entry+0x1143/0x2db0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1078 ocfs2_find_files_on_disk+0x18e/0x530 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1981 ocfs2_lookup_ino_from_name+0xb6/0x110 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:2003 ocfs2_lookup+0x30a/0xd40 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:122 lookup_open fs/namei.c:3627 [inline] open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3748 [inline] path_openat+0x145a/0x3870 fs/namei.c:3984 do_filp_open+0xe9/0x1c0 fs/namei.c:4014 do_sys_openat2+0x135/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1402 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1417 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1433 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1428 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x15d/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1428 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x210 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f01076903ad Code: c3 e8 a7 2b 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f01084acfc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f01077cbf80 RCX: 00007f01076903ad RDX: 0000000000105042 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c RBP: 00007f01077cbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000000001ff R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f01077cbf80 R14: 00007f010764fc90 R15: 00007f010848d000 </TASK> ================================================================== And a general protection fault in ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert: ================================================================== loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 32768 JBD2: Ignoring recovery information on journal ocfs2: Mounting device (7,0) on (node local, slot 0) with ordered data mode. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5096 Comm: syz-executor792 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4-syzkaller-00002-gb0da640826ba #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:ocfs2_find_dir_space_id fs/ocfs2/dir.c:3406 [inline] RIP: 0010:ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert+0x3309/0x5c70 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:4280 Code: 00 00 e8 2a 25 13 fe e9 ba 06 00 00 e8 20 25 13 fe e9 4f 01 00 00 e8 16 25 13 fe 49 8d 7f 08 49 8d 5f 09 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 20 84 c0 0f 85 bd 23 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 0f RSP: 0018:ffffc9000af9f020 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff88801e27a440 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000400 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: ffffc9000af9f830 R08: ffffffff8380395b R09: ffffffff838090a7 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff88801e27a440 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff88803c660878 R14: f700000000000088 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 000055555a677380(0000) GS:ffff888020800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000560bce569178 CR3: 000000001de5a000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ocfs2_mknod+0xcaf/0x2b40 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:292 vfs_mknod+0x36d/0x3b0 fs/namei.c:4088 do_mknodat+0x3ec/0x5b0 __do_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4166 [inline] __se_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4163 [inline] __x64_sys_mknodat+0xa7/0xc0 fs/namei.c:4163 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f2dafda3a99 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffe336a6658 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000103 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f2dafda3a99 RDX: 00000000000021c0 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 00007f2dafe1b5f0 R08: 0000000000004480 R09: 000055555a6784c0 R10: 0000000000000103 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe336a6680 R13: 00007ffe336a68a8 R14: 431bde82d7b634db R15: 00007f2dafdec03b </TASK> ================================================================== The two reports are all caused invalid negative i_size of dir inode. For ocfs2, dir_inode can't be negative or zero. Here add a check in which is called by ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry(). It fixes the second report as ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry() must be called before ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert(). Also set a up limit for dir with OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL. The i_size can't be great than blocksize. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250106140640.92260-1-glass.su@suse.com Reported-by: Jiacheng Xu <stitch@zju.edu.cn> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ocfs2-devel/17a04f01.1ae74.19436d003fc.Coremail.stitch@zju.edu.cn/T/#u Reported-by: syzbot+5a64828fcc4c2ad9b04f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000005894f3062018caf1@google.com/T/ Signed-off-by: Su Yue <glass.su@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

# Conflicts: # arch/arm64/configs/defconfig

When COWing a relocation tree path, at relocation.c:replace_path(), we can trigger a lockdep splat while we are in the btrfs_search_slot() call against the relocation root. This happens in that callchain at ctree.c:read_block_for_search() when we happen to find a child extent buffer already loaded through the fs tree with a lockdep class set to the fs tree. So when we attempt to lock that extent buffer through a relocation tree we have to reset the lockdep class to the class for a relocation tree, since a relocation tree has extent buffers that used to belong to a fs tree and may currently be already loaded (we swap extent buffers between the two trees at the end of replace_path()). However we are missing calls to btrfs_maybe_reset_lockdep_class() to reset the lockdep class at ctree.c:read_block_for_search() before we read lock an extent buffer, just like we did for btrfs_search_slot() in commit b40130b ("btrfs: fix lockdep splat with reloc root extent buffers"). So add the missing btrfs_maybe_reset_lockdep_class() calls before the attempts to read lock an extent buffer at ctree.c:read_block_for_search(). The lockdep splat was reported by syzbot and it looks like this: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz.0.0/5335 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880545dbc38 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146 but task is already holding lock: ffff8880545dba58 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}: reacquire_held_locks+0x3eb/0x690 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5374 __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5563 [inline] lock_release+0x396/0xa30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5870 up_write+0x79/0x590 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1629 btrfs_force_cow_block+0x14b3/0x1fd0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:660 btrfs_cow_block+0x371/0x830 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:755 btrfs_search_slot+0xc01/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2153 replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224 merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692 merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942 relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494 __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278 btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{4:4}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 down_write_nested+0xa2/0x220 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1693 btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 btrfs_init_new_buffer fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5052 [inline] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x41c/0x1440 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5132 btrfs_force_cow_block+0x526/0x1fd0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:573 btrfs_cow_block+0x371/0x830 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:755 btrfs_search_slot+0xc01/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2153 btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x1a0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4351 btrfs_insert_empty_item fs/btrfs/ctree.h:688 [inline] btrfs_insert_inode_ref+0x2bb/0xf80 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:330 btrfs_rename_exchange fs/btrfs/inode.c:7990 [inline] btrfs_rename2+0xcb7/0x2b90 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8374 vfs_rename+0xbdb/0xf00 fs/namei.c:5067 do_renameat2+0xd94/0x13f0 fs/namei.c:5224 __do_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:5258 [inline] __se_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:5255 [inline] __x64_sys_renameat2+0xce/0xe0 fs/namei.c:5255 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904 __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 down_read_nested+0xb5/0xa50 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1649 btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146 btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.h:188 [inline] read_block_for_search+0x718/0xbb0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1610 btrfs_search_slot+0x1274/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2237 replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224 merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692 merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942 relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494 __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278 btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: btrfs-tree-01 --> btrfs-tree-01/1 --> btrfs-treloc-02/1 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-treloc-02/1); lock(btrfs-tree-01/1); lock(btrfs-treloc-02/1); rlock(btrfs-tree-01); *** DEADLOCK *** 8 locks held by syz.0.0/5335: #0: ffff88801e3ae420 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write_file+0x5e/0x200 fs/namespace.c:559 #1: ffff888052c760d0 (&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __btrfs_balance+0x4c2/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4183 #2: ffff888052c74850 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x775/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4086 #3: ffff88801e3ae610 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: merge_reloc_root+0xf11/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1659 #4: ffff888052c76470 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x405/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288 #5: ffff888052c76498 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x405/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288 torvalds#6: ffff8880545db878 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 torvalds#7: ffff8880545dba58 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5335 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x13a/0x1b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2074 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2206 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904 __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 down_read_nested+0xb5/0xa50 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1649 btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146 btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.h:188 [inline] read_block_for_search+0x718/0xbb0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1610 btrfs_search_slot+0x1274/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2237 replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224 merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692 merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942 relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494 __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278 btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f1ac6985d29 Code: ff ff c3 (...) RSP: 002b:00007f1ac63fe038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1ac6b76160 RCX: 00007f1ac6985d29 RDX: 0000000020000180 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: 00007f1ac6a01b08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007f1ac6b76160 R15: 00007fffda145a88 </TASK> Reported-by: syzbot+63913e558c084f7f8fdc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/677b3014.050a0220.3b53b0.0064.GAE@google.com/ Fixes: 9978599 ("btrfs: reduce lock contention when eb cache miss for btree search") Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

…saction abort If while we are doing a direct IO write a transaction abort happens, we mark all existing ordered extents with the BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR flag (done at btrfs_destroy_ordered_extents()), and then after that if we enter btrfs_split_ordered_extent() and the ordered extent has bytes left (meaning we have a bio that doesn't cover the whole ordered extent, see details at btrfs_extract_ordered_extent()), we will fail on the following assertion at btrfs_split_ordered_extent(): ASSERT(!(flags & ~BTRFS_ORDERED_TYPE_FLAGS)); because the BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR flag is set and the definition of BTRFS_ORDERED_TYPE_FLAGS is just the union of all flags that identify the type of write (regular, nocow, prealloc, compressed, direct IO, encoded). Fix this by returning an error from btrfs_extract_ordered_extent() if we find the BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR flag in the ordered extent. The error will be the error that resulted in the transaction abort or -EIO if no transaction abort happened. This was recently reported by syzbot with the following trace: FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 1 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5321 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 fail_dump lib/fault-inject.c:53 [inline] should_fail_ex+0x3b0/0x4e0 lib/fault-inject.c:154 should_failslab+0xac/0x100 mm/failslab.c:46 slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4072 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4148 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4297 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0xdd/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:4310 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1037 [inline] btrfs_chunk_alloc_add_chunk_item+0x244/0x1100 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:5742 reserve_chunk_space+0x1ca/0x2c0 fs/btrfs/block-group.c:4292 check_system_chunk fs/btrfs/block-group.c:4319 [inline] do_chunk_alloc fs/btrfs/block-group.c:3891 [inline] btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x77b/0xf80 fs/btrfs/block-group.c:4187 find_free_extent_update_loop fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4166 [inline] find_free_extent+0x42d1/0x5810 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4579 btrfs_reserve_extent+0x422/0x810 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4672 btrfs_new_extent_direct fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:186 [inline] btrfs_get_blocks_direct_write+0x706/0xfa0 fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:321 btrfs_dio_iomap_begin+0xbb7/0x1180 fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:525 iomap_iter+0x697/0xf60 fs/iomap/iter.c:90 __iomap_dio_rw+0xeb9/0x25b0 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:702 btrfs_dio_write fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:775 [inline] btrfs_direct_write+0x610/0xa30 fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:880 btrfs_do_write_iter+0x2a0/0x760 fs/btrfs/file.c:1397 do_iter_readv_writev+0x600/0x880 vfs_writev+0x376/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:1050 do_pwritev fs/read_write.c:1146 [inline] __do_sys_pwritev2 fs/read_write.c:1204 [inline] __se_sys_pwritev2+0x196/0x2b0 fs/read_write.c:1195 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f1281f85d29 RSP: 002b:00007f12819fe038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000148 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1282176080 RCX: 00007f1281f85d29 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f12819fe090 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000003 R10: 0000000000007000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f1282176080 R15: 00007ffcb9e23328 </TASK> BTRFS error (device loop0 state A): Transaction aborted (error -12) BTRFS: error (device loop0 state A) in btrfs_chunk_alloc_add_chunk_item:5745: errno=-12 Out of memory BTRFS info (device loop0 state EA): forced readonly assertion failed: !(flags & ~BTRFS_ORDERED_TYPE_FLAGS), in fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:1234 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:1234! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5321 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_split_ordered_extent+0xd8d/0xe20 fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:1234 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d1df2b8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000057 RBX: 000000000006a000 RCX: 9ce21886c4195300 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000091 R08: ffffffff817f0a3c R09: 1ffff92001a3bdf4 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff52001a3bdf5 R12: 1ffff1100a45f401 R13: ffff8880522fa018 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 000000000006a000 FS: 00007f12819fe6c0(0000) GS:ffff88801fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000557750bd7da8 CR3: 00000000400ea000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> btrfs_extract_ordered_extent fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:702 [inline] btrfs_dio_submit_io+0x4be/0x6d0 fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:737 iomap_dio_submit_bio fs/iomap/direct-io.c:85 [inline] iomap_dio_bio_iter+0x1022/0x1740 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:447 __iomap_dio_rw+0x13b7/0x25b0 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:703 btrfs_dio_write fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:775 [inline] btrfs_direct_write+0x610/0xa30 fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:880 btrfs_do_write_iter+0x2a0/0x760 fs/btrfs/file.c:1397 do_iter_readv_writev+0x600/0x880 vfs_writev+0x376/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:1050 do_pwritev fs/read_write.c:1146 [inline] __do_sys_pwritev2 fs/read_write.c:1204 [inline] __se_sys_pwritev2+0x196/0x2b0 fs/read_write.c:1195 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f1281f85d29 RSP: 002b:00007f12819fe038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000148 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1282176080 RCX: 00007f1281f85d29 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f12819fe090 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000003 R10: 0000000000007000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f1282176080 R15: 00007ffcb9e23328 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:btrfs_split_ordered_extent+0xd8d/0xe20 fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:1234 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d1df2b8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000057 RBX: 000000000006a000 RCX: 9ce21886c4195300 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000091 R08: ffffffff817f0a3c R09: 1ffff92001a3bdf4 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff52001a3bdf5 R12: 1ffff1100a45f401 R13: ffff8880522fa018 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 000000000006a000 FS: 00007f12819fe6c0(0000) GS:ffff88801fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000557750bd7da8 CR3: 00000000400ea000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 In this case the transaction abort was due to (an injected) memory allocation failure when attempting to allocate a new chunk. Reported-by: syzbot+f60d8337a5c8e8d92a77@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/6777f2dd.050a0220.178762.0045.GAE@google.com/ Fixes: 52b1fdc ("btrfs: handle completed ordered extents in btrfs_split_ordered_extent") Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

In "one-shot" mode, turbostat 1. takes a counter snapshot 2. forks and waits for a child 3. takes the end counter snapshot and prints the result. But turbostat counter snapshots currently use affinity to travel around the system so that counter reads are "local", and this affinity must be cleared between #1 and #2 above. The offending commit removed that reset that allowed the child to run on cpu_present_set. Fix that issue, and improve upon the original by using cpu_possible_set for the child. This allows the child to also run on CPUs that hotplug online during its runtime. Reported-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Fixes: 7bb3fe2 ("tools/power/turbostat: Obey allowed CPUs during startup") Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>

This fixes the following hard lockup in isolate_lru_folios() during memory reclaim. If the LRU mostly contains ineligible folios this may trigger watchdog. watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 173 RIP: 0010:native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x255/0x2a0 Call Trace: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x31/0x40 folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x5f/0x90 folio_batch_move_lru+0x91/0x150 lru_add_drain_per_cpu+0x1c/0x40 process_one_work+0x17d/0x350 worker_thread+0x27b/0x3a0 kthread+0xe8/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 lruvec->lru_lock owner： PID: 2865 TASK: ffff888139214d40 CPU: 40 COMMAND: "kswapd0" #0 [fffffe0000945e60] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffffa567a555 #1 [fffffe0000945e68] nmi_handle at ffffffffa563b171 #2 [fffffe0000945eb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffffa6575920 #3 [fffffe0000945ed0] exc_nmi at ffffffffa6575af4 #4 [fffffe0000945ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffffa6601dde [exception RIP: isolate_lru_folios+403] RIP: ffffffffa597df53 RSP: ffffc90006fb7c28 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffc90006fb7c60 RCX: ffffea04a2196f88 RDX: ffffc90006fb7c60 RSI: ffffc90006fb7c60 RDI: ffffea04a2197048 RBP: ffff88812cbd3010 R8: ffffea04a2197008 R9: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffea04a2197008 R13: ffffea04a2197048 R14: ffffc90006fb7de8 R15: 0000000003e3e937 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 <NMI exception stack> #5 [ffffc90006fb7c28] isolate_lru_folios at ffffffffa597df53 torvalds#6 [ffffc90006fb7cf8] shrink_active_list at ffffffffa597f788 torvalds#7 [ffffc90006fb7da8] balance_pgdat at ffffffffa5986db0 torvalds#8 [ffffc90006fb7ec0] kswapd at ffffffffa5987354 torvalds#9 [ffffc90006fb7ef8] kthread at ffffffffa5748238 crash> Scenario: User processe are requesting a large amount of memory and keep page active. Then a module continuously requests memory from ZONE_DMA32 area. Memory reclaim will be triggered due to ZONE_DMA32 watermark alarm reached. However pages in the LRU(active_anon) list are mostly from the ZONE_NORMAL area. Reproduce: Terminal 1: Construct to continuously increase pages active(anon). mkdir /tmp/memory mount -t tmpfs -o size=1024000M tmpfs /tmp/memory dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/memory/block bs=4M tail /tmp/memory/block Terminal 2: vmstat -a 1 active will increase. procs ---memory--- ---swap-- ---io---- -system-- ---cpu--- ... r b swpd free inact active si so bi bo 1 0 0 1445623076 45898836 83646008 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445623076 43450228 86094616 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445623076 41003480 88541364 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445623076 38557088 90987756 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445623076 36109688 93435156 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619552 33663256 95881632 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619804 31217140 98327792 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619804 28769988 100774944 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619804 26322348 103222584 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619804 23875592 105669340 0 0 0 cat /proc/meminfo | head Active(anon) increase. MemTotal: 1579941036 kB MemFree: 1445618500 kB MemAvailable: 1453013224 kB Buffers: 6516 kB Cached: 128653956 kB SwapCached: 0 kB Active: 118110812 kB Inactive: 11436620 kB Active(anon): 115345744 kB Inactive(anon): 945292 kB When the Active(anon) is 115345744 kB, insmod module triggers the ZONE_DMA32 watermark. perf record -e vmscan:mm_vmscan_lru_isolate -aR perf script isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=2 nr_skipped=2 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=0 nr_skipped=0 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=28835844 nr_skipped=28835844 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=28835844 nr_skipped=28835844 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=29 nr_skipped=29 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=0 nr_skipped=0 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon See nr_scanned=28835844. 28835844 * 4k = 115343376KB approximately equal to 115345744 kB. If increase Active(anon) to 1000G then insmod module triggers the ZONE_DMA32 watermark. hard lockup will occur. In my device nr_scanned = 0000000003e3e937 when hard lockup. Convert to memory size 0x0000000003e3e937 * 4KB = 261072092 KB. [ffffc90006fb7c28] isolate_lru_folios at ffffffffa597df53 ffffc90006fb7c30: 0000000000000020 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7c40: ffffc90006fb7d40 ffff88812cbd3000 ffffc90006fb7c50: ffffc90006fb7d30 0000000106fb7de8 ffffc90006fb7c60: ffffea04a2197008 ffffea0006ed4a48 ffffc90006fb7c70: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7c80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7c90: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7ca0: 0000000000000000 0000000003e3e937 ffffc90006fb7cb0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7cc0: 8d7c0b56b7874b00 ffff88812cbd3000 About the Fixes: Why did it take eight years to be discovered? The problem requires the following conditions to occur: 1. The device memory should be large enough. 2. Pages in the LRU(active_anon) list are mostly from the ZONE_NORMAL area. 3. The memory in ZONE_DMA32 needs to reach the watermark. If the memory is not large enough, or if the usage design of ZONE_DMA32 area memory is reasonable, this problem is difficult to detect. notes: The problem is most likely to occur in ZONE_DMA32 and ZONE_NORMAL, but other suitable scenarios may also trigger the problem. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241119060842.274072-1-liuye@kylinos.cn Fixes: b2e1875 ("mm, vmscan: begin reclaiming pages on a per-node basis") Signed-off-by: liuye <liuye@kylinos.cn> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

devm_platform_profile_register() expects a pointer to the private driver data but instead an address of the pointer variable is passed due to a typo. This leads to the crashes later: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000fe0d0044 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 1284 Comm: tuned Tainted: G W 6.13.0+ torvalds#7 Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: LENOVO 21D0/LNVNB161216, BIOS J6CN45WW 03/17/2023 RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x6bf/0x7f0 Call Trace: <TASK> dytc_profile_set+0x4a/0x140 [ideapad_laptop] _store_and_notify+0x13/0x40 [platform_profile] class_for_each_device+0x145/0x180 platform_profile_store+0xc0/0x130 [platform_profile] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x13e/0x1f0 vfs_write+0x290/0x450 ksys_write+0x6c/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: 249c576 ("ACPI: platform_profile: Let drivers set drvdata to the class device") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> Reviewed-by: Kurt Borja <kuurtb@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250127210202.568691-1-pchelkin@ispras.ru Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>

…t/tnguy/net-queue Tony Nguyen says: ==================== ice: fix Rx data path for heavy 9k MTU traffic Maciej Fijalkowski says: This patchset fixes a pretty nasty issue that was reported by RedHat folks which occurred after ~30 minutes (this value varied, just trying here to state that it was not observed immediately but rather after a considerable longer amount of time) when ice driver was tortured with jumbo frames via mix of iperf traffic executed simultaneously with wrk/nginx on client/server sides (HTTP and TCP workloads basically). The reported splats were spanning across all the bad things that can happen to the state of page - refcount underflow, use-after-free, etc. One of these looked as follows: [ 2084.019891] BUG: Bad page state in process swapper/34 pfn:97fcd0 [ 2084.025990] page:00000000a60ee772 refcount:-1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x97fcd0 [ 2084.035462] flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 2084.041990] raw: 0017ffffc0000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 2084.049730] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 2084.057468] page dumped because: nonzero _refcount [ 2084.062260] Modules linked in: bonding tls sunrpc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_uncore_frequency intel_uncore_frequency_common i10nm_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm mgag200 irqd [ 2084.137829] CPU: 34 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/34 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-427.37.1.el9_4.x86_64 #1 [ 2084.147039] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R750/0216NK, BIOS 1.13.2 12/19/2023 [ 2084.154604] Call Trace: [ 2084.157058] <IRQ> [ 2084.159080] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48 [ 2084.162752] bad_page.cold+0x63/0x94 [ 2084.166333] check_new_pages+0xb3/0xe0 [ 2084.170083] rmqueue_bulk+0x2d2/0x9e0 [ 2084.173749] ? ktime_get+0x35/0xa0 [ 2084.177159] rmqueue_pcplist+0x13b/0x210 [ 2084.181081] rmqueue+0x7d3/0xd40 [ 2084.184316] ? xas_load+0x9/0xa0 [ 2084.187547] ? xas_find+0x183/0x1d0 [ 2084.191041] ? xa_find_after+0xd0/0x130 [ 2084.194879] ? intel_iommu_iotlb_sync_map+0x89/0xe0 [ 2084.199759] get_page_from_freelist+0x11f/0x530 [ 2084.204291] __alloc_pages+0xf2/0x250 [ 2084.207958] ice_alloc_rx_bufs+0xcc/0x1c0 [ice] [ 2084.212543] ice_clean_rx_irq+0x631/0xa20 [ice] [ 2084.217111] ice_napi_poll+0xdf/0x2a0 [ice] [ 2084.221330] __napi_poll+0x27/0x170 [ 2084.224824] net_rx_action+0x233/0x2f0 [ 2084.228575] __do_softirq+0xc7/0x2ac [ 2084.232155] __irq_exit_rcu+0xa1/0xc0 [ 2084.235821] common_interrupt+0x80/0xa0 [ 2084.239662] </IRQ> [ 2084.241768] <TASK> The fix is mostly about reverting what was done in commit 1dc1a7e ("ice: Centrallize Rx buffer recycling") followed by proper timing on page_count() storage and then removing the ice_rx_buf::act related logic (which was mostly introduced for purposes from cited commit). Special thanks to Xu Du for providing reproducer and Jacob Keller for initial extensive analysis. * '100GbE' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tnguy/net-queue: ice: stop storing XDP verdict within ice_rx_buf ice: gather page_count()'s of each frag right before XDP prog call ice: put Rx buffers after being done with current frame ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250131185415.3741532-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Filesystems can write to disk from page reclaim with __GFP_FS set. Marc found a case where scsi_realloc_sdev_budget_map() ends up in page reclaim with GFP_KERNEL, where it could try to take filesystem locks again, leading to a deadlock. WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.13.0 #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kswapd0/70 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8881025d5d78 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)){++++}-{0:0}, at: blk_mq_submit_bio+0x461/0x6e0 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff81ef5f40 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0x9f/0x760 The full lockdep splat can be found in Marc's report: https://lkml.org/lkml/2025/1/24/1101 Avoid the potential deadlock by doing the allocation with GFP_NOIO, which prevents both filesystem and block layer recursion. Reported-by: Marc Aurèle La France <tsi@tuyoix.net> Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250129104525.0ae8421e@fangorn Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>

Alexander added 2 commits June 11, 2024 17:13

crypto: rockchip: add rk3568 driver

58fcc4b

see https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-rockchip/list/?series=680909&archive=both

Crypto Kconfig fix

8bd2e53

Alexander added 3 commits January 28, 2025 12:37

VCAN increase delay

10c9b37

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/macro' into macro

72dfcc3

# Conflicts: # arch/arm64/configs/defconfig

Fix crypto driver to be compatible with the new kernel

7e862f2

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Включение поддержки аппаратной криптографии rk3568 #1

Включение поддержки аппаратной криптографии rk3568 #1

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shcgit commented Jun 18, 2024

Включение поддержки аппаратной криптографии rk3568 #1

Are you sure you want to change the base?

Включение поддержки аппаратной криптографии rk3568 #1

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