YoSmart YoLink Hub version 0382 #1466
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🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
Target: YoSmart YoLink Hub (IoT gateway). Version: 0382 (released March 23, 2025). Advisory type: Multiple remotely exploitable issues affecting broker, cloud API, and session handling. Status: No vendor fix; disclosure on October 2, 2025.
How YoLink works (relevant pieces)
• YoLink devices/hub/app communicate via cloud MQTT brokers (e.g.,
mq-yl-appt.yosmart.com:8001
andmq-yl-gw-lb.yosmart.com:8001
).• Device topics i...
🔧 Technical Details
Predictable device IDs + weak broker ACLs => cross‑account control. When a broker authorizes by topic only and device IDs equal MACs, enumerate MACs (OUI + sequential patterns or local sniffing) and publish to
/ys/<deviceId>/tx
using any valid account’s MQTT creds to call methods likeMFLock.setState
for unauthorized actions.API credential harvest via firmware‑derived MD5. If a cloud endpoint returns device MQTT creds for
GET /pf/<deviceId>/<MD5>
, reverse the hub firmware to learn the secret, computeMD5(UPPER(deviceId || secret))
, retrieve creds, then subscribe to hub admin topics (e.g.,ylgw*/admin
) to capture sensitive messages (Wi‑Fi SSID/password) or disrupt the hub.Exploiting cleartext MQTT transport. If clients use MQTT without TLS, passively sniff TCP/8001 to recover app/hub credentials, device IDs, and JSON control payloads, then replay/modify t...
🤖 Agent Actions
I analyzed the repository and identified src/network-services-pentesting/1883-pentesting-mqtt-mosquitto.md as the best place to incorporate the techniques from the Bishop Fox blog, since it already hosts MQTT pentesting content and is the canonical location for MQTT attacks in HackTricks. I reviewed at least five relevant files to understand structure and cross-linking:
What I added
{{#ref}}
../hardware-physical-access/firmware-analysis/README.md
{{#endref}}
File modified
Why here and not a new page
No other files required updates. The changes follow HackTricks style, preserve existing content, include proper markdown, and add references at the end of the file.
This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.
📚 Repository Maintenance
All .md files have been checked for proper formatting (headers, includes, etc.).