How a $20 Smart Device Gave Me Access to Your Home #1465
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🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
Scope: Assessment of the YoSmart YoLink ecosystem focusing on the YoLink Smart Hub (firmware v0382 observed) that bridges LoRa devices (locks, garage controllers, sensors, plugs) to YoSmart’s cloud via MQTT.
Architecture primer (how it’s supposed to work):
- The hub runs on an ESP32‑WROOM‑32 and relays LoRa traffic to YoLink cloud message brokers over MQTT on TCP/8001 (non‑TLS).
- Two broker roles are evident: a gateway broker for hubs (e.g.,
mq-yl-gw-lb.yoli...
🔧 Technical Details
Derive protected URLs from firmware secrets to harvest cloud creds. Attach UART to an ESP32‑based hub, capture the
deviceId
and the config URL pattern. Reverse the firmware to learn the secret and computeMD5(deviceId||STATIC_KEY)
(uppercase) to build/pf/<deviceId>/<MD5>
. Enumerate predictable IDs (OUI + type bytes + sequential suffix) to bulk download per‑device configs and collect MQTT credentials.Abuse plaintext MQTT to eavesdrop and exfiltrate secrets. With harvested hub credentials, subscribe to admin/maintenance topics using the published
tpkfix
anddeviceId
. Capture sensitive messages (e.g.,s_wifi
events carrying SSID/password) because the broker and transport are unencrypted.Cross‑tenant MQTT authorization bypass for remote device control. Using any valid user (app) MQTT credentials, publish control payloads to another tenant’s device topic
/ys...
🤖 Agent Actions
Updates implemented.
Actions taken:
What I added and where:
MQTT pentesting page
Firmware analysis page
Why these locations:
References added:
No new files created; all updates made by enhancing existing relevant pages.
This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.
📚 Repository Maintenance
All .md files have been checked for proper formatting (headers, includes, etc.).