[ Upstream commit 44d4775 ]

syzkaller shows that packets can still be dequeued while taprio_destroy()
is running. Let sch_taprio use the reset() function to cancel the advance
timer and drop all skbs from the child qdiscs.

Fixes: 5a781cc ("tc: Add support for configuring the taprio scheduler")
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f362872379bf8f0017fb667c1ab158f2d1e764ae
Reported-by: syzbot+8971da381fb5a31f542d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/63b6d79b0e830ebb0283e020db4df3cdfdfb2b94.1608142843.git.dcaratti@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 93decc5 upstream.

In __make_request() a new r10bio is allocated and passed to
raid10_read_request(). The read_slot member of the bio is not
initialized, and the raid10_read_request() uses it to index an
array. This leads to occasional panics.

Fix by initializing the field to invalid value and checking for
valid value in raid10_read_request().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kevin Vigor <kvigor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…as changed

commit 236761f upstream.

If state has not changed successfully and we updated cpufreq_state,
next time when the new state is equal to cpufreq_state (not changed
successfully last time), we will return directly and miss a
freq_qos_update_request() that should have been.

Fixes: 5130802 ("thermal: cpu_cooling: Switch to QoS requests for freq limits")
Cc: v5.4+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4+
Signed-off-by: Zhuguangqing <zhuguangqing@xiaomi.com>
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201106092243.15574-1-zhuguangqing83@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 75d18cd upstream.

As described in "fscrypt: add fscrypt_is_nokey_name()", it's possible to
create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory by creating a file
concurrently with adding the directory's encryption key.

Fix this bug on ext4 by rejecting no-key dentries in ext4_add_entry().

Note that the duplicate check in ext4_find_dest_de() sometimes prevented
this bug.  However in many cases it didn't, since ext4_find_dest_de()
doesn't examine every dentry.

Fixes: 4461471 ("ext4 crypto: enable filename encryption")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 76786a0 upstream.

As described in "fscrypt: add fscrypt_is_nokey_name()", it's possible to
create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory by creating a file
concurrently with adding the directory's encryption key.

Fix this bug on ubifs by rejecting no-key dentries in ubifs_create(),
ubifs_mkdir(), ubifs_mknod(), and ubifs_symlink().

Note that ubifs doesn't actually report the duplicate filenames from
readdir, but rather it seems to replace the original dentry with a new
one (which is still wrong, just a different effect from ext4).

On ubifs, this fixes xfstest generic/595 as well as the new xfstest I
wrote specifically for this bug.

Fixes: f4f61d2 ("ubifs: Implement encrypted filenames")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-5-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit bfc2b7e upstream.

As described in "fscrypt: add fscrypt_is_nokey_name()", it's possible to
create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory by creating a file
concurrently with adding the directory's encryption key.

Fix this bug on f2fs by rejecting no-key dentries in f2fs_add_link().

Note that the weird check for the current task in f2fs_do_add_link()
seems to make this bug difficult to reproduce on f2fs.

Fixes: 9ea9716 ("f2fs crypto: add filename encryption for f2fs_add_link")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 159e1de upstream.

It's possible to create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory
by creating a file concurrently with adding the encryption key.

Specifically, sys_open(O_CREAT) (or sys_mkdir(), sys_mknod(), or
sys_symlink()) can lookup the target filename while the directory's
encryption key hasn't been added yet, resulting in a negative no-key
dentry.  The VFS then calls ->create() (or ->mkdir(), ->mknod(), or
->symlink()) because the dentry is negative.  Normally, ->create() would
return -ENOKEY due to the directory's key being unavailable.  However,
if the key was added between the dentry lookup and ->create(), then the
filesystem will go ahead and try to create the file.

If the target filename happens to already exist as a normal name (not a
no-key name), a duplicate filename may be added to the directory.

In order to fix this, we need to fix the filesystems to prevent
->create(), ->mkdir(), ->mknod(), and ->symlink() on no-key names.
(->rename() and ->link() need it too, but those are already handled
correctly by fscrypt_prepare_rename() and fscrypt_prepare_link().)

In preparation for this, add a helper function fscrypt_is_nokey_name()
that filesystems can use to do this check.  Use this helper function for
the existing checks that fs/crypto/ does for rename and link.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 3ceb654 upstream.

There isn't really any valid reason to use __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX or
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID in a userspace program.  These constants are
only meant to be used by the kernel internally, and they are defined in
the UAPI header next to the mode numbers and flags only so that kernel
developers don't forget to update them when adding new modes or flags.

In https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201005074133.1958633-2-satyat@google.com
there was an example of someone wanting to use __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX in a
user program, and it was wrong because the program would have broken if
__FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX were ever increased.  So having this definition
available is harmful.  FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID has the same problem.

So, remove these definitions from the UAPI header.  Replace
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID with just listing the valid flags explicitly
in the one kernel function that needs it.  Move __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX to
fscrypt_private.h, remove the double underscores (which were only
present to discourage use by userspace), and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() and
comments to (hopefully) ensure it is kept in sync.

Keep the old name FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID, since it's been around for
longer and there's a greater chance that removing it would break source
compatibility with some program.  Indeed, mtd-utils is using it in
an #ifdef, and removing it would introduce compiler warnings (about
FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_* being redefined) into the mtd-utils build.
However, reduce its value to 0x07 so that it only includes the flags
with old names (the ones present before Linux 5.4), and try to make it
clear that it's now "frozen" and no new flags should be added to it.

Fixes: 2336d0d ("fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_ prefix for uapi constants")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201024005132.495952-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 16b8fe4 ]

In case an error occurs in vfio_pci_enable() before the call to
vfio_pci_probe_mmaps(), vfio_pci_disable() will  try to iterate
on an uninitialized list and cause a kernel panic.

Lets move to the initialization to vfio_pci_probe() to fix the
issue.

Signed-off-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Fixes: 05f0c03 ("vfio-pci: Allow to mmap sub-page MMIO BARs if the mmio page is exclusive")
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 7f458a3 ]

When defragmenting we skip ranges that have holes or inline extents, so that
we don't do unnecessary IO and waste space. We do this check when calling
should_defrag_range() at btrfs_defrag_file(). However we do it without
holding the inode's lock. The reason we do it like this is to avoid
blocking other tasks for too long, that possibly want to operate on other
file ranges, since after the call to should_defrag_range() and before
locking the inode, we trigger a synchronous page cache readahead. However
before we were able to lock the inode, some other task might have punched
a hole in our range, or we may now have an inline extent there, in which
case we should not set the range for defrag anymore since that would cause
unnecessary IO and make us waste space (i.e. allocating extents to contain
zeros for a hole).

So after we locked the inode and the range in the iotree, check again if
we have holes or an inline extent, and if we do, just skip the range.

I hit this while testing my next patch that fixes races when updating an
inode's number of bytes (subject "btrfs: update the number of bytes used
by an inode atomically"), and it depends on this change in order to work
correctly. Alternatively I could rework that other patch to detect holes
and flag their range with the 'new delalloc' bit, but this itself fixes
an efficiency problem due a race that from a functional point of view is
not harmful (it could be triggered with btrfs/062 from fstests).

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit b08070e ]

ext4_handle_error() with errors=continue mount option can accidentally
remount the filesystem read-only when the system is rebooting. Fix that.

Fixes: 1dc1097 ("ext4: avoid panic during forced reboot")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127113405.26867-2-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 6441fa6 ]

If the guest is configured to have SPEC_CTRL but the host does not
(which is a nonsensical configuration but these are not explicitly
forbidden) then a host-initiated MSR write can write vmx->spec_ctrl
(respectively svm->spec_ctrl) and trigger a #GP when KVM tries to
restore the host value of the MSR.  Add a more comprehensive check
for valid bits of SPEC_CTRL, covering host CPUID flags and,
since we are at it and it is more correct that way, guest CPUID
flags too.

For AMD, remove the unnecessary is_guest_mode check around setting
the MSR interception bitmap, so that the code looks the same as
for Intel.

Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit df7e881 ]

Userspace that does not know about the AMD_IBRS bit might still
allow the guest to protect itself with MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL using
the Intel SPEC_CTRL bit.  However, svm.c disallows this and will
cause a #GP in the guest when writing to the MSR.  Fix this by
loosening the test and allowing the Intel CPUID bit, and in fact
allow the AMD_STIBP bit as well since it allows writing to
MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL too.

Reported-by: Zhiyi Guo <zhguo@redhat.com>
Analyzed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Analyzed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 39485ed ]

Until commit e7c587d ("x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for
IBRS/IBPB/STIBP"), KVM was testing both Intel and AMD CPUID bits before
allowing the guest to write MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD.
Testing only Intel bits on VMX processors, or only AMD bits on SVM
processors, fails if the guests are created with the "opposite" vendor
as the host.

While at it, also tweak the host CPU check to use the vendor-agnostic
feature bit X86_FEATURE_IBPB, since we only care about the availability
of the MSR on the host here and not about specific CPUID bits.

Fixes: e7c587d ("x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for IBRS/IBPB/STIBP")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 1891ef2 ]

fls() and fls64() are using __builtin_ctz() and _builtin_ctzll().
On powerpc, those builtins trivially use ctlzw and ctlzd power
instructions.

Allthough those instructions provide the expected result with
input argument 0, __builtin_ctz() and __builtin_ctzll() are
documented as undefined for value 0.

The easiest fix would be to use fls() and fls64() functions
defined in include/asm-generic/bitops/builtin-fls.h and
include/asm-generic/bitops/fls64.h, but GCC output is not optimal:

00000388 <testfls>:
 388:   2c 03 00 00     cmpwi   r3,0
 38c:   41 82 00 10     beq     39c <testfls+0x14>
 390:   7c 63 00 34     cntlzw  r3,r3
 394:   20 63 00 20     subfic  r3,r3,32
 398:   4e 80 00 20     blr
 39c:   38 60 00 00     li      r3,0
 3a0:   4e 80 00 20     blr

000003b0 <testfls64>:
 3b0:   2c 03 00 00     cmpwi   r3,0
 3b4:   40 82 00 1c     bne     3d0 <testfls64+0x20>
 3b8:   2f 84 00 00     cmpwi   cr7,r4,0
 3bc:   38 60 00 00     li      r3,0
 3c0:   4d 9e 00 20     beqlr   cr7
 3c4:   7c 83 00 34     cntlzw  r3,r4
 3c8:   20 63 00 20     subfic  r3,r3,32
 3cc:   4e 80 00 20     blr
 3d0:   7c 63 00 34     cntlzw  r3,r3
 3d4:   20 63 00 40     subfic  r3,r3,64
 3d8:   4e 80 00 20     blr

When the input of fls(x) is a constant, just check x for nullity and
return either 0 or __builtin_clz(x). Otherwise, use cntlzw instruction
directly.

For fls64() on PPC64, do the same but with __builtin_clzll() and
cntlzd instruction. On PPC32, lets take the generic fls64() which
will use our fls(). The result is as expected:

00000388 <testfls>:
 388:   7c 63 00 34     cntlzw  r3,r3
 38c:   20 63 00 20     subfic  r3,r3,32
 390:   4e 80 00 20     blr

000003a0 <testfls64>:
 3a0:   2c 03 00 00     cmpwi   r3,0
 3a4:   40 82 00 10     bne     3b4 <testfls64+0x14>
 3a8:   7c 83 00 34     cntlzw  r3,r4
 3ac:   20 63 00 20     subfic  r3,r3,32
 3b0:   4e 80 00 20     blr
 3b4:   7c 63 00 34     cntlzw  r3,r3
 3b8:   20 63 00 40     subfic  r3,r3,64
 3bc:   4e 80 00 20     blr

Fixes: 2fcff79 ("powerpc: Use builtin functions for fls()/__fls()/fls64()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Acked-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/348c2d3f19ffcff8abe50d52513f989c4581d000.1603375524.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit cd3ed3c ]

Set rp_size to zero will be ignore during remounting.

The method to identify whether we input a remounting option of
rp_size is to check if the rp_size input is zero. It can not work
well if we pass "rp_size=0".

This patch add a bool variable "set_rp_size" to fix this problem.

Reported-by: Jubin Zhong <zhongjubin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lizhe <lizhe67@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit a61df3c ]

syzkaller found the following JFFS2 splat:

  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dfffa00000000001
  Mem abort info:
    ESR = 0x96000004
    EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
    SET = 0, FnV = 0
    EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
  Data abort info:
    ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
    CM = 0, WnR = 0
  [dfffa00000000001] address between user and kernel address ranges
  Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [Freescale#1] SMP
  Dumping ftrace buffer:
     (ftrace buffer empty)
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 12745 Comm: syz-executor.5 Tainted: G S                5.9.0-rc8+ Freescale#98
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  pstate: 20400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
  pc : jffs2_parse_param+0x138/0x308 fs/jffs2/super.c:206
  lr : jffs2_parse_param+0x108/0x308 fs/jffs2/super.c:205
  sp : ffff000022a57910
  x29: ffff000022a57910 x28: 0000000000000000
  x27: ffff000057634008 x26: 000000000000d800
  x25: 000000000000d800 x24: ffff0000271a9000
  x23: ffffa0001adb5dc0 x22: ffff000023fdcf00
  x21: 1fffe0000454af2c x20: ffff000024cc9400
  x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
  x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffa000102dbdd0
  x15: 0000000000000000 x14: ffffa000109e44bc
  x13: ffffa00010a3a26c x12: ffff80000476e0b3
  x11: 1fffe0000476e0b2 x10: ffff80000476e0b2
  x9 : ffffa00010a3ad60 x8 : ffff000023b70593
  x7 : 0000000000000003 x6 : 00000000f1f1f1f1
  x5 : ffff000023fdcf00 x4 : 0000000000000002
  x3 : ffffa00010000000 x2 : 0000000000000001
  x1 : dfffa00000000000 x0 : 0000000000000008
  Call trace:
   jffs2_parse_param+0x138/0x308 fs/jffs2/super.c:206
   vfs_parse_fs_param+0x234/0x4e8 fs/fs_context.c:117
   vfs_parse_fs_string+0xe8/0x148 fs/fs_context.c:161
   generic_parse_monolithic+0x17c/0x208 fs/fs_context.c:201
   parse_monolithic_mount_data+0x7c/0xa8 fs/fs_context.c:649
   do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2871 [inline]
   path_mount+0x548/0x1da8 fs/namespace.c:3192
   do_mount+0x124/0x138 fs/namespace.c:3205
   __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3413 [inline]
   __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3390 [inline]
   __arm64_sys_mount+0x164/0x238 fs/namespace.c:3390
   __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline]
   invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 [inline]
   el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x15c/0x598 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:149
   do_el0_svc+0x60/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:195
   el0_svc+0x34/0xb0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:226
   el0_sync_handler+0xc8/0x5b4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:236
   el0_sync+0x15c/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:663
  Code: d2d40001 f2fbffe1 91002260 d343fc02 (38e16841)
  ---[ end trace 4edf690313deda44 ]---

This is because since ec10a24, the option parsing happens before
fill_super and so the MTD device isn't associated with the filesystem.
Defer the size check until there is a valid association.

Fixes: ec10a24 ("vfs: Convert jffs2 to use the new mount API")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles <jamie@nuviainc.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit fa4d0f1 upstream.

With the current implementation the following race can happen:

 * blk_pre_runtime_suspend() calls blk_freeze_queue_start() and
   blk_mq_unfreeze_queue().

 * blk_queue_enter() calls blk_queue_pm_only() and that function returns
   true.

 * blk_queue_enter() calls blk_pm_request_resume() and that function does
   not call pm_request_resume() because the queue runtime status is
   RPM_ACTIVE.

 * blk_pre_runtime_suspend() changes the queue status into RPM_SUSPENDING.

Fix this race by changing the queue runtime status into RPM_SUSPENDING
before switching q_usage_counter to atomic mode.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201209052951.16136-2-bvanassche@acm.org
Fixes: 986d413 ("blk-mq: Enable support for runtime power management")
Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Acked-by: Stanley Chu <stanley.chu@mediatek.com>
Co-developed-by: Can Guo <cang@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Can Guo <cang@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit a85cbe6 upstream.

and include <linux/const.h> in UAPI headers instead of <linux/kernel.h>.

The reason is to avoid indirect <linux/sysinfo.h> include when using
some network headers: <linux/netlink.h> or others -> <linux/kernel.h>
-> <linux/sysinfo.h>.

This indirect include causes on MUSL redefinition of struct sysinfo when
included both <sys/sysinfo.h> and some of UAPI headers:

    In file included from x86_64-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/linux/kernel.h:5,
                     from x86_64-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/linux/netlink.h:5,
                     from ../include/tst_netlink.h:14,
                     from tst_crypto.c:13:
    x86_64-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/linux/sysinfo.h:8:8: error: redefinition of `struct sysinfo'
     struct sysinfo {
            ^~~~~~~
    In file included from ../include/tst_safe_macros.h:15,
                     from ../include/tst_test.h:93,
                     from tst_crypto.c:11:
    x86_64-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/sys/sysinfo.h:10:8: note: originally defined here

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201015190013.8901-1-petr.vorel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <petr.vorel@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx>
Acked-by: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Cc: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 7ddcdea upstream.

To pick up the changes in:

  a85cbe6 ("uapi: move constants from <linux/kernel.h> to <linux/const.h>")

That causes no changes in tooling, just addresses this perf build
warning:

  Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/uapi/linux/const.h' differs from latest version at 'include/uapi/linux/const.h'
  diff -u tools/include/uapi/linux/const.h include/uapi/linux/const.h

Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Petr Vorel <petr.vorel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 0ebcdd7 upstream.

For a null_blk device with zoned mode enabled is currently initialized
with a number of zones equal to the device capacity divided by the zone
size, without considering if the device capacity is a multiple of the
zone size. If the zone size is not a divisor of the capacity, the zones
end up not covering the entire capacity, potentially resulting is out
of bounds accesses to the zone array.

Fix this by adding one last smaller zone with a size equal to the
remainder of the disk capacity divided by the zone size if the capacity
is not a multiple of the zone size. For such smaller last zone, the zone
capacity is also checked so that it does not exceed the smaller zone
size.

Reported-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
Fixes: ca4b2a0 ("null_blk: add zone support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 5812b32 upstream.

Specify type alignment when declaring linker-section match-table entries
to prevent gcc from increasing alignment and corrupting the various
tables with padding (e.g. timers, irqchips, clocks, reserved memory).

This is specifically needed on x86 where gcc (typically) aligns larger
objects like struct of_device_id with static extent on 32-byte
boundaries which at best prevents matching on anything but the first
entry. Specifying alignment when declaring variables suppresses this
optimisation.

Here's a 64-bit example where all entries are corrupt as 16 bytes of
padding has been inserted before the first entry:

	ffffffff8266b4b0 D __clk_of_table
	ffffffff8266b4c0 d __of_table_fixed_factor_clk
	ffffffff8266b5a0 d __of_table_fixed_clk
	ffffffff8266b680 d __clk_of_table_sentinel

And here's a 32-bit example where the 8-byte-aligned table happens to be
placed on a 32-byte boundary so that all but the first entry are corrupt
due to the 28 bytes of padding inserted between entries:

	812b3ec0 D __irqchip_of_table
	812b3ec0 d __of_table_irqchip1
	812b3fa0 d __of_table_irqchip2
	812b4080 d __of_table_irqchip3
	812b4160 d irqchip_of_match_end

Verified on x86 using gcc-9.3 and gcc-4.9 (which uses 64-byte
alignment), and on arm using gcc-7.2.

Note that there are no in-tree users of these tables on x86 currently
(even if they are included in the image).

Fixes: 54196cc ("of: consolidate linker section OF match table declarations")
Fixes: f6e916b ("irqchip: add basic infrastructure")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>     # 3.9
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201123102319.8090-2-johan@kernel.org
[ johan: adjust context to 5.4 ]
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 2d18e54 upstream.

A memory leak is found in cgroup1_parse_param() when multiple source
parameters overwrite fc->source in the fs_context struct without free.

unreferenced object 0xffff888100d930e0 (size 16):
  comm "mount", pid 520, jiffies 4303326831 (age 152.783s)
  hex dump (first 16 bytes):
    74 65 73 74 6c 65 61 6b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  testleak........
  backtrace:
    [<000000003e5023ec>] kmemdup_nul+0x2d/0xa0
    [<00000000377dbdaa>] vfs_parse_fs_string+0xc0/0x150
    [<00000000cb2b4882>] generic_parse_monolithic+0x15a/0x1d0
    [<000000000f750198>] path_mount+0xee1/0x1820
    [<0000000004756de2>] do_mount+0xea/0x100
    [<0000000094cafb0a>] __x64_sys_mount+0x14b/0x1f0

Fix this bug by permitting a single source parameter and rejecting with
an error all subsequent ones.

Fixes: 8d2451f ("cgroup1: switch to option-by-option parsing")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Qinglang Miao <miaoqinglang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit cb52531 upstream.

SCSI_CXGB4_ISCSI selects CHELSIO_T4. The latter depends on TLS || TLS=n, so
since 'select' does not check dependencies of the selected symbol,
SCSI_CXGB4_ISCSI should also depend on TLS || TLS=n.

This prevents the following kconfig warning and restricts SCSI_CXGB4_ISCSI
to 'm' whenever TLS=m.

WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for CHELSIO_T4
  Depends on [m]: NETDEVICES [=y] && ETHERNET [=y] && NET_VENDOR_CHELSIO [=y] && PCI [=y] && (IPV6 [=y] || IPV6 [=y]=n) && (TLS [=m] || TLS [=m]=n)
  Selected by [y]:
  - SCSI_CXGB4_ISCSI [=y] && SCSI_LOWLEVEL [=y] && SCSI [=y] && PCI [=y] && INET [=y] && (IPV6 [=y] || IPV6 [=y]=n) && ETHERNET [=y]

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201208220505.24488-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Fixes: 7b36b6e ("[SCSI] cxgb4i v5: iscsi driver")
Cc: Karen Xie <kxie@chelsio.com>
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 70f259a upstream.

When h5_close() gets called, the memory allocated for the hu gets
freed only if hu->serdev doesn't exist. This leads to a memory leak.
So when h5_close() is requested, close the serdev device instance and
free the memory allocated to the hu entirely instead.

Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=6ce141c55b2f7aafd1c4
Reported-by: syzbot+6ce141c55b2f7aafd1c4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+6ce141c55b2f7aafd1c4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Anant Thazhemadam <anant.thazhemadam@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d24396c upstream.

when directory item has an invalid value set for ih_entry_count it might
trigger use-after-free or out-of-bounds read in bin_search_in_dir_item()

ih_entry_count * IH_SIZE for directory item should not be larger than
ih_item_len

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201101140958.3650143-1-rkovhaev@gmail.com
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+83b6f7cf9922cae5c4d7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=83b6f7cf9922cae5c4d7
Signed-off-by: Rustam Kovhaev <rkovhaev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…tx_get_chkpt_doorbells()

commit 31dcb6c upstream.

A kernel-infoleak was reported by syzbot, which was caused because
dbells was left uninitialized.
Using kzalloc() instead of kmalloc() fixes this issue.

Reported-by: syzbot+a79e17c39564bedf0930@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+a79e17c39564bedf0930@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Anant Thazhemadam <anant.thazhemadam@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201122224534.333471-1-anant.thazhemadam@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d0ac1a2 upstream.

As reported on:
	https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/20190627222020.45909-1-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com/

if gp8psk_usb_in_op() returns an error, the status var is not
initialized. Yet, this var is used later on, in order to
identify:
	- if the device was already started;
	- if firmware has loaded;
	- if the LNBf was powered on.

Using status = 0 seems to ensure that everything will be
properly powered up.

So, instead of the proposed solution, let's just set
status = 0.

Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reported-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit e584bbe upstream.

syzbot reported a bug which could cause shift-out-of-bounds issue,
fix it.

Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x107/0x163 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a lib/ubsan.c:148
 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb1/0x181 lib/ubsan.c:395
 sanity_check_raw_super fs/f2fs/super.c:2812 [inline]
 read_raw_super_block fs/f2fs/super.c:3267 [inline]
 f2fs_fill_super.cold+0x16c9/0x16f6 fs/f2fs/super.c:3519
 mount_bdev+0x34d/0x410 fs/super.c:1366
 legacy_get_tree+0x105/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:592
 vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0 fs/super.c:1496
 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2896 [inline]
 path_mount+0x12ae/0x1e70 fs/namespace.c:3227
 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3240 [inline]
 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3448 [inline]
 __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3425 [inline]
 __x64_sys_mount+0x27f/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3425
 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Reported-by: syzbot+ca9a785f8ac472085994@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Anant Thazhemadam <anant.thazhemadam@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 4ebd470 upstream.

The snd_seq_queue struct contains various flags in the bit fields.
Those are categorized to two different use cases, both of which are
protected by different spinlocks.  That implies that there are still
potential risks of the bad operations for bit fields by concurrent
accesses.

For addressing the problem, this patch rearranges those flags to be
a standard bool instead of a bit field.

Reported-by: syzbot+63cbe31877bb80ef58f5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201206083456.21110-1-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 88a06d6 upstream.

The runtime->avail field may be accessed concurrently while some
places refer to it without taking the runtime->lock spinlock, as
detected by KCSAN.  Usually this isn't a big problem, but for
consistency and safety, we should take the spinlock at each place
referencing this field.

Reported-by: syzbot+a23a6f1215c84756577c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+3d367d1df1d2b67f5c19@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201206083527.21163-1-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit dc889b8 upstream.

Make the printk() [bfs "printf" macro] seem less severe by changing
"WARNING:" to "NOTE:".

<asm-generic/bug.h> warns us about using WARNING or BUG in a format string
other than in WARN() or BUG() family macros.  bfs/inode.c is doing just
that in a normal printk() call, so change the "WARNING" string to be
"NOTE".

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201203212634.17278-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Reported-by: syzbot+3fd34060f26e766536ff@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Tigran A. Aivazian" <aivazian.tigran@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 8d1ddb5 upstream.

Syzbot reports a potential deadlock found by the newly added recursive
read deadlock detection in lockdep:

[...] ========================================================
[...] WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
[...] 5.9.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
[...] --------------------------------------------------------
[...] syz-executor.1/10214 just changed the state of lock:
[...] ffff88811f506338 (&f->f_owner.lock){.+..}-{2:2}, at: send_sigurg+0x1d/0x200
[...] but this lock was taken by another, HARDIRQ-safe lock in the past:
[...]  (&dev->event_lock){-...}-{2:2}
[...]
[...]
[...] and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.
[...]
[...]
[...] other info that might help us debug this:
[...] Chain exists of:
[...]   &dev->event_lock --> &new->fa_lock --> &f->f_owner.lock
[...]
[...]  Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
[...]
[...]        CPU0                    CPU1
[...]        ----                    ----
[...]   lock(&f->f_owner.lock);
[...]                                local_irq_disable();
[...]                                lock(&dev->event_lock);
[...]                                lock(&new->fa_lock);
[...]   <Interrupt>
[...]     lock(&dev->event_lock);
[...]
[...]  *** DEADLOCK ***

The corresponding deadlock case is as followed:

	CPU 0		CPU 1		CPU 2
	read_lock(&fown->lock);
			spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock, ...)
					write_lock_irq(&filp->f_owner.lock); // wait for the lock
			read_lock(&fown-lock); // have to wait until the writer release
					       // due to the fairness
	<interrupted>
	spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock); // wait for the lock

The lock dependency on CPU 1 happens if there exists a call sequence:

	input_inject_event():
	  spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock,...);
	  input_handle_event():
	    input_pass_values():
	      input_to_handler():
	        handler->event(): // evdev_event()
	          evdev_pass_values():
	            spin_lock(&client->buffer_lock);
	            __pass_event():
	              kill_fasync():
	                kill_fasync_rcu():
	                  read_lock(&fa->fa_lock);
	                  send_sigio():
	                    read_lock(&fown->lock);

To fix this, make the reader in send_sigurg() and send_sigio() use
read_lock_irqsave() and read_lock_irqrestore().

Reported-by: syzbot+22e87cdf94021b984aa6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+c5e32344981ad9f33750@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 28d2119 ]

When clk_hw_register_fixed_rate_with_accuracy() fails,
clk_data should be freed. It's the same for the subsequent
two error paths, but we should also unregister the already
registered clocks in them.

Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu <dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201020061226.6572-1-dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 5e8ed28 ]

If a module fails to load due to an error in prepare_coming_module(),
the following error handling in load_module() runs with
MODULE_STATE_COMING in module's state. Fix it by correctly setting
MODULE_STATE_GOING under "bug_cleanup" label.

Signed-off-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 10f04d4 ]

The on-disk quota format supports quota files with upto 2^32 blocks. Be
careful when computing quota file offsets in the quota files from block
numbers as they can overflow 32-bit types. Since quota files larger than
4GB would require ~26 millions of quota users, this is mostly a
theoretical concern now but better be careful, fuzzers would find the
problem sooner or later anyway...

Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 1eab0fe ]

When devm_rtc_allocate_device is failed in pl031_probe, it should release
mem regions with device.

Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zheng Liang <zhengliang6@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201112093139.32566-1-zhengliang6@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit ffa1797 ]

I noticed that iounmap() of msgr_block_addr before return from
mpic_msgr_probe() in the error handling case is missing. So use
devm_ioremap() instead of just ioremap() when remapping the message
register block, so the mapping will be automatically released on
probe failure.

Signed-off-by: Qinglang Miao <miaoqinglang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201028091551.136400-1-miaoqinglang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…gister

[ Upstream commit 59165d1 ]

Add the missing destroy_workqueue() before return from
i3c_master_register in the error handling case.

Signed-off-by: Qinglang Miao <miaoqinglang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-i3c/20201028091543.136167-1-miaoqinglang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

… inode

[ Upstream commit b6d49ec ]

When returning the layout in nfs4_evict_inode(), we need to ensure that
the layout is actually done being freed before we can proceed to free the
inode itself.

Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit a95ba66 ]

Light reported sometimes shinker gets nat_cnt < dirty_nat_cnt resulting in
wrong do_shinker work. Let's avoid to return insane overflowed value by adding
single tracking value.

Reported-by: Light Hsieh <Light.Hsieh@mediatek.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 38dc717 ]

Apparently there has been a longstanding race between udev/systemd and
the module loader. Currently, the module loader sends a uevent right
after sysfs initialization, but before the module calls its init
function. However, some udev rules expect that the module has
initialized already upon receiving the uevent.

This race has been triggered recently (see link in references) in some
systemd mount unit files. For instance, the configfs module creates the
/sys/kernel/config mount point in its init function, however the module
loader issues the uevent before this happens. sys-kernel-config.mount
expects to be able to mount /sys/kernel/config upon receipt of the
module loading uevent, but if the configfs module has not called its
init function yet, then this directory will not exist and the mount unit
fails. A similar situation exists for sys-fs-fuse-connections.mount, as
the fuse sysfs mount point is created during the fuse module's init
function. If udev is faster than module initialization then the mount
unit would fail in a similar fashion.

To fix this race, delay the module KOBJ_ADD uevent until after the
module has finished calling its init routine.

References: systemd/systemd#17586
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tested-By: Nicolas Morey-Chaisemartin <nmoreychaisemartin@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit edf7ddb ]

Missing calls to mntget() (or equivalently, too many calls to mntput())
are hard to detect because mntput() delays freeing mounts using
task_work_add(), then again using call_rcu().  As a result, mnt_count
can often be decremented to -1 without getting a KASAN use-after-free
report.  Such cases are still bugs though, and they point to real
use-after-frees being possible.

For an example of this, see the bug fixed by commit 1b0b9cc
("vfs: fsmount: add missing mntget()"), discussed at
https://lkml.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20190605135401.GB30925@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/T/#u.
This bug *should* have been trivial to find.  But actually, it wasn't
found until syzkaller happened to use fchdir() to manipulate the
reference count just right for the bug to be noticeable.

Address this by making mntput_no_expire() issue a WARN if mnt_count has
become negative.

Suggested-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit fc6b6a8 ]

Internally, UBD treats each physical IO segment as a separate command to
be submitted in the execution pipe.  If the pipe returns a transient
error after a few segments have already been written, UBD will tell the
block layer to requeue the request, but there is no way to reclaim the
segments already submitted.  When a new attempt to dispatch the request
is done, those segments already submitted will get duplicated, causing
the WARN_ON below in the best case, and potentially data corruption.

In my system, running a UML instance with 2GB of RAM and a 50M UBD disk,
I can reproduce the WARN_ON by simply running mkfs.fvat against the
disk on a freshly booted system.

There are a few ways to around this, like reducing the pressure on
the pipe by reducing the queue depth, which almost eliminates the
occurrence of the problem, increasing the pipe buffer size on the host
system, or by limiting the request to one physical segment, which causes
the block layer to submit way more requests to resolve a single
operation.

Instead, this patch modifies the format of a UBD command, such that all
segments are sent through a single element in the communication pipe,
turning the command submission atomic from the point of view of the
block layer.  The new format has a variable size, depending on the
number of elements, and looks like this:

+------------+-----------+-----------+------------
| cmd_header | segment 0 | segment 1 | segment ...
+------------+-----------+-----------+------------

With this format, we push a pointer to cmd_header in the submission
pipe.

This has the advantage of reducing the memory footprint of executing a
single request, since it allow us to merge some fields in the header.
It is possible to reduce even further each segment memory footprint, by
merging bitmap_words and cow_offset, for instance, but this is not the
focus of this patch and is left as future work.  One issue with the
patch is that for a big number of segments, we now perform one big
memory allocation instead of multiple small ones, but I wasn't able to
trigger any real issues or -ENOMEM because of this change, that wouldn't
be reproduced otherwise.

This was tested using fio with the verify-crc32 option, and by running
an ext4 filesystem over this UBD device.

The original WARN_ON was:

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0x13f/0x141
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-00002-g2a5bb2cf75c8 Freescale#346
Stack:
 6084eed0 6063dc77 00000009 6084ef60
 00000000 604b8d9f 6084eee0 6063dcbc
 6084ef40 6006ab8d e013d780 1c00000000
Call Trace:
 [<600a0c1c>] ? printk+0x0/0x94
 [<6004a888>] show_stack+0x13b/0x155
 [<6063dc77>] ? dump_stack_print_info+0xdf/0xe8
 [<604b8d9f>] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0x13f/0x141
 [<6063dcbc>] dump_stack+0x2a/0x2c
 [<6006ab8d>] __warn+0x107/0x134
 [<6008da6c>] ? wake_up_process+0x17/0x19
 [<60487628>] ? blk_queue_max_discard_sectors+0x0/0xd
 [<6006b05f>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0xd1/0xdf
 [<6006af8e>] ? warn_slowpath_fmt+0x0/0xdf
 [<600acc14>] ? raw_read_seqcount_begin.constprop.0+0x0/0x15
 [<600619ae>] ? os_nsecs+0x1d/0x2b
 [<604b8d9f>] refcount_warn_saturate+0x13f/0x141
 [<6048bc8f>] refcount_sub_and_test.constprop.0+0x2f/0x37
 [<6048c8de>] blk_mq_free_request+0xf1/0x10d
 [<6048ca06>] __blk_mq_end_request+0x10c/0x114
 [<6005ac0f>] ubd_intr+0xb5/0x169
 [<600a1a37>] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x6b/0x17e
 [<600a1b70>] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x26/0x69
 [<600a1bd9>] handle_irq_event+0x26/0x34
 [<600a1bb3>] ? handle_irq_event+0x0/0x34
 [<600a5186>] ? unmask_irq+0x0/0x37
 [<600a57e6>] handle_edge_irq+0xbc/0xd6
 [<600a131a>] generic_handle_irq+0x21/0x29
 [<60048f6e>] do_IRQ+0x39/0x54
 [...]
---[ end trace c6e7444e55386c0f ]---

Cc: Christopher Obbard <chris.obbard@collabora.com>
Reported-by: Martyn Welch <martyn@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Tested-by: Christopher Obbard <chris.obbard@collabora.com>
Acked-by: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit ba8ea8e ]

can_stop_idle_tick() checks whether the do_timer() duty has been taken over
by a CPU on boot. That's silly because the boot CPU always takes over with
the initial clockevent device.

But even if no CPU would have installed a clockevent and taken over the
duty then the question whether the tick on the current CPU can be stopped
or not is moot. In that case the current CPU would have no clockevent
either, so there would be nothing to keep ticking.

Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201206212002.725238293@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 618de0f ]

The PCM hw_params core function tries to clear up the PCM buffer
before actually using for avoiding the information leak from the
previous usages or the usage before a new allocation.  It performs the
memset() with runtime->dma_bytes, but this might still leave some
remaining bytes untouched; namely, the PCM buffer size is aligned in
page size for mmap, hence runtime->dma_bytes doesn't necessarily cover
all PCM buffer pages, and the remaining bytes are exposed via mmap.

This patch changes the memory clearance to cover the all buffer pages
if the stream is supposed to be mmap-ready (that guarantees that the
buffer size is aligned in page size).

Reviewed-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201218145625.2045-3-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 252bd12 ]

If emergency system shutdown is called, like by thermal shutdown,
a dm device could be alive when the block device couldn't process
I/O requests anymore. In this state, the handling of I/O errors
by new dm I/O requests or by those already in-flight can lead to
a verity corruption state, which is a misjudgment.

So, skip verity work in response to I/O error when system is shutting
down.

Signed-off-by: Hyeongseok Kim <hyeongseok@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210104155705.740576914@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

This is the 5.4.87 stable release

Signed-off-by: Andrey Zhizhikin <andrey.zhizhikin@leica-geosystems.com>

This reverts commit a135a1b.

This leads to blank screens on some boards after replugging a
display.  Revert until we understand the root cause and can
fix both the leak and the blank screen after replug.

Cc: Stylon Wang <stylon.wang@amd.com>
Cc: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Cc: Nicholas Kazlauskas <nicholas.kazlauskas@amd.com>
Cc: Andre Tomt <andre@tomt.net>
Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

This reverts stable commit baad618.

This commit is adding lines to spinand_write_to_cache_op, wheras the upstream
commit 868cbe2 that this was supposed to
backport was touching spinand_read_from_cache_op.
It causes a crash on writing OOB data by attempting to write to read-only
kernel memory.

Cc: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit a6e7f19 upstream.

All members of the structure are initialized below in the function,
there is no need to use kzalloc.

Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Acked-by: Ludovic Desroches <ludovic.desroches@microchip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200123140237.125799-1-tudor.ambarus@microchip.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 3832b78 upstream.

If of_find_device_by_node() succeed, at_dma_xlate() doesn't have a
corresponding put_device(). Thus add put_device() to fix the exception
handling for this function implementation.

Fixes: bbe89c8 ("at_hdmac: move to generic DMA binding")
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200817115728.1706719-3-yukuai3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit e097eb7 upstream.

If memory allocation for 'atslave' succeed, at_dma_xlate() doesn't have a
corresponding kfree() in exception handling. Thus add kfree() for this
function implementation.

Fixes: bbe89c8 ("at_hdmac: move to generic DMA binding")
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200817115728.1706719-4-yukuai3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit aa8c7db upstream.

Silly GCC doesn't always inline these trivial functions.

Fixes the following warning:

  arch/x86/kernel/sys_ia32.o: warning: objtool: cp_stat64()+0xd8: call to new_encode_dev() with UACCESS enabled

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/984353b44a4484d86ba9f73884b7306232e25e30.1608737428.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>	[build-tested]
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 7b6b512 upstream

One of a class of bugs pointed out by Lars in a recent review.
iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp assumes the buffer used is aligned
to the size of the timestamp (8 bytes).  This is not guaranteed in
this driver which uses an array of smaller elements on the stack.
As Lars also noted this anti pattern can involve a leak of data to
userspace and that indeed can happen here.  We close both issues by
moving to a suitable array in the iio_priv() data with alignment
explicitly requested.  This data is allocated with kzalloc() so no
data can leak apart from previous readings.

In this driver, depending on which channels are enabled, the timestamp
can be in a number of locations.  Hence we cannot use a structure
to specify the data layout without it being misleading.

Fixes: 77c4ad2 ("iio: imu: Add initial support for Bosch BMI160")
Reported-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Ardelean <alexandru.ardelean@analog.com>
Cc: Daniel Baluta  <daniel.baluta@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Baluta <daniel.baluta@oss.nxp.com>
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200920112742.170751-6-jic23@kernel.org
[sudip: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 5d069db ]

Jan Kara's analysis of the syzbot report (edited):

  The reproducer opens a directory on FUSE filesystem, it then attaches
  dnotify mark to the open directory.  After that a fuse_do_getattr() call
  finds that attributes returned by the server are inconsistent, and calls
  make_bad_inode() which, among other things does:

          inode->i_mode = S_IFREG;

  This then confuses dnotify which doesn't tear down its structures
  properly and eventually crashes.

Avoid calling make_bad_inode() on a live inode: switch to a private flag on
the fuse inode.  Also add the test to ops which the bad_inode_ops would
have caught.

This bug goes back to the initial merge of fuse in 2.6.14...

Reported-by: syzbot+f427adf9324b92652ccc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 78af4dc ]

Syzbot reported a lock inversion involving perf. The sore point being
perf holding exec_update_mutex() for a very long time, specifically
across a whole bunch of filesystem ops in pmu::event_init() (uprobes)
and anon_inode_getfile().

This then inverts against procfs code trying to take
exec_update_mutex.

Move the permission checks later, such that we need to hold the mutex
over less code.

Reported-by: syzbot+db9cdf3dd1f64252c6ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 0f9368b ]

In preparation for converting exec_update_mutex to a rwsem so that
multiple readers can execute in parallel and not deadlock, add
down_read_killable_nested.  This is needed so that kcmp_lock
can be converted from working on a mutexes to working on rw_semaphores.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87o8jabqh3.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 31784cf ]

In preparation for converting exec_update_mutex to a rwsem so that
multiple readers can execute in parallel and not deadlock, add
down_read_interruptible.  This is needed for perf_event_open to be
converted (with no semantic changes) from working on a mutex to
wroking on a rwsem.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87k0tybqfy.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit f7cfd87 ]

Recently syzbot reported[0] that there is a deadlock amongst the users
of exec_update_mutex.  The problematic lock ordering found by lockdep
was:

   perf_event_open  (exec_update_mutex -> ovl_i_mutex)
   chown            (ovl_i_mutex       -> sb_writes)
   sendfile         (sb_writes         -> p->lock)
     by reading from a proc file and writing to overlayfs
   proc_pid_syscall (p->lock           -> exec_update_mutex)

While looking at possible solutions it occured to me that all of the
users and possible users involved only wanted to state of the given
process to remain the same.  They are all readers.  The only writer is
exec.

There is no reason for readers to block on each other.  So fix
this deadlock by transforming exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore
named exec_update_lock that only exec takes for writing.

Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Christopher Yeoh <cyeoh@au1.ibm.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Fixes: eea9673 ("exec: Add exec_update_mutex to replace cred_guard_mutex")
[0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/00000000000063640c05ade8e3de@google.com
Reported-by: syzbot+db9cdf3dd1f64252c6ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87ft4mbqen.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…tart

[ Upstream commit 5c455c5 ]

mwifiex_cmd_802_11_ad_hoc_start() calls memcpy() without checking
the destination size may trigger a buffer overflower,
which a local user could use to cause denial of service
or the execution of arbitrary code.
Fix it by putting the length check before calling memcpy().

Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaohui <ruc_zhangxiaohui@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201206084801.26479-1-ruc_zhangxiaohui@163.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210107143049.929352526@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

This is the 5.4.88 stable release

Signed-off-by: Andrey Zhizhikin <andrey.zhizhikin@leica-geosystems.com>