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security(deps): update 🛡️ requests to v2.32.2 [security] (#30)
[](https://renovatebot.com) This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Change | Age | Adoption | Passing | Confidence | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | [requests](https://requests.readthedocs.io) ([source](https://togithub.com/psf/requests), [changelog](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/master/HISTORY.md)) | `==2.28.2` -> `==2.32.2` | [](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | ### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts #### [CVE-2023-32681](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/security/advisories/GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q) ### Impact Since Requests v2.3.0, Requests has been vulnerable to potentially leaking `Proxy-Authorization` headers to destination servers, specifically during redirects to an HTTPS origin. This is a product of how `rebuild_proxies` is used to recompute and [reattach the `Proxy-Authorization` header](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/f2629e9e3c7ce3c3c8c025bcd8db551101cbc773/requests/sessions.py#L319-L328) to requests when redirected. Note this behavior has _only_ been observed to affect proxied requests when credentials are supplied in the URL user information component (e.g. `https://username:password@proxy:8080`). **Current vulnerable behavior(s):** 1. HTTP → HTTPS: **leak** 2. HTTPS → HTTP: **no leak** 3. HTTPS → HTTPS: **leak** 4. HTTP → HTTP: **no leak** For HTTP connections sent through the proxy, the proxy will identify the header in the request itself and remove it prior to forwarding to the destination server. However when sent over HTTPS, the `Proxy-Authorization` header must be sent in the CONNECT request as the proxy has no visibility into further tunneled requests. This results in Requests forwarding the header to the destination server unintentionally, allowing a malicious actor to potentially exfiltrate those credentials. The reason this currently works for HTTPS connections in Requests is the `Proxy-Authorization` header is also handled by urllib3 with our usage of the ProxyManager in adapters.py with [`proxy_manager_for`](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/f2629e9e3c7ce3c3c8c025bcd8db551101cbc773/requests/adapters.py#L199-L235). This will compute the required proxy headers in `proxy_headers` and pass them to the Proxy Manager, avoiding attaching them directly to the Request object. This will be our preferred option going forward for default usage. ### Patches Starting in Requests v2.31.0, Requests will no longer attach this header to redirects with an HTTPS destination. This should have no negative impacts on the default behavior of the library as the proxy credentials are already properly being handled by urllib3's ProxyManager. For users with custom adapters, this _may_ be potentially breaking if you were already working around this behavior. The previous functionality of `rebuild_proxies` doesn't make sense in any case, so we would encourage any users impacted to migrate any handling of Proxy-Authorization directly into their custom adapter. ### Workarounds For users who are not able to update Requests immediately, there is one potential workaround. You may disable redirects by setting `allow_redirects` to `False` on all calls through Requests top-level APIs. Note that if you're currently relying on redirect behaviors, you will need to capture the 3xx response codes and ensure a new request is made to the redirect destination. ``` import requests r = requests.get('http://github.com/', allow_redirects=False) ``` ### Credits This vulnerability was discovered and disclosed by the following individuals. Dennis Brinkrolf, Haxolot (https://haxolot.com/) Tobias Funke, (tobiasfunke93@​gmail.com) #### [CVE-2024-35195](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/security/advisories/GHSA-9wx4-h78v-vm56) When making requests through a Requests `Session`, if the first request is made with `verify=False` to disable cert verification, all subsequent requests to the same origin will continue to ignore cert verification regardless of changes to the value of `verify`. This behavior will continue for the lifecycle of the connection in the connection pool. ### Remediation Any of these options can be used to remediate the current issue, we highly recommend upgrading as the preferred mitigation. * Upgrade to `requests>=2.32.0`. * For `requests<2.32.0`, avoid setting `verify=False` for the first request to a host while using a Requests Session. * For `requests<2.32.0`, call `close()` on `Session` objects to clear existing connections if `verify=False` is used. ### Related Links * [https://github.com/psf/requests/pull/6655](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/pull/6655) --- ### Unintended leak of Proxy-Authorization header in requests [CVE-2023-32681](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32681) / [GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q](https://togithub.com/advisories/GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q) / PYSEC-2023-74 <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Impact Since Requests v2.3.0, Requests has been vulnerable to potentially leaking `Proxy-Authorization` headers to destination servers, specifically during redirects to an HTTPS origin. This is a product of how `rebuild_proxies` is used to recompute and [reattach the `Proxy-Authorization` header](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/f2629e9e3c7ce3c3c8c025bcd8db551101cbc773/requests/sessions.py#L319-L328) to requests when redirected. Note this behavior has _only_ been observed to affect proxied requests when credentials are supplied in the URL user information component (e.g. `https://username:password@proxy:8080`). **Current vulnerable behavior(s):** 1. HTTP → HTTPS: **leak** 2. HTTPS → HTTP: **no leak** 3. HTTPS → HTTPS: **leak** 4. HTTP → HTTP: **no leak** For HTTP connections sent through the proxy, the proxy will identify the header in the request itself and remove it prior to forwarding to the destination server. However when sent over HTTPS, the `Proxy-Authorization` header must be sent in the CONNECT request as the proxy has no visibility into further tunneled requests. This results in Requests forwarding the header to the destination server unintentionally, allowing a malicious actor to potentially exfiltrate those credentials. The reason this currently works for HTTPS connections in Requests is the `Proxy-Authorization` header is also handled by urllib3 with our usage of the ProxyManager in adapters.py with [`proxy_manager_for`](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/f2629e9e3c7ce3c3c8c025bcd8db551101cbc773/requests/adapters.py#L199-L235). This will compute the required proxy headers in `proxy_headers` and pass them to the Proxy Manager, avoiding attaching them directly to the Request object. This will be our preferred option going forward for default usage. ##### Patches Starting in Requests v2.31.0, Requests will no longer attach this header to redirects with an HTTPS destination. This should have no negative impacts on the default behavior of the library as the proxy credentials are already properly being handled by urllib3's ProxyManager. For users with custom adapters, this _may_ be potentially breaking if you were already working around this behavior. The previous functionality of `rebuild_proxies` doesn't make sense in any case, so we would encourage any users impacted to migrate any handling of Proxy-Authorization directly into their custom adapter. ##### Workarounds For users who are not able to update Requests immediately, there is one potential workaround. You may disable redirects by setting `allow_redirects` to `False` on all calls through Requests top-level APIs. Note that if you're currently relying on redirect behaviors, you will need to capture the 3xx response codes and ensure a new request is made to the redirect destination. ``` import requests r = requests.get('http://github.com/', allow_redirects=False) ``` ##### Credits This vulnerability was discovered and disclosed by the following individuals. Dennis Brinkrolf, Haxolot (https://haxolot.com/) Tobias Funke, (tobiasfunke93@​gmail.com) #### Severity - CVSS Score: 6.1 / 10 (Medium) - Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N` #### References - [https://github.com/psf/requests/security/advisories/GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/security/advisories/GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q) - [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32681](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32681) - [https://github.com/psf/requests/commit/74ea7cf7a6a27a4eeb2ae24e162bcc942a6706d5](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/commit/74ea7cf7a6a27a4eeb2ae24e162bcc942a6706d5) - [https://github.com/psf/requests](https://togithub.com/psf/requests) - [https://github.com/psf/requests/releases/tag/v2.31.0](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/releases/tag/v2.31.0) - [https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/requests/PYSEC-2023-74.yaml](https://togithub.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/requests/PYSEC-2023-74.yaml) - [https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/06/msg00018.html](https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/06/msg00018.html) - [https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/AW7HNFGYP44RT3DUDQXG2QT3OEV2PJ7Y](https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/AW7HNFGYP44RT3DUDQXG2QT3OEV2PJ7Y) - [https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/KOYASTZDGQG2BWLSNBPL3TQRL2G7QYNZ](https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/KOYASTZDGQG2BWLSNBPL3TQRL2G7QYNZ) - [https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202309-08](https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202309-08) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://togithub.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://togithub.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)). </details> --- ### [CVE-2023-32681](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32681) / [GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q](https://togithub.com/advisories/GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q) / PYSEC-2023-74 <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details Requests is a HTTP library. Since Requests 2.3.0, Requests has been leaking Proxy-Authorization headers to destination servers when redirected to an HTTPS endpoint. This is a product of how we use `rebuild_proxies` to reattach the `Proxy-Authorization` header to requests. For HTTP connections sent through the tunnel, the proxy will identify the header in the request itself and remove it prior to forwarding to the destination server. However when sent over HTTPS, the `Proxy-Authorization` header must be sent in the CONNECT request as the proxy has no visibility into the tunneled request. This results in Requests forwarding proxy credentials to the destination server unintentionally, allowing a malicious actor to potentially exfiltrate sensitive information. This issue has been patched in version 2.31.0. #### Severity Unknown #### References - [https://github.com/psf/requests/security/advisories/GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/security/advisories/GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q) - [https://github.com/psf/requests/releases/tag/v2.31.0](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/releases/tag/v2.31.0) - [https://github.com/psf/requests/commit/74ea7cf7a6a27a4eeb2ae24e162bcc942a6706d5](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/commit/74ea7cf7a6a27a4eeb2ae24e162bcc942a6706d5) - [https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/AW7HNFGYP44RT3DUDQXG2QT3OEV2PJ7Y/](https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/AW7HNFGYP44RT3DUDQXG2QT3OEV2PJ7Y/) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/PYSEC-2023-74) and the [PyPI Advisory Database](https://togithub.com/pypa/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://togithub.com/pypa/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE)). </details> --- ### Requests `Session` object does not verify requests after making first request with verify=False [CVE-2024-35195](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35195) / [GHSA-9wx4-h78v-vm56](https://togithub.com/advisories/GHSA-9wx4-h78v-vm56) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details When making requests through a Requests `Session`, if the first request is made with `verify=False` to disable cert verification, all subsequent requests to the same origin will continue to ignore cert verification regardless of changes to the value of `verify`. This behavior will continue for the lifecycle of the connection in the connection pool. ##### Remediation Any of these options can be used to remediate the current issue, we highly recommend upgrading as the preferred mitigation. * Upgrade to `requests>=2.32.0`. * For `requests<2.32.0`, avoid setting `verify=False` for the first request to a host while using a Requests Session. * For `requests<2.32.0`, call `close()` on `Session` objects to clear existing connections if `verify=False` is used. ##### Related Links * [https://github.com/psf/requests/pull/6655](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/pull/6655) #### Severity - CVSS Score: 5.6 / 10 (Medium) - Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N` #### References - [https://github.com/psf/requests/security/advisories/GHSA-9wx4-h78v-vm56](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/security/advisories/GHSA-9wx4-h78v-vm56) - [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35195](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35195) - [https://github.com/psf/requests/pull/6655](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/pull/6655) - [https://github.com/psf/requests/commit/a58d7f2ffb4d00b46dca2d70a3932a0b37e22fac](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/commit/a58d7f2ffb4d00b46dca2d70a3932a0b37e22fac) - [https://github.com/psf/requests](https://togithub.com/psf/requests) - [https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/IYLSNK5TL46Q6XPRVMHVWS63MVJQOK4Q](https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/IYLSNK5TL46Q6XPRVMHVWS63MVJQOK4Q) - [https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/N7WP6EYDSUOCOJYHDK5NX43PYZ4SNHGZ](https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/N7WP6EYDSUOCOJYHDK5NX43PYZ4SNHGZ) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-9wx4-h78v-vm56) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://togithub.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://togithub.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)). </details> --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>psf/requests (requests)</summary> ### [`v2.32.2`](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/HEAD/HISTORY.md#2322-2024-05-21) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/compare/v2.32.1...v2.32.2) **Deprecations** - To provide a more stable migration for custom HTTPAdapters impacted by the CVE changes in 2.32.0, we've renamed `_get_connection` to a new public API, `get_connection_with_tls_context`. Existing custom HTTPAdapters will need to migrate their code to use this new API. `get_connection` is considered deprecated in all versions of Requests>=2.32.0. A minimal (2-line) example has been provided in the linked PR to ease migration, but we strongly urge users to evaluate if their custom adapter is subject to the same issue described in CVE-2024-35195. ([#​6710](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/issues/6710)) ### [`v2.32.1`](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/HEAD/HISTORY.md#2321-2024-05-20) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/compare/v2.32.0...v2.32.1) **Bugfixes** - Add missing test certs to the sdist distributed on PyPI. ### [`v2.32.0`](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/HEAD/HISTORY.md#2320-2024-05-20) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/compare/v2.31.0...v2.32.0) **Security** - Fixed an issue where setting `verify=False` on the first request from a Session will cause subsequent requests to the *same origin* to also ignore cert verification, regardless of the value of `verify`. (GHSA-9wx4-h78v-vm56) **Improvements** - `verify=True` now reuses a global SSLContext which should improve request time variance between first and subsequent requests. It should also minimize certificate load time on Windows systems when using a Python version built with OpenSSL 3.x. ([#​6667](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/issues/6667)) - Requests now supports optional use of character detection (`chardet` or `charset_normalizer`) when repackaged or vendored. This enables `pip` and other projects to minimize their vendoring surface area. The `Response.text()` and `apparent_encoding` APIs will default to `utf-8` if neither library is present. ([#​6702](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/issues/6702)) **Bugfixes** - Fixed bug in length detection where emoji length was incorrectly calculated in the request content-length. ([#​6589](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/issues/6589)) - Fixed deserialization bug in JSONDecodeError. ([#​6629](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/issues/6629)) - Fixed bug where an extra leading `/` (path separator) could lead urllib3 to unnecessarily reparse the request URI. ([#​6644](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/issues/6644)) **Deprecations** - Requests has officially added support for CPython 3.12 ([#​6503](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/issues/6503)) - Requests has officially added support for PyPy 3.9 and 3.10 ([#​6641](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/issues/6641)) - Requests has officially dropped support for CPython 3.7 ([#​6642](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/issues/6642)) - Requests has officially dropped support for PyPy 3.7 and 3.8 ([#​6641](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/issues/6641)) **Documentation** - Various typo fixes and doc improvements. **Packaging** - Requests has started adopting some modern packaging practices. The source files for the projects (formerly `requests`) is now located in `src/requests` in the Requests sdist. ([#​6506](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/issues/6506)) - Starting in Requests 2.33.0, Requests will migrate to a PEP 517 build system using `hatchling`. This should not impact the average user, but extremely old versions of packaging utilities may have issues with the new packaging format. ### [`v2.31.0`](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/HEAD/HISTORY.md#2310-2023-05-22) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/compare/v2.30.0...v2.31.0) **Security** - Versions of Requests between v2.3.0 and v2.30.0 are vulnerable to potential forwarding of `Proxy-Authorization` headers to destination servers when following HTTPS redirects. When proxies are defined with user info (`https://user:pass@proxy:8080`), Requests will construct a `Proxy-Authorization` header that is attached to the request to authenticate with the proxy. In cases where Requests receives a redirect response, it previously reattached the `Proxy-Authorization` header incorrectly, resulting in the value being sent through the tunneled connection to the destination server. Users who rely on defining their proxy credentials in the URL are *strongly* encouraged to upgrade to Requests 2.31.0+ to prevent unintentional leakage and rotate their proxy credentials once the change has been fully deployed. Users who do not use a proxy or do not supply their proxy credentials through the user information portion of their proxy URL are not subject to this vulnerability. Full details can be read in our [Github Security Advisory](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/security/advisories/GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q) and [CVE-2023-32681](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32681). ### [`v2.30.0`](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/HEAD/HISTORY.md#2300-2023-05-03) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/compare/v2.29.0...v2.30.0) **Dependencies** -⚠️ Added support for urllib3 2.0.⚠️ This may contain minor breaking changes so we advise careful testing and reviewing https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/latest/v2-migration-guide.html prior to upgrading. Users who wish to stay on urllib3 1.x can pin to `urllib3<2`. ### [`v2.29.0`](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/HEAD/HISTORY.md#2290-2023-04-26) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/compare/v2.28.2...v2.29.0) **Improvements** - Requests now defers chunked requests to the urllib3 implementation to improve standardization. ([#​6226](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/issues/6226)) - Requests relaxes header component requirements to support bytes/str subclasses. ([#​6356](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/issues/6356)) </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined). 🚦 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. 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