workflows: Stop pinning actions that are not security relevant #2479
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These workflows have no real security relevance (runtime build or test) in the sense that a compromise in the dependencies could compromise python-tuf security: * scorecards * dependency-review * codeql-analysis Stop pinning the actions used in them (except the common actions that are used everyewhere like actions/checkout: use the same version of those everywhere). The benefit here is fewer Dependabot PRs: If we had done this from the start we'd have skipped ~70 PRs by now. The interesting permissions used in these workflows are * security-events: write This can add things onto the "Security" tab in GitHub * id-token: write This allows OIDC authentication, but only as this specific workflow These permissions look completely acceptable to me. Signed-off-by: Jussi Kukkonen <jkukkonen@google.com>
joshuagl
approved these changes
Oct 3, 2023
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These workflows have no real security relevance (runtime, build or test) in the sense that a compromise in the dependencies could not compromise python-tuf security:
There is also no significant reproducibility issue as these are not part of the test suite. These are all "tier 3" dependencies as documented in #2014 (comment)
Stop pinning the actions used in these workflows (except the common actions that are used everywhere like actions/checkout: use the same version of those everywhere). The benefit here is fewer Dependabot PRs: If we had done this from the start we'd have skipped ~70 PRs by now.
The interesting permissions used in these workflows are
security-events: writeThis can add things onto the "Security" tab in GitHubid-token: writeThis allows OIDC authentication, but only as this specific workflowThese permissions look completely acceptable to me.