Skip to content
New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Economic Security Considerations #2

Open
shogochiai opened this issue Jul 3, 2024 · 0 comments
Open

Economic Security Considerations #2

shogochiai opened this issue Jul 3, 2024 · 0 comments

Comments

@shogochiai
Copy link
Contributor

shogochiai commented Jul 3, 2024

  1. Protocol Revenue and Usage: I think it would make sense for the loanRepaid loan's interest portion (in governance token) to be burned from the market.

  2. Loan Vote Attention Security: I think it would be more serious due diligence to reward those who loanVoted when the loanRepay is passed.

  3. CreditScore and LoanRate: I can't evaluate this in any way because I don't have rate information regarding how much I can borrow from Pool for one credit score unit, and I think this rate is the basis of the security. If this rate were to express the credit score as share information of what percentage of the total credit score you have now, it might be a good idea to say that you can borrow that much from LengingPool. It would be nice if once you borrow, your credit score goes to zero, and when you Repay, your credit is slightly higher than it was before you borrowed.

  4. Early birds win well: I think that the early participants and those who use stable coins will probably be able to borrow more. This is not meant to be an incentive to do so, but rather my impression that such a structure is in place.

  5. On borrowing non stable: Borrowing and paying back a governance token is a big burden to pay back if the price goes up too much, so borrowers shouldn't sell too much.

  6. Short Sell and Repay Reward: On the other hand, I think that people with high credit scores would be very motivated to initiate short sell, but they would get tokens if they return them properly, and I think a game tree analysis would be useful in this area.

  7. Whale Risk: When there is a hole that allows whale investors to arbitrarily create extremely large credit scores, they can borrow all the LendingPool, sell it all, buy up the governor's tokens, mint them, create another credit score with the proceeds from the sale, borrow all the tokens, and so on, in an endless loop. What can I do to prevent this?

  8. Whale Stopper: I think a one week delay before the borrowed money can be used and a freeze during that time, depending on the whales' movements, would be a deterrent.

Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
Labels
None yet
Projects
None yet
Development

No branches or pull requests

1 participant