diff --git a/Document/0x02-Frontispiece.md b/Document/0x02-Frontispiece.md
index a5a6d8a293..c4fcabf6dd 100644
--- a/Document/0x02-Frontispiece.md
+++ b/Document/0x02-Frontispiece.md
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 ## About the OWASP Mobile Security Testing Guide
 
-The OWASP Mobile Security Testing Guide (MSTG) is a comprehensive manual for testing the security of mobile apps. It describes processes and techniques for verifying the requirements listed in the [Mobile Application Security Verification Standard (MASVS)](https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-masvs "MASVS"), and provides a baseline for complete and consistent security tests.
+The OWASP Mobile Security Testing Guide (MSTG) is a comprehensive manual for testing the security of mobile apps. It describes processes and techniques for verifying the requirements listed in the [Mobile Application Security Verification Standard (MASVS)](https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-masvs), and provides a baseline for complete and consistent security tests.
 
 OWASP thanks the many authors, reviewers, and editors for their hard work in developing this guide. If you have any comments or suggestions on the Mobile Security Testing Guide, please join the discussion around MASVS and MSTG in the [OWASP Mobile Security Project Slack Channel](https://owasp.slack.com/messages/project-mobile_omtg/details/ "OWASP Mobile Security Project Slack Channel"). You can sign up for the Slack channel yourself using [this URL](https://owasp.slack.com/join/shared_invite/zt-g398htpy-AZ40HOM1WUOZguJKbblqkw# "Slack channel sign up").
 
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ OWASP thanks the many authors, reviewers, and editors for their hard work in dev
 
 Please consult the laws in your country before executing any tests against mobile apps by utilizing the MSTG materials. Refrain from violating the laws with anything described in the MSTG.
 
-Our [Code of Conduct](https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-mstg/blob/master/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md "Code of Conduct") has further details.
+Our [Code of Conduct](https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-mstg/blob/master/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md) has further details.
 
 ## Copyright and License
 
diff --git a/Document/0x04e-Testing-Authentication-and-Session-Management.md b/Document/0x04e-Testing-Authentication-and-Session-Management.md
index 375ac1f4ac..9d2b0ae338 100644
--- a/Document/0x04e-Testing-Authentication-and-Session-Management.md
+++ b/Document/0x04e-Testing-Authentication-and-Session-Management.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Mobile App Authentication Architectures
 
-Authentication and authorization problems are prevalent security vulnerabilities. In fact, they consistently rank second highest in the [OWASP Top 10](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project "OWASP Top Ten Project").
+Authentication and authorization problems are prevalent security vulnerabilities. In fact, they consistently rank second highest in the [OWASP Top 10](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project).
 
 Most mobile apps implement some kind of user authentication. Even though part of the authentication and state management logic is performed by the backend service, authentication is such an integral part of most mobile app architectures that understanding its common implementations is important.
 
diff --git a/Document/0x04h-Testing-Code-Quality.md b/Document/0x04h-Testing-Code-Quality.md
index 269010c041..eedf814581 100644
--- a/Document/0x04h-Testing-Code-Quality.md
+++ b/Document/0x04h-Testing-Code-Quality.md
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ SELECT * FROM users WHERE username='1' OR '1' = '1' AND Password='1' OR '1' = '1
 
 Because the condition `'1' = '1'` always evaluates as true, this query return all records in the database, causing the login function to return `true` even though no valid user account was entered.
 
-Ostorlab exploited the sort parameter of [Yahoo's weather mobile application](https://blog.ostorlab.co/android-sql-contentProvider-sql-injections.html "Android, SQL and ContentProviders or Why SQL injections aren\'t dead yet ?") with adb using this SQL injection payload.
+Ostorlab exploited the sort parameter of [Yahoo's weather mobile application](https://blog.ostorlab.co/android-sql-contentProvider-sql-injections.html) with adb using this SQL injection payload.
 
 Another real-world instance of client-side SQL injection was discovered by Mark Woods within the "Qnotes" and "Qget" Android apps running on QNAP NAS storage appliances. These apps exported content providers vulnerable to SQL injection, allowing an attacker to retrieve the credentials for the NAS device. A detailed description of this issue can be found on the [Nettitude Blog](https://blog.nettitude.com/uk/qnap-android-dont-provide "Nettitude Blog - QNAP Android: Don\'t Over Provide").