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Looking at mainnet issues the following changes to the proposal (#1200) and council pallets may be expensive but could help to remedy these and improve the quality of processes within the DAO. Where possible outstanding changes (#1984) could integrate selected ideas. If parts turn out valid they should be addressed in separate issues.
Leads vote on proposals
Rationale
Their inputs are essential for consuls to make informed decisions. Leads are automatically paid and staked to work for the platform. Ignoring their opinion would be a waste of resources.
Leads can stake candidates during council elections equivalent to the total WG stake. This would incentivize to hire workera by stake to strengthen committment to the DAO.
This would allow for proper representation of working group members (#143).
Council elections implement referenda but the proposal system does not.. This change would enable all token holders to influence proposal outcomes based on their funds.
Consuls can use this to start a public vote on specific topics to feel the temperature or offer binary choices.
Council is advised to carry out daily tasks based on those binding votes that reflect the option of the whole electorate (share holders).
Scope
The proposal creator may switch Allow stake based voting (versus one consul one vote).
This could either be a separate proposal type or be an option for selected existing proposal types (like signal, - especially interesting in combination with #2177 or its emulation, fire lead
A fictional createRuntimeDAO Proposal (#2068) could make use of this functionality to spin-off an organization funded by the total voter stake. Needs more thinking:
stakes are locked for the lifetime of the Runtime DAO and fill its initial mint
Runtime DAO ends either (1) by another fictional liquidateRuntimeDAO proposal after achieving its goals or voiding its initial purpose (eg. disposing a legal defense fund after settling a claim) which would return the current mint. (2) garbage collection removes Runtime DAOs with empty mints after a serious amount of time (for the opposite case where initial founders went insolvent).
Appeal Proposal Type
Rationale
A referendum to give the community a say about the productivity of one or more consuls or the whole council to temporarily lock their reward relationship (#148) until the issue is solved.
Effects can be to lock voter stakes, #2760 and/or to invoke an external party (for example aragon court). The author assumes better outcomes than for example bans (#2375) because by locking stakes over time or repeating appeals.a consul would find it harder to find backers. Locked tokens could be burned over time to fund conflict resolution which motivates involved parties for speedy resolution.
Scope
Add Proposal Type Appeal or Complaint as way to either (switch on creation)
revoke an executed Proposal
claim that a proposal was not properly implemented by the council
This would be different from a Veto (#1982) which stops a recently approved proposal from being executed. This is also not to signal that proposal execution failed due to a technical issue (#2740 or #2480) but (in)action of (parts of) the council with the intention of (temporarily) withholding their rewards.
The stake for this kind of proposal should probably be significant.
Love the effort and sprit of this suggestion, and really blown away by the level of detailed understanding 🤯 .
Be aware that this issue is resovled in Olympia: #143
For pretty much everything else, this would be super expensive to fix as there are cascading changes from the runtime, to query node, to cli + pioneer, so really all of this has to be part of the post-mainnet agenda to be triaged, so added that label.
If you are interested in contributing on the runtime side to stuff that will go into mainnet, check out these issues
A possibly long-standing unsolvable issue, likely post-post-mainnet.
The current Election System (#896) is great but has some shortcomings:
Looking at mainnet issues the following changes to the proposal (#1200) and council pallets may be expensive but could help to remedy these and improve the quality of processes within the DAO. Where possible outstanding changes (#1984) could integrate selected ideas. If parts turn out valid they should be addressed in separate issues.
Leads vote on proposals
Rationale
Their inputs are essential for consuls to make informed decisions. Leads are automatically paid and staked to work for the platform. Ignoring their opinion would be a waste of resources.
Scope
Leads have automatic voting power on proposals.
Leads stake councilors
Rationale
Same reason as above.
Scope
Leads can stake candidates during council elections equivalent to the total WG stake. This would incentivize to hire workera by stake to strengthen committment to the DAO.
This would allow for proper representation of working group members (#143).
Referendum
aka Stake-Based VotingRationale
Council elections implement referenda but the proposal system does not.. This change would enable all token holders to influence proposal outcomes based on their funds.
Consuls can use this to start a public vote on specific topics to feel the temperature or offer binary choices.
Council is advised to carry out daily tasks based on those binding votes that reflect the option of the whole electorate (share holders).
Scope
The proposal creator may switch
Allow stake based voting
(versus one consul one vote).This could either be a separate proposal type or be an option for selected existing proposal types (like
signal
, - especially interesting in combination with #2177 or its emulation,fire lead
Spin-Offs
A fictional
createRuntimeDAO
Proposal (#2068) could make use of this functionality to spin-off an organization funded by the total voter stake. Needs more thinking:liquidateRuntimeDAO
proposal after achieving its goals or voiding its initial purpose (eg. disposing a legal defense fund after settling a claim) which would return the current mint. (2) garbage collection removes Runtime DAOs with empty mints after a serious amount of time (for the opposite case where initial founders went insolvent).Appeal
Proposal TypeRationale
A referendum to give the community a say about the productivity of one or more consuls or the whole council to temporarily lock their reward relationship (#148) until the issue is solved.
Effects can be to lock voter stakes, #2760 and/or to invoke an external party (for example aragon court). The author assumes better outcomes than for example bans (#2375) because by locking stakes over time or repeating appeals.a consul would find it harder to find backers. Locked tokens could be burned over time to fund conflict resolution which motivates involved parties for speedy resolution.
Scope
Add Proposal Type
Appeal
orComplaint
as way to either (switch on creation)This would be different from a Veto (#1982) which stops a recently approved proposal from being executed. This is also not to signal that proposal execution failed due to a technical issue (#2740 or #2480) but (in)action of (parts of) the council with the intention of (temporarily) withholding their rewards.
The stake for this kind of proposal should probably be significant.
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